NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin
Another one 1 month ago:
American B738 and Canada A321 at Sarasota (FL) on Feb 16th 2023, loss of separation on runway
one on takeoff, the other went around
American B738 and Canada A321 at Sarasota (FL) on Feb 16th 2023, loss of separation on runway
one on takeoff, the other went around
The attendees discussed how to effectively implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) at more than 200 of America’s busiest commercial airports. The FAA recently published a final rule that requires those airports to develop and adopt SMS programs within five years.
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The other important point is that these recommendations in this FAA text are promoting tools for curing symtoms, but not the root cause of these runway incidents. ASDE , multilateration , ground-ADS. etc..are wonderful tools to catch up errors and prevent collsions , but it is the initial errors we need and have to cprevent in the first place,
Then : "Re-examine runway incursion data to identify underlying factors that led to these incidents and identify remedies" . That is one of the normal tasks the FAA should have been doing for years, Highlighting it today as a recommendation, to re-examine it , meaning it was not yet done or not working , is a bit astonishing I would say
Not mentioning standard phraseology, ( which would definitively help in curing the first errors layer) , is not mentioned , probably because it would be extremely difficult and met with fierce resistance by both pilots and controllers , who have been trained to "expedite" and got accustomised to this slang over the years.to allow these "expeditious operations" Once you allow yourself to expedite too much and go beyong the pre-defined satndard , there is no limit , and you can extend it until reality bite you. Maybe we are getting to that point. .
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On the FAA's "read-out" -
I'm relieved to see that I'm not alone in thinking, 'aren't some of these steps ones that FAA presumably has already been taking adequate care of all along?' (or thought process to same effect).
CNN aired a 1-hour program Thursday evening on the recent spate of issues and concerns. One "explanation" heard at least once if not more times is that various workforce segments of the overall aviation sector became "rusty" over the course of the pandemic and now with resumed levels of operations and activities. But wait. European aviation sector last summer was intensely active, and encountered problems and concerns - so much so that no less than EUROCONTROL convened a 1-day program in early October to address anticipating Summer 2023 and (proverbially) "planning ahead" so as to avoid any repeats of difficulties of last summer. This SLF/attorney attended. And I don't recall any discussion of a raft, a "spate", of incursion incidents. I don't recall news items last summer from Brussels Zaventem or Frankfurt or CDG or anywhere EUROCONTROL's members' flags fly about incursions. Maybe they occurred in an expected, that is to say, typical summer-season cadence and number but didn't generate news items...(?)
But the larger point is, we're now talking about end of 2022 and almost a full first quarter of this year. And the go-to explanation is workforce segments are shakin' off the rust - still?? Something's not adding up.
FAA and NTSB worthies want not only talk, they want action. (NTSB Chair Homendy emphasized this on CNN Thursday evening). Okay, so... let the action start with drilling into this Austin incident. How and why did the controller mishandle the situation? The follow-ups must start - in earnest - someplace, do they not? And admittedly, I'm not neutral, having focused on employment and labor law for a good many years. The airlines and their workforce segments have the RLA, but the air traffic control segment(s) have nothing quite the same, do they? Whereas when you want to start a fistfight amongst United pilots, current and retired, walk into a gathering and say, "you know, Richard Ferris was right" - but for an equivalent bad-guy heavy, Reagan fired the PATCO strikers and the ATC workforce segment(s) still do not have legislated collective bargaining - or did I miss this somehow? I'm only suggesting that if it's "rust" you're after, look for it at the system (or systemic) level, not at the level of individual members of the workforce. [Hey Hey, My My......]
For some later scene, rails and airways, cats and dogs living together? I'd volunteer to work on a new, all-stakeholders process to devise an Airline Labor Act, lifted out from the RLA, sufficient to undergird the sector for some length of a technologically well-informed future. I'm not holding any breaths.
I'm relieved to see that I'm not alone in thinking, 'aren't some of these steps ones that FAA presumably has already been taking adequate care of all along?' (or thought process to same effect).
CNN aired a 1-hour program Thursday evening on the recent spate of issues and concerns. One "explanation" heard at least once if not more times is that various workforce segments of the overall aviation sector became "rusty" over the course of the pandemic and now with resumed levels of operations and activities. But wait. European aviation sector last summer was intensely active, and encountered problems and concerns - so much so that no less than EUROCONTROL convened a 1-day program in early October to address anticipating Summer 2023 and (proverbially) "planning ahead" so as to avoid any repeats of difficulties of last summer. This SLF/attorney attended. And I don't recall any discussion of a raft, a "spate", of incursion incidents. I don't recall news items last summer from Brussels Zaventem or Frankfurt or CDG or anywhere EUROCONTROL's members' flags fly about incursions. Maybe they occurred in an expected, that is to say, typical summer-season cadence and number but didn't generate news items...(?)
But the larger point is, we're now talking about end of 2022 and almost a full first quarter of this year. And the go-to explanation is workforce segments are shakin' off the rust - still?? Something's not adding up.
FAA and NTSB worthies want not only talk, they want action. (NTSB Chair Homendy emphasized this on CNN Thursday evening). Okay, so... let the action start with drilling into this Austin incident. How and why did the controller mishandle the situation? The follow-ups must start - in earnest - someplace, do they not? And admittedly, I'm not neutral, having focused on employment and labor law for a good many years. The airlines and their workforce segments have the RLA, but the air traffic control segment(s) have nothing quite the same, do they? Whereas when you want to start a fistfight amongst United pilots, current and retired, walk into a gathering and say, "you know, Richard Ferris was right" - but for an equivalent bad-guy heavy, Reagan fired the PATCO strikers and the ATC workforce segment(s) still do not have legislated collective bargaining - or did I miss this somehow? I'm only suggesting that if it's "rust" you're after, look for it at the system (or systemic) level, not at the level of individual members of the workforce. [Hey Hey, My My......]
For some later scene, rails and airways, cats and dogs living together? I'd volunteer to work on a new, all-stakeholders process to devise an Airline Labor Act, lifted out from the RLA, sufficient to undergird the sector for some length of a technologically well-informed future. I'm not holding any breaths.
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I don't recall news items last summer from Brussels Zaventem or Frankfurt or CDG or anywhere EUROCONTROL's members' flags fly about incursions. Maybe they occurred in an expected, that is to say, typical summer-season cadence and number but didn't generate news items...(?)
It is not only "rust " as you call it , we are in 2023 , that effect is now past, what is the problem is staffing numbers and quality , in ATC at least and in Europe,. Here, unlike in the US, the revenue of ANSPs depends on the traffic numbers ,no traffic. = no revenue . During the pandemic In order to reduce costs measures were taken , encouraged by management, to let go some of the very experienced and expensive staff go, retired or leaving early. But the other main issue was the training of the new ones in 2020-21 , they were trained and certified in low traffic. Now that it has restarted , ( and the traffic peaks are the same or even worse than in 2019) you have today a lack of staff and the staff you have is less experienced ,and because you are short on staff , they have to work alone , even in high traffic. so you get these kinds of basic errors..
A bit like learning to drive on quiet country roads, get you licence and get thown into rush hour alone on the peripherique in Paris or the Ring road in Brusels. . Some will learn the tricks quickly, some others may need more time .
My analysis at least , we'll know and see if I am right or wrong in a year or so when the first incidents reports are out.
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Publishing the names of the controller and supervisor with comments like “crying “ etc. are shots below the belt . Did not expect this from the NYT.
The article focuses on the controller errors but fails to mention, let alone investigate the actions of the SW crew in the same manner as it did for the controller
Also missing are comments from the FAA on staff numbers , systemic overtime and lack of equipment,
The only new info ( if confirmed ) is the 50 feet miss distance. Wonder how they came to this ( radar altimeter recording from the Fedex? ) if correct , that was really , really close ☹️
The article focuses on the controller errors but fails to mention, let alone investigate the actions of the SW crew in the same manner as it did for the controller
Also missing are comments from the FAA on staff numbers , systemic overtime and lack of equipment,
The only new info ( if confirmed ) is the 50 feet miss distance. Wonder how they came to this ( radar altimeter recording from the Fedex? ) if correct , that was really , really close ☹️
The entire article is littered with bush-league writing, e.g.:
One of the FedEx pilots commandeered the air traffic control radio frequency. [All of the radio transmissions were short and authorized with plenty of space between transmissions. “Commandeer” does not apply.]
The FedEx crew blasted the engines to climb away…[The TOGA button is informally know in the industry as the “blaster,” right?]
As the FedEx plane descended through thick clouds, though, the pilots saw something terrifying [unless the NYT interviewed the Fedex pilots, not sure how this was established. I’d bet that neither of the two Fedex pilots was “terrified.”]
Both planes were moving fast. A crash was imminent. There was no time to ask permission. [permission for what? No permission required to go around.]
They yanked the cargo plane up and gunned the engines to avoid landing on top of the smaller jet. [I’d bet that Fedex executed a standard go around with no “yanking” or “gunning.” Media sources allege that there may have been some terror-induced “blasting” though.]
Just consider the fact that this is our area of subject-matter expertise. Imagine if all the articles in the NYT are this poorly written when viewed by subject-matter experts in other fields. Makes you wonder if it’s all trash?
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I’m not sure amazing is the right word but I struggle to find a suitable replacement. Shock? Disgust? Disappointment? Disbelief? Complete lack of knowledge of Cat III and SMGCS would be a logical explanation (at least partially) for the controller’s dangerous behavior. As to this being the root of the problem, it is only part of the root. The rest of the root must include an explanation of how a controller with such grave knowledge deficiencies was allowed to operate.
The LC operated as if this was a VFR arrival except he replaced what he would usually see with his eyes with assumptions; i.e., Southwest is always ready to go! He also assumed Southwest was at the hold bars when they said ready for departure (they were not).
The LC operated as if this was a VFR arrival except he replaced what he would usually see with his eyes with assumptions; i.e., Southwest is always ready to go! He also assumed Southwest was at the hold bars when they said ready for departure (they were not).
From reading the transcripts the root of the problem goes much deeper than just that. The facrep’s comments on page 123-124 are pretty - to use his own word - depressing.
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I have not read everything yet so will defer further comments for now.
One thing that I discover with dismay in this report is that not only the full names are in the open , but also your full personal lives, history , problems ., including which medication you take, when you go to sleep, and a print out of your cellphone activity , when you called and texted.. Good for background info for an investigation team , but to put all this on Internet for everyone to see ? We live in a crazy world ..
One thing that I discover with dismay in this report is that not only the full names are in the open , but also your full personal lives, history , problems ., including which medication you take, when you go to sleep, and a print out of your cellphone activity , when you called and texted.. Good for background info for an investigation team , but to put all this on Internet for everyone to see ? We live in a crazy world ..
The final interview from the Met observer certainly doesn’t instil any faith that the FAA will sort it out. It seems the oversight of Boeing isn’t the only area where things seem a little lax.