EK / Seychelles near miss - 14 July '17
short flights long nights
Having not posted here for a while, one of the answers is...remove the fear factor. And allow Pilots to use common sense. But I no longer think that is possible in certain airlines. And while this continues, things won't get better. Does anyone think that the crew in this latest incident will be treated with a 'just culture'?
Great to see you SOPs, I'd have to concur with Don, Wiz et al regarding airmanship etc, it's part of the wider issue that can be traced back in part to the explosive growth of European locos and their cadet programmes. Far different to the old legacy programmes where cadets were taught on the job by experienced and capable trainers. Nowadays cadet programmes are still able to produce a standard product but they are flawed in the sense that a large number of second and third generation of airline pilots have no real world experience beyond a set of SOPs and operating manuals, throw into the mix that many of the trainers are mere facsimiles themselves of those cadet programmes and you have more potential for significant gaps in knowledge and the ability to show resilience.
Recently I asked a chap I was flying with if he would consider landing with no autobrake selected, he told me it was "outside SOPs" so he wouldn't consider it unless it was an emergency, I asked him about disconnecting the AP above 10k if it wasn't doing what you wanted it to do, again "outside of SOPs" so only in an emergency, I asked him how did he plan his descent, "VNAV" does it for me.
At every turn his answer was that automation and SOPs would solve his problems for him as well as protect him from fleet etc.
For me that is ostensibly the result of the policies and blame mindset that currently exists, it's also why people don't move thrust levers, why they don't anticipate and identify small problems before they become bigger ones and it's why people make preventable mistakes as they have neither the capacity or skills to have a plan B..C..or even D sometimes stored away for when the proverbial hits the fan.
In the case of what's currently happening, based on the available information the Air Seychelles crew displayed far more resilience than the EK crew.
Recently I asked a chap I was flying with if he would consider landing with no autobrake selected, he told me it was "outside SOPs" so he wouldn't consider it unless it was an emergency, I asked him about disconnecting the AP above 10k if it wasn't doing what you wanted it to do, again "outside of SOPs" so only in an emergency, I asked him how did he plan his descent, "VNAV" does it for me.
At every turn his answer was that automation and SOPs would solve his problems for him as well as protect him from fleet etc.
For me that is ostensibly the result of the policies and blame mindset that currently exists, it's also why people don't move thrust levers, why they don't anticipate and identify small problems before they become bigger ones and it's why people make preventable mistakes as they have neither the capacity or skills to have a plan B..C..or even D sometimes stored away for when the proverbial hits the fan.
In the case of what's currently happening, based on the available information the Air Seychelles crew displayed far more resilience than the EK crew.
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Whilst it might be considered a dirty word in many airlines these days, ffs, guys & gals there's this thing known as AIRMANSHIP !!!
There was certainly a mistake by ATC (for not picking up on the incorrect read back, by EK). That said, there was a lot of pertinent information being passed by ATC, though none of it was evidently picked up and / or acted upon by the EK crew (and / or the Seychelles crew... assuming that the latter were on frequency?)... and one would surmise, from their transmissions, that ATC were passing a big clue wrt opposite direction traffic (albeit EK were evidently not 'listening to' and / or interpreting upon that).
So perhaps instead of sitting there fat, dumb, and happy, try instead listening-up to what's going on around you (especially when climbing & descending), i.e. try forming your own 'mental radar' picture / 'Situational Awareness' of where other aircraft are and where they are going to / where they are cleared to, and TCAS - when used in 'tactical mode', assuming you have it? - can often help here too... none of it's exactly f'ing rocket science, is it ?!
There was certainly a mistake by ATC (for not picking up on the incorrect read back, by EK). That said, there was a lot of pertinent information being passed by ATC, though none of it was evidently picked up and / or acted upon by the EK crew (and / or the Seychelles crew... assuming that the latter were on frequency?)... and one would surmise, from their transmissions, that ATC were passing a big clue wrt opposite direction traffic (albeit EK were evidently not 'listening to' and / or interpreting upon that).
So perhaps instead of sitting there fat, dumb, and happy, try instead listening-up to what's going on around you (especially when climbing & descending), i.e. try forming your own 'mental radar' picture / 'Situational Awareness' of where other aircraft are and where they are going to / where they are cleared to, and TCAS - when used in 'tactical mode', assuming you have it? - can often help here too... none of it's exactly f'ing rocket science, is it ?!
Hallelujah! At last a sensible post on this forum. How many times were clues passed by ATC, and ignored by EK crew. Airmanship, what airmanship...
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We have a large problem here at EK and that is a lack of maturity in terms of age and experience in both seats.
My remarks are not directed at this crew but the situation in general.
On the boeing side of the house it is rare to see a cpt with a seniority number of less than 400 and not an uncommon sight to see cpts with 410+ seniority numbers.
I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.
My remarks are not directed at this crew but the situation in general.
On the boeing side of the house it is rare to see a cpt with a seniority number of less than 400 and not an uncommon sight to see cpts with 410+ seniority numbers.
I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.
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Lots of talk about lack of SA, but... SA depends on your perception.
If you haven't picked up the error, your perception is that you have the correct information and your SA is based on that.
Yes, we'd like to think we'd all have picked up the incorrect read back or the opposite traffic clearance. But, no one here was there to know what was happening, what other threats were there.
Oh, to be as perfect as some here!
If you haven't picked up the error, your perception is that you have the correct information and your SA is based on that.
Yes, we'd like to think we'd all have picked up the incorrect read back or the opposite traffic clearance. But, no one here was there to know what was happening, what other threats were there.
Oh, to be as perfect as some here!
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There does appear at times to be an air of overconfidence among some of our peer group. I know more than I could safely write about certain pilot personalities, let's just say that some feel more elevated and superior than others and aren't afraid to tell you so, despite their own failings.
It's not only a question about slipping standards but also the requirement for pilots to occupy cockpit seats no matter how inexperienced (globally) they may be. As has been said before, you can't buy junior pilots experience, neither in a cockpit seat or in life {maturity}, you can only earn them over time. In today's fast growing airlines, it really is not Safety > Commercial > Training, but is more like Commercial > Safety/Training.
What's seen as important? Get the job done, earn the revenue, recruit whoever is required to achieve the revenue. Sadly, aviation in the cockpit is far too much of the office flying the flight deck and too many decade only experienced pilots thinking that they deserve the Big Jet L/R seats because for them, it's all about me, myself and I.
Sad to say and again I stick my neck out on the block. People are asking how this should be rectified and a good start will be to slow down the loss of experience in certain airlines that are suffering experience shortages. It's not that experience is everything but there is value that can be passed down and those values appear to be disappearing faster year on year.
J
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Lots of talk about lack of SA, but... SA depends on your perception.
If you haven't picked up the error, your perception is that you have the correct information and your SA is based on that.
Yes, we'd like to think we'd all have picked up the incorrect read back or the opposite traffic clearance. But, no one here was there to know what was happening, what other threats were there.
Oh, to be as perfect as some here!
If you haven't picked up the error, your perception is that you have the correct information and your SA is based on that.
Yes, we'd like to think we'd all have picked up the incorrect read back or the opposite traffic clearance. But, no one here was there to know what was happening, what other threats were there.
Oh, to be as perfect as some here!
What's disturbing is the assumption from the arm chair brigade above - that what we heard on YouTube is what was picked up by the Flt deck comm system on that 380 - even though no one here is privy to that CVR - or that they lacked airmanship & should have maneuvered without visual contact on a TA. Who knows whether they saw traffic? Air Sez maneuvered on a TA because they had visual (repeatedly stated in recording) and is part of the maneuver "if needed"
But the EK crew lacked airmanship from the posters above because...the said posters above - knew what that crew saw and heard that day!?
Look, the point is - they may well have FUBAR'd it completely & the Air Sez guys were spot on.
No one knows yet - so why not give our colleagues a little slack - because if it is their bad - they won't get much from the third floor who will hopefully gather ALL the facts before sentencing.
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Accepted reaction to near collision and TCAS approved procedures - Learning w this ev
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/ACAS_Bulletin_-_EUROCONTROL
Referring to the above several bulletins, it is not recommended to innitiate any avoidance maneuver based on visual or TA only information.
More is said about not trying to avoid a traffic by turning (horizontal avoidance)
Other more basic regulations are clear about avoiding a colision by turning to the R.
Based on one regulation, or it may be correct to say, recommendation, the R turn in this event, was incorrect. Based on the other, it was necessary and correct.
So I ask you.....what is correct, if this happened in Europe, and Eurocontrol ACAS recommended procedures not followed, the pilot who turned R would be penalized?
Referring to the above several bulletins, it is not recommended to innitiate any avoidance maneuver based on visual or TA only information.
More is said about not trying to avoid a traffic by turning (horizontal avoidance)
Other more basic regulations are clear about avoiding a colision by turning to the R.
Based on one regulation, or it may be correct to say, recommendation, the R turn in this event, was incorrect. Based on the other, it was necessary and correct.
So I ask you.....what is correct, if this happened in Europe, and Eurocontrol ACAS recommended procedures not followed, the pilot who turned R would be penalized?
Last edited by ricfly744; 18th Jul 2017 at 19:58.
ACAS Bulletins ACAS II | Eurocontrol
Referring to the above several bulletins, it is not recommended to innitiate any avoidance maneuver based on visual or TA only information.
More is said about not trying to avoid a traffic by turning, horizontal avoidance.
Referring to the above several bulletins, it is not recommended to innitiate any avoidance maneuver based on visual or TA only information.
More is said about not trying to avoid a traffic by turning, horizontal avoidance.
Quite frankly this kind of incident happens on a fairly regular basis in various parts of Africa and IMHO you would be an ass to wait until you got an RA before initiating any avoiding or mitigating action.....and yet there are many many flying around that would happily hang their hat on the eurocontrol guidance purely because it's written down and quantifiable, rather than being this nefarious and outright dangerous concept of airmanship.
It's the same kind of mindset that makes some happier to penertrate convective weather as they wait for a clearance rather than exercising sound judgement by avoiding the weather and filling out a bit of paperwork afterwards.
I know it's a bit of a drift from they subject matter here, but it's all part of the larger picture.
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[QUOTE=
I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.[/QUOTE]
Totally agree, so it also happens in EK.... it happens to me with most FOs, they start a chat with the cabin crew, and some without the headset (NOP if alone). I often see them turning back facing the jumpseat when I return.
I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.[/QUOTE]
Totally agree, so it also happens in EK.... it happens to me with most FOs, they start a chat with the cabin crew, and some without the headset (NOP if alone). I often see them turning back facing the jumpseat when I return.
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ricfly744
Yes, similar experience on return from crew rest. I asked the F/O if he sat in the simulator the same way (sideways). My final comment was a reminder "the passengers sit in the back, alluding that he should consider which position he should occupy.
CK
Yes, similar experience on return from crew rest. I asked the F/O if he sat in the simulator the same way (sideways). My final comment was a reminder "the passengers sit in the back, alluding that he should consider which position he should occupy.
CK
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A very wise training captain once told me in EK if you need to go to the bathroom, then take the F/O with you as he will do less damage than if you leave him there!
Looks like mandatory headsets and Chinese lessons all round as operation knee jerk commences.
Looks like mandatory headsets and Chinese lessons all round as operation knee jerk commences.
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Have to agree the amount of stupitidy whether intentional or not that one can observe here sometimes makes me speechless.
And what those idiots are good at is complaining, complaining complaining ....
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The Torygraph are running it right next to this article. The effing irony!
Everything that happens to your body when you don't get enough sleep
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None of you sky gods have any idea what actually happened. You think the media has the whole and accurate picture? You don't know what could be heard on any frequency by any of the people involved or what was going on in either flight deck or in the ATC office. Why is it so easy for some of you to sit back and judge someone else after the fact despite not really knowing any of the details or facts? Shouldn't we all just wait to see what comes out of this at the end and learn something in the process.