AA 106 @ JFK (13 Jan 23)
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The UK has:
"Hold position, cancel take-off, I say again, cancel take-off, acknowledge"
...but also, if it is necessary that the aircraft should abandon take-off, the option of:
"DAL1943, stop immediately I say again, DAL1943, stop immediately, acknowledge"
The difference being: 'Cancel' a clearance, or 'Stop' a movement.
"Hold position, cancel take-off, I say again, cancel take-off, acknowledge"
...but also, if it is necessary that the aircraft should abandon take-off, the option of:
"DAL1943, stop immediately I say again, DAL1943, stop immediately, acknowledge"
The difference being: 'Cancel' a clearance, or 'Stop' a movement.
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Yeah I'm not saying what he said was wrong. I'm saying that whatever he said doesn't seem to imply the kind of urgency that is required in those kinds of situations. I must admit, once the takeoff roll has started I've seen/experienced two things: one, engine noise increases so whatever volume setting existed during taxi may now be too low. Secondly, let's be honest we aren't as focused on ATC during take off as our attention may be focuses else where.
There needs to be some sort of change that ensures an urgent need to reject from ATC cannot in anyway be missed by pilots, and simply saying 'cancel take-off clearance' doesn't seem to imply that you'de better start stopping now or your going to kill hundreds of people, including yourself.
Firstly, there needs to be international standardization and the phrase used must not in anyway contain words in a format that could be interpreted in any other way (by any crew from any background, level of experience or nationality) other than what is intended.
Secpndly, ATC needed to repeat the phrase twice. So did Delta reject because of ATCs call or because they saw the American ahead of them? Obviously this is just conjecture/speculation but If it was the latter then there has been a COMPELTE FAILURE in one of the key layers of safety in the system.
There needs to be some sort of change that ensures an urgent need to reject from ATC cannot in anyway be missed by pilots, and simply saying 'cancel take-off clearance' doesn't seem to imply that you'de better start stopping now or your going to kill hundreds of people, including yourself.
Firstly, there needs to be international standardization and the phrase used must not in anyway contain words in a format that could be interpreted in any other way (by any crew from any background, level of experience or nationality) other than what is intended.
Secpndly, ATC needed to repeat the phrase twice. So did Delta reject because of ATCs call or because they saw the American ahead of them? Obviously this is just conjecture/speculation but If it was the latter then there has been a COMPELTE FAILURE in one of the key layers of safety in the system.
Secpndly, ATC needed to repeat the phrase twice. So did Delta reject because of ATCs call or because they saw the American ahead of them? Obviously this is just conjecture/speculation but If it was the latter then there has been a COMPELTE FAILURE in one of the key layers of safety in the system.
The video linked at post #8 is the first I’ve watched that included ATC instructions to AA106 to “hold position.”
Note that all of this audio is subject to the limitations of the Live ATC source and the many assumptions of the video creators.
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ICAO Phraseology Reference guide :
That is what the rest of the world pilots and controllers learn, . Not saying ATC phraseology used in the US (or in the UK is wrong) , it will work , as shown here however the 2 parties were US trained ,
But there is a major difference between "hold position cancel take off " , and "Stop immediately" depending if the aircrfat has started his take off roll or not. .
RTF Cancelling Take-off Clearance Aircraft has not commenced take-off roll:
Big Jet 345 hold position, Cancel take-off, I say again cancel take-off due to ...(vehicle on the runway)
answer: Holding, Big Jet 345
Aircraft has commenced take-off roll:
Big Jet 345 stop immediately, (Big Jet 345 stop immediately)!
answer : Stopping, Big Jet 345
Big Jet 345 hold position, Cancel take-off, I say again cancel take-off due to ...(vehicle on the runway)
answer: Holding, Big Jet 345
Aircraft has commenced take-off roll:
Big Jet 345 stop immediately, (Big Jet 345 stop immediately)!
answer : Stopping, Big Jet 345
But there is a major difference between "hold position cancel take off " , and "Stop immediately" depending if the aircrfat has started his take off roll or not. .
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Cross runway 31L at Kilo
Takeoff runway should have been briefed as 4L, as should the usual route to it that is to turn down Kilo.
How did AA106 crew think they were going to get to 4L by crossing it (not even at Kilo) and continuing on Juliet towards 4R.
This seems to have been far more than spatial disorientation.
Next issue for the investigators: is the CVR of this taxiing time going to be available to them? (which should be the reason why their take-off should also have been cancelled).
Takeoff runway should have been briefed as 4L, as should the usual route to it that is to turn down Kilo.
How did AA106 crew think they were going to get to 4L by crossing it (not even at Kilo) and continuing on Juliet towards 4R.
This seems to have been far more than spatial disorientation.
Next issue for the investigators: is the CVR of this taxiing time going to be available to them? (which should be the reason why their take-off should also have been cancelled).
Will the AA106 CVR during the incident be preserved after a trans Atlantic flight?
This has surprisingly few comments. It could have easily been an award winning disaster.
Listening to the voices of the two pilots and two controllers was enlightening. It will be interesting to see the experience levels of some of the players if a report IS made public..
Listening to the voices of the two pilots and two controllers was enlightening. It will be interesting to see the experience levels of some of the players if a report IS made public..
From friends at both American and Delta Airlines. The American crew was replaced and a reserve crew flew the flight.
Delta’s policy concerning rejected takeoffs,
“After an aborted takeoff the crew is required to call a duty pilot. I believe from there a joint decision is made on whether to return to gate or continue the flight.”
They obviously decided to return to the gate.
Delta’s policy concerning rejected takeoffs,
“After an aborted takeoff the crew is required to call a duty pilot. I believe from there a joint decision is made on whether to return to gate or continue the flight.”
They obviously decided to return to the gate.
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The FR24 track shows the American aircraft does not return to the gate - it stops for about 10 minutes, taxis back around to 31L, and is airborne 34 minutes after the incident occurred.
From friends at both American and Delta Airlines. The American crew was replaced and a reserve crew flew the flight.
Delta’s policy concerning rejected takeoffs,
“After an aborted takeoff the crew is required to call a duty pilot. I believe from there a joint decision is made on whether to return to gate or continue the flight.”
They obviously decided to return to the gate.
Delta’s policy concerning rejected takeoffs,
“After an aborted takeoff the crew is required to call a duty pilot. I believe from there a joint decision is made on whether to return to gate or continue the flight.”
They obviously decided to return to the gate.
A reserve crew operated the return from there ?
Stilton,
here’s a direct quote from another aviation website,
“From person I know at AA on 777
The operating crew was pulled off and did DH.
Another crew operated the AA flight.”
To be fair, other posters are saying the incident crew did fly to London, but were deadheaded back by the company.
here’s a direct quote from another aviation website,
“From person I know at AA on 777
The operating crew was pulled off and did DH.
Another crew operated the AA flight.”
To be fair, other posters are saying the incident crew did fly to London, but were deadheaded back by the company.
Last edited by Chiefttp; 16th Jan 2023 at 21:54.
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As the AA plane departed the gate at JFK 4 minutes early and arrived at LHR 13 minutes early there is clearly no way it could have gone back onto the gate and changed crews.
Following timeline pulled from ADS-B data:
01:44:29Z DL1943 start TO roll
01:44:30Z AA106 at J-K-B intersection
01:44:39Z DL1943 40 kts
01:44:43Z AA106 entering 4L at J
01:44:47Z DL1943 79 kts
01:44:54Z AA106 at middle of 4L (interpolated between data points assuming steady taxi speed)
01:44:55Z DL1943 104 kts, max speed, at K3/K4, approx 2000 ft from J
01:44:58Z DL1943 85 kts
01:45:00Z DL1943 62 kts
01:45:05Z AA106 clear of 4L on J
01:45:05Z DL1943 33 kts at 31L/4L intersection
Curious to know if the DL crew rejected takeoff based on observed conflict or ATC direction. Or perhaps both events were simultaneous. Even at night, seems a 777 broadside at 2000 ft would be hard to miss as a takeoff hazard. I suspect there was the expected human brain delay as the DL crew convinced themselves that they were seeing the unexpected. Also curious how AA crew verified runway was clear to cross. At that point, landing lights from DL1943 should have been clearly visible (4500 ft away) as takeoff roll was in progress.
01:44:29Z DL1943 start TO roll
01:44:30Z AA106 at J-K-B intersection
01:44:39Z DL1943 40 kts
01:44:43Z AA106 entering 4L at J
01:44:47Z DL1943 79 kts
01:44:54Z AA106 at middle of 4L (interpolated between data points assuming steady taxi speed)
01:44:55Z DL1943 104 kts, max speed, at K3/K4, approx 2000 ft from J
01:44:58Z DL1943 85 kts
01:45:00Z DL1943 62 kts
01:45:05Z AA106 clear of 4L on J
01:45:05Z DL1943 33 kts at 31L/4L intersection
Curious to know if the DL crew rejected takeoff based on observed conflict or ATC direction. Or perhaps both events were simultaneous. Even at night, seems a 777 broadside at 2000 ft would be hard to miss as a takeoff hazard. I suspect there was the expected human brain delay as the DL crew convinced themselves that they were seeing the unexpected. Also curious how AA crew verified runway was clear to cross. At that point, landing lights from DL1943 should have been clearly visible (4500 ft away) as takeoff roll was in progress.
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I wonder if you really want a crew that has just messed up in the way they had to be flying? They might have a bit too much on their minds thinking about what just happened, a bit distracted.
Doesn't the CFR's have something about preserving evidence in the event of an incident? I can't imagine they'll be able to explain that decision away...
EDIT: Yep - they do. Granted I'm not particularly fluent with 'Muricanese, but the following seems pretty clear-cut.
830.10 Preservation of aircraft wreckage, mail, cargo, and records.
(a) The operator of an aircraft involved in an accident or incident for which notification must be given is responsible for preserving to the extent possible any aircraft wreckage, cargo, and mail aboard the aircraft, and all records, including all recording mediums of flight, maintenance, and voice recorders, pertaining to the operation and maintenance of the aircraft and to the airmen until the Board takes custody thereof or a release is granted...
(a) The operator of an aircraft involved in an accident or incident for which notification must be given is responsible for preserving to the extent possible any aircraft wreckage, cargo, and mail aboard the aircraft, and all records, including all recording mediums of flight, maintenance, and voice recorders, pertaining to the operation and maintenance of the aircraft and to the airmen until the Board takes custody thereof or a release is granted...
"Any event in which an operator, when operating an airplane as an air carrier at a public-use airport on land:
(i) Lands or departs on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not designed as a runway; or
(ii) Experiences a runway incursion that requires the operator or the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to take immediate corrective action to avoid a collision.
(i) Lands or departs on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not designed as a runway; or
(ii) Experiences a runway incursion that requires the operator or the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to take immediate corrective action to avoid a collision.
Last edited by KRviator; 17th Jan 2023 at 04:00.
Given modern CVRs having a generally enabled push to erase that is part of SOP after parking, is there a "preserve" button? I'm unaware. Seems like it would be a lose your certificate problem if you did not preserve the relevant CVR after an incident like this even if that required heading back to the gate. From the crew response it's clear there was something interesting going on in the AA cockpit.
It continues to amaze me that in the US at a point like this when the AA crew appear to have reduced situational awareness, that ATC load them up with the “possible pilot deviation + phone number” business. It’s AA at JFK, it’s not like they can pretend it didn’t happen. No harm in dealing with that stuff in the background eg on return to the gate or, if the flight departs, to send it via the company. Loading people up with extra tasks when they have had (or may have had) and incident isn’t helpful. Of course, neither is clearing a flight to land when there are multiple departures and arrivals ahead, but that’s also ops normal there.