MD80 plane crash in Phuket, Sep. 07
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The Rescue Operation & a Question
I just posted my notes on the rescue operation. To me, it seems to have been more of a recovery than a rescue. For example, there was no crew to put out the fire, and the foam and water hadn't been re-stocked since the simulation a few days previous. In fact, I was assured that the rescuers treated the bodies of the victims very well.
I truly hope no one is learning about this for the first time via this thread or the petition site. If you are, please accept my apologies for this post.
My question is: what is the standard for an international airport? Please advise.
I truly hope no one is learning about this for the first time via this thread or the petition site. If you are, please accept my apologies for this post.
My question is: what is the standard for an international airport? Please advise.
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References
:
- ICAO Amendment 4 to International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes, Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, March 2001;
- ICAO Aerodrome Certification Manual, Doc 9774-AN/969, First Edition,
2001;
- ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes,
Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, Third Edition, July
1999
- ICAO Amendment 4 to International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes, Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, March 2001;
- ICAO Aerodrome Certification Manual, Doc 9774-AN/969, First Edition,
2001;
- ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes,
Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, Third Edition, July
1999
Each State is responsible for ensuring the safety, regularity and efficiency of aircraft operations at aerodromes under its jurisdiction. Therefore, when airport operations are entrusted to an operator, it is absolutely necessary for the State to retain its oversight responsibility and make sure that
the operator complies with ICAO SARPs and applicable national regulations.
According to Amendment 4 to ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, “as of 27 November 2003, States, through an appropriate regulatory framework, shall certify aerodromes used for international operations according to the specifications contained in Annex 14, Volume I, and other relevant ICAO
specifications.
Henri Marnet-Cornus
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/
the operator complies with ICAO SARPs and applicable national regulations.
According to Amendment 4 to ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, “as of 27 November 2003, States, through an appropriate regulatory framework, shall certify aerodromes used for international operations according to the specifications contained in Annex 14, Volume I, and other relevant ICAO
specifications.
Henri Marnet-Cornus
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/
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-ICAO Amendment 4 to International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes, Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, March 2001;
- ICAO Aerodrome Certification Manual, Doc 9774-AN/969, First Edition,
2001;
- ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes,
Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, Third Edition, July
1999;
- ICAO Aerodrome Certification Manual, Doc 9774-AN/969, First Edition,
2001;
- ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices, Aerodromes,
Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operation, Third Edition, July
1999;
Each State is responsible for ensuring the safety, regularity and efficiency of aircraft operations at aerodromes under its jurisdiction. Therefore, when airport operations are entrusted to an operator, it is absolutely necessary for the State to retain its oversight responsibility and make sure that
the operator complies with ICAO SARPs and applicable national regulations.
the operator complies with ICAO SARPs and applicable national regulations.
According to Amendment 4 to ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, “as of 27 November 2003, States, through an appropriate regulatory framework, shall certify aerodromes used for international operations according to the specifications contained in Annex 14, Volume I, and other relevant ICAO
specifications"
specifications"
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International Standards and Recommended Practices Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations
To summarize, an airport must meet a Rescue and Fire Fighting standard based on the fuselage size of the aircraft. Based on the size of the MD-82, HKT is Category 7 minimum. (Where 10 is max.) Here’s the chart: http://www.geocities.com/profemery/aviation/ARFF.htm
Here are some of the ICAO standards of Fire and Rescue obviously failed in the rescue of OG269:
1)Insufficient foam and water due to training exercises 3 days before.
ICAO: Significant changes in the level of protection normally available at an aerodrome for rescue and fire fighting shall be notified to the appropriate air traffic services units and aeronautical information units to enable those units to provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. When such a change has been corrected, the above units shall be advised accordingly.
2)Massively insufficient firefighting personnel at the on-site fire station, necessitated crew and equipment arrive from town. Their arrival was 20 minutes after the crash – based on a best-case estimate.
ICAO: The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding 3 minutes …. The ICAO standard for a category 7 airport is 2 fire and rescue vehicle. I do not believe the on-site fire station was staffed to man those vehicles.
ICAO: Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents (specified in a chart) should arrive no more than one minute after the first responding vehicle(s) so as to provide continuous agent application.
3)Rescue call was identified as a non-emergency
ICAO: ICAO doesn’t seem to address the necessity to faithfully report the need for rescue.
Please let me know if this assessment looks right. If so, I'll post it to the petition site.
Thanks in advance.
To summarize, an airport must meet a Rescue and Fire Fighting standard based on the fuselage size of the aircraft. Based on the size of the MD-82, HKT is Category 7 minimum. (Where 10 is max.) Here’s the chart: http://www.geocities.com/profemery/aviation/ARFF.htm
Here are some of the ICAO standards of Fire and Rescue obviously failed in the rescue of OG269:
1)Insufficient foam and water due to training exercises 3 days before.
ICAO: Significant changes in the level of protection normally available at an aerodrome for rescue and fire fighting shall be notified to the appropriate air traffic services units and aeronautical information units to enable those units to provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. When such a change has been corrected, the above units shall be advised accordingly.
2)Massively insufficient firefighting personnel at the on-site fire station, necessitated crew and equipment arrive from town. Their arrival was 20 minutes after the crash – based on a best-case estimate.
ICAO: The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding 3 minutes …. The ICAO standard for a category 7 airport is 2 fire and rescue vehicle. I do not believe the on-site fire station was staffed to man those vehicles.
ICAO: Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents (specified in a chart) should arrive no more than one minute after the first responding vehicle(s) so as to provide continuous agent application.
3)Rescue call was identified as a non-emergency
ICAO: ICAO doesn’t seem to address the necessity to faithfully report the need for rescue.
Please let me know if this assessment looks right. If so, I'll post it to the petition site.
Thanks in advance.
The Reverend
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Hate to deflate your sails as I agree with all the points raised very strongly. However, email or web petitions are not recognized as valid, only hard copy signatures can be accepted.
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HotDog: Accepted by whom?
Everyone: Thanks for all your assistance and support. More happening right now. Will post when able.
The rescue and a synopsis are posted on the petition. Thank you for all those new signatures.
Everyone: Thanks for all your assistance and support. More happening right now. Will post when able.
The rescue and a synopsis are posted on the petition. Thank you for all those new signatures.
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NTSB causes
Are there any examples of cases in which the NTSB documented glaring root causes of an incident?
For example in the case of OG269, a more accurate cause than "flight crew error" might be: "Systemic failures in oversight and airline management, safety and training leading to foreseeable flight crew errors."
Please advise.
For example in the case of OG269, a more accurate cause than "flight crew error" might be: "Systemic failures in oversight and airline management, safety and training leading to foreseeable flight crew errors."
Please advise.
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Remember the accident of Helios Airways Flight HCY522 on August 14, 2005. The final report found latent causes (extract)
1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
The OG269 crash has also latent causes
1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
The OG269 crash has also latent causes
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This report is from
HELLENIC REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS
AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
& AVIATION SAFETY BOARD
(AAIASB)
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT HCY522
BOEING 737-31S
AT GRAMMATIKO, HELLAS
ON 14 AUGUST 2005
11 / 2006
Chairman
Captain Akrivos D. Tsolakis
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS
AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
& AVIATION SAFETY BOARD
(AAIASB)
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT HCY522
BOEING 737-31S
AT GRAMMATIKO, HELLAS
ON 14 AUGUST 2005
11 / 2006
Chairman
Captain Akrivos D. Tsolakis
you can find it at http://www.rndt.eu/FINAL_REPORT_5B-DBY.pdf
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Track this one down from Transport Canada...
The F28 accident at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989 is a good example of this model. Taken at face value, this was a clear cut case of pilot error. The immediate cause of the crash was the failure of the flight crew to obtain adequate protection against wing icing prior to departure. The inquiry yielded a 6 volume report; probably the most exhaustive air accident report ever. The conclusion:
"The accident was not the result of one cause but of a combination of several related factors. Had the system operated effectively, each of the factors might have been identified and corrected before it took on significance. This accident was the result of a failure in the air transportation system as a whole."
The F28 accident at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989 is a good example of this model. Taken at face value, this was a clear cut case of pilot error. The immediate cause of the crash was the failure of the flight crew to obtain adequate protection against wing icing prior to departure. The inquiry yielded a 6 volume report; probably the most exhaustive air accident report ever. The conclusion:
"The accident was not the result of one cause but of a combination of several related factors. Had the system operated effectively, each of the factors might have been identified and corrected before it took on significance. This accident was the result of a failure in the air transportation system as a whole."
Is that report available somewhere?
Thank you.
Thank you.
"This Final Report consists of three volumes: I (Parts One-Four), II (Part Five), and III (Parts Six-Nine and the General Appendices). The table of contents in each volume is complete for that volume and abbreviated for the other two volumes. Seven specialist studies prepared for this Commission ave been published separately in a volume entitled Technical Appendices; he contents of the Technical Appendices are given at the end of this volume."
ISBN # 0-660-14382-8 (Vol 1-3)
Here is the Table of Contents for Vol III, with partial listings for some chapters just to give you an idea:
PART SIX TRANSPORT CANADA
27 Organization
28 Conditions at Transport Canada in the Early 1980s
29 Economic Deregulation and Deficit Reduction
30 The Effects of Deregulation and Downsizing on Aviation Safety
31 Aviation Regulation: Resourcing Process.
32 Audit Program
33 Audit of AU; Ontario Inc., 1988
34 Operating Rules and Legislation :
35 Company Check Pilot .
36 Contracting Out, Waivers, and Spot Checks
37 Safety Management and the Transport Canada Organization
PART SEVEN HUMAN FACTORS
38 Crew Information
39 Crew Coordination and the Communication of Safety Concerns by Passengers
40 Human Performance: A System Analysis
The Fundamental Question
Human Factors
The Organizational Component
The Organizational Component
Lack of Operational Support from Air Canada .
The Potential Disruptive Impact of Mergers and Strikes
High Personnel Turnover Following the Merger
Lack of Organizational Experience in Jet Operations
Deficiencies in System Operations Control Practices
Lack of Standard Operating Procedures and Manuals for the F-28
Leadership of the F-28 Program
The Informal Culture at Air Ontario
Flight Attendant Training
PART EIGHT LEGAL AND OTHER ISSUES BEFORE THE COMMISSION
41 The Aviation Accident Investigation Process in Canada
42 Aviation Incident and Occurrence Reporting and the Issue of Pilot Confidentiality
PART NINE CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS