VC10 Display (White Waltham 1977)
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Many thanks Chris, that all makes sense! It is certainly hard to know exactly what was occurring due to my memory now, and what my understanding would have been at the time. Brother and I have always talked about the new equipment made our plane follow the waves beneath, it is now clear that we should drop that part of our experience from the anecdote!
Thread drift: does anyone know if BOAC VC 10s flew from London to Dulles airport or only to New York? I have a vague memory that our VC 10 flights always went to/from NY, and we went by Electra between NY and Washington DC where we lived.
Thread drift: does anyone know if BOAC VC 10s flew from London to Dulles airport or only to New York? I have a vague memory that our VC 10 flights always went to/from NY, and we went by Electra between NY and Washington DC where we lived.
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My earlier weblink does not appear to work? Probably my mistake.
Go to Movietone
Go to 'start searching the newsreel archives'
In the 'Search Story' box enter '77/90/2' and press enter.
You should be at the mute clip which shows a lot more unused footage of the pageant.
You don't have to register to find or play the clip. There is some fascinating additional footage of the display, but no more footage of the vc10 fly past.
Go to Movietone
Go to 'start searching the newsreel archives'
In the 'Search Story' box enter '77/90/2' and press enter.
You should be at the mute clip which shows a lot more unused footage of the pageant.
You don't have to register to find or play the clip. There is some fascinating additional footage of the display, but no more footage of the vc10 fly past.
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Joy ride
I certainly operated LHR - IAD when on VC10s.
I would have to look in my logbook to see whether it was only on the Super.
Chris
As I remember the Standard mtow was 142427kg and the Super 151953kg.
What useless things stick inones memory!!
I don't recall any gulf airfield being restrictive but that is probably because most sectors were not that long compared to, say, NBO -LHR.
Going east the aircraft probably stopped, by the latest SIN and the longest sector Westbound was to LHR.
We used, often, to stop in continental europe as the likes of LH, AZ et al. didn't operate to the gulf.
Likewise with NBO/EBB the a/c often operated via an intermediate point, or two,
to LHR (NBO - KRT - FFM - LHR was a long night).
The direct flights regularly required an en-route alternate with a inflight replanning to make it.
Although not WAT limited, some of the longer sectors could present challenges with fuel planning.
LHR - Barbados, Dulles and probably others were near the limit of full tanks range.
BDA and HNL had problems with alternate distance and island reserve was taken.
We used to have problems on the SIN - SYD routing and I can remember the relief when atc came up with "Sydney does not need an alternate".
To clarify we always used flap 22 for take off, which possibly gave the better tora weight.
I suspect the Super was climb segment limited which required flap 141/2 at 400ft.
I too remember the small margin for flap retraction out of NBO and we did it all on an analogue asi.
These young chaps with their digital readouts and trend arrows don't know what they're missing!!
I have often wondered how much better performance could have been obtained had separate flap and slat retractions been possible.
I understand it would have meant a totally different design philosophy.
I certainly operated LHR - IAD when on VC10s.
I would have to look in my logbook to see whether it was only on the Super.
Chris
As I remember the Standard mtow was 142427kg and the Super 151953kg.
What useless things stick inones memory!!
I don't recall any gulf airfield being restrictive but that is probably because most sectors were not that long compared to, say, NBO -LHR.
Going east the aircraft probably stopped, by the latest SIN and the longest sector Westbound was to LHR.
We used, often, to stop in continental europe as the likes of LH, AZ et al. didn't operate to the gulf.
Likewise with NBO/EBB the a/c often operated via an intermediate point, or two,
to LHR (NBO - KRT - FFM - LHR was a long night).
The direct flights regularly required an en-route alternate with a inflight replanning to make it.
Although not WAT limited, some of the longer sectors could present challenges with fuel planning.
LHR - Barbados, Dulles and probably others were near the limit of full tanks range.
BDA and HNL had problems with alternate distance and island reserve was taken.
We used to have problems on the SIN - SYD routing and I can remember the relief when atc came up with "Sydney does not need an alternate".
To clarify we always used flap 22 for take off, which possibly gave the better tora weight.
I suspect the Super was climb segment limited which required flap 141/2 at 400ft.
I too remember the small margin for flap retraction out of NBO and we did it all on an analogue asi.
These young chaps with their digital readouts and trend arrows don't know what they're missing!!
I have often wondered how much better performance could have been obtained had separate flap and slat retractions been possible.
I understand it would have meant a totally different design philosophy.
Originally Posted by joy ride
does anyone know if BOAC VC 10s flew from London to Dulles airport or only to New York?
I cannot find a route in there that stops in Washington, but this could have changed the next year of course. I think I've got a timetable for the early 70s at home, I will check that later tonight.
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Many thanks finncapt and Jhieminga, but don't go out of your way, it's just curiosity. JH I was a regular visitor to your great site (and VC tenderness) long before I joined Pprune! I do still have my Passport from those times and Visas should provide some of the dates, but we also sometimes flew on Pan Am and TWA and a my BOAC Junior Jet Club book never made it back to UK it will always be a rough guess. I have a vague feeling that some or all of our VC10 flights were via JFK.
I certainly know that at least one of our TWA flights was via JFK and we were dumped on a circular sofa in the middle of the brand new TWA terminal there, and abandoned for 12 hours without any food or drink and no-one taking any notice of us; eventually NYPD was called and they located us!
I certainly know that at least one of our TWA flights was via JFK and we were dumped on a circular sofa in the middle of the brand new TWA terminal there, and abandoned for 12 hours without any food or drink and no-one taking any notice of us; eventually NYPD was called and they located us!
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I have just looked in my log book and can find only two entries in 7 years for the VC-10 going to Washington and both of these were via Philadelphia, this was in the years 1970 and 1971.
I just had a look at the BA timetables for the winter season of 1978-1979 and there are two flights that fly to Washington (IAD):
- BA191 is a daily service using the 747.
- BA189 is available on Tuesday, Friday or Sunday and uses Concorde.
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From my logbook;
Washington
17/4/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGG
19/4/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGG (18/4/72 local time)
24/5/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGH
26/5/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGH (25/5/72 local time)
02/6/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGR
04/6/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGR (03/6/72 local time)
Entebbe
05/5/71 EBB-LHR G-ARVK
14/5/71 EBB-LHR G-ARVL
The 'Standard' made it non-stop using the short runway (the new, long one had not yet been built).
Washington
17/4/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGG
19/4/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGG (18/4/72 local time)
24/5/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGH
26/5/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGH (25/5/72 local time)
02/6/72 LHR-IAD G-ASGR
04/6/72 IAD-LHR G-ASGR (03/6/72 local time)
Entebbe
05/5/71 EBB-LHR G-ARVK
14/5/71 EBB-LHR G-ARVL
The 'Standard' made it non-stop using the short runway (the new, long one had not yet been built).
Chris
acording to the timetable for that period, you pushed or taxied exactly on scheduled and arrived 5 minutes late!!
Do you know if the VC10s were still doing africargo in 1971?
acording to the timetable for that period, you pushed or taxied exactly on scheduled and arrived 5 minutes late!!
Do you know if the VC10s were still doing africargo in 1971?
Hello bean,
That's nice to know, but we must have had a hiccup of some kind at Entebbe, because the turnround was 2-45 before departing for Nairobi.
We certainly carried freight, and I think the Africargo brand-name persisted from its DC-6A (Hunting Clan?) origins. G-ARTA, in its Type 1109 configuration, still didn't have a main-deck cargo door, but the 3 Type 1103s did. The standard VC10 was, however, a poor load-carrier (about 17 tonnes) compared to the B707-320C (39 tonnes), and the latter fleet was being expanded rapidly.
(But the 707's range out of hot-high airfields was poor with a full payload. RTOW ex NBO was WAT-limited to about 128T until we introduced optimised (increased) V2 in 1975/6, to take advantage of Embakasi's 13000 ft runway. That got it up to about 135T.)
That's nice to know, but we must have had a hiccup of some kind at Entebbe, because the turnround was 2-45 before departing for Nairobi.
We certainly carried freight, and I think the Africargo brand-name persisted from its DC-6A (Hunting Clan?) origins. G-ARTA, in its Type 1109 configuration, still didn't have a main-deck cargo door, but the 3 Type 1103s did. The standard VC10 was, however, a poor load-carrier (about 17 tonnes) compared to the B707-320C (39 tonnes), and the latter fleet was being expanded rapidly.
(But the 707's range out of hot-high airfields was poor with a full payload. RTOW ex NBO was WAT-limited to about 128T until we introduced optimised (increased) V2 in 1975/6, to take advantage of Embakasi's 13000 ft runway. That got it up to about 135T.)
Flaps 14½° and BOAC
As a bit of light relief 
from discussing the relevance of the Geneva Convention to military aviators parachuting into insurgent territory they had recently bombed, having been shot down by fighters from a neighbouring country (Military forum), can someone answer the following question:
At what stage did BOAC decide to ban the use of Flaps 14½° for take-off? Could it have been in reaction to the BEA Trident accident on 18/6/72?
AFAIK, Flaps 14½° was first introduced into service in autumn 1964, when BUA introduced its first VC10 - a "standard" Type 1103 with the chord-extended "super" wing (G-ASIW). BOAC's 12 standards (Type 1101) retained the standard wing, and - for reasons unclear to this writer - the Flaps 14½° facility was not retrofitted. BOAC took delivery of its first Super VC10 (Type 1151) about a year later. Did the airline ever make use of its Flaps 14½° option for take-off, or simply as an intermediate setting above 400 ft for the initial climb?
For readers not conversant with the history of the Anglo-American fight for supremacy in the post-Comet, 1960s jet-airliner market, the VC10 was already struggling for sales against developments of the B707 and DC-8. The VC10's main mission to provide decent payload-range out of hot-high-shortish runways in the former colonies (Lusaka-City being a classic example) had quickly been marginalised by the fact that most other capital cities are situated at low altitude, and governments were rapidly extending their runways to accommodate the early, under-powered 707s and DC-8s (and Rolls Royce was providing by-pass Conways to transform their field performance, while Pratt & Whitney's JT3D turbofan was in the pipeline).
By introducing the option of Flaps 14½° as an addition to the basic Flaps 20°, Vickers/BAC were able to offer an RTOW increase of up to about six tonnes (see my previous posts) at very-hot or hot-high airfields where the runway was long enough to permit the higher V1, VR and V2 speeds involved. Flaps 20 would continue to be the better option on short runways. (I once carried 150 charter passengers from Bournemouth to Tenerife, a 4-hour flight off Hurn's [at the time] 6000 ft runway. You couldn't do that on a B707-320.) On our a/c, restricting take-offs to Flaps 20 would have involved no RTOW penalty at sea-level up to +39C. Despite Entebbe's elevation of 3782 ft, Flap 20 was the better option on its short, 7900 ft runway (until the mid-1970s, when a 12000 ft runway was opened).
But at Nairobi (elevation 5327 ft), as previously mentioned, the 13500 ft runway immediately enabled the benefit of Flaps 14½ to be fully exploited, and the same would have applied to the long runways at Johannesburg (elev. 5557 ft), Addis Ababa (elev. 7625 ft) and (from 1967) Lusaka International (elev. 3779 ft).
I infer that, ironically, the BOAC/BA Super VC10 was used mainly for routes between low-altitude airfields, where its unused Flaps 14½ capability would rarely have been an advantage in terms of performance (but might have reduced wear-and-tear). The hot-high airfields on the company's network seem to have been mainly operated by its Type 1101s, which only offered Flaps 20. No doubt East African Airways, like BCAL, took full advantage of Flaps 14½ on its (Super) VC10s.
Hi finncapt,
Yes, and the B707-320C MTOW was 151011!
No wonder the hard drive was nearly full after nine a/c types and their variants, despite futile efforts to delete data that was no longer relevant...
Quote:
"I have often wondered how much better performance could have been obtained had separate flap and slat retractions been possible."
But would BOAC/BA have used them?
Actually, as you know, the tied-together levers could be separated, but IIRC the slat lever had no detents of its own. From January 1972, BCAL started sim-training for double-engine failure on take-off. (BOAC may have considered the same contingency?) The zero rate-of-climb figures on our a/c with Flaps 20 were said to be 133T (ISA, sea-level), 123.5T (ISA+20, sea-level) or 115T (ISA+20, 5000 ft). I'll not relate the whole procedure in this post, but one segment of the acceleration involved retracting flaps to zero while leaving the slats extended. (The slats lever was pulled and held fully aft, while the flaps lever was selected forward.)
from discussing the relevance of the Geneva Convention to military aviators parachuting into insurgent territory they had recently bombed, having been shot down by fighters from a neighbouring country (Military forum), can someone answer the following question:At what stage did BOAC decide to ban the use of Flaps 14½° for take-off? Could it have been in reaction to the BEA Trident accident on 18/6/72?
AFAIK, Flaps 14½° was first introduced into service in autumn 1964, when BUA introduced its first VC10 - a "standard" Type 1103 with the chord-extended "super" wing (G-ASIW). BOAC's 12 standards (Type 1101) retained the standard wing, and - for reasons unclear to this writer - the Flaps 14½° facility was not retrofitted. BOAC took delivery of its first Super VC10 (Type 1151) about a year later. Did the airline ever make use of its Flaps 14½° option for take-off, or simply as an intermediate setting above 400 ft for the initial climb?
For readers not conversant with the history of the Anglo-American fight for supremacy in the post-Comet, 1960s jet-airliner market, the VC10 was already struggling for sales against developments of the B707 and DC-8. The VC10's main mission to provide decent payload-range out of hot-high-shortish runways in the former colonies (Lusaka-City being a classic example) had quickly been marginalised by the fact that most other capital cities are situated at low altitude, and governments were rapidly extending their runways to accommodate the early, under-powered 707s and DC-8s (and Rolls Royce was providing by-pass Conways to transform their field performance, while Pratt & Whitney's JT3D turbofan was in the pipeline).
By introducing the option of Flaps 14½° as an addition to the basic Flaps 20°, Vickers/BAC were able to offer an RTOW increase of up to about six tonnes (see my previous posts) at very-hot or hot-high airfields where the runway was long enough to permit the higher V1, VR and V2 speeds involved. Flaps 20 would continue to be the better option on short runways. (I once carried 150 charter passengers from Bournemouth to Tenerife, a 4-hour flight off Hurn's [at the time] 6000 ft runway. You couldn't do that on a B707-320.) On our a/c, restricting take-offs to Flaps 20 would have involved no RTOW penalty at sea-level up to +39C. Despite Entebbe's elevation of 3782 ft, Flap 20 was the better option on its short, 7900 ft runway (until the mid-1970s, when a 12000 ft runway was opened).
But at Nairobi (elevation 5327 ft), as previously mentioned, the 13500 ft runway immediately enabled the benefit of Flaps 14½ to be fully exploited, and the same would have applied to the long runways at Johannesburg (elev. 5557 ft), Addis Ababa (elev. 7625 ft) and (from 1967) Lusaka International (elev. 3779 ft).
I infer that, ironically, the BOAC/BA Super VC10 was used mainly for routes between low-altitude airfields, where its unused Flaps 14½ capability would rarely have been an advantage in terms of performance (but might have reduced wear-and-tear). The hot-high airfields on the company's network seem to have been mainly operated by its Type 1101s, which only offered Flaps 20. No doubt East African Airways, like BCAL, took full advantage of Flaps 14½ on its (Super) VC10s.
Hi finncapt,
Yes, and the B707-320C MTOW was 151011!
No wonder the hard drive was nearly full after nine a/c types and their variants, despite futile efforts to delete data that was no longer relevant...Quote:
"I have often wondered how much better performance could have been obtained had separate flap and slat retractions been possible."
But would BOAC/BA have used them?
Actually, as you know, the tied-together levers could be separated, but IIRC the slat lever had no detents of its own. From January 1972, BCAL started sim-training for double-engine failure on take-off. (BOAC may have considered the same contingency?) The zero rate-of-climb figures on our a/c with Flaps 20 were said to be 133T (ISA, sea-level), 123.5T (ISA+20, sea-level) or 115T (ISA+20, 5000 ft). I'll not relate the whole procedure in this post, but one segment of the acceleration involved retracting flaps to zero while leaving the slats extended. (The slats lever was pulled and held fully aft, while the flaps lever was selected forward.)
Last edited by Chris Scott; 26th Nov 2015 at 09:36. Reason: (1st) Minor improvements. (2nd) Para 3 expanded and split; Para 7 added.
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Chris
I remember the splitting of the levers and the procedure you describe - we probably did it in the sim and maybe 2 eng inop was the reason.
I am sitting in BKK airport at the moment on my way to Rangoon and Mandalay for a couple of weeks so I may not contribute for a while.
It's a bit warmer then Helsinki!!
Alan
I remember the splitting of the levers and the procedure you describe - we probably did it in the sim and maybe 2 eng inop was the reason.
I am sitting in BKK airport at the moment on my way to Rangoon and Mandalay for a couple of weeks so I may not contribute for a while.
It's a bit warmer then Helsinki!!
Alan
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By the time of our first VC10 flight my brother and I were well used to 707s and DC8s. Leaving London and sitting in the back row the take off angle was dramatically steeper than any previous plane, all part of the thrill of these magnificent planes. I was in the aisle seat and it felt that I was looking up at 45º to the flight deck whose curtains (pr 9/11!) were open enough to see in.
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Some more thread drift......
In the summer of 1967 all eastern-Africa flights were routed via Tehran due to the situation in the ME. A BUA VC10 did this about mid-July, but went tech in Nairobi and flew no further. All passengers had an enforced wait of many hours, before proceeding with EAA. Meanwhile engineers were up a gantry looking at the tail plane and scratching their heads. Chris, were you involved with this at all?
In the summer of 1967 all eastern-Africa flights were routed via Tehran due to the situation in the ME. A BUA VC10 did this about mid-July, but went tech in Nairobi and flew no further. All passengers had an enforced wait of many hours, before proceeding with EAA. Meanwhile engineers were up a gantry looking at the tail plane and scratching their heads. Chris, were you involved with this at all?
Hi gruntie,
"...engineers were up a gantry looking at the tail plane and scratching their heads. Chris, were you involved with this at all?"
Not me, guv! In the summer of 1967 I was flying a tiny airliner that happened to share the same engine-synchrometer as the VC10. Sorry I can't shed any light on that one. Have you read about BCAL's Andes incident, which damaged the TPI (tail-plane) on G-ASIX, the Type 1103 a/c now in Omani colours at Brooklands?
"...engineers were up a gantry looking at the tail plane and scratching their heads. Chris, were you involved with this at all?"
Not me, guv! In the summer of 1967 I was flying a tiny airliner that happened to share the same engine-synchrometer as the VC10. Sorry I can't shed any light on that one. Have you read about BCAL's Andes incident, which damaged the TPI (tail-plane) on G-ASIX, the Type 1103 a/c now in Omani colours at Brooklands?
finncapt,
You are indeed correct. The BOAC/BA Double Engine Failure Drill went like this:-
Throttles...........................E Fully Forward
Aileron Upset.....................P Normal
Flaps/Slats.....................CPE Split Levers. Select Flaps ONLY to UP. Check Slat Lever at MID Quadrant/Post Mod Fully Aft
Fuel Jettison......................E Jettison from all tanks. Centre Tank Pumps On
Engine Fire/Failure Drill.....CE Complete Immediate Actions
Min Climb Speed FLAPS UP/SLATS OUT.......................V2 + 20
Minimum SLAT Retract speed....................................V2 + 45
Minimum speed Flaps Up/SLATS IN............................V2 + 60
Engine Fire Drill Secondary Actions when convenient
We even used to do this on the aircraft during command courses.
You are indeed correct. The BOAC/BA Double Engine Failure Drill went like this:-
Throttles...........................E Fully Forward
Aileron Upset.....................P Normal
Flaps/Slats.....................CPE Split Levers. Select Flaps ONLY to UP. Check Slat Lever at MID Quadrant/Post Mod Fully Aft
Fuel Jettison......................E Jettison from all tanks. Centre Tank Pumps On
Engine Fire/Failure Drill.....CE Complete Immediate Actions
Min Climb Speed FLAPS UP/SLATS OUT.......................V2 + 20
Minimum SLAT Retract speed....................................V2 + 45
Minimum speed Flaps Up/SLATS IN............................V2 + 60
Engine Fire Drill Secondary Actions when convenient
We even used to do this on the aircraft during command courses.
Last edited by Bergerie1; 26th Nov 2015 at 13:38.
Double Engine Failure on Take-off
Hello Bergerie1,
On conversion as P2 in 1971, I was given a 2-eng approach and G/A on the a/c at LGW, but at a very low weight. (ATC were inured to the noise in those days!)
However, BCAL's formal double-EFTO procedure was first disseminated in a January 1972 Flight Notice (prior to insertion in our Emergency C/L, which is not to hand) and is, predictably, almost identical to the one you quote.
A slight added complication resulted from our policy of take-off with either Flaps 14½ or Flaps 20, but for this drill the speeds were all defined relative to V2 (Flaps 20), and were always calculated and displayed on our Take-off data card.
So the only apparent differences from yours were as follows (my phraseology):
If Flaps 20, accelerate to V2 + 5 and select Flaps 14½;
Sacrifice height if available to accelerate and raise the FLAPS only, aiming at V2 + 25 (a loss of 150 ft should give a speed rise of 10 kt);
Climb in this config until obstacle clearance assured, then accelerate to V2 + 45 and retract SLATS.
In sim details at Cranebank, take-off weights were pushed close to the rough limits described in my previous post. If the second engine failed prior to L/G (sorry, U/C) retraction, the general consensus was that it should be left down until the a/c showed willingness to climb; mainly to avoid the initial performance degradation from opening the U/C doors.
I'm not sure what the imperative was for this drill's introduction in January 1972. In addition to the possibility of un-contained engine failures, however, the EAA accident at Addis a few months later led to further discussion of possible main-wheel or nose-wheel tyre ingestion after a FOD encounter.
On conversion as P2 in 1971, I was given a 2-eng approach and G/A on the a/c at LGW, but at a very low weight. (ATC were inured to the noise in those days!)
However, BCAL's formal double-EFTO procedure was first disseminated in a January 1972 Flight Notice (prior to insertion in our Emergency C/L, which is not to hand) and is, predictably, almost identical to the one you quote.
A slight added complication resulted from our policy of take-off with either Flaps 14½ or Flaps 20, but for this drill the speeds were all defined relative to V2 (Flaps 20), and were always calculated and displayed on our Take-off data card.
So the only apparent differences from yours were as follows (my phraseology):
If Flaps 20, accelerate to V2 + 5 and select Flaps 14½;
Sacrifice height if available to accelerate and raise the FLAPS only, aiming at V2 + 25 (a loss of 150 ft should give a speed rise of 10 kt);
Climb in this config until obstacle clearance assured, then accelerate to V2 + 45 and retract SLATS.
In sim details at Cranebank, take-off weights were pushed close to the rough limits described in my previous post. If the second engine failed prior to L/G (sorry, U/C) retraction, the general consensus was that it should be left down until the a/c showed willingness to climb; mainly to avoid the initial performance degradation from opening the U/C doors.
I'm not sure what the imperative was for this drill's introduction in January 1972. In addition to the possibility of un-contained engine failures, however, the EAA accident at Addis a few months later led to further discussion of possible main-wheel or nose-wheel tyre ingestion after a FOD encounter.