Alaska Airlines 737-900 MAX loses a door in-flight out of PDX
If any EEs are plugged surely it should be either pair of over-wing EEs, not those at mid-cabin. Certainly, retaining mid-cabin EEs better meets intent of regulation as discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 25.807-1 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXITS. Note regulation number has changed since AC was written.
Is it Legal to Plug Emergency Exits on MAX 9?
Previously I’ve questioned ethics of plugging EEs; it seems wrong to deliberately block an available escape route. I wasn’t questioning legality of doing so, provided maximum passenger load complied with ratings of remaining EEs.
However, on reflection plugging mid-cabin EEs on MAX9 may not comply with FAR §25.813 Emergency Exit Access: “…. Emergency exit distribution must be as uniform as practical….”
If any EEs are plugged surely it should be either pair of over-wing EEs, not those at mid-cabin. Certainly, retaining mid-cabin EEs better meets intent of regulation as discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 25.807-1 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXITS. Note regulation number has changed since AC was written.
Previously I’ve questioned ethics of plugging EEs; it seems wrong to deliberately block an available escape route. I wasn’t questioning legality of doing so, provided maximum passenger load complied with ratings of remaining EEs.
However, on reflection plugging mid-cabin EEs on MAX9 may not comply with FAR §25.813 Emergency Exit Access: “…. Emergency exit distribution must be as uniform as practical….”
If any EEs are plugged surely it should be either pair of over-wing EEs, not those at mid-cabin. Certainly, retaining mid-cabin EEs better meets intent of regulation as discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 25.807-1 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXITS. Note regulation number has changed since AC was written.
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The warning light came on during three previous flights: on Dec. 7, Jan. 3 and Jan. 4 — the day before the door plug broke off. Homendy said she didn’t have all the details regarding the Dec. 7 incident but specified the light came on during a flight on Jan. 3 and on Jan. 4 after the plane had landed.
AAR says they dont touch plug doors. However satellite image shows some kind of ramp near the location of that door on some variant of the 737 unable to see if it is a MAX 9. Look for AAR in Oklahoma on Google maps (i am not allowed to post the image because I am a new user).
I think the NTSB should look into this despite the claims of the MRO.
Especially if the forensics find markings on the bolt holes and where the door rests indicating that there was a bolt there at some point. If not then I guess the most likely scenario is still them being missing from the get go.
You can watch a WiFi retrofit video on youtube by United (for A320) but you can still see that it appears to be a massive job.
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Is it Legal to Plug Emergency Exits on MAX 9?
Previously I’ve questioned ethics of plugging EEs; it seems wrong to deliberately block an available escape route. I wasn’t questioning legality of doing so, provided maximum passenger load complied with ratings of remaining EEs.
However, on reflection plugging mid-cabin EEs on MAX9 may not comply with FAR §25.813 Emergency Exit Access: “…. Emergency exit distribution must be as uniform as practical….”
If any EEs are plugged surely it should be either pair of over-wing EEs, not those at mid-cabin. Certainly, retaining mid-cabin EEs better meets intent of regulation as discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 25.807-1 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXITS. Note regulation number has changed since AC was written.
Previously I’ve questioned ethics of plugging EEs; it seems wrong to deliberately block an available escape route. I wasn’t questioning legality of doing so, provided maximum passenger load complied with ratings of remaining EEs.
However, on reflection plugging mid-cabin EEs on MAX9 may not comply with FAR §25.813 Emergency Exit Access: “…. Emergency exit distribution must be as uniform as practical….”
If any EEs are plugged surely it should be either pair of over-wing EEs, not those at mid-cabin. Certainly, retaining mid-cabin EEs better meets intent of regulation as discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 25.807-1 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXITS. Note regulation number has changed since AC was written.
Dominic Gates Article 14th January
Another big Dominic Gates article in the Seattle Times today 14th Jan.
Unfortunately I've reached my limit of free articles but for those with access its entitled "Boeing and U.S. aerospace set back by Alaska Airlines fuselage blowout".
Unfortunately I've reached my limit of free articles but for those with access its entitled "Boeing and U.S. aerospace set back by Alaska Airlines fuselage blowout".
It may take up to a month before United and Alaska can have their MAX 900 aircrafts in the air... Alaska is cancelling between 110 and 150 flights a day because of the MAX 9 being grounded.
In the NTSB media briefing they say there is “no indication whatsoever that [the pressurisation controller issues] correlate in any way to the expulsion of the door plug”. That’s not “we don’t know”, that’s them saying it’s not related as positively as they can in an investigation that hasn’t been completed.
AAR says they dont touch plug doors. However satellite image shows some kind of ramp near the location of that door on some variant of the 737 unable to see if it is a MAX 9. Look for AAR in Oklahoma on Google maps (i am not allowed to post the image because I am a new user).
I think the NTSB should look into this despite the claims of the MRO.
I think the NTSB should look into this despite the claims of the MRO.
I think, for now, better not call the NTSB...
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Text of letter to FAA from U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D. - WA.)
From Senate website:
Chair Cantwell’s letter to FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker:
By letter dated January 26, 2023, I requested that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiate a new Special Technical Audit of 11 areas related to Boeing’s production systems. In the Agency’s response dated April 4, 2023, former Acting Administrator Billy Nolen stated that such an audit was not needed because “the agency has [already] implemented tools to complete audits [of Boeing] for the bulk of this information at regular intervals.” FAA’s reply pointed to the Quality System Audit (QSA) program, which evaluates manufacturers’ production systems to ensure compliance with FAA regulations.
Recent accidents and incidents—including the expelled door plug on Alaska Airlines flight 1282—call into question Boeing’s quality control. In short, it appears that FAA’s oversight processes have not been effective in ensuring that Boeing produces airplanes that are in condition for safe operation, as required by law and by FAA regulations.
To help the Committee determine whether FAA’s oversight processes are effective, please provide us with copies of notification letters from the last 24 months for all Quality Systems Audits of Boeing and for all Supplier Control Audits of Spirit AeroSystems. Also, please provide us with copies of any reports relating to these audits and any letters of investigation or other documents provided to Boeing or Spirit AeroSystems following the audits.
Specifically regarding Spirit AeroSystems, please provide the Committee with an explanation of FAA’s oversight of Spirit’s production system and of FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s supplier control system as it relates to Spirit. Please identify what, if any, improvements in oversight by FAA that you intend to implement to ensure that Spirit’s future performance meets all FAA regulatory requirements.
In reviewing FAA orders on how oversight processes are to be conducted, it appears that there may be ways for manufacturers to avoid audit accountability. For example, FAA Order 8120.23A requires that, before performing a Quality System Audit, the Agency must provide 50 days advance notice. This generous notice period clears the way for manufacturers to correct noncompliant conditions prior to the audit, ensuring that non-compliant conditions are rarely if ever detected during an audit. In effect, manufacturers must only get their house in order once an audit is announced.
While the order directs FAA audit teams to determine whether the manufacturer has various documented procedures, it is not clear from the order to what depth the audit teams review manufacturers’ performance to determine whether they comply with their own internal requirements. For example, the order requires auditors to “[p]erform, as necessary, a combination of document and product reviews to determine if the quality system element meets applicable requirements,” leaving the depth of the reviews to the audit team’s discretion. How is the FAA ensuring that documented procedures are being routinely and uniformly followed?
Finally, we are aware that several years ago, Boeing initiated a “Verification Optimization” program that resulted in eliminating thousands of quality inspections on each airplane, relying instead on mechanics self-verifying that they performed their work properly. This resulted in the elimination of 900 quality inspector positions. This program was implemented for several years and would appear to be contrary to FAA’s requirements that production certificate holders have inspection programs that are adequate to ensure that products conform to their type design. Has the FAA verified that Boeing’s inspection program complies with FAA requirements for production certificate holders? If so, please explain how FAA has verified Boeing complied?
We are aware that the FAA has initiated at least two investigations in the past in relation to this Verification Optimization program. Under FAA enforcement policy, recurring violations of this type require legal enforcement action. Please advise of the status of any enforcement actions and outcomes. And please advise the Committee as to whether this program has been rescinded and that an adequate inspection program has been restored.
I request that you provide a written response by January 25, 2024. Thank you for your prompt attention to these important matters.
[Editorial note from this SLF/attorney: In the practice of employment and labor law over the course of, let's say close to four decades, many instances of staff reductions, downsizing, reductions in force, and so on were encountered. Still, tagging the elimination of 900 positions, that is 900 quality inspector positions, as "Verification Optimization", . . . well, innovation truly isn't gone from Boeing, it's just moved into cynical manipulation of language, in this instance anyway.]
Chair Cantwell’s letter to FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker:
By letter dated January 26, 2023, I requested that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiate a new Special Technical Audit of 11 areas related to Boeing’s production systems. In the Agency’s response dated April 4, 2023, former Acting Administrator Billy Nolen stated that such an audit was not needed because “the agency has [already] implemented tools to complete audits [of Boeing] for the bulk of this information at regular intervals.” FAA’s reply pointed to the Quality System Audit (QSA) program, which evaluates manufacturers’ production systems to ensure compliance with FAA regulations.
Recent accidents and incidents—including the expelled door plug on Alaska Airlines flight 1282—call into question Boeing’s quality control. In short, it appears that FAA’s oversight processes have not been effective in ensuring that Boeing produces airplanes that are in condition for safe operation, as required by law and by FAA regulations.
To help the Committee determine whether FAA’s oversight processes are effective, please provide us with copies of notification letters from the last 24 months for all Quality Systems Audits of Boeing and for all Supplier Control Audits of Spirit AeroSystems. Also, please provide us with copies of any reports relating to these audits and any letters of investigation or other documents provided to Boeing or Spirit AeroSystems following the audits.
Specifically regarding Spirit AeroSystems, please provide the Committee with an explanation of FAA’s oversight of Spirit’s production system and of FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s supplier control system as it relates to Spirit. Please identify what, if any, improvements in oversight by FAA that you intend to implement to ensure that Spirit’s future performance meets all FAA regulatory requirements.
In reviewing FAA orders on how oversight processes are to be conducted, it appears that there may be ways for manufacturers to avoid audit accountability. For example, FAA Order 8120.23A requires that, before performing a Quality System Audit, the Agency must provide 50 days advance notice. This generous notice period clears the way for manufacturers to correct noncompliant conditions prior to the audit, ensuring that non-compliant conditions are rarely if ever detected during an audit. In effect, manufacturers must only get their house in order once an audit is announced.
While the order directs FAA audit teams to determine whether the manufacturer has various documented procedures, it is not clear from the order to what depth the audit teams review manufacturers’ performance to determine whether they comply with their own internal requirements. For example, the order requires auditors to “[p]erform, as necessary, a combination of document and product reviews to determine if the quality system element meets applicable requirements,” leaving the depth of the reviews to the audit team’s discretion. How is the FAA ensuring that documented procedures are being routinely and uniformly followed?
Finally, we are aware that several years ago, Boeing initiated a “Verification Optimization” program that resulted in eliminating thousands of quality inspections on each airplane, relying instead on mechanics self-verifying that they performed their work properly. This resulted in the elimination of 900 quality inspector positions. This program was implemented for several years and would appear to be contrary to FAA’s requirements that production certificate holders have inspection programs that are adequate to ensure that products conform to their type design. Has the FAA verified that Boeing’s inspection program complies with FAA requirements for production certificate holders? If so, please explain how FAA has verified Boeing complied?
We are aware that the FAA has initiated at least two investigations in the past in relation to this Verification Optimization program. Under FAA enforcement policy, recurring violations of this type require legal enforcement action. Please advise of the status of any enforcement actions and outcomes. And please advise the Committee as to whether this program has been rescinded and that an adequate inspection program has been restored.
I request that you provide a written response by January 25, 2024. Thank you for your prompt attention to these important matters.
[Editorial note from this SLF/attorney: In the practice of employment and labor law over the course of, let's say close to four decades, many instances of staff reductions, downsizing, reductions in force, and so on were encountered. Still, tagging the elimination of 900 positions, that is 900 quality inspector positions, as "Verification Optimization", . . . well, innovation truly isn't gone from Boeing, it's just moved into cynical manipulation of language, in this instance anyway.]
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 14th Jan 2024 at 18:09.
In reviewing FAA orders on how oversight processes are to be conducted, it appears that there may be ways for manufacturers to avoid audit accountability. For example, FAA Order 8120.23A requires that, before performing a Quality System Audit, the Agency must provide 50 days advance notice. This generous notice period clears the way for manufacturers to correct noncompliant conditions prior to the audit, ensuring that non-compliant conditions are rarely if ever detected during an audit. In effect, manufacturers must only get their house in order once an audit is announced.
Now these "client representative" staff will be looking absolutely at the manufacturing process in detail, compliance with procedures, seeing the daily work plan, walking round the aircraft for much of their time, etc. An interesting task, one or two who have had this role previously have even posted their experiences on here in the past. Engineers are sent from all over the world to Boeing to oversee what is being built for them - Alaska Airlines doubtless have the easiest time of all, given that their corporate HQ and principal maintenance base is just down the street from Renton.
Doesn't that image show a work stand and shelter aligned with the position of the antenna system? Doesn't that image also show that the top of the work stand is almost at the top of the door opening and would not provide any useful access to the interior if the plug was open or removed?
I'm not saying the image proves that the door plug is not opened or removed but, as shown, I don't see that it offers any proof that it is opened or removed.
I'm not saying the image proves that the door plug is not opened or removed but, as shown, I don't see that it offers any proof that it is opened or removed.
I think it gives a pretty good indication on where, how and what they were up to, given the roof-top mounted wifi dome was part of their mission. And at first sight, that does not include any plug door activity.
So that is why I included in my original post
So that is why I included in my original post
I think, for now, better not call the NTSB...
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I'm not sure what diameter the arrestor bolts are because my eyeballing skills aren't up to it, but they must at least be 6/32. Your basic vanilla 6/32 bolt has a shear strength around 2000 lbs. The two at the bottom have two shear planes each so each one is good for 4000 lbs.
(Definitions on bolt type names are from the website of the supplier of stainless steel hardware inox.ie)
This could also have been done by a Spirit employee and especially if they thoght Boeing routinely would replace them later.
They could even have used non hardened bolts.
That Alaska plane needs to be taken apart to see if not at least one bolt have fallen into a gap and down into the belly of the plane. If they did fail its unlikely they all failed at the same time.
And I wouldn't worry to much about lose bolts on other planes. It's the precense of the bolt that is important. Not its thightness. And a castellated nut with a split pin would stop it coming out altoghether, unless it was broken in two.
But what if in the confusion of bolt definition they used an available fully threaded bolt (called set screw (with no head they are called grub screw)) instead of one only partially threaded (just called bolt). How much would that reduce the shear strength. And in this case it's bending and hitting/pushing on the middle by the roller pins strength we are talking about, not pull strength.
(Definitions on bolt type names are from the website of the supplier of stainless steel hardware inox.ie)
This could also have been done by a Spirit employee and especially if they thoght Boeing routinely would replace them later.
They could even have used non hardened bolts.
(Definitions on bolt type names are from the website of the supplier of stainless steel hardware inox.ie)
This could also have been done by a Spirit employee and especially if they thoght Boeing routinely would replace them later.
They could even have used non hardened bolts.
It's easy enough to find specs for set screws that are fully threaded with no head e.g. AN565.
