Nepal Plane Crash
Changing seats
Fly Safe
PJ88
Because of a shortage of co-pilots the company scheduled captains to fly the other seat, being helicopter things are rather different to fixed wing when it came to accessibility of certain items, personally my choice was to remain as PM when assigned the seat.
All the terms refer to different parts of the job.
PIC vs CoPilot is who is legally responsible for the aircraft PIC is the one who must ensure the legality of operations. CoPilots are any other pilot on board assigned to operate the flight, but not finally responsible for it.
Captain vs FO/SO and so on are payrole and company specific titles usually with a list of responsibilities associated with compliance and company directives. You can have two Captains on a flight but only one will be assigned PIC, the other as CoPilot.
PF/PM/LP/RP are operational duties. Procedures will be specific to operating said position in flight. Usually a combination of manufacturer and operators procedures to ensure compliance and safety of flight. Anyone appropriately trained can perform each duty, PIC does not have to occupy the LP position, however that is the norm.
PIC vs CoPilot is who is legally responsible for the aircraft PIC is the one who must ensure the legality of operations. CoPilots are any other pilot on board assigned to operate the flight, but not finally responsible for it.
Captain vs FO/SO and so on are payrole and company specific titles usually with a list of responsibilities associated with compliance and company directives. You can have two Captains on a flight but only one will be assigned PIC, the other as CoPilot.
PF/PM/LP/RP are operational duties. Procedures will be specific to operating said position in flight. Usually a combination of manufacturer and operators procedures to ensure compliance and safety of flight. Anyone appropriately trained can perform each duty, PIC does not have to occupy the LP position, however that is the norm.
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(Many years ago, flying with a new captain on the fourth sector of the day just after midday on a Friday, being the 20th sector of that week, made me decide that after 1,000hr of line training, I had done enough. All had gone well on that flight, but I was seeing the 'danger signs'. The resulting reduction in pay was well worth it!)
I have only known one airline that restricted the percentage of a trainer's flying that could be training (that airline no longer exists). That is something that needs to be looked at very, very seriously.
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Thanks for those videaos YouX4 , good resume of the possibilities, . Very sad to see on the first video, that when the PF realized lost power they were in fact on short final for the old airport and could probably have made it had they reacted faster.
de minimus non curat lex
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ppo73zeAvDo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIlO-TBDyaw
Two Excellent Video Analysis , Summing Up Everything we Know so far .
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIlO-TBDyaw
Two Excellent Video Analysis , Summing Up Everything we Know so far .
When the NTSB carried out simulator flights (knowing that the loss of thrust was about to happen) it took I think 17 attempts to successfully dead stick the ac back to the departure airfield.
The presence of mind required to go for an unplanned ‘plan B’ for YETI 691 & instantaneously go for the old airfield would require exceptional situational awareness. So unless this extremely remote scenario had been discussed between the crew, I think it would have been a non starter.
A good spot though and worthy of some discussion.
It reminds me of Neil Williams who suffered a structural failure shortly after take off, and prevented disaster by inverting the ac immediately. He later said that he had already thought about it the day before, and what action he would take.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing…
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I've just been catching up on this, having not viewed it since the perplexing days immediately following the event. It hasn't taken long to discover what appears to have happened. But why, oh why did it happen? With this level of experience, mistaking the condition leverS with the flap lever in the first instance is almost unbelievable, but then not picking up on it when the flap lever was subsequently moved to the correct position strongly suggests incapacitation to me. Something that wasn't immediately obvious to either participant but was to prove fatal to all concerned. Events like this are a timely reminder to any of us operating these machines to check and double check what is happening around us. Assume nothing as we all know what assumptions are...
Last edited by Captain Fishy; 4th Mar 2023 at 19:59. Reason: grammar
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A
The presence of mind required to go for an unplanned ‘plan B’ for YETI 691 & instantaneously go for the old airfield would require exceptional situational awareness. So unless this extremely remote scenario had been discussed between the crew, I think it would have been a non starter. A good spot though and worthy of some discussion.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing…
The presence of mind required to go for an unplanned ‘plan B’ for YETI 691 & instantaneously go for the old airfield would require exceptional situational awareness. So unless this extremely remote scenario had been discussed between the crew, I think it would have been a non starter. A good spot though and worthy of some discussion.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing…
But that is what we do here in this forum no? That said, I have still difficulties accepting the 'simple " mixing up levers. explanation though. Hopefully the CVR/FDR will indicate if there was something more tto it.
It is slightly more disturbing than the US Bangla bingle at Katmandu, where, at a stretch, one could argue that the ND display was not as user friendly as it could be, perhaps a "PLEASE LAND HERE" message should be flashed on the map with an "INSERT THIS WAY" series of arrows suggesting which way is which for the cartographically challenged.
" the aircraft system designers were not involved in the event"
There was enough information and sensor inputs and enough computational power to avoid the type of accident. UAVs can land themselves - perhaps there needs to be a pilot cut-out switch controlled by the airplane computer.
The brainpower failure in PIA 8303 was from one pilot believing a go-around was the right move and cleaning up and the other one feeling like he could stick the landing. Seems like the computer should have been the tie-breaker.
There was enough information and sensor inputs and enough computational power to avoid the type of accident. UAVs can land themselves - perhaps there needs to be a pilot cut-out switch controlled by the airplane computer.
The brainpower failure in PIA 8303 was from one pilot believing a go-around was the right move and cleaning up and the other one feeling like he could stick the landing. Seems like the computer should have been the tie-breaker.
" the aircraft system designers were not involved in the event"
There was enough information and sensor inputs and enough computational power to avoid the type of accident. UAVs can land themselves - perhaps there needs to be a pilot cut-out switch controlled by the airplane computer.
The brainpower failure in PIA 8303 was from one pilot believing a go-around was the right move and cleaning up and the other one feeling like he could stick the landing. Seems like the computer should have been the tie-breaker.
There was enough information and sensor inputs and enough computational power to avoid the type of accident. UAVs can land themselves - perhaps there needs to be a pilot cut-out switch controlled by the airplane computer.
The brainpower failure in PIA 8303 was from one pilot believing a go-around was the right move and cleaning up and the other one feeling like he could stick the landing. Seems like the computer should have been the tie-breaker.
I crawl over broken glass to defend defensible positions of HMI, P-I-T-L stuff, but sometimes, just sometimes, it is just head shakin' makin'.
Aviation should not require an A grade performance at all times, however, it should avoid having F-troop in the office; the walk on freight would probably appreciate airlines and regulators avoiding the latter.
Last edited by fdr; 5th Mar 2023 at 03:26.
I agree - rubber hitting the runway would have been a better choice. HAL had all the info required to know to inhibit pilot#2 from pulling them up.
I think it can be both. If the plane overrides the pilot that goes to investigation and potentially removes another problem source from the pointy end before they can go any farther.
I think it can be both. If the plane overrides the pilot that goes to investigation and potentially removes another problem source from the pointy end before they can go any farther.
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Surprisingly though, not everyone on board was killed; there were 2 survivors from among the passengers.
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I just wonder … about operating the wrong lever in the first place …
If you look at the interesting video of Magnar in detail … his explanation goes in slow deliberate steps … this gives the pilot time to feel the shape of the knobs, which is a possible muscle memory trigger …
both CL’s as a pair and the single flap lever … both require a liftup/pull action, but a bit different,… again Magnar here shows relatively slow deliberate actions adding possible muscle memory triggers…
question that i now have (for ATR pilots) … how different would it feel… (while looking out of the window) … but now, going in a rush, doing a ‘single’ fast and rough lift up/pull movement of each of the levers … between CL and flap operation?
in other words does a fast movement substantially reduce the difference in feel, and thereby reduce possible triggers ?
if so, in that case, would there be a difference being in the left seat or the right seat…?
if so, in that case, would there be a difference in the pilot being right or left handed…?
If you look at the interesting video of Magnar in detail … his explanation goes in slow deliberate steps … this gives the pilot time to feel the shape of the knobs, which is a possible muscle memory trigger …
both CL’s as a pair and the single flap lever … both require a liftup/pull action, but a bit different,… again Magnar here shows relatively slow deliberate actions adding possible muscle memory triggers…
question that i now have (for ATR pilots) … how different would it feel… (while looking out of the window) … but now, going in a rush, doing a ‘single’ fast and rough lift up/pull movement of each of the levers … between CL and flap operation?
in other words does a fast movement substantially reduce the difference in feel, and thereby reduce possible triggers ?
if so, in that case, would there be a difference being in the left seat or the right seat…?
if so, in that case, would there be a difference in the pilot being right or left handed…?
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question that i now have (for ATR pilots) … how different would it feel… (while looking out of the window) … but now, going in a rush, doing a ‘single’ fast and rough lift up/pull movement of each of the levers … between CL and flap operation?
in other words does a fast movement substantially reduce the difference in feel, and thereby reduce possible triggers ?
in other words does a fast movement substantially reduce the difference in feel, and thereby reduce possible triggers ?
if so, in that case, would there be a difference being in the left seat or the right seat…?
We know now that this was not the case.
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In the cabin video, are the cabin lights off? Or are they always off during a day flight? I cannot determine if they are on or off from the video stream as I'm not very familiar with the aircraft. Also on the before landing checklist there are items that would have been a clue (Ex. lights) to point to an AC "wild" generator shutdown. Or is that just a flick switch without indicator?
Although not related to this accident it's noteworthy that the ATR engines are labelled 1 & 2. The original B737-200s had this labelling but later Boeing types changed to L & R, a potential source of confusion due to multiple meanings of the word 'right'. As in:
Looks like we'll have to shut it down.
Agreed - make sure we shut down the right engine.
Did Boeing managers initiate the change of labelling or was it customer airlines? And for what reason?
Looks like we'll have to shut it down.
Agreed - make sure we shut down the right engine.
Did Boeing managers initiate the change of labelling or was it customer airlines? And for what reason?
(PAX). From my position of layperson ignorance, I find it a bit odd that the 'pilot monitoring' gets to move controls. Is the 'pilot flying' meant to monitor the ' pilot monitoring' for these actions ? In this case, from what I can see, the initial pf didn't do much in the way of monitoring either after control was handed over to the previous pm.
Is the task of landing so onerous that the pf can't manipulate flaps and gear under the watchful gaze of the pm ? Genuinely puzzled .
Is the task of landing so onerous that the pf can't manipulate flaps and gear under the watchful gaze of the pm ? Genuinely puzzled .