AF447
Thread totally off the point
They were not fit to fly the sector having spent the day sight seeing including a helicopter flight (the pilot was interviewed on French TV) so they started one of the most demanding night flights already fatigued, let alone the shag fest the skipper was on, who chose to leave two relatively (for the forecast conditions) inexperienced copilots to navigate through a virulent ITCZ. PNF was on the cusp of not being current and they found themselves in an area of thunderstorms that everyone else avoided. Having been extremely fatigued twice and hallucinating I can guess how they felt..but both of my occurrences were driving; the second in a 30 mile stretch of contraflow on the A1M after.I had driven up from Darkest essex to Piercebridge to take the father of P2 at staines to Sutton Bank and get him a ride in a K21..he had been shot down during the battle of Britain and spent the war in the stalaglufts. Dropped him home and decided I would stop at the first services which were closed. I must have fallen asleep three or four times..no where to stop and heavy traffic.
So whilst you write about control laws, visible or not sticks..pitot icing..it is a complete waste of time as none of them were fit enough to operate a clothes mangle let alone Airbuses best.
PS I had 13 years RHS and 6,000+ hours on Jets when I first flew through the ITCZ located over the South Atlantic on the death cruiser. I did 20 transits in my first 3 years. At no time was the captain out of his seat and at times the second captain joined us. The crossing varied from benign to severe turbulence and one of the two occasions I hit the Turbulence button in 6 years. This disconnected the auto throttle, autopilot and trim with the flight director directing cruise pitch attitude. There was one transit where we couldn’t find a way around any of what looked like line squalls. 447 had better radar and info than we did.
So whilst you write about control laws, visible or not sticks..pitot icing..it is a complete waste of time as none of them were fit enough to operate a clothes mangle let alone Airbuses best.
PS I had 13 years RHS and 6,000+ hours on Jets when I first flew through the ITCZ located over the South Atlantic on the death cruiser. I did 20 transits in my first 3 years. At no time was the captain out of his seat and at times the second captain joined us. The crossing varied from benign to severe turbulence and one of the two occasions I hit the Turbulence button in 6 years. This disconnected the auto throttle, autopilot and trim with the flight director directing cruise pitch attitude. There was one transit where we couldn’t find a way around any of what looked like line squalls. 447 had better radar and info than we did.
Last edited by blind pew; 31st Mar 2023 at 16:16. Reason: PS
Thread Starter
Fair point. Of those, how many would volunteer to do so under the same circumstances?? Without hitting the books, and not foregoing all that fun in Brazil? Even In the Simulator? Had a neighbor in 2009, who was A320 Captain for UAL. Of the thousands of hours in the Bus, he admitted the aircraft had never been in other than Normal Law.. "A very sweet flying airplane..." modest tailwinds, Will
Two CAs
Was because either the second didn't trust the first or was too frightened.
In my first flag carrier I came across a captain who decided he would take the next days flight on holiday rather than sit down the back with captain X ..he wasn't alone. I did one Rio with a skipper who was that frightened that he sat in first class rather than using crew bunk.
I have to admit I had a very scary time in it having transmitted the ITCZ then handed over to the other crew when the forecast was wrong and they flew a missed approach and forgot the gear for a long time knowing that they then didn't have alternate fuel and that RIO ATC had successfully vectored two aircraft into terrain over recent years.
With the radar sets of the 70s it was always a team decision on which way to go..at times not easy and I did make a mess once out of southern Africa when I diverted off track for over half an hour before I realised that we were the only ones doing so to discover that I had tweaked the radar toi low and it was ground returns that looked like CBs.
I was fortunate in that I'm not a nervous pax and if I'm going to die then hard luck. In my first outfit one operating captain went and hid in the toilet when the going got rough and not because he had his opera singer girlfriend along.
In my first flag carrier I came across a captain who decided he would take the next days flight on holiday rather than sit down the back with captain X ..he wasn't alone. I did one Rio with a skipper who was that frightened that he sat in first class rather than using crew bunk.
I have to admit I had a very scary time in it having transmitted the ITCZ then handed over to the other crew when the forecast was wrong and they flew a missed approach and forgot the gear for a long time knowing that they then didn't have alternate fuel and that RIO ATC had successfully vectored two aircraft into terrain over recent years.
With the radar sets of the 70s it was always a team decision on which way to go..at times not easy and I did make a mess once out of southern Africa when I diverted off track for over half an hour before I realised that we were the only ones doing so to discover that I had tweaked the radar toi low and it was ground returns that looked like CBs.
I was fortunate in that I'm not a nervous pax and if I'm going to die then hard luck. In my first outfit one operating captain went and hid in the toilet when the going got rough and not because he had his opera singer girlfriend along.
Luck is perceived differently by different people. Others may disagree with your perception of luck.
Last edited by pilotmike; 2nd Apr 2023 at 18:17.
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Pegase Driver
The human factors aspects are well described in the final BEA report pages 100-102 . Worth reading them back as I just did.
one correction however : On the crew Fatigue the BEA writes (on 1.16.7 )
:
I know the BEA had the exact info , but was prevented to use it by the SNPL which argued successfully that what happens in lay over free time is purely in the private sphere and cannot be mentioned and used in the report.
However some of it was leaked in the press , but a sound analysis of the rest periods would have helped making recommendations to AF on this matter. . In the Colgan report the NTSB went into that area, and issued recommendations on rest and minimizing fatigue for commuting pilots , that ultimately did help in changing old habbits..
Pity the BEA was not allowed to go into this in this case.
one correction however : On the crew Fatigue the BEA writes (on 1.16.7 )
:
The investigation was not able to determine exactly the activities of the flight crew members during the stopover in Rio, where the crew had arrived three days earlier. It was not possible to obtain data on their sleep during this stopover. This lack of precise information on their activity during the stopover, in particular in relation to sleep, makes it impossible to evaluate the level of fatigue associated to the flight crew’s duty time.
However some of it was leaked in the press , but a sound analysis of the rest periods would have helped making recommendations to AF on this matter. . In the Colgan report the NTSB went into that area, and issued recommendations on rest and minimizing fatigue for commuting pilots , that ultimately did help in changing old habbits..
Pity the BEA was not allowed to go into this in this case.
Just a reminder that Air France management realised that there was something seriously wrong with the lack of professionalism and brought in four extremely qualified outsiders to advise them, one was ex military/ ex American major, the second was ex hamble/ BOAC/ BA who had learnt the handshake which would have gone down well across the channel and iirc the other two were European or Scandinavian.
Seems to have done the trick.
Seems to have done the trick.
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I highly doubt that in the extreme stress of the situation, they could consider what control law they were in, anyway ... and from that to infer what's a good vs. bad idea to do with the pitch, with respect to the protections available. No, once the chips are down like that, and the person's looking at the world through a soda straw, all they will do is bring their ingrained habits and thought processes, at the most base level. No higher processing will occur. If those base actions are only to chase the flight director (because that's all the person has ever done, and that's their conception of "flying," then that's what they're gonna do. And if that flight directions is +6000 fpm, well there you have it.
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Hard disagree. Reactions like this don't happen as a result of an "indoctrination." They're a result of repeated practice, to where a normalcy in one's gut, in that flight state, is felt.
I highly doubt that in the extreme stress of the situation, they could consider what control law they were in, anyway ... and from that to infer what's a good vs. bad idea to do with the pitch, with respect to the protections available. No, once the chips are down like that, and the person's looking at the world through a soda straw, all they will do is bring their ingrained habits and thought processes, at the most base level. No higher processing will occur. If those base actions are only to chase the flight director (because that's all the person has ever done, and that's their conception of "flying," then that's what they're gonna do. And if that flight directions is +6000 fpm, well there you have it.
I highly doubt that in the extreme stress of the situation, they could consider what control law they were in, anyway ... and from that to infer what's a good vs. bad idea to do with the pitch, with respect to the protections available. No, once the chips are down like that, and the person's looking at the world through a soda straw, all they will do is bring their ingrained habits and thought processes, at the most base level. No higher processing will occur. If those base actions are only to chase the flight director (because that's all the person has ever done, and that's their conception of "flying," then that's what they're gonna do. And if that flight directions is +6000 fpm, well there you have it.
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Indoctrination is to emphasize that in alternate law with AP tripping you don't act out of a reaction and kill yourself but do nothing till you look at PFD and only do what is required. Unreliable speed is not repeatedly practiced. None of abnormal are repeatedly practiced to create a reaction. They are practiced to see what happens and what you have to do. Nothing should be done as a reaction because air is not a human habitat and invariably it will be wrong. What you do in the cockpit is a well considered action after positively orientating oneself. Otherwise demons like somatogravic illusions pop out with disastrous results.
"Nothing should be done as a reaction," this is not the reality of how human brains work. For all the basic flight tasks (such as one of the PFD tapes or horizon moves a certain way, what should be the control response) the response from the human will be the reflexive reaction trained in over many hours of repetition (and "do nothing and keep it still" is one of these!); it will not be a reasoned logic problem (such as which way do I go around this thunderstrom, or what descent rate do I use on downwind wrt. how far traffic is strung out on final). ESPECIALLY if in the middle of a high stress, tunnel vision event.
If the proper reaction is not trained in through repetition, there's no expectation that it will be brought into the event.
We agree on that the air is not a natural human habitat. This points even more strongly to the necessity that proper reactions are trained in, because what comes natural (pull back on the stick) is in most cases the wrong one.
Vessbot re #119.
'Stick and rudder skills' - like the FAA's 'more hand flying'; whereas the human aspects relate to the cognitive skills, the thinking required for flying. (Casner, NASA http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf)
See the second part of https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
Paries considers the wider system issues. How many of todays Captains would benefit to the competencies of the ACCOMPLI project - page 15 (Revisit the enlightening first half of the paper at a later time.)
"Proceduralisation and automation both try to reduce the uncertainty in the system by reducing variety, diversity, deviation, instability. But the side effect is that this also reduces autonomy, creativity, and reactivity. Increasing order, conformity, stability, predictability, discipline, anticipation, makes the systems better (more efficient, more reliable), possibly cheaper, and generally safer within the confines of their standard environment. They also make them increasingly brittle (less resilient) outside the boundaries of the normal envelope. We have to recognize that there is a universal trade-off between efficiency (adaptation degree) and flexibility (adaptation bandwidth)."
The underlying point is that most accident discussions (Pprune) focus on a particular event seeking to cure the last accident, whereas the industry requires (Paries);
"i) generic anticipation schemes, providing (common) sense-making frameworks of what happens, at a level of abstraction which is high enough to wrap around all the countless and unpredictable variations of real stories and
ii) fast and efficient implementation sketches and skills, capable of forcing the available generic schemes to fit the parameters of the day, under critical time constraints."
The above might appear to be a high level academic viewpoint; but when written by a pilot they require greater thought as to implementation. For this, current pilots are the implementing experts, but require a forward looking, systemic viewpoint, together with consideration how changes in the modern world can influence us.
Many aspects relate to situation awareness; perception, comprehension. Generally this is sufficient to identify the required SOP; yet SOPs imply an assured outcome; thus reduced requirement for the projection component of SA.
SOPs 'discourage' thinking ahead, being ready for surprises.
Also; in a very safe industry, training emphasis on SOP compliance opposes the skills required to manage the unexpected.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/9o7da1hmi5fsr0z/From individuals to the evolution of safety paradigms Paries +++.pdf?dl=0
As much as I agree with the 'theory' above, the practical aspects of modern aviation training involving human imitations of awareness, surprise, and memory recall, suggest that the avoidance of challenging situations is the more practical option.
"It is difficult to change the human conditon, easier to change the conditions of work" (J. Reason). Thus the focus of improvement must move from the individual to the system, the situation - operational, organisational, personal which jointly have to be managed.
The technical aspects are reflected by safety statistics when comparing generations of aircraft - https://accidentstats.airbus.com/sit...dents-2023.pdf
Page 21 -
'Stick and rudder skills' - like the FAA's 'more hand flying'; whereas the human aspects relate to the cognitive skills, the thinking required for flying. (Casner, NASA http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf)
See the second part of https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
Paries considers the wider system issues. How many of todays Captains would benefit to the competencies of the ACCOMPLI project - page 15 (Revisit the enlightening first half of the paper at a later time.)
"Proceduralisation and automation both try to reduce the uncertainty in the system by reducing variety, diversity, deviation, instability. But the side effect is that this also reduces autonomy, creativity, and reactivity. Increasing order, conformity, stability, predictability, discipline, anticipation, makes the systems better (more efficient, more reliable), possibly cheaper, and generally safer within the confines of their standard environment. They also make them increasingly brittle (less resilient) outside the boundaries of the normal envelope. We have to recognize that there is a universal trade-off between efficiency (adaptation degree) and flexibility (adaptation bandwidth)."
The underlying point is that most accident discussions (Pprune) focus on a particular event seeking to cure the last accident, whereas the industry requires (Paries);
"i) generic anticipation schemes, providing (common) sense-making frameworks of what happens, at a level of abstraction which is high enough to wrap around all the countless and unpredictable variations of real stories and
ii) fast and efficient implementation sketches and skills, capable of forcing the available generic schemes to fit the parameters of the day, under critical time constraints."
The above might appear to be a high level academic viewpoint; but when written by a pilot they require greater thought as to implementation. For this, current pilots are the implementing experts, but require a forward looking, systemic viewpoint, together with consideration how changes in the modern world can influence us.
Many aspects relate to situation awareness; perception, comprehension. Generally this is sufficient to identify the required SOP; yet SOPs imply an assured outcome; thus reduced requirement for the projection component of SA.
SOPs 'discourage' thinking ahead, being ready for surprises.
Also; in a very safe industry, training emphasis on SOP compliance opposes the skills required to manage the unexpected.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/9o7da1hmi5fsr0z/From individuals to the evolution of safety paradigms Paries +++.pdf?dl=0
As much as I agree with the 'theory' above, the practical aspects of modern aviation training involving human imitations of awareness, surprise, and memory recall, suggest that the avoidance of challenging situations is the more practical option.
"It is difficult to change the human conditon, easier to change the conditions of work" (J. Reason). Thus the focus of improvement must move from the individual to the system, the situation - operational, organisational, personal which jointly have to be managed.
The technical aspects are reflected by safety statistics when comparing generations of aircraft - https://accidentstats.airbus.com/sit...dents-2023.pdf
Page 21 -
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May I kindly suggest that people interested in this long standing and sad saga start by reading all the material posted here AF447 thread 12?
Lots of very knowledgeable people have provided useful data, comments, insights, etc. that may alleviate some of the b......t we have been reading on the current thread.
And as stated by fdr and PJ2 above, I am also embarrassed by this thread.
Lots of very knowledgeable people have provided useful data, comments, insights, etc. that may alleviate some of the b......t we have been reading on the current thread.
And as stated by fdr and PJ2 above, I am also embarrassed by this thread.
I am also embarrassed by this thread.
It is just restarting Threads 1 and 2 as if no new info had been obtained from the cvr and dvr. And again we get total misstatements about what Airbus Modes do.
IB
It is just restarting Threads 1 and 2 as if no new info had been obtained from the cvr and dvr. And again we get total misstatements about what Airbus Modes do.
IB
