F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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Ken,
Israel's IAI has been given a contract to provide L-M more than 800 sets of outer-wings for the F-35As. I don't believe there are "special" outer-wings for the F-35Is. The deal is an offset agreement by the US DoD enticing Israel to buy F-35s and it worked.
There is a YouTube video that goes with these remarks at the plant's ribbon cutting.
Israel's IAI has been given a contract to provide L-M more than 800 sets of outer-wings for the F-35As. I don't believe there are "special" outer-wings for the F-35Is. The deal is an offset agreement by the US DoD enticing Israel to buy F-35s and it worked.
Published on Aug 3, 2015
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inaugurated its production line of wings for the F-35 fighter jet at its facility in central Israel on Tuesday.
IAI has signed a long-term contract with US defence giant Lockheed Martin to produce the wings for the F-35 next-generation warplane.
The state-owned company said the contract is for 10 to 15 years and could generate up to 2.5 billion (b) US dollars in sales.
The Israeli facility already produces wings for Lockheed's F-16 fighter jet.
US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Shapiro, who attended the event at the IAI plant near Petah Tikva, said the contract was "evidence of a strong friendship and dedication that defines the Israel-US relationship."
Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Yaalon, reiterated the importance of the project in strengthening the "special relationship" between Israel and the US.
IAI will make more than 800 sets of wings for the F-35, which is the Pentagon's most expensive weapons programme, with an estimated cost of nearly 400 billion (b) US dollars.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inaugurated its production line of wings for the F-35 fighter jet at its facility in central Israel on Tuesday.
IAI has signed a long-term contract with US defence giant Lockheed Martin to produce the wings for the F-35 next-generation warplane.
The state-owned company said the contract is for 10 to 15 years and could generate up to 2.5 billion (b) US dollars in sales.
The Israeli facility already produces wings for Lockheed's F-16 fighter jet.
US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Shapiro, who attended the event at the IAI plant near Petah Tikva, said the contract was "evidence of a strong friendship and dedication that defines the Israel-US relationship."
Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Yaalon, reiterated the importance of the project in strengthening the "special relationship" between Israel and the US.
IAI will make more than 800 sets of wings for the F-35, which is the Pentagon's most expensive weapons programme, with an estimated cost of nearly 400 billion (b) US dollars.
Originally Posted by a1bill
CM, I'm sure DMO will take it on board that you think their 2008 estimate is spin.
Seriously? Still doesn't make me any less sceptical about the "estimates". I really, really hope they're not too upset by the total cost of $12.4B for 72 jets with support and infrastructure. Perhaps it doesn't matter when 30 Australian companies stand to benefit from business.
I enjoyed the 2012 report you sent me a link to where they say they'd be getting 100 for $13.2B. Ooh, it's gone up, not down. Your link and DMO's latest report (Sep 15) seem to moving further from €85M not closer.
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$12.4B for 72 jets with support and infrastructure = welcome to the acquisition cost, the flyaway is but a part of this.
*with the hit our dollar has taken, that 12B is more like 15B now
what we see as current risk
http://search.defence.gov.au/search?...ess=p&oe=UTF-8
Both of Australia’s F-35 pilots have qualified and continue to operate at the International Pilot Training Centre, Luke Air Force Base Arizona. The long lead items and support for next eight F-35A aircraft have been contracted. The construction of facilities at RAAF Base Williamtown, New South Wales has continued on schedule. The sustainment model, including training for Australian based support continues to be developed.
•
The risk profile of the project remains largely unchanged:
• Agreement by the US to fund the next two years of production to enable planned ramp up in production represents a reduction in aircraft cost risk for Australia.
• Stand up and delivery of an effective and timely F-35 Australian based training has emerged as a risk.
• The JSF air system continues to mature at a slow and steady pace. The Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS) and reprogramming capabilities remain major risks.
• The timely delivery of key infrastructure at RAAF Base Williamtown and RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory, remain a high risk. The potential for the RAAF Base Williamtown ground water contamination issue to impact facilities delivery being an emerging risk which is being managed.
The variance can be primarily attributed to delays in finalising contracts and the variable receipt of invoices through the US Government contracting processes.
*with the hit our dollar has taken, that 12B is more like 15B now
what we see as current risk
http://search.defence.gov.au/search?...ess=p&oe=UTF-8
Both of Australia’s F-35 pilots have qualified and continue to operate at the International Pilot Training Centre, Luke Air Force Base Arizona. The long lead items and support for next eight F-35A aircraft have been contracted. The construction of facilities at RAAF Base Williamtown, New South Wales has continued on schedule. The sustainment model, including training for Australian based support continues to be developed.
•
The risk profile of the project remains largely unchanged:
• Agreement by the US to fund the next two years of production to enable planned ramp up in production represents a reduction in aircraft cost risk for Australia.
• Stand up and delivery of an effective and timely F-35 Australian based training has emerged as a risk.
• The JSF air system continues to mature at a slow and steady pace. The Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS) and reprogramming capabilities remain major risks.
• The timely delivery of key infrastructure at RAAF Base Williamtown and RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory, remain a high risk. The potential for the RAAF Base Williamtown ground water contamination issue to impact facilities delivery being an emerging risk which is being managed.
The variance can be primarily attributed to delays in finalising contracts and the variable receipt of invoices through the US Government contracting processes.
Last edited by a1bill; 8th Feb 2016 at 23:05.
OK, A1Bill. So the cost is going up even more and there are a number of issues that have been identified as risks by Australia - risks don't tend to lower costs. We're getting even further from the $85M figure - unless you choose to ignore a whole bunch of stuff that is required, but makes the jet look too costly to sell to the taxpayer.
Thank you for your honesty. I am now more sceptical about the predicted cost than I was.
Thank you for your honesty. I am now more sceptical about the predicted cost than I was.
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a1bill,
Thanks for sending the Australian audit office report, it was informative to me in that I didn't know certain things weren't being done in the most expensive US Defense program. I don't mean to be antagonistic, but more explanatory from what I read of the report. There is one key section that I will save for a separate post as I think it is the most important discussion item of the entire report, besides the learning curve chart in 5.68, Figure 5.3 .
It is a report, not an audit, it is a good historical document of what has happened, written from the viewpoint of the Australian participation in the F-35 program. At various points of the report, there is considerable emphasis of the fact that Australia isn't responsible for cost overruns, and substantial cost increases as the development program has progressed. This is evident starting at paragraph 30, 34 and 71. Luckily for Australia, the bad news of the program thus far has been avoided, escalating costs. It goes on to say there is "potential" for the program to continue with the revised (goalposts have moved) cost and program parameters, maybe.
It goes on to say in 5.50, Figure 5.0 that the program fell short of plan and management interventions failed to reduce the declining cost and schedule performance and couldn't guarantee that new technical problems wouldn't continue the downward trend. Overall, the effect has been to extend the time for start of Full-rate Production of the F-35 by 7 years, e.g., 2012 to 2019.
The learning curve chart depicted in 5.68, Figure 5.3, showing the latest "estimates", developed by the US DoD JPO for the F-35 Unit Reoccurring Flyaway costs are imaginary at best, based on what has taken place and the pseudo learning curve. If this is where you apparently believe the $85M cost will come from, it will not happen.
Learning curves are interesting in that profit and loss businesses use them extensively to determine where a breakeven point occurs for new products transitioning from development to full production. It is important that a learning curve is established with exceptional knowledge of the product development and cost makeup, how actual development is progressing and therefore the curve is drawn with real meaningful goals, e.g., on such and such a date the product will cost XXX$$$s. If you are above the line and can't get to the line by that date, then you have to redraw the curve extending the time and date to breakeven. Now the Government isn't a profit and loss business and doesn't have to explain much to their stockholders (Congress) who doesn't understand much about profit and loss businesses at all. So, there you have it, an assumed $85M price balloons to $130M in a heartbeat and will go higher with performance running above the curve line.
Thanks for sending the Australian audit office report, it was informative to me in that I didn't know certain things weren't being done in the most expensive US Defense program. I don't mean to be antagonistic, but more explanatory from what I read of the report. There is one key section that I will save for a separate post as I think it is the most important discussion item of the entire report, besides the learning curve chart in 5.68, Figure 5.3 .
It is a report, not an audit, it is a good historical document of what has happened, written from the viewpoint of the Australian participation in the F-35 program. At various points of the report, there is considerable emphasis of the fact that Australia isn't responsible for cost overruns, and substantial cost increases as the development program has progressed. This is evident starting at paragraph 30, 34 and 71. Luckily for Australia, the bad news of the program thus far has been avoided, escalating costs. It goes on to say there is "potential" for the program to continue with the revised (goalposts have moved) cost and program parameters, maybe.
It goes on to say in 5.50, Figure 5.0 that the program fell short of plan and management interventions failed to reduce the declining cost and schedule performance and couldn't guarantee that new technical problems wouldn't continue the downward trend. Overall, the effect has been to extend the time for start of Full-rate Production of the F-35 by 7 years, e.g., 2012 to 2019.
The learning curve chart depicted in 5.68, Figure 5.3, showing the latest "estimates", developed by the US DoD JPO for the F-35 Unit Reoccurring Flyaway costs are imaginary at best, based on what has taken place and the pseudo learning curve. If this is where you apparently believe the $85M cost will come from, it will not happen.
Learning curves are interesting in that profit and loss businesses use them extensively to determine where a breakeven point occurs for new products transitioning from development to full production. It is important that a learning curve is established with exceptional knowledge of the product development and cost makeup, how actual development is progressing and therefore the curve is drawn with real meaningful goals, e.g., on such and such a date the product will cost XXX$$$s. If you are above the line and can't get to the line by that date, then you have to redraw the curve extending the time and date to breakeven. Now the Government isn't a profit and loss business and doesn't have to explain much to their stockholders (Congress) who doesn't understand much about profit and loss businesses at all. So, there you have it, an assumed $85M price balloons to $130M in a heartbeat and will go higher with performance running above the curve line.
Last edited by Turbine D; 9th Feb 2016 at 00:01. Reason: spelling
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a1bill,
What I saved for last and most important is this:
I am here to tell you this process dates back to the mid 1970s and it blows my mind that it hasn't been used in the F-35 Program. When we received our first desktop computers and learned how to use them, I asked one of my more computer literate staff members to put together a should cost computer program to develop costs for turbine blades and vanes, both simple solid and complex air-cooled ones that we had been doing by hand. We then used it two ways, first to show the design engineers the would cost of what they were designing and how they could reduce costs. Then we would use it as a basis to negotiate procurement costs with suppliers. No request for quotes left the purchasing department without having first received a should cost estimate. Subsequently, the program was expanded to include all castings, airfoils and structural alike. We had really big and expensive one piece structural castings. Other areas liked what we did and developed similar should cost programs. It then became very easy for the project department to roll up the costs for an entire engine and begin to develop the learning curve to determine the break-even point based on what the engines were proposed to be sold for.
So I can't express how surprised and disappointed I was to learn that this process, 37 years later, hasn't been used on the most sophisticated and expensive aircraft program ever undertaken by the US DoD, the F-35 program. It is no wonder the program has run amok from a cost point of view which always is a contributor to technical snafus... Just amazing, can you see why my point of view tend to be negative relative to the program and its management?
What I saved for last and most important is this:
5.60 The renewed emphasis on controlling costs includes a proactive approach to establishing cost and price data, based on fair dealing established by the Truth in Negotiations Act. The new approach, which has been termed Will‐Cost/Should‐Cost Management, aims to control and lower prices before they have been agreed on:
Will‐Cost: decision‐makers and Congress use independent cost estimates—forecasts of what a program will cost based upon reasonable extrapolations from historical experience—to support budgeting and programming; and
Should‐Cost: the manager of each major program is required to conduct a Should‐Cost analysis justifying each element of program cost and showing how it is improving year by year or meeting other relevant benchmarks and/or value.
5.61 The US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has announced that the JSF Program is implementing Will‐ Cost/Should‐Cost Management:
We will use this method, for example, to drive cost down in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Department’s largest program and the backbone of tactical air power for the U.S. and many other countries in the future. This aircraft’s ICE [independent cost estimate] (Will Cost) average unit price grew from $50 million Average Unit Procurement Cost (APUC) when the program began (in 2002 dollars, when the program was baselined) to $92 million in the most recent ICE. Accordingly, the JSF Program had a Nunn‐McCurdy breach last year and had to be restructured by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of that restructuring, a Should Cost analysis is being done in association with the negotiation of the early lot production contracts. The Department is scrubbing costs with the aim of identifying unneeded cost and rewarding its elimination over time. The result should be a negotiated price substantially lower than the Will Cost ICE to which the Department has forecasted and budgeted. Secretary Gates indicated in his Efficiency Initiative that monies saved in this way could be retained by the Service that achieved the efficiency; in this case the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could reallocate JSF funds to buy other capabilities.286
Will‐Cost: decision‐makers and Congress use independent cost estimates—forecasts of what a program will cost based upon reasonable extrapolations from historical experience—to support budgeting and programming; and
Should‐Cost: the manager of each major program is required to conduct a Should‐Cost analysis justifying each element of program cost and showing how it is improving year by year or meeting other relevant benchmarks and/or value.
5.61 The US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has announced that the JSF Program is implementing Will‐ Cost/Should‐Cost Management:
We will use this method, for example, to drive cost down in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Department’s largest program and the backbone of tactical air power for the U.S. and many other countries in the future. This aircraft’s ICE [independent cost estimate] (Will Cost) average unit price grew from $50 million Average Unit Procurement Cost (APUC) when the program began (in 2002 dollars, when the program was baselined) to $92 million in the most recent ICE. Accordingly, the JSF Program had a Nunn‐McCurdy breach last year and had to be restructured by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of that restructuring, a Should Cost analysis is being done in association with the negotiation of the early lot production contracts. The Department is scrubbing costs with the aim of identifying unneeded cost and rewarding its elimination over time. The result should be a negotiated price substantially lower than the Will Cost ICE to which the Department has forecasted and budgeted. Secretary Gates indicated in his Efficiency Initiative that monies saved in this way could be retained by the Service that achieved the efficiency; in this case the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could reallocate JSF funds to buy other capabilities.286
So I can't express how surprised and disappointed I was to learn that this process, 37 years later, hasn't been used on the most sophisticated and expensive aircraft program ever undertaken by the US DoD, the F-35 program. It is no wonder the program has run amok from a cost point of view which always is a contributor to technical snafus... Just amazing, can you see why my point of view tend to be negative relative to the program and its management?
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CM and Td, I don't play silly games fudging numbers and misrepresenting facts. Unlike some, when I'm wrong I acknowledge it. There is plenty of blame in the program to go around the gov, pentagon, JPO and LM in the procurement. But it's the same with nearly every program in the US, some are even worse off. Also none of the eurocanards had an easy run either.
the cost in US$ for aus is 11.4b for the 72 or US$158m
when the 22 gripen for the swiss was 3.1 billion Swiss francs or US$140m
UPDATE 1-Sweden to buy 40-60 next generation Saab Gripen jets | Reuters
I hope you don't mind if I don't get into a doom and gloom hand wringing exercise, because I still see the f-35 as 'cheap' for what you get.
the cost in US$ for aus is 11.4b for the 72 or US$158m
when the 22 gripen for the swiss was 3.1 billion Swiss francs or US$140m
UPDATE 1-Sweden to buy 40-60 next generation Saab Gripen jets | Reuters
I hope you don't mind if I don't get into a doom and gloom hand wringing exercise, because I still see the f-35 as 'cheap' for what you get.
Last edited by a1bill; 9th Feb 2016 at 10:30.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Looks like the F-18 line isn't going to close any time soon......
U.S. Navy F-35 Boost Partly Offsets Last Year’s Cuts
The U.S. Navy will increase its planned future orders of the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter in the fiscal 2017 defense budget to be released Tuesday, as directed by Defense Secretary Ash Carter in a December memo to the service.
However, the increases only partially offset cuts that were made in the 2016 budget and do not take effect until 2019 and later years, according to internal Navy documents obtained by Aviation Week.
The service also will plan to buy two more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with fiscal 2017 overseas contingency operations money and another 14 in later budget years.
However, internal documents once again discuss a “shortfall” in strike fighters because of late deliveries of F-35Cs and higher-than-planned utilization of F/A-18s. Even with an F/A-18E/F service life extension program, with installations expected to begin in 2024, the Navy projects a shortfall of 193 Super Hornets in 2026 and suggests that the service will need more of the Boeing fighters: “Far-term (2020-2035) inventory is predominantly affected by new aircraft procurement, F/A-18E/F and F-35,” the document states.
Under the 2017 budget plan, the Navy’s total F-35C buys between fiscal 2015 and fiscal 2021 will total 74 aircraft – more than the 64 planned last year but still fewer than the 78 envisioned in 2015. The Navy does not make a squadron-size buy (12 airplanes) until 2019, with deliveries in 2021.......
U.S. Navy F-35 Boost Partly Offsets Last Year’s Cuts
The U.S. Navy will increase its planned future orders of the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter in the fiscal 2017 defense budget to be released Tuesday, as directed by Defense Secretary Ash Carter in a December memo to the service.
However, the increases only partially offset cuts that were made in the 2016 budget and do not take effect until 2019 and later years, according to internal Navy documents obtained by Aviation Week.
The service also will plan to buy two more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with fiscal 2017 overseas contingency operations money and another 14 in later budget years.
However, internal documents once again discuss a “shortfall” in strike fighters because of late deliveries of F-35Cs and higher-than-planned utilization of F/A-18s. Even with an F/A-18E/F service life extension program, with installations expected to begin in 2024, the Navy projects a shortfall of 193 Super Hornets in 2026 and suggests that the service will need more of the Boeing fighters: “Far-term (2020-2035) inventory is predominantly affected by new aircraft procurement, F/A-18E/F and F-35,” the document states.
Under the 2017 budget plan, the Navy’s total F-35C buys between fiscal 2015 and fiscal 2021 will total 74 aircraft – more than the 64 planned last year but still fewer than the 78 envisioned in 2015. The Navy does not make a squadron-size buy (12 airplanes) until 2019, with deliveries in 2021.......
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The shortage of strike fighters due to the late arrival of the F35C into USN squadrons, is obviously a problem, how is the fleet going to cope with the late arrival of the F35C to replace the USMC Hornets that are part of carrier air wings? The cost of keeping the legacy Hornets airworthy must be getting quite a budgetary problem for the USMC, as well as being a logistics complication.
I am assuming that the numbers of F35Cs quoted for the USN by ORAC exclude the USMCs F35Cs?
I also assume that the IOC for the F35C will be declared by both the USN and USMC for the same variant, the USMC will not say try to go IOC with 3i software on their F35Cs whilst the Navy waits for 3F?
I am assuming that the numbers of F35Cs quoted for the USN by ORAC exclude the USMCs F35Cs?
I also assume that the IOC for the F35C will be declared by both the USN and USMC for the same variant, the USMC will not say try to go IOC with 3i software on their F35Cs whilst the Navy waits for 3F?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Timeline for the 4 USMC F-35C sqns can be seen here, nothing about software build - but I can't see it being different to the USN.
CM and Td, I don't play silly games fudging numbers and misrepresenting facts.
As any fule kno, comparing costs across different nations' fighter deals is a tricky exercise because all kinds of ground rules may be different. Last time I looked, Switzerland and Australia were not the same country.
I'd merely suggest, at this point, that there are some illuminating comparisons out there - such as the Korean deal, the 30-year LCC estimates in Sweden and Norway (which are quite similar nations), and the Swiss LCC estimates.
As any fule kno, comparing costs across different nations' fighter deals is a tricky exercise because all kinds of ground rules may be different. Last time I looked, Switzerland and Australia were not the same country.
I'd merely suggest, at this point, that there are some illuminating comparisons out there - such as the Korean deal, the 30-year LCC estimates in Sweden and Norway (which are quite similar nations), and the Swiss LCC estimates.
ORAC - Yes, the facts are awkwardly at odds with the hyped "increase" story after Carter's memo, exactly as I called it nearly two months ago in response to a silly comment.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...ml#post9215336
The fascinating question, of course, is "31 more than what"?
“To meet the expanding adversary fighter threat, we will procure 31 additional F-35C relative to the Navy POM submission (and 10 more than the PB-16 plan)".
So the answer is "31 more than a plan we haven't seen" which apparently contained a startling 21-jet cut relative to the PB16 (Presidential Budget, the one published at the beginning of the year).
Folks like Tourist need to start looking at things like this and figuring out who lives under a bridge and who does not.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...ml#post9215336
The fascinating question, of course, is "31 more than what"?
“To meet the expanding adversary fighter threat, we will procure 31 additional F-35C relative to the Navy POM submission (and 10 more than the PB-16 plan)".
So the answer is "31 more than a plan we haven't seen" which apparently contained a startling 21-jet cut relative to the PB16 (Presidential Budget, the one published at the beginning of the year).
Folks like Tourist need to start looking at things like this and figuring out who lives under a bridge and who does not.
a1b - Is that the hearing where Dog Davis bragged that his new $150m wonderjet is four times as effective as an airplane half its size that's based on a 57-year-old British X-plane?
A1B, $85M a copy would have been good value, assuming it performs as claimed. $158M is not "cheap", especially as we've yet to see the operational testing so we still don't know what we're going to get - only claims.
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CM, Our ~us$85m flyaway is also our ~us$158 procurement, they are both part of the same cost structure. The lifetime cost is probably $3-400m. My opinion is the f-35 is cheap fro what you get, when looking at what else is on the market. a lot of nations and airforces seem to see value in it too.
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Following up on LO's post:
US Air Force Defers 45 F-35As Over Next Five Years
By Lara Seligman, Defense News 5:47 p.m. EST February 9, 2016
WASHINGTON – The Air Force is deferring 45 F-35As from its budget request over the next five years, essentially stretching out the program’s planned production ramp over the next decade.
The Air Force is absorbing the biggest F-35 cut of the three services that will operate Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation fighter jet, but the Pentagon’s overall buy will also drop across the five-year defense plan, comptroller Mike McCord told reporters Tuesday. The announcement comes as the Pentagon was preparing to drastically ramp up production of the aircraft over the next decade.
The reduction to 404 total Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps F-35s over the next five years is not expected to produce a significant change in the unit cost, McCord said. However, it is not clear the Pentagon will be able to get back to the planned production rate, he said.
“We are trying to get it back up to where we want it to be across the FYDP," McCord said, referring to the Future Years Defense Program. "But it’s just a lot of money too, and it’s unclear that we will be able to get this program back to the ramps that we had hoped for previously."
Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Maj. Gen. James F. Martin Jr. and Air Force Deputy for Budget Carolyn M. Gleason conduct a briefing about the FY2017 budget Tuesday afternoon at the Pentagon. (Photo: Mike Morones/staff)
The Air Force’s official budget documents reflect a significantly slower buildup of F-35A production than previously planned. As first reported by Defense News, the Air Force deferred five F-35As this year, requesting just 43 in its fiscal 2017 budget submission, down from a planned 48. The Air Force had planned to jump to 60 F-35As a year starting in FY18, but the FY17 funding profile shows the service will not get to the 60-per-year rate until FY21. The Air Force will buy 43 aircraft in FY17; 44 in FY18; and 48 in both FY19 and FY20 before the buy jumps to 60 in FY21, according to the documents.
The delayed F-35A ramp to the ultimate goal of 1,763 aircraft is one of the “tough choices” the Air Force was forced to make in this year's budget negotiations, according to the documents. The service is partially funding Block 4 software upgrades for the jet, as well as research and development of nuclear weapons capability.
Although the Air Force cut alone is not hugely significant in the context of the thousands of aircraft the Pentagon intends to buy over the next decade, the near-term Air Force reduction could impact the unit price of the plane. Some analysts believe the deferral could have a domino effect on the program, potentially spooking international partners.
Doug Birkey, executive director of the Mitchell Institute, cautioned that the Pentagon must be extremely careful when playing with the F-35 numbers.
“The second you start bringing down numbers or you delay things, the price goes up, and so it’s a risk factor,” Birkey said, adding that the move “puts blood in the water.”
“I really do think it will implode if they mess up the numbers too much,” he added.
Still, the Pentagon cuts over the FYDP do necessarily indicate bad news for the overall program. Lockheed Martin can move customers around within its planned production time line, according to Capital Alpha’s Byron Callan. As the Air Force drops F-35As, international partners could fill in those slots, he pointed out in a Feb. 7 report.
Overall, the Air Force is requesting $166.9 billion in FY17, a slight uptick from the $167.9 billion requested in FY16. Included in that topline is $46.9 billion for operations and maintenance, $22.4 billion for procurement, $19.6 billion for research, development, technology and evaluation, and $12.3 billion for overseas contingency operations.
As Defense News previously reported, the Air Force’s FY17 budget request fully funds the Long Range Strike Bomber and the 15-aircraft KC-46 tanker buy. The request additionally includes commitment to moving forward with the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System recapitalization effort, the Combat Rescue Helicopter, the T-X advanced trainer replacement, and the recapitalization of Air Force One. JSTARS is expected to reach initial operational capability by 2024, according to the budget documents.
The budget submission also maintains a commitment to the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, which will replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile and is ultimately planned to arm LRSB.
Aside from F-35 delays, the Air Force is also slowing procurement of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which will eventually replace the aging C-130Hs. The Air Force cut three C-130Js from its FY17 budget request, a drop to 11 overall: three C-130Js (including one through the OCO budget), three HC-130Js and six MC-130Js. However, the Air Force is holding onto its legacy EC-130 Compass Call aircraft, a key component of the fleet’s electronic attack capability. Meanwhile, the service requested funding to recapitalize the Compass Call fleet by moving the plane’s electronics onto new business jet bodies.
In another expected move, the Air Force is deferring retirement of the A-10 Warthog until 2022, and funding additional contract maintainers. The service will replace the attack plane with F-35s on a squadron-by-squadron basis to ensure commanders have sufficient aircraft to confront the threat. In the meantime, the Air Force has launched a program to upgrade the A-10 to keep it flying well into the next decade, releasing a draft statement of work on Feb. 2 for updated wings.
In modernization, the Air Force’s budget request includes multiple offensive and defensive upgrades of legacy F-16 and F-15 aircraft to ensure capability and survivability in the out years, according to an Air Force spokeswoman. The FY17 budget funds F-15 C/D upgrades, which include a new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar capability and a new Infra-Red Search and Track system, which will extend the F-15 C/D capability into the mid-2040s. Meanwhile, legacy F-16s will be equipped with a new AESA radar, as well as new electronic warfare equipment and software upgrades.
The stealthy F-22 Raptors will also receive combat capability upgrades to remain viable in contested airspace and stay ahead of acceleration threats.
The service is committed to restocking munitions expended in the fight against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, requesting funds for additional Joint Direct Attack Munitions, AGM-114 Hellfires, and Small Diameter Bombs through OCO, according to the budget documents.
In intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), the Air Force is sticking to its plan to divest the Lockheed Martin U-2 spy plane in FY19, according to a spokeswoman. Meanwhile, the Air Force will work to upgrade Northrop Grumman’s unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk with a new sensor and payload adapter to ensure it can complete the ISR mission when the U-2 is retired.
The Air Force’s FY17 budget request also continues the service’s commitment to space superiority, including re-phasing the GPS space vehicle procurement from FY17 to FY18. The service has realigned the anticipated savings from the GPS III competition strategy to fund the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX).
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By Lara Seligman, Defense News 5:47 p.m. EST February 9, 2016
WASHINGTON – The Air Force is deferring 45 F-35As from its budget request over the next five years, essentially stretching out the program’s planned production ramp over the next decade.
The Air Force is absorbing the biggest F-35 cut of the three services that will operate Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation fighter jet, but the Pentagon’s overall buy will also drop across the five-year defense plan, comptroller Mike McCord told reporters Tuesday. The announcement comes as the Pentagon was preparing to drastically ramp up production of the aircraft over the next decade.
The reduction to 404 total Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps F-35s over the next five years is not expected to produce a significant change in the unit cost, McCord said. However, it is not clear the Pentagon will be able to get back to the planned production rate, he said.
“We are trying to get it back up to where we want it to be across the FYDP," McCord said, referring to the Future Years Defense Program. "But it’s just a lot of money too, and it’s unclear that we will be able to get this program back to the ramps that we had hoped for previously."
Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Maj. Gen. James F. Martin Jr. and Air Force Deputy for Budget Carolyn M. Gleason conduct a briefing about the FY2017 budget Tuesday afternoon at the Pentagon. (Photo: Mike Morones/staff)
The Air Force’s official budget documents reflect a significantly slower buildup of F-35A production than previously planned. As first reported by Defense News, the Air Force deferred five F-35As this year, requesting just 43 in its fiscal 2017 budget submission, down from a planned 48. The Air Force had planned to jump to 60 F-35As a year starting in FY18, but the FY17 funding profile shows the service will not get to the 60-per-year rate until FY21. The Air Force will buy 43 aircraft in FY17; 44 in FY18; and 48 in both FY19 and FY20 before the buy jumps to 60 in FY21, according to the documents.
The delayed F-35A ramp to the ultimate goal of 1,763 aircraft is one of the “tough choices” the Air Force was forced to make in this year's budget negotiations, according to the documents. The service is partially funding Block 4 software upgrades for the jet, as well as research and development of nuclear weapons capability.
Although the Air Force cut alone is not hugely significant in the context of the thousands of aircraft the Pentagon intends to buy over the next decade, the near-term Air Force reduction could impact the unit price of the plane. Some analysts believe the deferral could have a domino effect on the program, potentially spooking international partners.
Doug Birkey, executive director of the Mitchell Institute, cautioned that the Pentagon must be extremely careful when playing with the F-35 numbers.
“The second you start bringing down numbers or you delay things, the price goes up, and so it’s a risk factor,” Birkey said, adding that the move “puts blood in the water.”
“I really do think it will implode if they mess up the numbers too much,” he added.
Still, the Pentagon cuts over the FYDP do necessarily indicate bad news for the overall program. Lockheed Martin can move customers around within its planned production time line, according to Capital Alpha’s Byron Callan. As the Air Force drops F-35As, international partners could fill in those slots, he pointed out in a Feb. 7 report.
Overall, the Air Force is requesting $166.9 billion in FY17, a slight uptick from the $167.9 billion requested in FY16. Included in that topline is $46.9 billion for operations and maintenance, $22.4 billion for procurement, $19.6 billion for research, development, technology and evaluation, and $12.3 billion for overseas contingency operations.
As Defense News previously reported, the Air Force’s FY17 budget request fully funds the Long Range Strike Bomber and the 15-aircraft KC-46 tanker buy. The request additionally includes commitment to moving forward with the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System recapitalization effort, the Combat Rescue Helicopter, the T-X advanced trainer replacement, and the recapitalization of Air Force One. JSTARS is expected to reach initial operational capability by 2024, according to the budget documents.
The budget submission also maintains a commitment to the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, which will replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile and is ultimately planned to arm LRSB.
Aside from F-35 delays, the Air Force is also slowing procurement of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which will eventually replace the aging C-130Hs. The Air Force cut three C-130Js from its FY17 budget request, a drop to 11 overall: three C-130Js (including one through the OCO budget), three HC-130Js and six MC-130Js. However, the Air Force is holding onto its legacy EC-130 Compass Call aircraft, a key component of the fleet’s electronic attack capability. Meanwhile, the service requested funding to recapitalize the Compass Call fleet by moving the plane’s electronics onto new business jet bodies.
In another expected move, the Air Force is deferring retirement of the A-10 Warthog until 2022, and funding additional contract maintainers. The service will replace the attack plane with F-35s on a squadron-by-squadron basis to ensure commanders have sufficient aircraft to confront the threat. In the meantime, the Air Force has launched a program to upgrade the A-10 to keep it flying well into the next decade, releasing a draft statement of work on Feb. 2 for updated wings.
In modernization, the Air Force’s budget request includes multiple offensive and defensive upgrades of legacy F-16 and F-15 aircraft to ensure capability and survivability in the out years, according to an Air Force spokeswoman. The FY17 budget funds F-15 C/D upgrades, which include a new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar capability and a new Infra-Red Search and Track system, which will extend the F-15 C/D capability into the mid-2040s. Meanwhile, legacy F-16s will be equipped with a new AESA radar, as well as new electronic warfare equipment and software upgrades.
The stealthy F-22 Raptors will also receive combat capability upgrades to remain viable in contested airspace and stay ahead of acceleration threats.
The service is committed to restocking munitions expended in the fight against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, requesting funds for additional Joint Direct Attack Munitions, AGM-114 Hellfires, and Small Diameter Bombs through OCO, according to the budget documents.
In intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), the Air Force is sticking to its plan to divest the Lockheed Martin U-2 spy plane in FY19, according to a spokeswoman. Meanwhile, the Air Force will work to upgrade Northrop Grumman’s unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk with a new sensor and payload adapter to ensure it can complete the ISR mission when the U-2 is retired.
The Air Force’s FY17 budget request also continues the service’s commitment to space superiority, including re-phasing the GPS space vehicle procurement from FY17 to FY18. The service has realigned the anticipated savings from the GPS III competition strategy to fund the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX).
More Stories
Everything is proceeding as I have foreseen...
There is a metric
ton of money in the new budget, in FY2017 and out-years, flowing into F-16 and F-15. Meanwhile, the USAF is having to hire contract maintenance crews for active units, so they can throw more people at the task of keeping the unreliable, maintenance-hungry JSFs sorta-flying, even though not a one will be combat-capable before 2019...
By the way...
"But it’s just a lot of money too, and it’s unclear that we will be able to get this program back to the ramps that we had hoped for previously."
Not getting on the ramps = wave goodbye to all the price promises.
And I seem to remember one of our number whingeing on and on and on about a report in November that ACC would cut JSF to pay for F-15/F-16 force improvements. Did he ever write that letter and sign his mom's real name to it, I wonder?
There is a metric
ton of money in the new budget, in FY2017 and out-years, flowing into F-16 and F-15. Meanwhile, the USAF is having to hire contract maintenance crews for active units, so they can throw more people at the task of keeping the unreliable, maintenance-hungry JSFs sorta-flying, even though not a one will be combat-capable before 2019...By the way...
"But it’s just a lot of money too, and it’s unclear that we will be able to get this program back to the ramps that we had hoped for previously."
Not getting on the ramps = wave goodbye to all the price promises.
And I seem to remember one of our number whingeing on and on and on about a report in November that ACC would cut JSF to pay for F-15/F-16 force improvements. Did he ever write that letter and sign his mom's real name to it, I wonder?
Last edited by LowObservable; 9th Feb 2016 at 23:32.