Nepal Plane Crash
Under EASA’s Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/2338, aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 59,500 pounds manufactured after Jan. 1, 2021 must feature a CVR with a recording duration of at least 25 hours and the ability to accurately determine the location of an aircraft accident. Part of the new requirements also took effect as of Jan. 1, 2019, including the replacement of recorders featuring magnetic tape with solid-state CVRs.
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A long time ago, when I was a newbie copilot, it was drilled into me for handing powerplant/wheels/flaps controls: "(name control) Identified " (as pilot handling engine controls puts hand on that control knob) "Confirmed" (pilot monitoring says) then the pilot handling operates the control. Is it still done this way?
June 2019 in Canada, the PNF pulled the condition levers to shutdown on a cargo Basler DC-3T by mistake, and you have to pull them past a gate to do it! Splashed the plane.
June 2019 in Canada, the PNF pulled the condition levers to shutdown on a cargo Basler DC-3T by mistake, and you have to pull them past a gate to do it! Splashed the plane.
Too many pilots will operate a control be it flaps or gear without actually checking what they have their hand on. Many times an Airbus has landed with the park brake on when the crew thought they had selected the flaps.
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@ Michaelbinary :
For 2 pilots, both captains, to have made such stupid and elmentary errors and then not recognise the results of their actions and cause a perfectly servicable aircraft to crash is unforgivable.
Enough of people saying they were tired, or fatigued or stressed, flying the bloody plane was their job and between them they screwed up.
Enough of people saying they were tired, or fatigued or stressed, flying the bloody plane was their job and between them they screwed up.
1- The prelim report said the props were feathered nothing else, what you say is probable but is still a speculation . Remember there are families and friends behind those pilots that may read or shown messages like yours .
2- Nobody here said they were tired , fatigued or stressed. We did ( I was one of the first) raised the issue as one of the possible contributing causes, but only the report will establish if it played a role here.
Apportioning blame should not be part of any aviation investigation , which is basically what you just did , and worse not knowing all the facts
The leaked memo with the suggestions/ early lessons learned did mention fatigue and the need to improve duty hours. And it mentioned a need to check instructors to operate by manufacturer approved procedures and standards.
Surely you mean the speed brakes, not the parking brake . because seen the position , the form of the knob and the mechanism to activate ( turn instead of up/down movement) I would find this highly improbable. But Ok there might be a first in everything.
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Safety Pilot
Not sure if this was suggested before, but when there’s training in the cockpit, normally there’s a safety pilot in the jump seat.
may have helped in this situation.
may have helped in this situation.
de minimus non curat lex
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With a FO being trained up as (new) Captain occupying the LHS on a type already qualified as a FO, unlikely to have a covering pilot.
They should be a third pair of eyes although that proved to be untrue on the Turkish 737-800 at AMS which stalled on final approach.
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My understanding was that both captains were already qualified on the ATR 72, the captain on the left was taking an airport familiarization course however. There have been multiple events in the past where having additional pairs of eyes in the flightdeck proved useless as parkfell mentionned.
Drain Bamaged
I'm pretty sure both Basler's guys knew right away what happened and just didn't have enough time to do a restart contrary to the obvious cockpit confusion in the Nepal crash.
I’m wondering was there a medical issue affecting PM?
Do we actually have any current ATR pilots here to explain how the condition levers and flap levers are operated..?As I understand it the CLs have `release buttons underneath the `knobs`,which have to be lifted ,before moved,Does the flaplever have to be moved in a similar fashion between settings...? Was the prop setting at 100%,before the event,or is that only done on `finals`...?
I have watched Magnar`s training videos,but in-cockpit operations it is difficult to see if the PM actually `looks`before selecting either,flap or CL lever.
I have watched Magnar`s training videos,but in-cockpit operations it is difficult to see if the PM actually `looks`before selecting either,flap or CL lever.
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On second toughts it looks like this satement was probably in pipeline before the accident and the Team used the accident to leak it , to show they were on top of things, but I doubbt it was written, at least not in its totality, especially for this Yeti ATR accident .But maybe it was , we;ll see when the final is out.
@Lookleft
Nope I mean park brakes and not just a first, its happened on at least 5 occasions. On an A320 the park brake is next to the flap handle.
@Parkfell :
They should be a third pair of eyes although that proved to be untrue on the Turkish 737-800 at AMS which stalled on final approach.
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I'd say this wasn't the first time that the props were feathered but the mistake was spotted in time, I'm quite surprised that there isn't a audible warning that they have been feathered, looking at the position of those levers, especially with flaps 15 selected and when flaps 30 are called for then IMO its almost inevitible that someone will, under the "right" conditions, pull the wrong lever(s).
The Staines accident occured despite having three pilots, a P1 and a P2 plus additionally, a monitoring pilot, a P3 sitting back between them. After this accident a speed baulk was installed to prevent retraction of the droop lever until the speed was above the stall speed. BEA said that the likelihood of someone retracting the droops before the stall speed was exceeded was very low because the droop lever only became unguarded when the flap lever was moved, it then only took something like 10 secs for the speed to build up to exceed the stall limit.
The Staines accident occured despite having three pilots, a P1 and a P2 plus additionally, a monitoring pilot, a P3 sitting back between them. After this accident a speed baulk was installed to prevent retraction of the droop lever until the speed was above the stall speed. BEA said that the likelihood of someone retracting the droops before the stall speed was exceeded was very low because the droop lever only became unguarded when the flap lever was moved, it then only took something like 10 secs for the speed to build up to exceed the stall limit.
I'd say this wasn't the first time that the props were feathered but the mistake was spotted in time, I'm quite surprised that there isn't a audible warning that they have been feathered, looking at the position of those levers, especially with flaps 15 selected and when flaps 30 are called for then IMO its almost inevitible that someone will, under the "right" conditions, pull the wrong lever(s).
The Staines accident occured despite having three pilots, a P1 and a P2 plus additionally, a monitoring pilot, a P3 sitting back between them. After this accident a speed baulk was installed to prevent retraction of the droop lever until the speed was above the stall speed. BEA said that the likelihood of someone retracting the droops before the stall speed was exceeded was very low because the droop lever only became unguarded when the flap lever was moved, it then only took something like 10 secs for the speed to build up to exceed the stall limit.
The Staines accident occured despite having three pilots, a P1 and a P2 plus additionally, a monitoring pilot, a P3 sitting back between them. After this accident a speed baulk was installed to prevent retraction of the droop lever until the speed was above the stall speed. BEA said that the likelihood of someone retracting the droops before the stall speed was exceeded was very low because the droop lever only became unguarded when the flap lever was moved, it then only took something like 10 secs for the speed to build up to exceed the stall limit.
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And while I'm at it, can we have an end to this ridiculous term "Pilot Monitoring"? "Monitor" has a colour of policing, which is the last thing we want. The term should be "Support Pilot", and I marvel so many of us have got it so wrong for so long.
"Flying Pilot", "Support Pilot", okay?
"Flying Pilot", "Support Pilot", okay?
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Not being a suitably qualified pilot, may I ask: are the condition levers moved to full feather as part of the normal post flight procedures? If so I wonder if a partial explanation of the erroneous selection of the condition levers was that the right seat pilot had already done that action twice that day so it would not feel as inappropriate as it otherwise would, muscle memory being another part of the equation.
All this assuming that the final report does indeed conclude that the feathering was manual and not due to some mechanical failure.
All this assuming that the final report does indeed conclude that the feathering was manual and not due to some mechanical failure.
@ATC Watcher
Look at it from the reverse perspective...
On each and every flight, pilots make hundreds or even thousands of safe and correct selections and decisions that prevent a catastrophe and crash killing everybody.
This has to be performed to 100% on each and every flight to be a safe sector without hull loss.
It is only when one of these things is screwed up that an accident ensues...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lookleft View Post
Too many pilots will operate a control be it flaps or gear without actually checking what they have their hand on. Many times an Airbus has landed with the park brake on when the crew thought they had selected the flaps.
Surely you mean the speed brakes, not the parking brake . because seen the position , the form of the knob and the mechanism to activate ( turn instead of up/down movement) I would find this highly improbable. But Ok there might be a first in everything.
@ Michaelbinary :
Quote:
For 2 pilots, both captains, to have made such stupid and elmentary errors and then not recognise the results of their actions and cause a perfectly servicable aircraft to crash is unforgivable.
Enough of people saying they were tired, or fatigued or stressed, flying the bloody plane was their job and between them they screwed up.
Before hanging up high the pilots here 2 facts to remember:
1- The prelim report said the props were feathered nothing else, what you say is probable but is still a speculation . Remember there are families and friends behind those pilots that may read or shown messages like yours .
2- Nobody here said they were tired , fatigued or stressed. We did ( I was one of the first) raised the issue as one of the possible contributing causes, but only the report will establish if it played a role here.
Apportioning blame should not be part of any aviation investigation , which is basically what you just did , and worse not knowing all the facts
ATC Watcher is offline
Originally Posted by Lookleft View Post
Too many pilots will operate a control be it flaps or gear without actually checking what they have their hand on. Many times an Airbus has landed with the park brake on when the crew thought they had selected the flaps.
Surely you mean the speed brakes, not the parking brake . because seen the position , the form of the knob and the mechanism to activate ( turn instead of up/down movement) I would find this highly improbable. But Ok there might be a first in everything.
@ Michaelbinary :
Quote:
For 2 pilots, both captains, to have made such stupid and elmentary errors and then not recognise the results of their actions and cause a perfectly servicable aircraft to crash is unforgivable.
Enough of people saying they were tired, or fatigued or stressed, flying the bloody plane was their job and between them they screwed up.
Before hanging up high the pilots here 2 facts to remember:
1- The prelim report said the props were feathered nothing else, what you say is probable but is still a speculation . Remember there are families and friends behind those pilots that may read or shown messages like yours .
2- Nobody here said they were tired , fatigued or stressed. We did ( I was one of the first) raised the issue as one of the possible contributing causes, but only the report will establish if it played a role here.
Apportioning blame should not be part of any aviation investigation , which is basically what you just did , and worse not knowing all the facts
ATC Watcher is offline
On each and every flight, pilots make hundreds or even thousands of safe and correct selections and decisions that prevent a catastrophe and crash killing everybody.
This has to be performed to 100% on each and every flight to be a safe sector without hull loss.
It is only when one of these things is screwed up that an accident ensues...
Is the design brilliant? Nope, when ah HS748 looks like an ergonomic miracle, it is time to revisit the Part 25 bits that surround HMI, but until then, would it not be nice for people to do pilots things when they dress up in fancy dress.
@ATC Watcher
Look at it from the reverse perspective...
On each and every flight, pilots make hundreds or even thousands of safe and correct selections and decisions that prevent a catastrophe and crash killing everybody.
This has to be performed to 100% on each and every flight to be a safe sector without hull loss.
It is only when one of these things is screwed up that an accident ensues...
Look at it from the reverse perspective...
On each and every flight, pilots make hundreds or even thousands of safe and correct selections and decisions that prevent a catastrophe and crash killing everybody.
This has to be performed to 100% on each and every flight to be a safe sector without hull loss.
It is only when one of these things is screwed up that an accident ensues...
Hours in the aircraft do not correlate linearly to safety, something that insurers should comprehend but do not.
