AA5342 Down DCA

[OwnNav]

I’m sure Edward A. Murphy Jr would have had something to say about Route 4.

Of Murphy’s Law, for those wondering

SPlot

[LowObservable]

Originally Posted by tdracer

At the risk of adding more politics to this, I've read elsewhere (more than once) that the only reason Reagan National hasn't been closed years ago is because the various politicians in DC want the convenience of the close by airport (instead of having to travel out to Dulles).
IF this is a case of 'stuff happens' and not someone's serious error, maybe it's time to put human lives above the convenience of some politicians and close this airport.

That's a little over the top. DCA was at one time slated for closure with all traffic going to Dulles, and that was opposed by politicians, but it remains open today because people find it useful, and because aircraft are much quieter than they were in those days.

DCA should not be inherently dangerous to operate. It does work under 9/11-legacy restrictions that make it harder to use than it should be and that should be reviewed at such time as the US has a non-lunatic government. But I suspect that a root cause in this tragedy will be the expansion of military helicopter traffic and the Pentagon's insistence on maintaining two routes out of central DC, one down 395 and the other down the Potomac. There will be questions too if the collision was well above the 200-foot limit on the helo corridor. There is no way that a busy civilian heliport would be tolerated so close to a flightpath.

[henra]

Originally Posted by Luc Lion

Adding an additional slice of cheese in the sandwich is very easy: just state that when 2 tracking routes provide less than 500 ft of separation, then they are mutually exclusive.

This is the really puzzling part. Looking at the expected altitude of an approaching Airliner with a 3° G/S at the expected crossing point it would be at 250 ft +/-50 That leaves a mere 0-100ft to the helicopter route (and that is assuming the Helo path along the East side of the Potomac, if it deviates somewhat to the West the default altitude of the Airliner will drop below 200ft at the crossing). This is simply insane. You could count the number of bolts in the rotor head if everything goes according to plan. If not -well we saw that last night. How can this be allowed? What was the plan? Did ATC assume the Helo would duck under? At night over water? And visual separation in case of a circle to land -not a straight in- at night? Courageous. Note to self: Never take a flight into DCA.

[galaxy flyer]

Originally Posted by tdracer

At the risk of adding more politics to this, I've read elsewhere (more than once) that the only reason Reagan National hasn't been closed years ago is because the various politicians in DC want the convenience of the close by airport (instead of having to travel out to Dulles).
IF this is a case of 'stuff happens' and not someone's serious error, maybe it's time to put human lives above the convenience of some politicians and close this airport.

Having been in business for too long and flown in/out of DCA, both airline and private, I don’t think actually closing has ever been discussed once it was ruled out when Dulles opened. Certainly, the politicians wanted it open and played all sorts of politics with things like mouse curfews, perimeter rules, facility improvements. There’s no reason it couldn’t be closed, KIAD has lots of room to expand. It was a miserable place 40 years ago in a 727 with half the operations.

[Meehan Mydogg]

Hi all, I’m a UK lapsed PPL and, having listened to the recordings of the ATC comms during this incident, a number of things strike me.

1. The ATC (local controller, or LC) was entirely blameless and appears to have followed all the rules.

2. Likewise the crew of the airliner were entirely blameless, and appeared to be following the procedures perfectly.

3. The mistake, if that is the right word, clearly lies with the actions of the crew of the helicopter here, and the traffic they reported being visual with was obviously not the airliner involved. We will never know what they were looking at, but it wasn’t the CRJ referred to by the LC.

4. My guess is that the result of the investigation into this incident will point the finger at some sort of misunderstanding of radio comms, eg. The helicopter crew might have thought the LC was referring to another aircraft or something similar. Remember, misunderstood comms was responsible for Tenerife in 1977.

5. The troubling thing, though, was that it sounded to me as if the LC here was on the verge of being overwhelmed. He had to speak so quickly that his comms were bordering on being unfathomable. And yet it seems that this was ‘normality’ at DCA.

6. Effective radio comms depend on the people communicating speaking clearly and precisely, so that what they say is understood by all parties involved. That includes waiting for read-backs and acknowledgements.

7. This man was having to speak so fast in order to do his job that it seems strikingly obvious that the volume of traffic he was having to deal with was far too high.

8. I remember that in the UK when I was flying radio comms were set down in a detailed publication which I think was known as CAP413. What I heard of the comms at DCA last night fell rather short of that publication, but it was in no way the fault of the LC.

9. Rather, it was down to whoever set down how much traffic capacity was ‘safe’ to be handled at DCA, and the procedures allowed to accomplish that capacity. It was a fault of the procedures themselves, and my own personal opinion is that having low-level VFR helicopter traffic in potential conflict with low-level VFR airliner traffic in this way, and especially at night, is utterly bonkers.

10. Unless and until the authorities in the US reduce the volume of traffic that they deem to be safe at certain airports, these sorts of incidents will continue to be possible.

11. But of course they won’t reduce the volume, will they. Because the greater volume means more dollars, and dollars trumps safety, doesn’t it, regardless of the platitudes of politicians. It’s just that they have managed to get away with it for so long.

[22/04]

I'm m not going to do my UK vs US ting this time.

DCA does not seem to be inherently dangerous viewed by an outsider. Intense yes and the heli route does not make any sense. Certainly not if they are doing the 01/33 switch. Is there ground comms between the US mil heliport and the airport and can DCA put a temporary stop on a departure.

Controller seriously over worked but split frequencies may not be an advantage in this situation but two controllers operating would. Take turns in monitoring.

How long would a shift be at that pace for DCA tower - I wouldn't last 10 minutes.

An avoidable accident and thinking of those who lost their lives.

[MissChief]

Stop night visual separation in Class B airspace, and accidents such as this will not happen. Sure, other accidents might, but this one was and should be avoidable. Radar control is required.

Ideally in daytime ops too. Visual separation is hazardous in congested airspace at all times.

[TachyonID]

Comms

Since the Blackhawk pilot was on a different (military) band is it possible he thought AA5342 was landing on 1, not 33?
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.

[WITCHWAY550]

AA5432 Down DCA

Terrible and tragic. If the Blackhawk crew did not or was not made aware of the landing patterns at DCA at that time they would then never expect to see an aircraft in front of them. I understand they had experience and expertise but if at that time they did not brief or discuss the terminal area traffic flow then I am not sure they were fully aware of their situation. All speculation...

[skwdenyer]

Originally Posted by Meehan Mydogg

Hi all, I’m a UK lapsed PPL and, having listened to the recordings of the ATC comms during this incident, a number of things strike me.

1. The ATC (local controller, or LC) was entirely blameless and appears to have followed all the rules.

As a counter to that, the local controller seems to have taken few steps to prove to his own satisfaction that the Helo pilot categorically knew which traffic they were both talking about.

Asking questions which can only be answered by demonstrating knowledge is an art. Asking a question related to discrimination of information that can be answered yes/no is easier but much less satisfactory.

That lack of mutual understanding seems to be a likely proximate cause of this tragedy.

[C0ir3all]

ATC asked for visual avoidance in darkness

………
I am a long retired aviator but with strong views that have been inflamed by today’s tragedy. I am writing this post for non professionals so for you guys, please tolerate my carefully chosen words.
…,..
US air traffic controlling has been awful since Ronald Reagan sacked all the ATCs in the mid 80’s. Their replacements were amateur (-ish) from the start and the previous highly regarded professionals’ ethos was not replicated. I stopped flying in 2010 so maybe it has improved since then.🙏🙏🙏🙏🙏
……
I know we have to wait for the formal investigation. But I have first impressions.
The crash today is an example that I can associate with.
The TV clips are very revealing to me.
The ATC (air traffic controller) asks the helicopter if he has the “CRJ insight?). The CRJ is the type of aeroplane. If the pilot replies “yes” then the ATC is absolved from responsibility to deconflict them.
The problem with this issue is that it is difficult or impossible to see what type of plane it is in the dark. All we can see is the plane’s navigation and anti-collision lights. So when the helicopter replied “yes” this morning in Washington, he clearly was not referring to the plane he collided with a few seconds later!!!!!! He must have seen a different plane (and there are many planes at any busy airport!!).
………
I had one memorable experience of this myself when leaving Los Angeles as a copilot in the mid 90’s. It was nighttime. ….The ATC asked me if I had “the DC9 ahead visual?” I said “I have no idea if it is a DC9 but I can see aircraft lights”. He got the message!
What they want to do is dump their own responsibility and pass it on to the pilot using his/her own eyes. And they speak far too fast etc etc etc.
I feel sad for the airliner pilots of today’s crash. At that stage, at just over 200feet from touchdown (20-25seconds) their attention was on the runway, not looking 90degrees either side …..(They would not have been looking around in case another plane might be targeting them!!!)
May they all be resting in peace. Such an unnecessary accident.
i look forward to the accident report which will be done in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.
In particular, I will be looking forward to their recommendations for avoidance of a repeat of this kind of collision..
POTUS’s comments today are totally in conflict with Annex 15’s words: …..accident investigation is …”not to apportion blame or responsibility”.

[C0ir3all]

Originally Posted by Fonsini

Visual separation at night and LAHSO need to go. It’s that simple.

Originally Posted by dervish

Having listened to the 8 minute audio clip linked earlier, it never ceases to amaze me how aircrew and ATCOs manage to understand each other. I got maybe 5% of what was said. Too quick, no diction.
RIP

so so right. As well as rubbish procedures, the speed of conversation and lack of pauses for responding is disastrous, US ATC needs a whole review from top to bottom.

[Rushed Approach]

Not if at the point he got the instruction he had yet to intercept the 01 approach track.

Before this intercept point he would turn right (which he did) to go behind the mis-identified traffic rather than in front of it.

[TEEEJ]

Originally Posted by jumpseater

A possibility I can see here is that the PAT25 crew misidentified AAL3130 (on extended final for 01) as the CRJ. If so, they didn't see the CRJ to their left and possibly above them descending. If the CRJ descended into the helicopter from above the CRJ crew would likely not have seen PAT25 as it would have been in the blind spot underneath the nose.

Yes, that is very much a possibility. Confirmed via US Defence Secretary that the crew were on night vision goggle flight. Did the helo pilot call visual on AAL3130 Airbus A319 that was on approach?

See following video.

You Tube

[KRviator]

Originally Posted by TachyonID

Since the Blackhawk pilot was on a different (military) band is it possible he thought AA5342 was landing on 1, not 33?
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.

What makes you think the BlackHawk crew were on UHF, not VHF? Every military aircraft I've ever flown in - and there's been a few - speak to civilian controllers on civil VHF frequencies.

[canigida]

Originally Posted by galaxy flyer

Having been in business for too long and flown in/out of DCA, both airline and private, I don’t think actually closing has ever been discussed once it was ruled out when Dulles opened. Certainly, the politicians wanted it open and played all sorts of politics with things like mouse curfews, perimeter rules, facility improvements. There’s no reason it couldn’t be closed, KIAD has lots of room to expand. It was a miserable place 40 years ago in a 727 with half the operations.

There's no reason to keep DCA open other than the people like me who lived here found it a convenient and useful airport. That's enough reason. I don't care what you and the other 10 people grasping at straws feel about keeping it open or not. If you don't want to fly here, don't. MYOB.
No, DCA not a miserable experience. IAD, with it's peoplemover (a 60 year old giant bus that you have to board after an 11 hour flight), however is most certainly pure misery.
The reason that KIAD has "plenty of room" is that it's landing and other fees are exorbitant which causing airlines to loathe it, leading to poor flight options and ridiculous prices. Up until 2024, DCA had been literally subsidizing Dulles for decades from their revenue (they're both in the same airport and both are in Virginia.) since customers prefer it. Without the subsidy, prices are just going to get worst.
The operation of DCA is a decision for Virginians (there are no 'DC' airports) It's not some grand political trick to keep it open.
Getting kinda bored with this whole "this whole airspace and DCA facility is a deathtrap" meme. I've been in and out of KDCA and flown at least a thousand hours in the DC FRZ and it's no wild west death trap. stop with the nonsense, please.

[galaxy flyer]

Not so in the US, somewhere I saw they were on UHF.

[shared reality]

Originally Posted by photonclock

Yes, I saw that. Why wasn't ATC more specific, ie, do you see the traffic at your 1 o'clock, etc? Still, the question stands: ATC sees both aircraft, so why is ATC putting them on a collision course with AA setup to turn in front of the helicopter with almost no separation? The clock was ticking and ATC wasn't reacting with instructions – ATC was just asking questions. Is that SOP?

Listening to the ATC transcript on YouTube, one can clearly hear ATC receive a conflict warning as the CRJ and the Blackhawk get close. Why on earth didn't ATC immediately instruct the helo simply to "PAT25 turn left hdg xxx IMMEDIATELY, I say again ..." , instead he again asked for verification that PAT 25 had the CRJ in sight?

In such close distance, on a collision course, there is no place for a question, but an INSTRUCTION, as ATC is the only one with a clear overview of the situation.
Not trying to put blame here, but the controller needs to step up once he gets a conflict warning and act, and ask questions later.

RIP to all involved, a truly sad and avoidable event.

[CayleysCoachman]

Originally Posted by shared reality

Listening to the ATC transcript on YouTube, one can clearly hear ATC receive a conflict warning as the CRJ and the Blackhawk get close. Why on earth didn't ATC immediately instruct the helo simply to "PAT25 turn left hdg xxx IMMEDIATELY, I say again ..." , instead he again asked for verification that PAT 25 had the CRJ in sight?

In such close distance, on a collision course, there is no place for a question, but an INSTRUCTION, as ATC is the only one with a clear overview of the situation.
Not trying to put blame here, but the controller needs to step up once he gets a conflict warning and act, and ask questions later.

RIP to all involved, a truly sad and avoidable event.

in a place where controllers give headings to aircraft flying visually well below MSA, perhaps, but no such place exists. Controllers provide a service, they are not an authority.

[TachyonID]

Originally Posted by KRviator

What makes you think the BlackHawk crew were on UHF, not VHF? Every military aircraft I've ever flown in - and there's been a few - speak to civilian controllers on civil VHF frequencies.

The VASaviation (and other) ATC clips have specifically mentioned that LC for KDCA transmitted back to the Helo on their separate assigned frequency, as well as the civil approach frequency. Basically dual transmit.
The audio is stitched back together.
But that's why nobody picked up the responses from the Helo crew, despite the LC clearly hearing and getting acks.
Complicating matters in that TRACON is that the military A/C also have their own controller on the assigned frequency. This is probably essential given the comings and goings at the Pentagon and local bases.

Given the track for the helo? It sure appears they expected the aircraft they were waiting on was lined up for 1, not 33. Given this, it is at least possible that they were watching the lights coming from the inbound AC from the Localizer for 1 (a A319 AA plane), not the CRJ descending through their position towards 33.

It's all conjecture, but the use of a separate frequency for the Pentagon-adjacent traffic is cited in several reputable reports as of this AM. Juan Brown's just uploaded an update with further information on the frequency split.
It seems clear from that the the CRJ likely could not hear the Blackhawk. And, with less certainty, that the Blackhawk probably didn't hear transmissions from the CRJ.