Double Engine Failure on Take-off
Hello Bergerie1,
On conversion as P2 in 1971, I was given a 2-eng approach and G/A on the a/c at LGW, but at a very low weight. (ATC were inured to the noise in those days!)
However, BCAL's formal double-EFTO procedure was first disseminated in a January 1972 Flight Notice (prior to insertion in our Emergency C/L, which is not to hand) and is, predictably, almost identical to the one you quote.
A slight added complication resulted from our policy of take-off with either Flaps 14½ or Flaps 20, but for this drill the speeds were all defined relative to V2 (Flaps 20), and were always calculated and displayed on our Take-off data card.
So the only apparent differences from yours were as follows (my phraseology):
If Flaps 20, accelerate to V2 + 5 and select Flaps 14½;
Sacrifice height if available to accelerate and raise the FLAPS only, aiming at V2 + 25 (a loss of 150 ft should give a speed rise of 10 kt);
Climb in this config until obstacle clearance assured, then accelerate to V2 + 45 and retract SLATS.
In sim details at Cranebank, take-off weights were pushed close to the rough limits described in my previous post. If the second engine failed prior to L/G (sorry, U/C) retraction, the general consensus was that it should be left down until the a/c showed willingness to climb; mainly to avoid the initial performance degradation from opening the U/C doors.
I'm not sure what the imperative was for this drill's introduction in January 1972. In addition to the possibility of un-contained engine failures, however, the EAA accident at Addis a few months later led to further discussion of possible main-wheel or nose-wheel tyre ingestion after a FOD encounter.