Progressive enhancement/optimisation of in-service hardware
Hello DoorsOff.
The costly Seasprite fiasco was not an airframe upgrade issue, as camouflaged by Defence; but an absurd attempt to gut an in-service aircraft cockpit and weapon system to replace with an Australian-designed flight management and combat system. That was a totally unrealistic objective considering the years and expertise required for Boeing and Airbus to develop their computerised flight management systems.
AGM-142 'Popeye' was mooted for the RAAF primarily to provide a supersonic 50nm stand-off missile capability for the F-111 in a maritime strike role. At that time, there was broad intent to re-engine the aircraft and optimise further with digital avionics. Enhancement of the F-111 was estimated at around $2.5billion to provide a very adequate capability to well beyond 2020, whereas scrapping and knee-jerk acquisition of the Super Hornet has cost taxpayers about $6.5billion.
Shortcomings in progressive maintenance on all RAN warships are now the subject of close scrutiny.
As for the 10 year delayed M113 APC enhancement project; it seems Defence were largely conned by Tenix/BAE Systems/DMO into questionable stretching of the basic vehicle in lieu of just optimising what was pretty standard kit. The program also failed to embrace a combined cannon/mortar fire support vehicle which would have given the Army much enhanced flexibility/versatility for operations in remote areas like Afghanistan and PNG.
There is continually an abundance of optimisation options for in-service military hardware paralleling the peddling of new platforms. Adequate military capabilities can be maintained in multiple respects by progressively enhancing in-service hardware, where cost-effective. There seems no good reason why Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea Hawk, Sea King, Chinook or whatever else should not have been put through manufacturer upgrade programs where applicable and conduct of such work negotiated in Australia. That is an entirely different proposition than having whoever meddle with unique Australianisation.
While the Defence organisation is dysfunctional and DMO out of control, the military leadership have also been culpable in the generation of increasing capability gaps. It is really their collective responsibility to assure maintenance of continual adequate and credible military preparedness, even if that means falling on swords to resist poor hardware decisions.
The reality is ambitious funding for the mythical Force 2030 will simply not be available, so there will have to be some effort toward recovering diminishing military capacity at modest cost, if the ADF is to regain credibility.