JAL incident at Haneda Airport

[EXDAC]

Originally Posted by ams6110

Are any commercial aircraft fitted with infrared cameras viewing ahead?

Yes, many are but I have no information of the equipment fit of the accident aircraft. (Do a search for HUD/EFVS)

[JapanHanuma]

Originally Posted by MLHeliwrench

A pilot acting on their own - contrary to their acknowledged and read back instruction - can not be fixed with changes to regulations or aircraft equipment. Sometimes humans mess up. Sometimes that has massive deadly consequences.

Training the humans to do better and making sure they are well rested is key. Also training humans to defensively cross check/monitor what the other humans are doing aground you is key.

I want to defend the ATC here as well.

The ATC only needs to provide information to pilots that they require to make decisions that pilots are allowed to and need to (i.e. weather information when you are landing). Information about taxing to a holding position is basic instructions and the pilots aren't allowed to do anything else and/or shouldn't have to make any decisions themselves (just follow orders and get to the holding point). You don't want the equivalent of a mental audio Christmas tree dashboard through the radio channels.

You can argue that the pilot of the DHC disobeyed ATC instructions and should be prosecuted for professional negligence, but no one here is arguing that because the reasons behind the bizarre jump from taxiway clearance through runway clearance to takeoff clearance has not been explained yet.

[PeteMonty]

Originally Posted by DarkPenguin

Why should the ground script matter? Ground doesn't give you permission / clearance to enter a runway. If you would listen carefully to the recordings available on LiveATC u can hear that an aircraft is instructed to taxi to holding point C5. And that Aircraft reads back the clearance to taxi to holding point C5. There is no evidence of any clearance that would include runway 34R except of landing clearances.
So pretty much what is written on the transcript can be heard (more or less) on the recordings available.

I will try and respond to these blow by blow...
Why do the ground coms matter? Well, ground will coordinate with tower. What if ground had said to JA722A something about the intention to get them away quickly? They might have been asked if they would be ready immediate for example. One thing that is odd is that they told JAL166 that there was a departure to get out ahead of their landing. Yet there would have not been sufficient time to do so with JAL516 landing ahead of them and the wake seperation. So tower were clearly already in a fudge about some plan that they may or not have communicated to ground. So there could have been something in the coms from ground to JA722A that throws more light onto what their expectation was. Or even in the departure clearance given earlier to JA722A.

You then mention the recordings on LiveATC. Specifically which? Please post a link. And then please state timestamps for what you are saying. There a few postings of cut audio clips. I can only find one that gives a longer listen that would encompass the 'official transcript' timeframe. But what is on that recording is VERY different to the transcript. There are multiple other calls (including at least one that is a line up clearance at timestamp 15:30 on the audio file I link to below) that are not on the transcript. You say the transcript is "more or less" accurate? I'm my opinion it isn't. And even if it were "more or less" that isn't good enough! Air traffic transmissions are very precise!

You say you have heard a readback from JA722A on the live recording. There is no readback on any recording I can find. Please state which recording and timestamp you can hear a readback. This is the audio I am refering to that I can hear no readback and lots of transmissions that are not included on that 'official transcript' https://archive.liveatc.net/rjtt/RJT...2024-0830Z.mp3

When I clean up the noise on the hold instruction (C5) given to JA722A (timestamp 15:13), I do not hear what that 'official transcript' states. I am not going to post on here what I hear as others have and have had their posts taken down... Which was the original point my above post to ask why is deemed unacceptable on this forum to discuss what we can hear in the audio? Why are those posts taken down?

[6 DOF]

Originally Posted by jaytee54

Absolutely right!
, the copilot WILL have looked to his right, any pilot would, and checked the runway and approach path,

Until the voice recorder is analyzed, we don't know if the Co-pilot was maybe screaming at the captain to stop entering the runway.

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by SRMman

Flying Roland, ref your post 891. As I have pointed out earlier Fig A2 is not supported by the evidence of the crash damage. The pictures of the A350 engines IMO do not show symmetrical horizontal damage to both sides of both nacelles (as would be caused by impacting the horizontal TE at high speed).

I believe your point should be addressed to me, because Flying Roland updated his diagrams based upon my comments. Here is the evidence which I based them on. This is a compound image made up of stills taken from Juan Browne's excellent video commentary of 3 January (linked earlier in the thread but repeated below for convenience). I have added markup showing the 4 damage sites on the nacelle leading edges. As was pointed out by someone else in response to your previous comment on this, the difference in damage between inboard and outboard sites can be explained by the Dash-8 wing structure being flimsier towards the wingtips. Given that all 4 damage sites are in the same position vertically, and the fact that anything more than a 1.2 metre offset between aircraft centrelines would have resulted in either location 1 or location 4 being undamaged, it seems very clear to me that the Dash-8's wing is responsible for all 4 impacts, so clear in fact that I think the onus is on you to explain how else they could possibly have been inflicted in such a symmetrical way.



Juan Browne / Blancolirio video commentary: engine damage assessment from 9:04 to 9:30

Juan Browne / Blancolirio video commentary (link to 9:04)

[Indarra]

Report from the Yomiuri Shimbun online
東京・羽田空港の滑走路上で日本航空と海上保安庁の航空機が衝突した死傷事故で、海保機の男性機長（３９）が事故前日の１日、別 の機体で沖ノ鳥島（東京都）周辺との間を約７時間飛行し、中国公船への対応に従事していたことがわかった。国の運輸安全委員会は 、当時の健康状態なども確認する。
My translation:
Regarding the fatal accident in the Haneda runway at Tokyo between the JAL and Coastguard aircraft, it has been revealed that the Coastguard Captain (39) on the previous day（１January) flew a different aircraft for about 7 hours to the area around Okinoshima (Tokyo Prefecture) on an assignment regarding Chinese government vessel(s). The national transportation safety board will look at the issue of his physical condition on the day, etc.

[FlyingRoland]

Originally Posted by SRMman

Flying Roland, ref your post 891. As I have pointed out earlier Fig A2 is not supported by the evidence of the crash damage. The pictures of the A350 engines IMO do not show symmetrical horizontal damage to both sides of both nacelles (as would be caused by impacting the horizontal TE at high speed).

Originally Posted by Easy Street

I believe your point should be addressed to me, because Flying Roland updated his diagrams based upon my comments. Here is the evidence which I based them on. This is a compound image made up of stills taken from Juan Browne's excellent video commentary of 3 January (linked earlier in the thread but repeated below for convenience). I have added markup showing the 4 damage sites on the nacelle leading edges. As was pointed out by someone else in response to your previous comment on this, the difference in damage between inboard and outboard sites can be explained by the Dash-8 wing structure being flimsier towards the wingtips. Given that all 4 damage sites are in the same position vertically, and the fact that anything more than a 1.2 metre offset between aircraft centrelines would have resulted in either location 1 or location 4 being undamaged, it seems very clear to me that the Dash-8's wing is responsible for all 4 impacts, so clear in fact that I think the onus is on you to explain how else they could possibly have been inflicted in such a symmetrical way.



Juan Browne / Blancolirio video commentary: engine damage assessment from 9:04 to 9:30

Juan Browne / Blancolirio video commentary (link to 9:04)

I agree with Easy Street; Indeed I don't see any other explanation for the radome and engine cowl damage than what is pictured on the A2 image.

In addition to the comment of Easy Street: The flaps setting on the DHC-8 was most probably 5. The flaps do not run of the full length of the outboard sections of the wings. On a picture of another Dash 8 I have marked the 4 points of the approximate impact which explains why the damage was not symmetrical.

[JP7000]

toyokeizai.net/articles/-/725704?page=4

Toyo Keizai Inc. established 1895 publishes one of the oldest leading economic magazines of Japan. Its web page above contains a photo of the transcript which is identical to the one discussed above. This transcript was distributed to reporters on January 3rd during a press conference by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Multiple web sites have taken photographs of this transcript (which implies that reporters are very interested to preserve proof of what the Ministry said).

What this ministry says is particularly important in this case, since this single ministry and its minister (currently Mr. Tetsuo Saito of Kometo Party) oversees, controls: 1): The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), 2) Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), 3) Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB). Thus if the Haneda tower side and JCG do not exactly agree, still this same ministry is their boss. Also the investigation body that writes up the final report JTSB is under the same ministry though the leadership is filled with former university professors to preserve independence. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police who have launched a possible criminal investigation is completely independent. Probably to avoid the appearance of conflict-of-interest, it is reported that the American NTSB will participate in the JTSB investigation, specifically in analyzing the contents of the flight recorder and voice recorder, and also experts from Airbus, the French Regulatory body, and the UK AAIB will/have sent investigators to Haneda. It is very irresponsible to say this, but in the Japanese internet there are already accusations of cover-up intent and conspiracy theories, so the ministry may be interested to preserve public confidence in this way by bringing in overseas experts.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by JP7000

toyokeizai.net/articles/-/725704?page=4

Toyo Keizai Inc. established 1895 publishes one of the oldest leading economic magazines of Japan. Its web page above contains a photo of the transcript which is identical to the one discussed above. This transcript was distributed to reporters on January 3rd during a press conference by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Multiple web sites have taken photographs of this transcript (which implies that reporters are very interested to preserve proof of what the Ministry said).

What this ministry says is particularly important in this case, since this single ministry and its minister (currently Mr. Tetsuo Saito of Kometo Party) oversees, controls: 1): The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), 2) Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), 3) Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB). Thus if the Haneda tower side and JCG do not exactly agree, still this same ministry is their boss. Also the investigation body that writes up the final report JTSB is under the same ministry though the leadership is filled with former university professors to preserve independence. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police who have launched a possible criminal investigation is completely independent. Probably to avoid the appearance of conflict-of-interest, it is reported that the American NTSB will participate in the JTSB investigation, specifically in analyzing the contents of the flight recorder and voice recorder, and also experts from Airbus, the French Regulatory body, and the UK AAIB will/have sent investigators to Haneda. It is very irresponsible to say this, but in the Japanese internet there are already accusations of cover-up intent and conspiracy theories, so the ministry may be interested to preserve public confidence in this way by bringing in overseas experts.

JP, you describe a modestly compromised oversight structure, but that is not uncommon sadly.

Bringing in external specialists would be desirable not just for assurance but to use the opportunity to benchmark systems in this area. I would not be surprised that an external review would be less harsh on the principal parties here than the national authorities will be.

This event provides an opportunity to enhance operational safety. The fundamental problem with a closed system is that they tend to develop assumptions based on prior outcomes which can mask underlying systemic issues. Blaming the PIC of the JCG, or his/her management, or the ATC controllers is not going to serve the public interest in achieving a safer system than existed previously. This is not an unusual type of accident, it just happened to occur on his night, at this location, could have been KLAX, (again) or another fright in San Antonio, or Newark, or another repeat of the Italian disaster. This is not likely to be as stark as Tenerife was, but time will tell.

Increasing operational safety by upgrade of A-SGMCS or using stop bars at all times, like Singapore Changi... is not that big a deal to do, and the fundamental problem is that what is obvious after the fact is usually hiding in plain sight before the events. Flight operations at all times are complex, close coupled systems, and the human component should not be berated as the root of all evil; every single day of the year, there are crews on the line that catch errors that have crept into the system, and those are often generated by GIGO with software.

Cover ups occur all the time, and in all parts of the world. Resolving the issues needs open and respectful awareness of human and system behaviour, if there is any intent to learn from an unfortunate event.

The US DOD uses the term mishap for all accidents, making the point that the outcomes are not accidental in nature, they are the consequence of a system response that was undesired. That is the good bit. The bad bit is, the command that is responsible for the asset involved is normally charged with the investigation, and yet, occasionally, some really worthwhile reports arise. Not always, but sometimes. The benefits of a just culture are that it is slightly easier to uncover factors associated with the events.

IMHO, and hoping that the crew, command and the ATC officers are not thrown under the bus, nor the director of the regulatory authority, absent any wilful disregard or neglect.

to err is human.

[Jasonbay]

Originally Posted by PeteMonty

There are multiple other calls (including at least one that is a line up clearance at timestamp 15:30 on the audio file I link to below) that are not on the transcript. You say the transcript is "more or less" accurate? I'm my opinion it isn't. And even if it were "more or less" that isn't good enough! Air traffic transmissions are very precise!

Isn't the simple explanation that the line up clearance at that timestamp is for RWY 05 and therefore irrelevant?
And as for why certain calls don't appear on the liveatc recording -- that's because the recording station may not have line-of-sight to all the transmitting stations.

[Jasonbay]

Originally Posted by FlyingRoland

Reading some of the comments indeed probably:

- the A350 and DHC-8 were almost aligned.
- the A350's nose did not drop within 0,4 seconds after collision to to ground, but took probably took around a second or so.

So my latest speculation is:

A1: Approximately at main gear touchdown the A350's left side of the RADOME hit the top part of DHC-8's TAIL first.
A2: About 0,4 seconds later the A350's ENGINE NACELLES hit the DHC-8's WING.
A3: About 0,6 seconds after that the A350's NOSE hit the runway.

Just curious about the purported precision in the 0.4s, 0.6s and 1s estimates. Not that it matters significantly, but FlyingRoland -- if we were going to attempt such precision here, I'd ask if you might be able to determine the height of the upper and lower edge of the engine inlet cowls at +3, -1 and -5.5 deg pitch attitude. Then we can corroborate against the images of the damaged engines to back out the A350's attitude. There are just so many forces and moments (net collision reaction force, CG, thrust, elevator), acting about the MLG (treating that as the fulcrum)...

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by Expatrick

"you're No.1 for departure"

While I understand the reasoning for passing this information, does its inclusion (in a requirement for an aircraft to hold), specifically use of the word departure, not create the possibility of a misunderstanding by a busy / fatigued crew?

"departure" was never said.
I operate out of Narita not Haneda but the phrase is most commonly used to indicate you're ahead of another aircraft taxiing to the same holding point from an intersecting taxiway and has nothing to do with departure sequence at all.
In this case it does seem to refer to departure sequence, but the word 'departure' was never uttered.

[glekichi]

i.e No1 to the red aircraft but still no.5 in sequence. That's how the phrase is usually used in Japan. Haneda may be an exception.
It certainly never means cleared to line up or take off!

[Glamdring]

Originally Posted by fdr

Increasing operational safety by upgrade of A-SGMCS

A-SGMCS is not even needed. A basic SMR RIMCAS system would've alarmed in this situation, and I'm still baffled as to how an airfield of this size would not have such a system.

[framer]

Damnit, we're still not yet No. 1 for takeoff and I've been sitting here for 45 minutes trying to get takeoff clearance. Don't they understand that the golden hour saves lives and people are trapped by an earthquake? We lost an hour / need to be there, not here!" He's potentially salivating for takeoff clearance

Sailplaneflier…..are you sure you’re not Tom Clancy in disguise? I like your style
I think your suggestion looks good from a distance but if you went close enough to listen to it it would sound like this;
”%%#$@&%$#$&%&%”……”two at once, Delta 494 it will be a late landing clearance” …” Control %-#@#%@+$#$#@%-$@%” …” two at once” “@#%3&#@%$@#$%”…..”Delta 494 Go around”…”Going round Delta 49%#@$%#$%#-#”

[Pluto7777]

''With all that lighting clutter I don't believe the Tower could have seen the Dash-8 enter the runway'' indeed, as in my post; these are still mid 60s situations, nowadays we have hi tech IP cameras with nightview and IR, controllers would be able to see the RWY zone as they were on the spot, and this would be a rather cheap solution too, i wonder...

[Pilot2003]

Originally Posted by PeteMonty

I will try and respond to these blow by blow...
Why do the ground coms matter? Well, ground will coordinate with tower. What if ground had said to JA722A something about the intention to get them away quickly? They might have been asked if they would be ready immediate for example. One thing that is odd is that they told JAL166 that there was a departure to get out ahead of their landing. Yet there would have not been sufficient time to do so with JAL516 landing ahead of them and the wake seperation. So tower were clearly already in a fudge about some plan that they may or not have communicated to ground. So there could have been something in the coms from ground to JA722A that throws more light onto what their expectation was. Or even in the departure clearance given earlier to JA722A.

You then mention the recordings on LiveATC. Specifically which? Please post a link. And then please state timestamps for what you are saying. There a few postings of cut audio clips. I can only find one that gives a longer listen that would encompass the 'official transcript' timeframe. But what is on that recording is VERY different to the transcript. There are multiple other calls (including at least one that is a line up clearance at timestamp 15:30 on the audio file I link to below) that are not on the transcript. You say the transcript is "more or less" accurate? I'm my opinion it isn't. And even if it were "more or less" that isn't good enough! Air traffic transmissions are very precise!

You say you have heard a readback from JA722A on the live recording. There is no readback on any recording I can find. Please state which recording and timestamp you can hear a readback. This is the audio I am refering to that I can hear no readback and lots of transmissions that are not included on that 'official transcript'

When I clean up the noise on the hold instruction (C5) given to JA722A (timestamp 15:13), I do not hear what that 'official transcript' states. I am not going to post on here what I hear as others have and have had their posts taken down... Which was the original point my above post to ask why is deemed unacceptable on this forum to discuss what we can hear in the audio? Why are those posts taken down?

I also did not hear ...."what that 'official transcript' states" on the attached audio recording. What I heard was close to "No1, taxi to northern entrance C5". However, I cannot verify if the above live recording is doctored. What I heard could be different from what others make out based on the above audio recording.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by Pluto7777

''With all that lighting clutter I don't believe the Tower could have seen the Dash-8 enter the runway'' indeed, as in my post; these are still mid 60s situations, nowadays we have hi tech IP cameras with nightview and IR, controllers would be able to see the RWY zone as they were on the spot, and this would be a rather cheap solution too, i wonder...

Forget the visual bit, not a requirement anymore and not feasible in many places due the location of Tower, or buildings in between, Parking lights facing the Tower windows, working positions facing the wrong way , etc.. etc. plus and most important : overall Wx visibility , ,many towers are Kilometers from runway threshold. . In addition a lot of ANSPs consider Towers as an architectural competition and do not care much about visibility . When I visited Bangkok new Control tower , praised at the time by the local ANSP as the " Highest in the world " the Controllers complained they could not see the aircraft most of the time .

[PeteMonty]

Originally Posted by Jasonbay

Isn't the simple explanation that the line up clearance at that timestamp is for RWY 05 and therefore irrelevant?
And as for why certain calls don't appear on the liveatc recording -- that's because the recording station may not have line-of-sight to all the transmitting stations.

Yes I hear RWY 05 for that takeoff clearance as well. I'm not suggesting that it was a clearance for JA722A. But I am STATING that this transmission is not on the 'official transcript' which does include some transmissions that are not specifically to the aircraft in the collision (and JAL166 that was #2 to land and was told to go around). So this supports my argument that the transcript is not complete or accurate.

The other point is that in the time period we are talking about, there were transmissions that JA722A could have miss-heard as clearances for them. They may have even read those clearances back and these readbacks were stepped on or missed by ATC. The captain of JA722A is adamant he was cleared. He didn't deliberately decide to take matters into his own hands and line up without clearance as some are suggesting. He had a lot more experience than me, that tells me I could also make the same mistake! This is why I am so keen to understand the mistake that was made, so I can analyze my own actions and make sure I am not so complacent that I think it could never happen to me. So, I am convinced that JA722A had heard something that meant they thought THEY were cleared. What I can make out of the taxi clearance from tower to them that we do hear leads me to believe that was not as clear-cut as some are saying. And we don't hear the readback so cannot hear what might have changed in the understanding of the crew from command to readback.

There being a departure on 05 also changes what everyone is assuming about both JAL516 [not heard in actual audio, only on written transcript] and JAL166 being told there was a departure to get out. Commentators are assuming this was reference to JA722A's departure. Which threw up a load of questions as there was no space to get anyone out in this gap. But if that were a departure on 05 then then conflict window is a lot smaller and the approach only need be clear while that departure is rolling with no consecutive departure and go-around procedure conflict or wake turbulence conflict. My point being, by using the 'official transcript' we are missing a lot of this detail that builds a bigger picture. This is why I would argue for more discussion around what we can hear in the audio (the posts that keep getting removed) and less sticking to the line that the transcript that is out there is official and without error.

Line of sight is exactly what I am saying about the transmissions and why they are so hit and miss for different aircraft. JAL166's transmissions are the clearest (also helped by that pilot having very clear English - there is a Delta in the transmissions as well who is easy to hear despite the poor audio quality because of the clear English). What is odd though is that some of Tower's transmissions are clear and others garbage. But maybe they have multiple antennae and are using different ones depending which controller is talking to which aircraft?

[AGL_Guy]

Stop Bars

Originally Posted by waito

WRT to inop airport lighting, let's check one of the NOTAMs again (taken from AVHERALD, there are more NOTAMs listed)

J2253/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QLRAS/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2312271500 C) 2402211500
E) REF AIP SUP 225/23 ITEM TWY:2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11,12,13,33,38,44,54
TWY-CL-LGT FOR M1,R1,W11(BTN W AND R1)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR E10(BEHIND SPOT 53)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR D5-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A(BTN W AND A2),A(INT OF W1),A1,A2(INT OF A),W1
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A16-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR K(BTN SPOT 304 AND C),R(INT OF K)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR R(BTN K AND Y),R(INT OF Y)-PARTLY U/S
STOP-BAR-LGT FOR C1 THRU C14-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TAXIING-GUIDANCE-SIGN FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C(INT OF C3),C(INT OF C5)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T(BTN T2 AND SPOT 909),T(INT OF T4),T(INT OF T6)
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C3(INT OF RWY 16L/34R)-PARTLY U/S
RAPID EXIT TWY INDICATOR LGT FOR D5-U/S

While we know that the Stop Bar System was not meant to be used outside Low Vis conditions
the other defect was partial defect in taxy centerline light of twy C. Correct?
So no relevance regarding influence on the accident?

(NOTAM contains a typo, so credibility could be checked as well)

While we know that the Stop Bar System was not meant to be used outside Low Vis conditions

The comment "While we know that the Stop Bar System was not meant to be used outside Low Vis conditions" is invalid.
While Stop Bars may be mandated for use in Low Vis conditions, many airports operate with the philosophy that the Stop Bars (and associated Lead On Lights) are to be in use all of the time the associated RWY is in use This eliminates any confusion between holding point procedures and operations under all vis conditions.