AF447
 

AF447. Yeah that one. My memory actually is getting better with age. To wit: I recall from early thread, either TechLog or Rumours, that the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder was found somewhat separated and distant from the impact with the sea. There was discussion linking the loss of HF Comms with loss of VS which contained HF antenna. It was reported that the HF antenna was elsewhere on the fuselage, so that theory was sunk. Researching the possible re-engining of the 747 into a twin, I found A330 architecture, and lo! HF antenna is located in the leading edge of the A330 Vertical Stabilizer.... for whatever that might mean. I was never satisfied that PF pulled on the stick start to finish. Occam would say he had a reason, perhaps in concert with loss of all directional control..... just sayin'

In a stalled condition, the tail will hit the sea first, breaking off, probably. This was all covered in the other threads. No idea where you got the idea that the HF Antenna is fitted elsewhere. It's public knowledge.
Also, the CVR transcript said nothing about loss of directional control or ECAM warnings for hydraulic systems or rudder lost.
Let it go eh. 👍

Pilot error after a simple tech failure, this has been done to death.

What is far more interesting is why two supposedly competent pilots were unable to recognise that 10 degrees nose up and 10000ft per min descent rate is a stall. The Captain realised as soon as he entered the flight deck but by then there was insufficient height to recover, hence his comment “we’re dead”.

If only they’d initiated the airspeed unreliable checklist, or performed an FNC or simply set 2.5 degrees pitch and 90% N1.

Ultimately pilots don’t make mistakes on purpose which begs questions of their training and attitude.

LD

02:13:40 (Bonin) But I've had the stick back the whole time!

I don't think the CVR transcript supports what you say about the Captain's reaction, or his words - https://tailstrike.com/database/01-j...ir-france-447/

It doesn't take much to Google the last words heard on the CVR... the official transcript is 'tided up' and substitutes a (!) for the expletive - the word's said were "****, we're going to crash" said by the occupant of the right seat. And then

But what you were or weren't satisfied with isn't important - the evidence was in the CVR recording the entire time. I mean there's this: "But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while".

And then of course there was the FDR data.

Let it go.

Stall recovery. To Bonin, holding back stick and commanded full power is Stall recove
 

Right...I should have been more explicit."Holding the stick back without apparent reason...." A reason could have been lack of yaw control at lower AoA...​​​​​​​Captain DuBois: "Watch your lateral..." ​​​​​​​Don't know that "intact at impact" was established without doubt... I work on cold cases, and it's been slow...

A poster in an early thread formalized duff airspeed in an acronym: 'UAS' Unreliable airspeed, usage became ubiquitous. A sign of lack of acknowledgement by industry til this crash?

Stall recovery til this crash involved "maintain back pressure and full power"

Fine for an approach Stall, but not at altitude. "I don't understand, we have the engines..."

HopIng for additional improvements to the flight manual...unfortunate the CVR is sequestered... modifying eye witness testimony is a serious crime here in the US.
Won a case on suppressed testimony. (The lawyers did, I was just the investigator)​​​​​​​

An important part of doing this when a crisis happens is to have already gone through your mind several times previously that about 2.5 degrees is what you want along with about 90% N1(or whatever is applicable to your type). Yes, you may deviate somewhat from this due to powerful instincts from unusual airspeed indications but you are more likely to quickly recognize that you are deviating away from where you always want to be in cruise.

If this important target is not very familiar to you, it is less likely that you will think amid much confusion of what your target is when other things do not make sense. You may find yourself chasing an airspeed as that is all you are truly familiar with.

Elephant/parlour
 

"If this important target is not very familiar to you, it is less likely that you will think amid much confusion of what your target is when other things do not make sense. You may find yourself chasing an airspeed as that is all you are truly familiar with." ....... punkalouver
As I recall, one of the last transmissions included "...turbulences....FORTE...!" Well, on top of all the goofy readings, it may have been too unstable in the cockpit to see the panel anyway....They had blundered into the red, and the crazy climb may well have been a thunderboomer lifting everything up and up. Then they blundered out, and lost lift, much of their thrust, and the rest of their composure.... The Pitot tubes were due to be replaced, AF was too cheap to fit BUSS, and Pitch and Power was too obvious, too much nonsense and poor luck squeezed it out of the consciousness of our lost pilots...

‘ POOR LUCK!’
Substitute ‘lack of professionalism’

Seriously?

There are a squillion posts spread over a dozen threads, starting here

AF 447 Search to resume - PPRuNe Forums

Dear god tell me you aren’t a professional pilot. Full back stick has NEVER been part of the stall recovery on any commercial aircraft.

Are you saying that was an Air France SOP? If it was it explains the pilots behaviour and why they killed everyone on board.

Stall recovery is taught at the very start of any pilots training, and always involves reducing the AoA by lowering the nose, increasing thrust to assist acceleration and gently easing into a climb once flying speed is achieved.

Good Lord, spare us....................

I don't understand why JT didn't simply close the thread, having provided a link where every aspect of the accident that could possibly be discussed has already been.

Not fine anywhere unless you are inverted :E

I agree as there is nothing " new" that came out so far that would justify reopening this discussion . There are just one thing that could perhaps help : to be able to read a detailed report on the test flights made by Airbus on their A340 test bed somewhere in Spring 2010 trying to reproduce the event.. Rumors at the time was than one flight did not go well and was only recovered at very low level. The report of those flights never was made public as far as I know. , hopefully one day we might see it and that might shed some new light. Maybe.

All air crashes are due to human error. Zero air crashes are due to pilot error. AF447 crashed due to human error. To wit- Airbus placing the sidestick where it's not visible to other crew members.

I don't understand why JT didn't simply close the thread,

I'm just a bear of very little brain (with apologies to Milne) ... all too hard to do that.

The series of threads, however (and once you sort the wheat from the chaff), have a lot of very useful stuff from many very knowledgeable folk. Just a great pity that circumstances conspired to make it all a bit too hard for the crew at the time with due consideration of their, perhaps limited, knowledge base.

Please accept my deepest apologies... I believed that at lower level, the procedure was "at low level, minimize altitude loss, full power...." after all, the aircraft "cannot Stall". In Normal Law, that allowed for a stick (alpha) controlled by the computer...no? Pilots were accustomed to cavalier inputs. "Mayonnaise stirring"