Hi again FA18. Thank you for the feedback and sorry, but I did not mean to come across tersely. I do acknowledge that some broad brush info on defence expenditure can be ascertained through ferreting; but detailed project costings ought to be more transparent for the public in my view and exposure on the DMO website, with say quarterly updating by project managers, would seem appropriate.
There seems a phobia about enhancement/optimisation of early design platforms, but that goes on continually being a secondary means of how the aircraft/arms industry makes money - consider the DC3/Dakota (BT-67), B-52, C-130, Iroquois/Huey II, etcetera. But Australia of course sheds low time adequate capability airframes for upgrading and further utilisation around the world, which is rather asinine!
The new airframe component of the Super Hornet buy is perhaps around $2billion whereas the F-111 airframes were wholly-owned and adequately supportable for another decade or 2 considering components available from AMARC in the US. That unique platform, appropriately optimised, would have adequately fulfilled a long range maritime strike capability now requiring SH with tanker support. Being a sole operator of type would not have mattered for Australia's regional requirements, pending downstream development of a more suitable replacement platform than a fighter-bomber. Regarding what aircrew might prefer to operate in a combat environment; you have to be prepared to go to war in what the nation has in service at any point in time. A former Chief Defence Scientist and the now retired CDF were instrumental in forfeiting that great capability, but it is of course history now.
Justifying high outlay on the Super Hornet as forward planning for the JSF is a huge gamble considering the very parlous state of the F-35 project, which could even founder. Such thinking seems to run counter to the supposed risk minimization strategy underlying Australian defence acquisition planning. Similarly, shedding proven capabilities that could (and should) have been progressively optimised and introducing relatively unproven hardware with delayed operational capabilities (Wedgetail, MRTT, Tiger, MRH90, etcetera).
In a nutshell, my beef is the somewhat reckless outlaying of billions of dollars toward a mythical downstream force structure instead of cost-effectively maintaining adequate ongoing military preparedness. While some top shelf capabilities are appropriate (like Global Hawk), optimised hardware that is affordable and adequate for regional operations deserves more emphasis; and especially now to recover some diminishing military capacities, as in battlefield support helos.
The foreseeable shrinking money pot just has to be better spent, but Australia is going somewhat down the unaffordable US track. In 2008, defence expenditure was 7.6 percent of government revenue, but has since climbed to over 9 percent. That is a huge percentage increase in a short time-frame and clearly an unsustainable trend considering other national expenditure imperatives.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 10th Jul 2011 at 23:04.