RAF Rivet Joint
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Engines,
Fully agree with your post.. however, ambulance chasing lawyers are certainly a consideration these days. Ask an ex-colleague of mine who spent a long time with the threat of legal action hanging over him because he did what a senior officer ordered him to do. (Thankfully it was all dropped because he kept a good paper trail). There but for the grace of God perhaps?
Fully agree with your post.. however, ambulance chasing lawyers are certainly a consideration these days. Ask an ex-colleague of mine who spent a long time with the threat of legal action hanging over him because he did what a senior officer ordered him to do. (Thankfully it was all dropped because he kept a good paper trail). There but for the grace of God perhaps?
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Wensley,
Yes, I agree that the lawyers are very much more in evidence than they were. I have recent experience of this being used, but not in the way I expected - being told that if my actions delayed a project, the MoD could be sued for 'undue delays'. Note no mention of the MoD running the risk of being sued for taking short cuts with basic airworthiness management.
I agree that things have changed, but the basics of ensuring a safe and effective product for the aircrew haven't, and that's what Tuc keeps pointing out. Neither have the basics of military discipline - if an order's not reasonable, you don't have to obey it. Here's my (not very warry) story.
My first ever front line embarkation. I'm a very junior Lieutenant aircraft engineer. During an ORI, but not at war. Aircraft lands on with blade leading edge strip (old rubber type) severely holed and lifting. I tell the crew to shut down. Senior Pilot angrily tells me to sign the aircraft fit for the next sortie. I refuse. He then gives me a direct order to do as I am told and sign the aircraft as serviceable. I drop the volume, request a word in a quiet space away from the flight deck. I quietly tell him that I'm the engineer, he is the pilot, and I will get the aircraft fixed as fast as possible, and only then will he get the aircraft to fly. If he's unhappy, get another engineer.
Pause.
Senior Pilot asks me if I'm sure I'm right. I say yes. he nods, turns and walks off. Here's the postscript. We had a truly outstanding relationship from that point forward. I would have jumped over the proverbial cliff for him, and I know he'd have done the same for me.
If things have changed, I'm truly sorry for those who have to work in the system. But I suppose what I'm trying to say is that whatever the system, as long as aircrew and engineers behave professionally and honourably, the system can recover. In fact, I think that's the only way things will get better - by people taking responsibility whenever they are required to. Perhaps I'm being naive, but that's where I stand.
Best regards as ever
Engines
Yes, I agree that the lawyers are very much more in evidence than they were. I have recent experience of this being used, but not in the way I expected - being told that if my actions delayed a project, the MoD could be sued for 'undue delays'. Note no mention of the MoD running the risk of being sued for taking short cuts with basic airworthiness management.
I agree that things have changed, but the basics of ensuring a safe and effective product for the aircrew haven't, and that's what Tuc keeps pointing out. Neither have the basics of military discipline - if an order's not reasonable, you don't have to obey it. Here's my (not very warry) story.
My first ever front line embarkation. I'm a very junior Lieutenant aircraft engineer. During an ORI, but not at war. Aircraft lands on with blade leading edge strip (old rubber type) severely holed and lifting. I tell the crew to shut down. Senior Pilot angrily tells me to sign the aircraft fit for the next sortie. I refuse. He then gives me a direct order to do as I am told and sign the aircraft as serviceable. I drop the volume, request a word in a quiet space away from the flight deck. I quietly tell him that I'm the engineer, he is the pilot, and I will get the aircraft fixed as fast as possible, and only then will he get the aircraft to fly. If he's unhappy, get another engineer.
Pause.
Senior Pilot asks me if I'm sure I'm right. I say yes. he nods, turns and walks off. Here's the postscript. We had a truly outstanding relationship from that point forward. I would have jumped over the proverbial cliff for him, and I know he'd have done the same for me.
If things have changed, I'm truly sorry for those who have to work in the system. But I suppose what I'm trying to say is that whatever the system, as long as aircrew and engineers behave professionally and honourably, the system can recover. In fact, I think that's the only way things will get better - by people taking responsibility whenever they are required to. Perhaps I'm being naive, but that's where I stand.
Best regards as ever
Engines
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Okay, then what is the best and safest solution to the problem? (I was only joking about the CAS and his five trips by the way). After 32 years in the service I know that would never happen).
Is there a clear way out of this mess? If the original Boeing and USAF documentation is not avaialable from the 60's, where do the MOD safety people start?
Is their an estimate of when I might actually see an RJ stooging around the MATZ above me?
Is there a clear way out of this mess? If the original Boeing and USAF documentation is not avaialable from the 60's, where do the MOD safety people start?
Is their an estimate of when I might actually see an RJ stooging around the MATZ above me?
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Engines, Tuc, Wensleydale et al,
Many thanks for such an informative (if depressing) review. I have two questions (or had, It's Life Jim 208 has asked the one about "When?").
The second is what is the level of assurance required? I don't suppose that a 1964 KC-135 is as inherently safe as a 2013 built A330 Voyager - if only because of the FBW protection in the Airbus. So how do you get to a place where something like the RJs can get certified? How much assurance is "enough"?
Thanks in advance,
S41
Many thanks for such an informative (if depressing) review. I have two questions (or had, It's Life Jim 208 has asked the one about "When?").
The second is what is the level of assurance required? I don't suppose that a 1964 KC-135 is as inherently safe as a 2013 built A330 Voyager - if only because of the FBW protection in the Airbus. So how do you get to a place where something like the RJs can get certified? How much assurance is "enough"?
Thanks in advance,
S41
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S41,
The simple (but probably not reassuring) answer is not the actual amount of 'assurance', but the development of a proven and auditable safety case that demonstrates that operation of the aircraft is sufficiently safe.
By 'sufficiently', I mean that the safety case shows that the aircraft meets the target laid down in MAA RA1230, which says:
The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) leading to the death of any aircrew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
How long does that take? As long as it takes to assemble all the evidence and analysis to underpin the claims made in the safety case. (I've probably got some of the detailed terminology wrong here, but I think I'm fairly close).
If the original Boeing and USAF documentation isn't available (and let's be clear, there's a decent possibility that it never existed in the first place) then the PT is having to develop new evidence based on analysis and/or read across from other airframes. As Tuc so often (and rightly) reminds us, doing that after the aircraft has been built and flown for many years is not an easy task.
Hope this helps
Best Regards
Engines
The simple (but probably not reassuring) answer is not the actual amount of 'assurance', but the development of a proven and auditable safety case that demonstrates that operation of the aircraft is sufficiently safe.
By 'sufficiently', I mean that the safety case shows that the aircraft meets the target laid down in MAA RA1230, which says:
The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) leading to the death of any aircrew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
How long does that take? As long as it takes to assemble all the evidence and analysis to underpin the claims made in the safety case. (I've probably got some of the detailed terminology wrong here, but I think I'm fairly close).
If the original Boeing and USAF documentation isn't available (and let's be clear, there's a decent possibility that it never existed in the first place) then the PT is having to develop new evidence based on analysis and/or read across from other airframes. As Tuc so often (and rightly) reminds us, doing that after the aircraft has been built and flown for many years is not an easy task.
Hope this helps
Best Regards
Engines
The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) leading to the death of any aircrew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
Firstly, it rather bodyswerves the concept of functional safety. Tornado ZG710 would, probably, have passed this test, yet was functionally unsafe because its IFF failure warning systems were not integrated and the failure to reply to the Patriot interrogation was not notified to the crew. (See BoI report, ACM Burridge’s comments and recommendations – which were ignored). That failure left them with a Build Standard that “COULD result in loss of life”; which is the definition of Safety Critical. The regulations decreed the aircraft, at that Build Standard, could not be put to the use for which it was intended. It was “airworthy” in the sense it could be flown in a very benign environment, with restrictive limitations. However, the management rulings of the day (by DGAS2 and XD5) decreed that the IPT need NOT integrate the warnings. DE&S and the MAA continue to support these rulings. Ministers continue to uphold them. Sort that one out and you’re half way to fixing the systemic failures that plague MoD.
The last bit is important.... “when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.” What is that? The initial “airworthiness demonstration” is typically carried out in the Proof Installation aircraft, very often without systems that would be considered operationally “No Go”. That is partly why you have a Part 2 (Service Deviations) in the RTS. Each subsequent change to the Build Standard MUST be tested and trialled and the subject of an update to the Safety Case. This last is where the system falls down, especially when the change is a Service Modification. Again, the same 2 Stars ruled that this regulation, mandated upon MoD by Secy of State, could be waived. Worse, that a false declaration could be made that it had been complied with. (See Chinook HC Mk2 RTS). It is this lack of a valid Safety Case which compromises any current airworthiness declaration. Without it, the RTS cannot be validated. The RTS is the Master Airworthiness Reference.
Part of the above ruling and practice upheld by the Nimrod/Chinook 2 Star (DGAS2) was that “if it works on the bench, it will work and be safe in the aircraft”, so testing and trialling at the new Build Standard was, and is, often waived. That is, the “airworthiness demonstration” baseline often omits complete systems. That was the case with IFF, for example. So, this definition, combined with extant rulings and practice, is very restrictive and could, and often does, produce an aircraft that is unsafe and not fit for purpose. (Remember that during the XV179 C130 inquest, the IPTL claimed he did not know how to achieve and maintain fitness for purpose. I am always reminded of a young civilian clerical officer who supported me in the late 80s. He knew, and could be trusted to manage the administrative side of such routine work. Billy, I hope you read this!)
Now, as Engines says, try applying that retrospectively to a 50 year old airframe. The chances of the OEMs having the relevant evidence, and a robust audit trail of every change (and Change, if you know the difference!), is very remote indeed. But we (UK) cannot complain. We can’t produce such evidence for our newest aircraft, never mind 50 year old ones. And that is why the IPT would have had a problem seeking funding to attempt to reconcile these conflicts (the risk reduction activity I mentioned). Requirement Scrutiny would immediately reveal that the same issue applied Pan-MoD, opening up a can of worms. Which is why conducting Requirement Scrutiny can be an offence in MoD, despite being a legal obligation. Another ruling by the same people.
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Tucumseh,
May I also add the muddying of water caused by using COTS (components off the shelf) which was encouraged by our lords and masters in order to save money - however this has made the configuration of aircraft within a fleet nearly impossible to manage... it has been suggested that a new installation in a COTS fleet has to be fully tested for every aircraft because the configuration for each aircraft (if known) is different. This is particularly problematical for complex aircraft - especially when fitted with highly classified equipment and software.
May I also add the muddying of water caused by using COTS (components off the shelf) which was encouraged by our lords and masters in order to save money - however this has made the configuration of aircraft within a fleet nearly impossible to manage... it has been suggested that a new installation in a COTS fleet has to be fully tested for every aircraft because the configuration for each aircraft (if known) is different. This is particularly problematical for complex aircraft - especially when fitted with highly classified equipment and software.
Wensleydale
Very true. After many years of sensible people avoiding COTS like the plague, for these very reasons, the Defence Scientific Advisory Council (not just scientists, but including users at, typically, SO1 level, and reporting direct to SofS) issued a report in 2000 completely trashing the notion as too risky. (MoD refuses to release it, which is why you keep your own copy!) There are exceptions in various domains, but usually not in airborne equipment.
You mention configuration management. Nailed it. The RAF Chief Engineer withdrew ALL funding for CM in 1992/3 and, while partly resurrected, the gaps were never plugged. And subsequent generations of staff were taught it was a waste. Without it, the Safety Case can NEVER be validated. This is the remedial work the MAA should have been concentrating on instead of re-writing the regs. But doing so would reveal the underlying reason for their very existence, which they do not want to acknowledge.
Very true. After many years of sensible people avoiding COTS like the plague, for these very reasons, the Defence Scientific Advisory Council (not just scientists, but including users at, typically, SO1 level, and reporting direct to SofS) issued a report in 2000 completely trashing the notion as too risky. (MoD refuses to release it, which is why you keep your own copy!) There are exceptions in various domains, but usually not in airborne equipment.
You mention configuration management. Nailed it. The RAF Chief Engineer withdrew ALL funding for CM in 1992/3 and, while partly resurrected, the gaps were never plugged. And subsequent generations of staff were taught it was a waste. Without it, the Safety Case can NEVER be validated. This is the remedial work the MAA should have been concentrating on instead of re-writing the regs. But doing so would reveal the underlying reason for their very existence, which they do not want to acknowledge.
W
To be entirely fair, I should add that I once saw a vacancy notice at AbbeyWood for a Configuration Manager for EFA (Typhoon). But I often wondered where they got a sufficiently experienced candidate from, given they had graded it very low. Thier counterparts in industry are usually quite senior, same as Risk Managers. Very often the RM is by far the most senior grade in the company team. In MoD it is a peripheral appointment, ditched at the first hint of savings. Always assuming you're given the post in the first place. The two are linked. Failure to maintain CC is ALWAYS a standing risk in MoD.
To be entirely fair, I should add that I once saw a vacancy notice at AbbeyWood for a Configuration Manager for EFA (Typhoon). But I often wondered where they got a sufficiently experienced candidate from, given they had graded it very low. Thier counterparts in industry are usually quite senior, same as Risk Managers. Very often the RM is by far the most senior grade in the company team. In MoD it is a peripheral appointment, ditched at the first hint of savings. Always assuming you're given the post in the first place. The two are linked. Failure to maintain CC is ALWAYS a standing risk in MoD.
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Guys,
As ever, Tuc does a great job of filling in the important gaps I left in my brief post. The concept of 'functional' safety (aka fitness for purpose) is one I've been trying to get across to requirements managers for around seven years now, and Tuc is right on the money when he identifies the level of ignorance around the risks of assuming that if kit works on the bench (or worse, on the demo stand at the air show) it will work on the aircraft.
Perhaps this will help: here's my own (admittedly imperfect) 'take' on what I see as the three elements of safety.
First - the basic 'airworthiness' aspect - will the item stay in one piece/not catch fire/not fall out of the sky/not poison you/last the required service life, stop working next to a radar, etc. This is where a lack of airframe and systems related information on Rivet Joint could pose an issue.
Second - the 'Functional Safety' bit, or 'Fitness for Purpose': Does the item work as intended? Does it work with the other kit on the platform? Does it tell the aircrew when it is working and when it isn't? Is it reliable? Can it be used in a safe manner? This is where HMI issues can come in. (Example - requiring ten button presses to select an emergency frequency isn' a good thing). On Rivet Joint, this should pose less of an issue, but US sourced kit (or COTS kit) has a habit of springing some nasty little surprises - 'Hey, why isn't that light coming on when I press the button?', etc.
Third - does it support safe operations - does the radio have the required range and clarity, does the aircraft deliver the capability required to stay safe - does the DAS kit work, do data links link, etc. On Rivet Joint, this area will depend on high level agreements for information exchange with the USAF - I would guess (but don't know) that this should be less of an issue.
This is my own personal list - it's probably not right for all projects, but i've found it useful. I'm totally relaxed if others disagree.
The key to achieving all of this safety stuff in a quick and effective manner is a good set of requirements. If the team takes the time to set down a clear and achievable set of requirements in enough detail, the contractor and the PT have a fighting chance of getting across the line in good order.
And this is where the problems, in my view, usually arise.
If the requirement for Rivet Joint was 'we'll have three of those lovely Rivet Joint aircraft just like you've got, please' (I exaggerate to make my point) then problems are bound to arise. If the requirement was 'We'll have three RJ aircraft, but they've got to meet the UK's Air Safety requirements as set down in MAA regs xxxxx' then the issue would be getting the US Government to sign up to that. They would not have.
My personal observation is that too many Requirements Managers I have worked with on aircraft related projects are simply not equipped to do the job. It's not that they are aircrew (as most of them are), it's that they are aircrew who have not had the required training in systems engineering and requirements management. They are often freshly promoted SO2s straight out of flying jobs. As a result, many of them just don't understand what a good requirement set looks like, or what it takes to produce one. I would say straight away that there have been exceptions, and very good ones, who were keen, technically aware, very experienced and happy to learn. But they were exceptions.
Starting out with a poor requirements set throws the risks straight on to the project managers and engineers in the PTs, who are sometimes short of experience and technical expertise, or detailed knowledge about the systems they are dealing with. Again, not their fault, but it's another link in the accident chain.
Of course, variation in configuration within a (supposedly consistent) fleet of aircraft is just another honking great link in the chain. It's a source of real worry that this variation is often deliberately introduced by the customer (those RMs again) with no declaration of the consequent potential safety hazard.
Hope this ramble (sorry for length) is of passing interest to some people out there.
Best Regards as ever to all those trying to get over the line in good order,
Engines
As ever, Tuc does a great job of filling in the important gaps I left in my brief post. The concept of 'functional' safety (aka fitness for purpose) is one I've been trying to get across to requirements managers for around seven years now, and Tuc is right on the money when he identifies the level of ignorance around the risks of assuming that if kit works on the bench (or worse, on the demo stand at the air show) it will work on the aircraft.
Perhaps this will help: here's my own (admittedly imperfect) 'take' on what I see as the three elements of safety.
First - the basic 'airworthiness' aspect - will the item stay in one piece/not catch fire/not fall out of the sky/not poison you/last the required service life, stop working next to a radar, etc. This is where a lack of airframe and systems related information on Rivet Joint could pose an issue.
Second - the 'Functional Safety' bit, or 'Fitness for Purpose': Does the item work as intended? Does it work with the other kit on the platform? Does it tell the aircrew when it is working and when it isn't? Is it reliable? Can it be used in a safe manner? This is where HMI issues can come in. (Example - requiring ten button presses to select an emergency frequency isn' a good thing). On Rivet Joint, this should pose less of an issue, but US sourced kit (or COTS kit) has a habit of springing some nasty little surprises - 'Hey, why isn't that light coming on when I press the button?', etc.
Third - does it support safe operations - does the radio have the required range and clarity, does the aircraft deliver the capability required to stay safe - does the DAS kit work, do data links link, etc. On Rivet Joint, this area will depend on high level agreements for information exchange with the USAF - I would guess (but don't know) that this should be less of an issue.
This is my own personal list - it's probably not right for all projects, but i've found it useful. I'm totally relaxed if others disagree.
The key to achieving all of this safety stuff in a quick and effective manner is a good set of requirements. If the team takes the time to set down a clear and achievable set of requirements in enough detail, the contractor and the PT have a fighting chance of getting across the line in good order.
And this is where the problems, in my view, usually arise.
If the requirement for Rivet Joint was 'we'll have three of those lovely Rivet Joint aircraft just like you've got, please' (I exaggerate to make my point) then problems are bound to arise. If the requirement was 'We'll have three RJ aircraft, but they've got to meet the UK's Air Safety requirements as set down in MAA regs xxxxx' then the issue would be getting the US Government to sign up to that. They would not have.
My personal observation is that too many Requirements Managers I have worked with on aircraft related projects are simply not equipped to do the job. It's not that they are aircrew (as most of them are), it's that they are aircrew who have not had the required training in systems engineering and requirements management. They are often freshly promoted SO2s straight out of flying jobs. As a result, many of them just don't understand what a good requirement set looks like, or what it takes to produce one. I would say straight away that there have been exceptions, and very good ones, who were keen, technically aware, very experienced and happy to learn. But they were exceptions.
Starting out with a poor requirements set throws the risks straight on to the project managers and engineers in the PTs, who are sometimes short of experience and technical expertise, or detailed knowledge about the systems they are dealing with. Again, not their fault, but it's another link in the accident chain.
Of course, variation in configuration within a (supposedly consistent) fleet of aircraft is just another honking great link in the chain. It's a source of real worry that this variation is often deliberately introduced by the customer (those RMs again) with no declaration of the consequent potential safety hazard.
Hope this ramble (sorry for length) is of passing interest to some people out there.
Best Regards as ever to all those trying to get over the line in good order,
Engines
I see that the airworthiness issues surrounding the ac have finally made today's Sunday Times. However, I am intrigued that MOD have now decided that (quote)'an alternative method of issuing a safety certificate has been devised!
So we lose one aircraft type (and the whole MR/R1 capability) that can't meet a new MAA system, buy a much older airframe just for the R1 that also can't meet the new airworthiness system, and immediately kick it all in to touch so that no one gets egg on their face (but presumably much scrambled egg on their hats).
After being involved in conversations in both the crewroom and Ops room conversations at Aldergrove the day before Mull of Kintyre regarding the HC2 Chinook when Boscombe effectively grounded theirs I had hoped I would not see yet another occurrence of the safety case being over-ridden. I'm sure the ac (RJ) is probably perfectly safe, but if we have an airworthiness system - no matter how flawed as Tuc has well argued - it should not be circumvented.
So we lose one aircraft type (and the whole MR/R1 capability) that can't meet a new MAA system, buy a much older airframe just for the R1 that also can't meet the new airworthiness system, and immediately kick it all in to touch so that no one gets egg on their face (but presumably much scrambled egg on their hats).
After being involved in conversations in both the crewroom and Ops room conversations at Aldergrove the day before Mull of Kintyre regarding the HC2 Chinook when Boscombe effectively grounded theirs I had hoped I would not see yet another occurrence of the safety case being over-ridden. I'm sure the ac (RJ) is probably perfectly safe, but if we have an airworthiness system - no matter how flawed as Tuc has well argued - it should not be circumvented.
Not wanting to give too much away (look at my user name); but, put simply, I'd leave the service at the first sign of a posting on this aircraft.
I'm not chasing promotion and I'm not going to give myself an ulcer through worry - I will, however, only sign what is correct when people's lives are at stake.
I'm not chasing promotion and I'm not going to give myself an ulcer through worry - I will, however, only sign what is correct when people's lives are at stake.
Boscombe effectively grounded theirs I had hoped I would not see yet another occurrence of the safety case being over-ridden. I'm sure the ac (RJ) is probably perfectly safe, but if we have an airworthiness system - no matter how flawed as Tuc has well argued - it should not be circumvented.
I'm afraid such an over-rule is not only permitted, but as I've often said MoD and Ministers (and lately the Head of the Civil Service) have consistently ruled that it can not only be made by unqualified people, but the person who has the airworthiness delegation can be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false declaration that the regs have been met.
As ever, it is the implementation of the regulations that is lacking, not necessarily the regs themselves. More recently however, it has become apparent many in the MAA don't actually understand them. Hardly a surprise given the ethos of the last 20-odd years.
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Picking up on an earlier point. The RJ has never been 'operationally tested'. Title 10 rules are paid lip service with BS claiming rapid refresh of capabilities to satisfy many UORs and being a 'black programme' make testing a nugatory process. Development and acceptance test is carried out to a degree.
If the press reports are correct, there are not enough qualified personnel to carry out the work required to correctly certify aircraft.
Embarrassment is now starting to out weigh risk.
If the press reports are correct, there are not enough qualified personnel to carry out the work required to correctly certify aircraft.
Embarrassment is now starting to out weigh risk.
Last edited by Phoney Tony; 13th Apr 2014 at 15:44.
If MoD/MAA finds an acceptable way of certifying the aircraft, excellent. No issue with that.
However, the very fact that, not for the first time, it has been admitted as a major risk is a major cock up in the first place. It clearly indicates mandated regulations were completely ignored and lessons from past failures, and notable successes, ignored. So much for the MAA and oversight.
The exceptionally high probability of encountering airworthiness problems in MoD programmes has been a standing risk for well over 20 years. That risk MUST be mitigated before approval is sought to proceed. You MUST demonstrate a "route map" to achieving certain fundamental milestones.
For example, the ability to bring the design Under Ministry Control, Transfer to PDS, Attaining Airworthiness, a funded and viable plan to Maintain Airworthiness and so on.
In confidence terms, and uppermost in one's mind throughout, is the Transfer to PDS. Every MoD Technical Agency and Programme Manager should know the 4 page Transfer form backwards, and if you get that right you are 95% of the way there, the other 5% being "unavoidables" (like political interference). It establishes that you have a valid, compliant Safety Case. Unsurprisingly, this is precisely what the Chief Engineer pulled the funding for in the early 90s and what was subsequently taught to be a "waste of money". And I wonder where the Transfer procedure is articulated now, given the mandated Def Stan was cancelled a few years ago without replacement.
Predictable, predicted, notified and ignored. Again.
However, the very fact that, not for the first time, it has been admitted as a major risk is a major cock up in the first place. It clearly indicates mandated regulations were completely ignored and lessons from past failures, and notable successes, ignored. So much for the MAA and oversight.
The exceptionally high probability of encountering airworthiness problems in MoD programmes has been a standing risk for well over 20 years. That risk MUST be mitigated before approval is sought to proceed. You MUST demonstrate a "route map" to achieving certain fundamental milestones.
For example, the ability to bring the design Under Ministry Control, Transfer to PDS, Attaining Airworthiness, a funded and viable plan to Maintain Airworthiness and so on.
In confidence terms, and uppermost in one's mind throughout, is the Transfer to PDS. Every MoD Technical Agency and Programme Manager should know the 4 page Transfer form backwards, and if you get that right you are 95% of the way there, the other 5% being "unavoidables" (like political interference). It establishes that you have a valid, compliant Safety Case. Unsurprisingly, this is precisely what the Chief Engineer pulled the funding for in the early 90s and what was subsequently taught to be a "waste of money". And I wonder where the Transfer procedure is articulated now, given the mandated Def Stan was cancelled a few years ago without replacement.
Predictable, predicted, notified and ignored. Again.
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Good enough for RAF
According to this link
RAF rewrites safety rules to fly old jets after being told £660m purchase was useless | Mail Online
‘If the aircraft is safe for the US Army Air Force, it must be good enough for the RAF to fly.’
------------------
Well that's all right then. Brits have never disagreed with the US over airworthiness......................
RAF rewrites safety rules to fly old jets after being told £660m purchase was useless | Mail Online
‘If the aircraft is safe for the US Army Air Force, it must be good enough for the RAF to fly.’
------------------
Well that's all right then. Brits have never disagreed with the US over airworthiness......................
I know it's the Mail, but....
That would include the one still flying ops as a KC-135 last year then - and it's downhill from there!
The RC-135 Rivet Joint jets, built in 1964, were gathering dust in a ‘boneyard’ for retired planes in the US when the RAF bought them as a replacement for its Nimrod spy aircraft
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Especially with the line "US Army Air Force"!
The Mail must be employing senile WW2 veterans!
Except in numbers, by the USAF, for decades! Yes, there IS a world outside the UK, strange as it may seem to you.
Exactly - and they are being modified from a type the USAF has operated for >50 years.
And each airframe has extensive maintenance documentation, and has been modified to a set configuration identical to that the USAF is currently operating.
But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.
The Mail must be employing senile WW2 veterans!
Originally Posted by Phoney Tony
Picking up on an earlier point. The RJ has never been 'operationally tested'.
Originally Posted by Just This Once
Perhaps the MoD is trying to make sense of what they have seen given that the type has been flown by the USAF for decades.
And each airframe has extensive maintenance documentation, and has been modified to a set configuration identical to that the USAF is currently operating.
But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.
But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.
“No documentation” and “no configuration control” were major contributory factors in the deaths of many of our UK servicemen. This Rivet Joint problem has been noted before by MoD, in 2011 if I recall, so the “blathering” has come from them. Much to their credit I suppose; a frankness which was lacking in the past.
The article is based on yet another MoD admission, in the 2013 MAA annual report. In it, the new DG repeats the 20 year old fact that MoD lacks experienced and competent (not the same thing) engineers. What he doesn’t say is that this shortage was a direct result of two of the main perpetrators of the airworthiness scandal decreeing, in 1991 and 1996, that MoD did not need engineers to manage any part of engineering programmes. One fallout from these decisions was the policy that permitted non-engineers to have airworthiness and technical delegation; in fact, self delegation.
However, I agree with your last comment. There is too much reinvention of wheels and duplication. There also happens to be a perfectly good procedure in MoD for using foreign certification and, as far as possible, reading across. I mentioned the transfer to PDS. What PDS Category is the aircraft and its kit? 1,2,3,4,5 or 6? A simple question, but if not addressed problems accumulate and bite you just as you’re looking to issue certification. The decision must be made up front, as it is a major decision point regarding achieving and especially maintaining airworthiness. Not least due to funding and complex contractual arrangements.
The MAA has not revealed precisely what is causing concern at the moment, but MoD did reveal itself when the decision to buy these aircraft was announced. They claimed they would be exactly the same configuration as those used by the US. The problem here is that such a configuration would (in part) breach not MoD rules, but those imposed on MoD by our Home Office. It was too simplistic a statement, something noted on pprune at the time. If that truly was the level of thinking, then problems were inevitable because much else would be ignored.
tuc,
as I recall every RAF a/c has to have a 'Design Authority'. I believe the USAF usually take up this role for their a/c. When we bought the C130K Marshalls became our design authority for it. Who is the design authority for the Rivet Joint a/c ?
as I recall every RAF a/c has to have a 'Design Authority'. I believe the USAF usually take up this role for their a/c. When we bought the C130K Marshalls became our design authority for it. Who is the design authority for the Rivet Joint a/c ?