Airbus Procedures and callouts
Only half a speed-brake
Hi, the original AB logic is that with AP on:
The PF will perform all necessary selections, and after the modes become active, read out loud the FMA.
So the answer to your question is: NO (as per Airbus).
The callout "SET" is in use whenever PF will ask the other guy to do something for him/her.
Šťastlivo, FD.
EDITED: the clue you may have missed is in the headline of the page provided: actions COMMANDED by PF. In this sense, COMMANDED means whenever the PF requests somebody else to perform a selection / adjustment / action.
The PF will perform all necessary selections, and after the modes become active, read out loud the FMA.
So the answer to your question is: NO (as per Airbus).
The callout "SET" is in use whenever PF will ask the other guy to do something for him/her.
Šťastlivo, FD.
EDITED: the clue you may have missed is in the headline of the page provided: actions COMMANDED by PF. In this sense, COMMANDED means whenever the PF requests somebody else to perform a selection / adjustment / action.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,407
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
StrIA
The basic principle of handling FCU is to look at FCU to select the appropriate knob but check the value on PFD with or without guidance mode change.The title ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF is incomplete because it doesn't mention that PF commands actions when he is manually flying. With AP on PF takes the actions himself.
The basic principle of handling FCU is to look at FCU to select the appropriate knob but check the value on PFD with or without guidance mode change.The title ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF is incomplete because it doesn't mention that PF commands actions when he is manually flying. With AP on PF takes the actions himself.
Join Date: Apr 2013
Location: Europe
Age: 54
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
vilas
Did I rightly know? That if PF is want to change FL320 to FL340, he announces own's actions: FL340-"SET", "PULL", afterthat reads FMA: FL340 BLUE, THR IDLE, OP CLB.
Or so PF doesn't announce the actions on FCU, only FMA
It's very important for me.
Thank's
With AP on PF takes the actions himself.
Or so PF doesn't announce the actions on FCU, only FMA
It's very important for me.
Thank's
Quote from vilas:
"The basic principle of handling FCU is to look at FCU to select the appropriate knob but check the value on PFD with or without guidance mode change.The title ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF is incomplete because it doesn't mention that PF commands actions when he is manually flying. With AP on PF takes the actions himself."
YES! Spot-on.
And if you current Airbus-flyers will permit me to intrude briefly into your conversation, the other VITAL discipline is that the person who has made the mode-change on the FCU (as described by vilas) does NOT call the result on the FMAs. If the call is to have any monitoring value it MUST be made by the OTHER pilot.
If - due to inattention, high workload or R/T operations - the other pilot fails to call an FMA change that is required by the airline's FCOM, the pilot who has made the FCU selection can choose a suitable moment to ask him/her to "Check FMAs?" In a continuing high workload situation, of course, that may not be practicable. In that case, wait for the next required FMA call. If that is not forthcoming, it may indicate that the other pilot is overloaded (or possibly incapacitated).
"The basic principle of handling FCU is to look at FCU to select the appropriate knob but check the value on PFD with or without guidance mode change.The title ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF is incomplete because it doesn't mention that PF commands actions when he is manually flying. With AP on PF takes the actions himself."
YES! Spot-on.
And if you current Airbus-flyers will permit me to intrude briefly into your conversation, the other VITAL discipline is that the person who has made the mode-change on the FCU (as described by vilas) does NOT call the result on the FMAs. If the call is to have any monitoring value it MUST be made by the OTHER pilot.
If - due to inattention, high workload or R/T operations - the other pilot fails to call an FMA change that is required by the airline's FCOM, the pilot who has made the FCU selection can choose a suitable moment to ask him/her to "Check FMAs?" In a continuing high workload situation, of course, that may not be practicable. In that case, wait for the next required FMA call. If that is not forthcoming, it may indicate that the other pilot is overloaded (or possibly incapacitated).
And if you current Airbus-flyers will permit me to intrude briefly into your conversation, the other VITAL discipline is that the person who has made the mode-change on the FCU (as described by vilas) does NOT call the result on the FMAs. If the call is to have any monitoring value it MUST be made by the OTHER pilot.
If - due to inattention, high workload or R/T operations - the other pilot fails to call an FMA change that is required by the airline's FCOM, the pilot who has made the FCU selection can choose a suitable moment to ask him/her to "Check FMAs?" In a continuing high workload situation, of course, that may not be practicable. In that case, wait for the next required FMA call. If that is not forthcoming, it may indicate that the other pilot is overloaded (or possibly incapacitated).
If - due to inattention, high workload or R/T operations - the other pilot fails to call an FMA change that is required by the airline's FCOM, the pilot who has made the FCU selection can choose a suitable moment to ask him/her to "Check FMAs?" In a continuing high workload situation, of course, that may not be practicable. In that case, wait for the next required FMA call. If that is not forthcoming, it may indicate that the other pilot is overloaded (or possibly incapacitated).
Quote from Capn Bloggs:
"Or just have the discipline to, as PF, only call something that is already on the FMA and as PNF, not call "checked" without looking at the FMA first... Pretty simple really."
With respect, although you are right to emphasise that it's vital for a call not to be made until the new FMA combination has been verified, there's rather more to it than that. Let me explain.
Firstly, as others have pointed out, the PF only makes the FCU selections when the AP is engaged. If it isn't, the PF theoretically orders what he/she wants and the FCU selection is made by the PNF (PM). That's why I avoided mention of PF and PNF in my post.
Secondly, it's unnecessary and counter-productive for both pilots to speak following the FMA change. The only one who should announce the FMA change is the pilot who did NOT make the selection.
The pilot who made the selection carefully verifies that the FMA change on his/her PFD is in accordance with what (s)he wants, but there is no need for him/her to make a call. There are two reasons for this:
(1) otherwise it discourages the other pilot from taking time to check it properly on his/her PFD;
(2) both pilots calling adds to the plethora of noise in the cockpit (and the brief expression "checked" is so ambiguous as to be of little value).
Remember, as you imply in your post, the pilot who has made the selection is always, by definition, content that (s)he has got it right. Putting the responsibility on the other pilot to make the call:
(a) gives an independent verification (a second opinion);
(b) forces the other pilot to remain "in the loop".
"Or just have the discipline to, as PF, only call something that is already on the FMA and as PNF, not call "checked" without looking at the FMA first... Pretty simple really."
With respect, although you are right to emphasise that it's vital for a call not to be made until the new FMA combination has been verified, there's rather more to it than that. Let me explain.
Firstly, as others have pointed out, the PF only makes the FCU selections when the AP is engaged. If it isn't, the PF theoretically orders what he/she wants and the FCU selection is made by the PNF (PM). That's why I avoided mention of PF and PNF in my post.
Secondly, it's unnecessary and counter-productive for both pilots to speak following the FMA change. The only one who should announce the FMA change is the pilot who did NOT make the selection.
The pilot who made the selection carefully verifies that the FMA change on his/her PFD is in accordance with what (s)he wants, but there is no need for him/her to make a call. There are two reasons for this:
(1) otherwise it discourages the other pilot from taking time to check it properly on his/her PFD;
(2) both pilots calling adds to the plethora of noise in the cockpit (and the brief expression "checked" is so ambiguous as to be of little value).
Remember, as you imply in your post, the pilot who has made the selection is always, by definition, content that (s)he has got it right. Putting the responsibility on the other pilot to make the call:
(a) gives an independent verification (a second opinion);
(b) forces the other pilot to remain "in the loop".
Join Date: May 2007
Location: FL390
Age: 38
Posts: 224
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My opinion regarding FMA and cockpit monitoring..
1) Reading FMA has obvious advantages, well analyzed above.
2) Reading and generally challenging the SOP callouts force you to stay in the loop. Autocallouts simply isn't the solution. One day remove them and we all know the results. E.g remove ALT Alert together with ALT ACQ in the boeings (or whatever aircraft with altitude alert), distract them and here you are with a nice flown level bust. Called Primary-Backup inversion. Saying thousand to go is there to enchance your and your colleague's SA. Not for confirming that the altitude alert sounded. This was actually done in a Boeing simulator in a research.
3) SOPs are designed for a standard pilot. This ranges from the younger one to the older, with excellent, average, unsatisfactory performance (at times for gods sake) or whatever and with different personalities, interests. Simply saying that "two good pilots fly nice paired together" is not the everyday norm. One can stay in the loop easily, others can't. This is reality...SOP's are for everyone.
I dont say that calling anything loudly is the best practice, however, for sure, it is safe. If it's too loud I don't know. Checklists and procedures today are so summarized that I don't even find it boring to do so.
It is a personal opinion only.
Only half a speed-brake
StrIA: as per Airbus doctrine:
PF with autopilot engaged
- will make all selections silently
- afterwards read out loud the FMA
- PNF then confirms from his side with a verbal confirmation (check)
PF with autopilot NOT engaged
- will request the other pilot to do the required actions using standard callout "SET .. " / "... MANAGE" / " ... PULL"
- the other pilot will make all selections silently and then read out loud his respective FMA-
- PF then confirms from his own side with a verbal confirmation (check).
Chris Scott: I wonder when they did change? The above is valid since 2004 min.
PF with autopilot engaged
- will make all selections silently
- afterwards read out loud the FMA
- PNF then confirms from his side with a verbal confirmation (check)
PF with autopilot NOT engaged
- will request the other pilot to do the required actions using standard callout "SET .. " / "... MANAGE" / " ... PULL"
- the other pilot will make all selections silently and then read out loud his respective FMA-
- PF then confirms from his own side with a verbal confirmation (check).
Chris Scott: I wonder when they did change? The above is valid since 2004 min.
Hi FlightDetent,
Thanks for the heads-up on the manufacturer's SOP. The philosophy detailed in my two posts above predates 2004, and was not from Airbus's FCOM. In the airline that employed me it was SOP from 1988 until 2002, at least, and AFAIK it still applies there. I'm not familiar with other airlines' current SOPs, but I would be surprised if all of them conform precisely to the manufacturer's FCOM.
The task-allocation of FMA calls I described evolved in the months following the introduction into service of the A320 during 1988. We were a launch customer and had experience of previous types with FMAs, such as the DC-10 and A310. On the DC-10 they were comparatively few, and IIRC both pilots would call all FMA changes. That was tolerable but, when we had acquired a couple of A310s in 1984, the type's greater number and complexity of FMAs led to a lot of criticism of the resulting plethora of calls.
Many of us initial pilots on the A320, including the chief training captain, had earlier been on the A310 and had done our type conversions at Toulouse on both types. Airbus's own SOPs for the A320 were not fully defined, however, and the type had/has even more FMAs than the A310. (A handful more were added as improvements were made in the first few years.) So it was up to our fleet management to define our policy for FMA calls.
The two issues for consideration were which FMA changes needed to be called and who to make the calls. The former were pruned to a fairly modest list; the latter designed to be in accordance with good CRM. Clearly the latter must ensure that the two pilots share responsibility for any current or projected changes in the flight-path commanded via the AFS.
The FCU is complex and easily mishandled but, as previously noted, the pilot who has manipulated it will by definition think (s)he has got what (s)he wanted. One of the easiest mistakes, IIRC, is to call the armed altitude just before removing finger and thumb from the ALT selector knob. During removal, as you know, it's possible to shift the knob unintentionally - particularly in turbulence. So, in general, it's vital not to spoon-feed the other pilot into a false sense of security. In both high and low workload situations, it's all too tempting for him/her to call "checked!" without really doing so. (S)he must be made to look AND think. Giving him/her the task of making the call should achieve that.
The SOP I have described in these three posts served us well during the 14 years I spent on my airline's A320 fleet. If in the last 28 years Airbus may not have fully addressed the CRM aspects of FMA calls, I would admit to being disappointed. Routine airline operations with qualified line-pilots are, of course, different from an Airbus line-training environment where, typically, the Airbus training captain would be teaching a pilot or embryonic crew from scratch.
Chris
Thanks for the heads-up on the manufacturer's SOP. The philosophy detailed in my two posts above predates 2004, and was not from Airbus's FCOM. In the airline that employed me it was SOP from 1988 until 2002, at least, and AFAIK it still applies there. I'm not familiar with other airlines' current SOPs, but I would be surprised if all of them conform precisely to the manufacturer's FCOM.
The task-allocation of FMA calls I described evolved in the months following the introduction into service of the A320 during 1988. We were a launch customer and had experience of previous types with FMAs, such as the DC-10 and A310. On the DC-10 they were comparatively few, and IIRC both pilots would call all FMA changes. That was tolerable but, when we had acquired a couple of A310s in 1984, the type's greater number and complexity of FMAs led to a lot of criticism of the resulting plethora of calls.
Many of us initial pilots on the A320, including the chief training captain, had earlier been on the A310 and had done our type conversions at Toulouse on both types. Airbus's own SOPs for the A320 were not fully defined, however, and the type had/has even more FMAs than the A310. (A handful more were added as improvements were made in the first few years.) So it was up to our fleet management to define our policy for FMA calls.
The two issues for consideration were which FMA changes needed to be called and who to make the calls. The former were pruned to a fairly modest list; the latter designed to be in accordance with good CRM. Clearly the latter must ensure that the two pilots share responsibility for any current or projected changes in the flight-path commanded via the AFS.
The FCU is complex and easily mishandled but, as previously noted, the pilot who has manipulated it will by definition think (s)he has got what (s)he wanted. One of the easiest mistakes, IIRC, is to call the armed altitude just before removing finger and thumb from the ALT selector knob. During removal, as you know, it's possible to shift the knob unintentionally - particularly in turbulence. So, in general, it's vital not to spoon-feed the other pilot into a false sense of security. In both high and low workload situations, it's all too tempting for him/her to call "checked!" without really doing so. (S)he must be made to look AND think. Giving him/her the task of making the call should achieve that.
The SOP I have described in these three posts served us well during the 14 years I spent on my airline's A320 fleet. If in the last 28 years Airbus may not have fully addressed the CRM aspects of FMA calls, I would admit to being disappointed. Routine airline operations with qualified line-pilots are, of course, different from an Airbus line-training environment where, typically, the Airbus training captain would be teaching a pilot or embryonic crew from scratch.
Chris
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: Village of Santo Poco
Posts: 876
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,407
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I didn't understand what is the confusion about FD's original post "What do you say after arming the approach mode and engaging the other AP? It has always been GLIDE SLOPE BLUE, LOC BLUE, CAT3 DUAL, AP 1+2
Only half a speed-brake
That post was done 5 months ago as a gentle push to Speedwinner in the right direction. The smiley face is the hint. Judging by his response then, it worked.
Nothing to see here, move along ...
Nothing to see here, move along ...
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: 5° above the Equator, 75° left of Greenwich
Posts: 412
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I simply find it amazing that the easier thing to do is usually the hardest. Mate, with all due to respect to everyone: you're flying a 77 ton aircraft that can carry 170+ people at 700+ kmh and you're one of only two guys preventing the thing from making a hole in the ground. Every action done or not can lead to something unexpected and potentially dangerous, even fatal and you know you can make a mistake so easily. Are you telling me that knowing all this, you can't spare a second or two to confirm that you (or your colleague) are not heading to a potentially hazardous situation and call "checked" by mere reflex? Someone said it before, it's called being professional about your job. Simple as that.
We do call out the FMA (Latin American operator), though I'm fairly recent to the type, I came from a turbo prop aircraft on which we also called the FMA. It may be a bit loud and noisy at times, but there comes this flight at night in bad weather where it becomes important to read and call the FMA
We do call out the FMA (Latin American operator), though I'm fairly recent to the type, I came from a turbo prop aircraft on which we also called the FMA. It may be a bit loud and noisy at times, but there comes this flight at night in bad weather where it becomes important to read and call the FMA
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: india
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
correct way for FCU handling
Hello team,
I have a query regarding the FCU Handling.
If The instruction given by ATC is to turn left heading180deg and reduce speed to 180kts. As PF What is the correct way for handling FCU apart from The point given above:
a) first turn heading/speed knob to 180Deg and then pull or,
b) first pull the respective knob and then set.
Thank you.
I have a query regarding the FCU Handling.
If The instruction given by ATC is to turn left heading180deg and reduce speed to 180kts. As PF What is the correct way for handling FCU apart from The point given above:
a) first turn heading/speed knob to 180Deg and then pull or,
b) first pull the respective knob and then set.
Thank you.
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: UK
Posts: 71
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
a. Correct either or. Make sure does not turn wrong way.
b. Reducing speed is dependent on GW and selected/managed speed and S speed and F speed. To many variations.
I prefer the PF to call FMA's as it implies they are not incapacitated. One particular First officer in mind.
b. Reducing speed is dependent on GW and selected/managed speed and S speed and F speed. To many variations.
I prefer the PF to call FMA's as it implies they are not incapacitated. One particular First officer in mind.
Join Date: Jan 2014
Location: N5109.2W10.5
Posts: 720
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
a) Possible for the aircraft to turn in the wrong direction if the new heading selected is more than 180 degrees away.
b) Better way as you can see on the FMA that you have pulled the correct knob (avoids speed / heading mix up) and will always generate the turn in the correct sense.
b) Better way as you can see on the FMA that you have pulled the correct knob (avoids speed / heading mix up) and will always generate the turn in the correct sense.
Seeking some feedback on other Airbus operators around the globe to FMA callouts regarding Alt/FL.
If below TA and cleared to climb FL370, PF sets 37000 in the FCU window however the PFD still shows 37000 in blue. Only once, above TA and altimeters switch to STD will it change to FL370.
My question is do you guys call 37000 blue or FL370 blue? As per FCOM and our OMB requirements we call what is displayed from the PFD.
If below TA and cleared to climb FL370, PF sets 37000 in the FCU window however the PFD still shows 37000 in blue. Only once, above TA and altimeters switch to STD will it change to FL370.
My question is do you guys call 37000 blue or FL370 blue? As per FCOM and our OMB requirements we call what is displayed from the PFD.