Hi
FlightDetent,
Thanks for the heads-up on the manufacturer's SOP. The philosophy detailed in my two posts above predates 2004, and was not from Airbus's FCOM. In the airline that employed me it was SOP from 1988 until 2002, at least, and
AFAIK it still applies there. I'm not familiar with other airlines' current SOPs, but I would be surprised if all of them conform precisely to the manufacturer's FCOM.
The task-allocation of FMA calls I described evolved in the months following the introduction into service of the A320 during 1988. We were a launch customer and had experience of previous types with FMAs, such as the DC-10 and A310. On the DC-10 they were comparatively few, and IIRC both pilots would call all FMA changes. That was tolerable but, when we had acquired a couple of A310s in 1984, the type's greater number and complexity of FMAs led to a lot of criticism of the resulting plethora of calls.
Many of us initial pilots on the A320, including the chief training captain, had earlier been on the A310 and had done our type conversions at Toulouse on both types. Airbus's own SOPs for the A320 were not fully defined, however, and the type had/has even more FMAs than the A310. (A handful more were added as improvements were made in the first few years.) So it was up to our fleet management to define our policy for FMA calls.
The two issues for consideration were which FMA changes needed to be called and who to make the calls. The former were pruned to a fairly modest list; the latter designed to be in accordance with good CRM. Clearly the latter must ensure that the two pilots share responsibility for any current or projected changes in the flight-path commanded via the AFS.
The FCU is complex and easily mishandled but, as previously noted, the pilot who has manipulated it will by definition think (s)he has got what (s)he wanted. One of the easiest mistakes, IIRC, is to call the armed altitude just before removing finger and thumb from the ALT selector knob. During removal, as you know, it's possible to shift the knob unintentionally - particularly in turbulence. So, in general, it's vital not to spoon-feed the other pilot into a false sense of security. In both high and low workload situations, it's all too tempting for him/her to call "checked!" without really doing so. (S)he must be made to look AND think. Giving him/her the task of making the call should achieve that.
The SOP I have described in these three posts served us well during the 14 years I spent on my airline's A320 fleet. If in the last 28 years Airbus may not have fully addressed the CRM aspects of FMA calls, I would admit to being disappointed. Routine airline operations with qualified line-pilots are, of course, different from an Airbus line-training environment where, typically, the Airbus training captain would be teaching a pilot or embryonic crew from scratch.
Chris