New Helos for the RAN
Upgrading some old kit is bound to be cheap, capable and successful.
Australia has a great record on that front.
Look at Seasprite, Popeye on F111, HMAS Minoora/Kanimbla, M113 AS4 etc etc
Doors Off
Australia has a great record on that front.Look at Seasprite, Popeye on F111, HMAS Minoora/Kanimbla, M113 AS4 etc etc
Doors Off
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Progressive enhancement/optimisation of in-service hardware
Hello DoorsOff.
The costly Seasprite fiasco was not an airframe upgrade issue, as camouflaged by Defence; but an absurd attempt to gut an in-service aircraft cockpit and weapon system to replace with an Australian-designed flight management and combat system. That was a totally unrealistic objective considering the years and expertise required for Boeing and Airbus to develop their computerised flight management systems.
AGM-142 'Popeye' was mooted for the RAAF primarily to provide a supersonic 50nm stand-off missile capability for the F-111 in a maritime strike role. At that time, there was broad intent to re-engine the aircraft and optimise further with digital avionics. Enhancement of the F-111 was estimated at around $2.5billion to provide a very adequate capability to well beyond 2020, whereas scrapping and knee-jerk acquisition of the Super Hornet has cost taxpayers about $6.5billion.
Shortcomings in progressive maintenance on all RAN warships are now the subject of close scrutiny.
As for the 10 year delayed M113 APC enhancement project; it seems Defence were largely conned by Tenix/BAE Systems/DMO into questionable stretching of the basic vehicle in lieu of just optimising what was pretty standard kit. The program also failed to embrace a combined cannon/mortar fire support vehicle which would have given the Army much enhanced flexibility/versatility for operations in remote areas like Afghanistan and PNG.
There is continually an abundance of optimisation options for in-service military hardware paralleling the peddling of new platforms. Adequate military capabilities can be maintained in multiple respects by progressively enhancing in-service hardware, where cost-effective. There seems no good reason why Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea Hawk, Sea King, Chinook or whatever else should not have been put through manufacturer upgrade programs where applicable and conduct of such work negotiated in Australia. That is an entirely different proposition than having whoever meddle with unique Australianisation.
While the Defence organisation is dysfunctional and DMO out of control, the military leadership have also been culpable in the generation of increasing capability gaps. It is really their collective responsibility to assure maintenance of continual adequate and credible military preparedness, even if that means falling on swords to resist poor hardware decisions.
The reality is ambitious funding for the mythical Force 2030 will simply not be available, so there will have to be some effort toward recovering diminishing military capacity at modest cost, if the ADF is to regain credibility.
The costly Seasprite fiasco was not an airframe upgrade issue, as camouflaged by Defence; but an absurd attempt to gut an in-service aircraft cockpit and weapon system to replace with an Australian-designed flight management and combat system. That was a totally unrealistic objective considering the years and expertise required for Boeing and Airbus to develop their computerised flight management systems.
AGM-142 'Popeye' was mooted for the RAAF primarily to provide a supersonic 50nm stand-off missile capability for the F-111 in a maritime strike role. At that time, there was broad intent to re-engine the aircraft and optimise further with digital avionics. Enhancement of the F-111 was estimated at around $2.5billion to provide a very adequate capability to well beyond 2020, whereas scrapping and knee-jerk acquisition of the Super Hornet has cost taxpayers about $6.5billion.
Shortcomings in progressive maintenance on all RAN warships are now the subject of close scrutiny.
As for the 10 year delayed M113 APC enhancement project; it seems Defence were largely conned by Tenix/BAE Systems/DMO into questionable stretching of the basic vehicle in lieu of just optimising what was pretty standard kit. The program also failed to embrace a combined cannon/mortar fire support vehicle which would have given the Army much enhanced flexibility/versatility for operations in remote areas like Afghanistan and PNG.
There is continually an abundance of optimisation options for in-service military hardware paralleling the peddling of new platforms. Adequate military capabilities can be maintained in multiple respects by progressively enhancing in-service hardware, where cost-effective. There seems no good reason why Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea Hawk, Sea King, Chinook or whatever else should not have been put through manufacturer upgrade programs where applicable and conduct of such work negotiated in Australia. That is an entirely different proposition than having whoever meddle with unique Australianisation.
While the Defence organisation is dysfunctional and DMO out of control, the military leadership have also been culpable in the generation of increasing capability gaps. It is really their collective responsibility to assure maintenance of continual adequate and credible military preparedness, even if that means falling on swords to resist poor hardware decisions.
The reality is ambitious funding for the mythical Force 2030 will simply not be available, so there will have to be some effort toward recovering diminishing military capacity at modest cost, if the ADF is to regain credibility.
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*Sigh*...The Super Hornets DID NOT cost $6.5 billion! 
The aircraft, spares, weapons, sensors etc cost about $3.2 billion. The rest is for about a decade's worth of operations, new basing infrastructure, simulators, personnel costs, oil, tyres, fuel and even windscreen washer liquid, all of which (and probably more) would have had to have been paid for the F-111 anyway!
The aircraft, spares, weapons, sensors etc cost about $3.2 billion. The rest is for about a decade's worth of operations, new basing infrastructure, simulators, personnel costs, oil, tyres, fuel and even windscreen washer liquid, all of which (and probably more) would have had to have been paid for the F-111 anyway!
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Okay FA18; tell us where transparency is for taxpayers pre-purchase regarding overall project components and detailed breakdown of projected costings for any hardware acquisition. Certainly not on the DMO website. This info may of course be available, under the cloak of 'classified' information, but the taxpayer is entitled to know just how the defence dollar is being spent. Unit costings for particular bits of hardware seem pretty vague and perhaps that is intentional - e.g. how much each for Tiger, MRH90, MH-60R helos? There will be no public confidence in Defence while equipment acquisition dealings seem murky.
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Hey, I'm not defending the DMO nor the government, I'm just stating a fairly well know fact within Defence and Industry re that particular project. To say that 24 Super Hornets cost $6.5 billion (suggesting they cost $271 million each) is ridiculous.
For projected project costs, the public DCP is a good place to start - it lays out the projected cost of each project (admittedly, within a fairly broad band), and what is included in that.
And then the DMO major projects report which is published each December-ish clearly reports on finished projects, or on projects that are under review, delayed, on the POC list etc, and what needs to be done to complete them. It may not always make for pretty reading, but it's all there.
For projected project costs, the public DCP is a good place to start - it lays out the projected cost of each project (admittedly, within a fairly broad band), and what is included in that.
And then the DMO major projects report which is published each December-ish clearly reports on finished projects, or on projects that are under review, delayed, on the POC list etc, and what needs to be done to complete them. It may not always make for pretty reading, but it's all there.
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"In December 2006, therefore, The Australian reported that Defence Minister Brendan Nelson was discussing an A$ 3 billion (about $2.36 billion) purchase of 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet aircraft around 2009-2010. A move that came as “a surprise to senior defence officials on Russell Hill”; but became an official purchase as requests and contracts were hurriedly submitted. Australia’s new Labor government’s later decided to keep the Super Hornet purchase rather than pay cancellation fees, and ministerial statements place the program’s final figure at A$ 6.6 billion, which includes basing, training, and other ancillary costs."
We still outlayed A$ 6.6 billion, regardless.
And some of that 6.5 billion can be spread across future purchases of Super Hornets as it is infrastructure et al.
"And then the DMO major projects report which is published each December-ish clearly reports on finished projects, or on projects that are under review, delayed, on the POC list etc, and what needs to be done to complete them. It may not always make for pretty reading, but it's all there."
DMO has been hiding crap for years, that's why Smith is so cranky.
IF it was all nicely published for all to see, why is it the Gov't couldn't get Defence force assets when it wanted for Cyclone Yasi and other ventures.
IF DMO (and defence chiefs) had kept the minister informed, they wouldn't be in this mess.
Someone, at some point needs to be in charge and acept responsibility for good and bad and people not be afraid to speak up when something stuffs up. Create the culture so we don't keep blundering onwards with $$$ being wasted.
Maybe at last the chook is coming home to roost.
Just my HO.
.
We still outlayed A$ 6.6 billion, regardless.
And some of that 6.5 billion can be spread across future purchases of Super Hornets as it is infrastructure et al.
"And then the DMO major projects report which is published each December-ish clearly reports on finished projects, or on projects that are under review, delayed, on the POC list etc, and what needs to be done to complete them. It may not always make for pretty reading, but it's all there."
DMO has been hiding crap for years, that's why Smith is so cranky.
IF it was all nicely published for all to see, why is it the Gov't couldn't get Defence force assets when it wanted for Cyclone Yasi and other ventures.
IF DMO (and defence chiefs) had kept the minister informed, they wouldn't be in this mess.
Someone, at some point needs to be in charge and acept responsibility for good and bad and people not be afraid to speak up when something stuffs up. Create the culture so we don't keep blundering onwards with $$$ being wasted.
Maybe at last the chook is coming home to roost.
Just my HO.
.
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We still outlayed A$ 6.6 billion, regardless.
And some of that 6.5 billion can be spread across future purchases of Super Hornets as it is infrastructure et al.
And some of that 6.5 billion can be spread across future purchases of Super Hornets as it is infrastructure et al.
The infrastructure being built for the Super Hornets - new squadron HQ, maintenance hangars etc - have all been designed with JSF in mind, i.e. they have the necessary compartmentalisation for the increased security required on the JSF (and the Rhino), so they will not need to be redone when the JSF finally arrives.
I enjoy a lot of what you write B71 but every time I see some one writing how spending more billions on the F111 would have been a good investment I begin to wonder.
That much money to maybe have 6 aircraft on line as an orphan capability just makes no sense.
Its like an old car, fix the engine, then the hydraulics break, fix them the suspension breaks etc etc, (let alone wings, rudders, elevators)
No body I know who flies it has anything bad to say about it in fact when they compare it the the F111 I haven't heard anyone say they would take it over the Rhino into a modern combat zone.
Kinda like updating a 40 year old seasprite for a modern combat zone.....
That much money to maybe have 6 aircraft on line as an orphan capability just makes no sense.
Its like an old car, fix the engine, then the hydraulics break, fix them the suspension breaks etc etc, (let alone wings, rudders, elevators)
No body I know who flies it has anything bad to say about it in fact when they compare it the the F111 I haven't heard anyone say they would take it over the Rhino into a modern combat zone.
Kinda like updating a 40 year old seasprite for a modern combat zone.....
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Hi again FA18. Thank you for the feedback and sorry, but I did not mean to come across tersely. I do acknowledge that some broad brush info on defence expenditure can be ascertained through ferreting; but detailed project costings ought to be more transparent for the public in my view and exposure on the DMO website, with say quarterly updating by project managers, would seem appropriate.
There seems a phobia about enhancement/optimisation of early design platforms, but that goes on continually being a secondary means of how the aircraft/arms industry makes money - consider the DC3/Dakota (BT-67), B-52, C-130, Iroquois/Huey II, etcetera. But Australia of course sheds low time adequate capability airframes for upgrading and further utilisation around the world, which is rather asinine!
The new airframe component of the Super Hornet buy is perhaps around $2billion whereas the F-111 airframes were wholly-owned and adequately supportable for another decade or 2 considering components available from AMARC in the US. That unique platform, appropriately optimised, would have adequately fulfilled a long range maritime strike capability now requiring SH with tanker support. Being a sole operator of type would not have mattered for Australia's regional requirements, pending downstream development of a more suitable replacement platform than a fighter-bomber. Regarding what aircrew might prefer to operate in a combat environment; you have to be prepared to go to war in what the nation has in service at any point in time. A former Chief Defence Scientist and the now retired CDF were instrumental in forfeiting that great capability, but it is of course history now.
Justifying high outlay on the Super Hornet as forward planning for the JSF is a huge gamble considering the very parlous state of the F-35 project, which could even founder. Such thinking seems to run counter to the supposed risk minimization strategy underlying Australian defence acquisition planning. Similarly, shedding proven capabilities that could (and should) have been progressively optimised and introducing relatively unproven hardware with delayed operational capabilities (Wedgetail, MRTT, Tiger, MRH90, etcetera).
In a nutshell, my beef is the somewhat reckless outlaying of billions of dollars toward a mythical downstream force structure instead of cost-effectively maintaining adequate ongoing military preparedness. While some top shelf capabilities are appropriate (like Global Hawk), optimised hardware that is affordable and adequate for regional operations deserves more emphasis; and especially now to recover some diminishing military capacities, as in battlefield support helos.
The foreseeable shrinking money pot just has to be better spent, but Australia is going somewhat down the unaffordable US track. In 2008, defence expenditure was 7.6 percent of government revenue, but has since climbed to over 9 percent. That is a huge percentage increase in a short time-frame and clearly an unsustainable trend considering other national expenditure imperatives.
There seems a phobia about enhancement/optimisation of early design platforms, but that goes on continually being a secondary means of how the aircraft/arms industry makes money - consider the DC3/Dakota (BT-67), B-52, C-130, Iroquois/Huey II, etcetera. But Australia of course sheds low time adequate capability airframes for upgrading and further utilisation around the world, which is rather asinine!
The new airframe component of the Super Hornet buy is perhaps around $2billion whereas the F-111 airframes were wholly-owned and adequately supportable for another decade or 2 considering components available from AMARC in the US. That unique platform, appropriately optimised, would have adequately fulfilled a long range maritime strike capability now requiring SH with tanker support. Being a sole operator of type would not have mattered for Australia's regional requirements, pending downstream development of a more suitable replacement platform than a fighter-bomber. Regarding what aircrew might prefer to operate in a combat environment; you have to be prepared to go to war in what the nation has in service at any point in time. A former Chief Defence Scientist and the now retired CDF were instrumental in forfeiting that great capability, but it is of course history now.
Justifying high outlay on the Super Hornet as forward planning for the JSF is a huge gamble considering the very parlous state of the F-35 project, which could even founder. Such thinking seems to run counter to the supposed risk minimization strategy underlying Australian defence acquisition planning. Similarly, shedding proven capabilities that could (and should) have been progressively optimised and introducing relatively unproven hardware with delayed operational capabilities (Wedgetail, MRTT, Tiger, MRH90, etcetera).
In a nutshell, my beef is the somewhat reckless outlaying of billions of dollars toward a mythical downstream force structure instead of cost-effectively maintaining adequate ongoing military preparedness. While some top shelf capabilities are appropriate (like Global Hawk), optimised hardware that is affordable and adequate for regional operations deserves more emphasis; and especially now to recover some diminishing military capacities, as in battlefield support helos.
The foreseeable shrinking money pot just has to be better spent, but Australia is going somewhat down the unaffordable US track. In 2008, defence expenditure was 7.6 percent of government revenue, but has since climbed to over 9 percent. That is a huge percentage increase in a short time-frame and clearly an unsustainable trend considering other national expenditure imperatives.
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Relating the configuration options to fore-mentioned DWP2009 criteria begs the question: Why was the Romeo selected instead of the Sierra?
(sigh) Because one of the two primary operational roles of the aircraft is ASW, which the Romeo is capable of performing and the Sierra sadly isn't.
Relating the configuration options to fore-mentioned DWP2009 criteria begs the question: Why was the Romeo selected instead of the Sierra?
(sigh) Because one of the two primary operational roles of the aircraft is ASW, which the Romeo is capable of performing and the Sierra sadly isn't.
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Hi Spoz. Have to disagree with you regarding the versatility of the MH-60S platform - consider adaptations of Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Chinook over the years and the myriad of certified modular bolt-on systems to enable flexibility, versatility and economy of effort.
The Sierra could be just as easily fitted with various already certified systems a la Blackhawk. Re ASW and ASUW; FLIR, modular dipping sonar (like http://www.l-3com.com/products-servi...t.aspx?id=1134), torpedo racks, Penguin, Hellfire, podded cannon, etcetera are all available options. Just because the large US Navy has not gone down that track does not mean it is inappropriate.
Granted the Sierra would not be quite as sophisticated for those roles as the Romeo, but certainly a darn site more usable militarily in a broader sense for the smallish ADF.
Having already reckelssly squandered around $5billion on ill-conceived helo projects, DoD cannot justifiably splurge about another $3billion on an aircraft with narrowly applicable capabilities in contravention of DWP2009 policy. Adequate ASW/ASUW capabilities could be provided by acquiring some adaptable Sierra and sufficiently enhancing S-70B-2 in service, perhaps saving around $2billion. That is a vast amount of money that could be better utilised to remedy other capability gaps that have been created by flawed planning.
Continuation of reckless defence spending just has to be curtailed and some second tier capabilities accepted. It that does not happen, then ADF military preparedness and capacity will continue to shrink in my view.
The Sierra could be just as easily fitted with various already certified systems a la Blackhawk. Re ASW and ASUW; FLIR, modular dipping sonar (like http://www.l-3com.com/products-servi...t.aspx?id=1134), torpedo racks, Penguin, Hellfire, podded cannon, etcetera are all available options. Just because the large US Navy has not gone down that track does not mean it is inappropriate.
Granted the Sierra would not be quite as sophisticated for those roles as the Romeo, but certainly a darn site more usable militarily in a broader sense for the smallish ADF.
Having already reckelssly squandered around $5billion on ill-conceived helo projects, DoD cannot justifiably splurge about another $3billion on an aircraft with narrowly applicable capabilities in contravention of DWP2009 policy. Adequate ASW/ASUW capabilities could be provided by acquiring some adaptable Sierra and sufficiently enhancing S-70B-2 in service, perhaps saving around $2billion. That is a vast amount of money that could be better utilised to remedy other capability gaps that have been created by flawed planning.
Continuation of reckless defence spending just has to be curtailed and some second tier capabilities accepted. It that does not happen, then ADF military preparedness and capacity will continue to shrink in my view.
The whole fitting of sonar, penguin missile, avionics on an old platform was tried. It failed drastically, but still it is still professed by some to try that foolish attempt again
Seasprite!
Now that was a waste of taxpayers money! You can creatively suggest that is has been done with UH1Y and AH1Z, but do some research and check the project and unit cost on that one. It aint as cheap as some think. Plus decision is made and contract signed.
Seasprite!Now that was a waste of taxpayers money! You can creatively suggest that is has been done with UH1Y and AH1Z, but do some research and check the project and unit cost on that one. It aint as cheap as some think. Plus decision is made and contract signed.
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Intersting BR71 that you advocate using tried and proven tech (Huey II etc) over new development programs (MRH, ARH), and yet you also support a dramatic upgrade of the F-111 (now THAT'S a development program!) over the Rhino, or going it alone in developing capabilities for the Sierra which no other service will want or use instead of getting the bog stock standard Romeo. 
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Hi Doors Off, FA18.
Re Seasprite; the Navy was absolutely foolish to attempt gutting of a certified aircraft which was in service with the USN Reserve and also introduced successfully in the RNZN. Orphan building of digital flight management and associated weapon systems required complete airworthiness recertification with no benchmark version in service elsewhere. The Seasprite fiasco was a far cry from adaptation of multi-role airframes with modular and bolt-on systems/weaponry that have been type certified by manufacturers for many aircraft types.
The RAAF adapted the XM-23 weapon system designed for Charlie model Iroquois gunships to the Hotel model which had additional airframe hard points enabling differing fuselage positioning of weaponry. Because the weapon system was already certified, simple aircraft wiring was accomplished within hangar resources. ARDU visited the squadron and ran the ultimate design configuration through a US Navy test schedule for operational proving. The concept enabled adaptation of a standard utility aircraft to gunship configuration within about 90 minutes, including weapons system harmonisation, and reconfiguration for utility roles in just 30 minutes.
That feat was accomplished in the late 1960s, yet complied with the Operational Flexibility intent of DWP2009, Chapter 8.61 - Australia cannot afford to maintain a large number of narrowly applicable capabilities. The future development of the ADF is to emphasise, wherever possible, operational flexibility and multi-role employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might involve, for example, achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular design and construction techniques.
The Blackhawk has been widely adapted for varying roles through fitment of certified modular systems and weaponry. For example, the 'Direct Air Penetrator' is a MH-60L Blackhawk which has been configured to act as a gunship. A range of ordnance can be fitted to the DAP's various hardpoints. This bird is armed with 2xfixed M134 miniguns, 4 AIM-92 stinger air-to-air missiles, 1x M230 30mm chain gun and a pylon holding 2 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The bulge under the DAP's chin is a FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) pod which includes a laser designator for the Hellfires. When so configured, the DAP is unable to carry passengers as all the cabin space is taken up with ammunition.
The MH-60S uses the Blackhawk airframe, which provides the larger cabin volume and double-doors needed for cargo and passenger transport, enabling troops to embark and disembark quickly. The MH-60S retains the Blackhawk's provisions for mounting the external pylons to carry stores and equipment, providing added capability to carry out a wide range of missions. The MH-60S has replaced the aging HH-60H in the combat search and rescue role. Mission equipment includes a digital map, AN/AAS-44 FLIR, the electronic warfare self-defense suite fitted on the MH-60R and additional pylon to carry HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles. Crew-served weapons include 7.62 mm guns from port and starboard cabin windows and .50-calibre guns from port and starboard cabin doors. See this link for baseline configuration: MH-60S
The Sierra could be configured for ASW and ASUW roles by fitment as required of modular systems and weaponry in military service. No costly R&D should be necessary considering many desirable systems have already been type certified and can be adapted through manufacturer programs. Going down the Romeo track will limit multi-role helo capabilities for RAN warships and the MRH90 is not suited for shipboard roles like the Sea King so the broader helo potential for the Navy will shrink.
Regarding the F-111. 'Tis history now; but given Australia's regional strategic scenario, that bird arguably provided an adequate maritime strike deterrent for maybe another decade, even without optimisation. Although Australia remained the sole operator, the aircraft was not an orphan having seen operational service with the USAF and substantial component support still available through US stored reserves. The government was seemingly stampeded into the Super Hornet acquisition on the basis of a perceived capability gap due to unnecessary intended decommissioning of the F-111 and further delays in a largely unproven JSF that has hitherto not yet achieved 10 percent of necessary test flying and operational evaluation.
Much F-111 engineering research had already been done for adaptation of other type cockpits, weapons systems and improved engines. Alas; all that good work was forsaken when a former Chief Defence Scientist and the now retired CDF advocated F-111 retirement based on a false outcome from wing structural testing. On present indications, the JSF might not even emerge so the ADF will then be locked into the Super Hornet that does not have the unique long range capability of the F-111, requiring appreciable tanker support. A rather costly step backwards in my view, although some will disagree.
Re Seasprite; the Navy was absolutely foolish to attempt gutting of a certified aircraft which was in service with the USN Reserve and also introduced successfully in the RNZN. Orphan building of digital flight management and associated weapon systems required complete airworthiness recertification with no benchmark version in service elsewhere. The Seasprite fiasco was a far cry from adaptation of multi-role airframes with modular and bolt-on systems/weaponry that have been type certified by manufacturers for many aircraft types.
The RAAF adapted the XM-23 weapon system designed for Charlie model Iroquois gunships to the Hotel model which had additional airframe hard points enabling differing fuselage positioning of weaponry. Because the weapon system was already certified, simple aircraft wiring was accomplished within hangar resources. ARDU visited the squadron and ran the ultimate design configuration through a US Navy test schedule for operational proving. The concept enabled adaptation of a standard utility aircraft to gunship configuration within about 90 minutes, including weapons system harmonisation, and reconfiguration for utility roles in just 30 minutes.
That feat was accomplished in the late 1960s, yet complied with the Operational Flexibility intent of DWP2009, Chapter 8.61 - Australia cannot afford to maintain a large number of narrowly applicable capabilities. The future development of the ADF is to emphasise, wherever possible, operational flexibility and multi-role employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might involve, for example, achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular design and construction techniques.
The Blackhawk has been widely adapted for varying roles through fitment of certified modular systems and weaponry. For example, the 'Direct Air Penetrator' is a MH-60L Blackhawk which has been configured to act as a gunship. A range of ordnance can be fitted to the DAP's various hardpoints. This bird is armed with 2xfixed M134 miniguns, 4 AIM-92 stinger air-to-air missiles, 1x M230 30mm chain gun and a pylon holding 2 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The bulge under the DAP's chin is a FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) pod which includes a laser designator for the Hellfires. When so configured, the DAP is unable to carry passengers as all the cabin space is taken up with ammunition.
The MH-60S uses the Blackhawk airframe, which provides the larger cabin volume and double-doors needed for cargo and passenger transport, enabling troops to embark and disembark quickly. The MH-60S retains the Blackhawk's provisions for mounting the external pylons to carry stores and equipment, providing added capability to carry out a wide range of missions. The MH-60S has replaced the aging HH-60H in the combat search and rescue role. Mission equipment includes a digital map, AN/AAS-44 FLIR, the electronic warfare self-defense suite fitted on the MH-60R and additional pylon to carry HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles. Crew-served weapons include 7.62 mm guns from port and starboard cabin windows and .50-calibre guns from port and starboard cabin doors. See this link for baseline configuration: MH-60S
The Sierra could be configured for ASW and ASUW roles by fitment as required of modular systems and weaponry in military service. No costly R&D should be necessary considering many desirable systems have already been type certified and can be adapted through manufacturer programs. Going down the Romeo track will limit multi-role helo capabilities for RAN warships and the MRH90 is not suited for shipboard roles like the Sea King so the broader helo potential for the Navy will shrink.
Regarding the F-111. 'Tis history now; but given Australia's regional strategic scenario, that bird arguably provided an adequate maritime strike deterrent for maybe another decade, even without optimisation. Although Australia remained the sole operator, the aircraft was not an orphan having seen operational service with the USAF and substantial component support still available through US stored reserves. The government was seemingly stampeded into the Super Hornet acquisition on the basis of a perceived capability gap due to unnecessary intended decommissioning of the F-111 and further delays in a largely unproven JSF that has hitherto not yet achieved 10 percent of necessary test flying and operational evaluation.
Much F-111 engineering research had already been done for adaptation of other type cockpits, weapons systems and improved engines. Alas; all that good work was forsaken when a former Chief Defence Scientist and the now retired CDF advocated F-111 retirement based on a false outcome from wing structural testing. On present indications, the JSF might not even emerge so the ADF will then be locked into the Super Hornet that does not have the unique long range capability of the F-111, requiring appreciable tanker support. A rather costly step backwards in my view, although some will disagree.
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Aye TBM-L, you are correct.
Just prior to operational introduction of the Bushrangers, we belatedly realised we had not adequately recorded the project photographically and got airborne on a dull day for some camera work. A2-773, the original prototype gunship, was being flown by the late Flight Lieutenant Rex Budd, DFC with me flying the camera ship. The images taken were all black and white and that shown in post #74 was 'Photoshopped' by a friend and the error subsequently corrected; but I inserted an older image which I will now dump.
Just prior to operational introduction of the Bushrangers, we belatedly realised we had not adequately recorded the project photographically and got airborne on a dull day for some camera work. A2-773, the original prototype gunship, was being flown by the late Flight Lieutenant Rex Budd, DFC with me flying the camera ship. The images taken were all black and white and that shown in post #74 was 'Photoshopped' by a friend and the error subsequently corrected; but I inserted an older image which I will now dump.
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MH-60R is the wrong aircraft
Further to posts #71 and 74.
See this interesting snippet: ADM: LM develops MH-60R variant
The RAN unwisely removed the dunking sonar from Sea Kings years back and have not hitherto added a type certified modular dipping sonar to the Seahawk. Lack of this capability has been argued a serious limitation for submariner training in particular.
A range of type certified bolt-on modular weapons systems might be fitted as required to a more versatile MH-60S rather than reinventing the MH-60R, for which Australia yet again might be a first non-US customer!
See this interesting snippet: ADM: LM develops MH-60R variant
The RAN unwisely removed the dunking sonar from Sea Kings years back and have not hitherto added a type certified modular dipping sonar to the Seahawk. Lack of this capability has been argued a serious limitation for submariner training in particular.
A range of type certified bolt-on modular weapons systems might be fitted as required to a more versatile MH-60S rather than reinventing the MH-60R, for which Australia yet again might be a first non-US customer!
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60S is not designed for Frigates
Look at the location of the tail wheels on 60R and 60S and also look for the RAST probe....
MH-60R has RAST, MH-60S doesn't. The location of the tailwheel on the 60S will restrict the space available for landing on the flight deck of frigates meaning that in order to make landing ALARP it would be necessary to reduce either SHOL or Deck motion limits to derisk the Wheel Landing Area going over the stern, which in turn would increase the number of days you can't fly. These reasons alone mean the 60S is not a serious candidate for a frigate based navy (like the RAN)
The USN doesn't embark 60S in FF/DD for those very reasons.
MH-60R has RAST, MH-60S doesn't. The location of the tailwheel on the 60S will restrict the space available for landing on the flight deck of frigates meaning that in order to make landing ALARP it would be necessary to reduce either SHOL or Deck motion limits to derisk the Wheel Landing Area going over the stern, which in turn would increase the number of days you can't fly. These reasons alone mean the 60S is not a serious candidate for a frigate based navy (like the RAN)
The USN doesn't embark 60S in FF/DD for those very reasons.
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MH60R Crewing Options
I wonder if anyone can shed light on a snippet of info I heard recently.
The USN MH60R is certified as a two-pilot aircraft. This is important because it affects things like IFR clearance, Minimum Equipment Lists etc. The Australian Navy has insisted on operating it with one Pilot and one Aviation Warfare Officer (Observer) in the front.
I heard recently that the USN training squadron has refused to let the AvWO's in the front seat of the USN Romeos being used for training the RAN crew because it is contrary to the certification baseline. This will have significant implications for the introduction of the Romeo?
I understand that there was a study done regarding the crewing options for RAN aircraft a number of years ago by one of the Fleet Air Arm's most experienced pilots, and the recommendation he came up with was to go to a two-pilot crew (plus Senso in the back). This plan would have halved training times, reduced the number of people required and saved bucket loads of money (i.e tens of millions per year). The Senior sirs in the FAA didn't like it because they thought it would be unpopular, and most of them were Observers. The pilot who did this study eventually resigned in disgust, as I understand.
Adopting this plan would have prevented the FAA being in a pickle today, perhaps?
The USN MH60R is certified as a two-pilot aircraft. This is important because it affects things like IFR clearance, Minimum Equipment Lists etc. The Australian Navy has insisted on operating it with one Pilot and one Aviation Warfare Officer (Observer) in the front.
I heard recently that the USN training squadron has refused to let the AvWO's in the front seat of the USN Romeos being used for training the RAN crew because it is contrary to the certification baseline. This will have significant implications for the introduction of the Romeo?
I understand that there was a study done regarding the crewing options for RAN aircraft a number of years ago by one of the Fleet Air Arm's most experienced pilots, and the recommendation he came up with was to go to a two-pilot crew (plus Senso in the back). This plan would have halved training times, reduced the number of people required and saved bucket loads of money (i.e tens of millions per year). The Senior sirs in the FAA didn't like it because they thought it would be unpopular, and most of them were Observers. The pilot who did this study eventually resigned in disgust, as I understand.
Adopting this plan would have prevented the FAA being in a pickle today, perhaps?
