Not only.
Airbus has 2 published procedures now. Both are memory items.

1. STALL RECOVERY
2. STALL WARNING AT LIFT-OFF

So the first one must be applied at any altitude, except lift-off :
Historically, the answer to a stall warning was to apply full thrust and reducing the AoA, minimum altitude loss was a factor. Now not anymore: Above all it is making sure to reduce the AoA first and reducing thrust may be necessary. Smoothly increasing thrust comes only after stall indications are no longer present.

CONF iture;
The "answer" showed up in 2006, in an Airbus presentation entitled, "Unreliable Speed; Latest Improvements". References to the correct procedure for UAS were in a number of FCTMs by 2007, all before the Air Caraibes event.
Yes, that's correct, they wrote that in November, 2002 under the heading, "Immediate Pitch Attitude and Thrust Guidance" followed by an admonition to "Respect the Stall Warning" and, "When the Flight Path is Stabilized" -Attitude/Thrust - Adjust".

This drill/checklist has gone through several revisions since its first appearance - the earliest I have is November, 2002.

The qualification to level off and troubleshoot when above circuit altitude or MSA clarifies the original checklist item, "When the Flight Path is Stabilized". Every drill, and guidance in the A330 FCTM emphasizes that leveling off and stabilizing the aircraft should be done as quickly as possible to avoid an overspeed. Stalling is not mentioned as a risk but every drill/checklist since 2002 also emphasizes the need to respect the stall warning. Later checklists provide guidance on the "flying technique to stabilize flight" with regard to pitch and power.

PJ2
CONF iture had already posted:
This reference come from a video (docu about AF447 in french language) posted earlier in another thread ....
EDIT:
Thank you HazelNuts39 .. I was searching for the video :ok:

PJ2;
The video is (goto 21:40)

Ah yes, I do recall now, thank you all.

Link to two Airbus stall recovery documents - posted before, but to refresh:

http://fucampagne2008.unblog.fr/file...lprocedure.pdf

http://orleans.neting.com.es/esa/ESA...20recovery.ppt

There was a statement long ago from an official source who had heard the cvr that one striking feature was that the word stall was not uttered once. No reason to think otherwise now especially as to think otherwise would require an answer as to why the appropriate commands were not forthcoming.

Confiture: thank you!
The clarification
"In case of lack of pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary"

makes sense, and clears up my misunderstanding. :ok:

It was basically the same procedure for both Rosemount and Thales replacement: no emergency AD, no immediate grounding until the mater is resolved, just the timeframe in which all probes are to be replaced while aeroplanes could keep on flying. What is the point you are trying to argue?

Are you trying to make a principle out of illustration? Namely: inexperienced=unsafe? So, what do you think was the experience in manual flight, at cruise altitude, in ALTN law of thirtysomething 330/340 crews that all of a sudden had to perform the feat? How come they survived?

Doing nothing would have saved them. So would executing the memory items. There are many combinations of power and attitude that will keep you flying. 17.9° pitch above MAX REC alt will not, even with TOGA.

How can one conclude that the exasperated (and a bit cut-off in post-production ) answer of mr Rosay to mediapersons working on dramatization of AF447 represents the one and only right thing to do, rendering all the prescribed procedures wrong, escapes me.

Note on page 43 and graph on the page 42 of interim 3 clearly show that turbulence was of short duration, light to moderate intensity and has completely stopped by the time the second, fatal, pull was initiated. Notwithstanding whether "Easy stuff in turbulence" argument is true or not, it is utterly inapplicable in AF447 case.

Your like or dislike does not alter the fact a bit. Page 20 of interim 3 refers.

It's attempt at dumbing down the procedure to unachieavable level, no matter if it proposed by Airbus or some PPRuNer. Applying such a procedure for low level approach to stall can easily result in unnecessary deaths and damage to property.

Straw man argument. It is supposed to be applied until QRH is brought out and correct values for weight found and set. If it takes five minutes of fumbling, it won't kill you in this five minutes. Or until the fuel runs out but that doesn't mean it should be applied indefinitely.

It's not me and BEA, it's just BEA. I only repeated its findings for the benefit of those too lazy to look it up themselves or are too preoccupied with their pet theories/agendas to notice them.

Maybe. What is the difference if low speed stability is available or not? It can be overridden by a pull on the stick and that certainly wasn't lacking.

Anyway, here's the important difference


Good question. Most important is to recognize that all the technical jargon about laws signifies that the safety nets are no longer there. Pilot able to understand the state of the aeroplane and to control it will perform well no matter the law. Pilot that gets disoriented and/or confused will not be saved by the computers in degraded FC laws.

I'm afraid I can't follow your argument here. The issue whether or not the memory items apply was not addressed in the Air Caraibe Memo. Airbus said they would think about a modification of the checklists to address ACA's problem which was that their pilots were 'intimately' convinced that the two stall warnings were 'inapproprié', and had decided to disregard the phrase "RESPECT STALL WARNING AND DISREGARD 'RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING' STATUS MESSAGE IF DISPLAYED ON ECAM":

clandestino
I just wanted to point out that to illustrate your experienced pilots was about you had cited a bad example (Yuri Gagarin)
Yuri Gagarin was not an experienced pilot .. he was a celeb pilot .. not because his flying experience
Here is the gist of my comment .. no more no less

@ OK465

I tend to agree that the various colors of ALT Law are not well documented, but can only assume that Airbus Industrie have determined in their wisdom that full divulgence will conflict with their KISS policy.

Best I can judge is that the switch to ALT2B was due to diverging CAS data which set up the ADR monitoring sequence with ADR2 being voted the "median". At the end of the monitoring period the new CAS "median" was not within 50KTS of the initial "median" value. Now that certainly matches the UAS criteria, but whether that should have been displayed or annunciated is debatable. The PNF announced, "We've lost the speeds", but then failed to check the QRH for guidance and the game was lost before reaching first base.

The following discussion between HazelNuts39 and Takata in AF447 - Thread No.5 should give you an insight into why the law change was ALT2B, and the implications for the remainder of the flight.

I do think that Clandestino summed up ALL the ALT Law states quite succinctly:- and this could be quantified by the "bucket is half full" approach which is eminently preferable to the "bucket is half empty" scenario when DIRECT Law is applicable.

SPIEGEL reporting
 

For the record, SPIEGEL reporting concerning AF 447 usually reflects the thinking of Gerhard Hüttig, a professor from Technical University Berlin and advisor to the lawyers of the families of German victims (E.g., he thinks Airbus A330/340 are dangerous & should be grounded because he "proved" in the sim that they can't be recovered from stall). I'm pretty sure he or the lawyers are also the source for most of the "insider" information.

"Now that certainly matches the UAS criteria, but whether that should have been displayed or annunciated is debatable. The PNF announced, "We've lost the speeds", but then failed to check the QRH for guidance and the game was lost before reaching first base."......from mm43, above.

How is it debatable? Are you comfortable hand flying without speeds in these conditions? For thirteen seconds, now the ship is climbing? Now you will wait for UAS determination causing serious control changes in mode until 2:10:22?

What am I missing here?

The game was lost before crew had a chance to troubleshoot.

Flavours:
'Vanilla' 1 = Normal Lateral law
'Vanilla' 2 = Roll DIRECT law & Alternate Yaw law


For ALT1/2A 'alternate stall protection':


The ALTERNATE stall protection is based upon Vc.
When Vc < Vc prot a SS pitch order is a DIRECT! elevator deflection order, a stability order with limited authority is added to the SS order.

Quote:

---

My question regards the difference in failure modes that would create one or the other level of reconfig. I would have thought that 2A & 2B are a function of how many ADR's get flaky, i.e.

1 flaky ADR = continued Normal Law
2 flaky ADR = ALT2A
3 flaky ADR = ALT2B

---

Ok, but not exclusive to ADRs only. (e.g. loss of weight information)

Quote:

---

I guess I'd like to know how do I then get into each of these conditions and then how do I recognize which one I have, which ones 'latch', which can be recovered to a different level of reconfig, or do I even need to know any of this?

---

I can list them for you (from fragmented data) but don't know the latched state or possibility to recovery to a higher level.

Quote:

---

Simulators generally only provide a limited range of constrained failures to achieve one or the other reconfiguration level for training, so does the available documentation need to be enhanced?

---

Don't know, I am not a pilot, but from the side I would say you need to experience the difference between NORMAL & DIRECT SS manipulation and consider everything what is available to you as a bonus.

Thanks A33Zab & MM43.

This quote is from Takata, and if I understand it correctly, raises an interesting point about the 'latched' state of ALT2B and addresses some of the recent discussion about VLS availability and other displays.

It indicates to me that when speeds returned to normal at the apex at 5.6 degrees of pitch, that not only was VLS not available, but there was no red & black zipper (VSW) displayed either. Just a valid speed value (~215k) and speed tape and a SPD LIM flag.

So when the FD's returned, there was no visual indication of VSW, i.e. no real good visual indication of stall proximity or the inadvisability of pulling up again at this point. And without the classic aircraft response, a source of confusion in correlating the audio SW to the actual flight conditions.

I think this is why, at least I think, knowing what actually gets 'latched' may be of some use to the drivers.

"It indicates to me that when speeds returned to normal at the apex at 5.6 degrees of pitch, that not only was VLS not available, but there was no red & black zipper (VSW) displayed either. Just a valid speed value (~215k) and speed tape and a SPD LIM flag."....OK.

Whether the stall bug returns with speeds or not is unclear, the BEA say that with ADRs out, the bug is not available, HazelNuts39 pointed that out, it is in #3.

Apologies if I'm going over old territory. Just trying to relate it to available documentation. :)

You are correct to underline one aspect of the memo on which, by the way, answers are still to be developed, as mentioned here earlier.

But point in debate is more general, it is not only about the memory items but the overall applicability of the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION PROCEDURE :
Have we seen that modification yet ?

Admonition to respect Stall Warning but then part of the ACA Memo, everybody, Airbus included, thinks the Stall Warnings were inappropriate and the crew did well to ignore them.

A similar language is part of the AF info OSV :
here and here

So, a lot has still to be clarified and we are certainly not at the last revision for the UAS drill/checklist.

Note:
I post here a few slides of a "NEW" UAS procedure but I cannot certified the date of that revision ?
To note the clear request for 5 deg pitch attitude in cruise phase.

http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/ltop_a10.gif

http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/ltop_a11.gif

http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/ltop_a12.gif

http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/ltop_a13.gif

The point.

Aeroplane did not pitch up out of her own accord but because CM2 commanded her to. It stalled because CM2 kept on pulling when she was alredy above her practical ceiling. Aeroplane performed as expected. Pilots not at all.

If the name of the game is "situational awareness", then you are right.

Errrr... not quite. The apex of first pull-up was 12°, zoom climb made vertical speed go up to 7000 fpm (at FL362!), both recorded airspeeds (ADR 1 & ISIS) were false. Nose pitched down slowly, following the order form the right sidestick, IAS 1 returned to normal while pitch was 11°. ISIS speed started showing the correct value just about the time the aeroplane exited envelope following the second pull-up. Pitch was about 16° and alpha about ten.

For the time being, this seems to be the correct assessment. However, altitude display was available so why would anyone consider a good idea to pull, especially as MAX REC was discussed just a couple of minutes before and the aeroplane was very near it, or to pull while something is shouting "STALL STALL STALL" in the cockpit is something I find inexplicable in rational terms.

Response was completely according to the tired old cliche: To go up, pull back on the stick, to go down, pull back further.

Originally Posted by OK 465
So when the FD's returned, there was no visual indication of VSW, i.e. no real good visual indication of stall proximity or the inadvisability of pulling up again at this point.
If you will notice, no where during the pull up was there ever a mention of actual altitude by the crew, only that weird "go down" recommendation from PM.

It would seem that this crew was already so stressed, that neither of them actually read the altitude numbers, and they only noted the scrolling of the altitude tic marks on the PFD.

What could cause this level of stress? Other than it was a black and turbulent night, and neither of the pilots had experience with UAS or Alt2 at altitude (which is enough to make most pilots edgy), it would appear that the initial overcontrol of roll caused an adrenaline flood when the aircraft refused to calmly follow PF's piloting efforts.

Something really got to these guys. What else is unusual about the first 30 seconds after the AP dropped that would set them on edge? How many of the 30+ flights that didn't lose control experienced roll oscillation?

Yep!

Clandestino:

You are correct that the CAS (which BTW is referred to in the report as "calculated airspeed' not calibrated nor IAS, the term you use) is actually recovered at 2:10:34 at 223 knots.

However, the FD's become available at 2:10:47, and as you correctly state, CAS 'has already been recovered' and is at 216k with a theta of 5.6 degrees at 2:10:49 at ~FL375, eventually topping out at an 'apex' of FL379.

The stall warning occurs 4 seconds after the FD's return (2:10:51) at a '6 degree' AOA (FD bars steady not flashing).

We may be splitting hairs here, I'm an old guy and get distracted easily. :)

Entirely correct as far as vertical direction of flight. (I'm old and occasionally get tired also. :})

I think there's a considerable effort going on to make it 'explicable', and that effort unfortunately may indeed fail.

(I understand that pilots need to know the state of their airplane to control it, and those that do will perform well no matter. As you say, sometimes they don't, but as you also say (if I may paraphrase without going back and directly quoting), "pilots 'learn' their aircraft from reading their manuals".)

Typical Clandestino stuff here :
I write how illusionary it is to pretend to maintain indefinitely a 5 deg pitch in altitude but you find 5 reasons to state I’m wrong but now you feel the need to precise it is only for the necessary time to get the QRH out …
How long do you think it takes at CLB thrust from FL350 200T before the AoA matches the 5 deg given to the pitch ?
I have no precise idea just a guess it would not take much but I’m certainly not ready to test and validate or not your theory.

No pprune in that, and not only Airbus.
And on the contrary, to not apply that procedure for low level has proved to be deadly, but then the procedure was not published yet …

If you allow me to 'split hairs' on terminology: The airspeed indicated on the display (corrected for instrument error, if any) is commonly referred to as IAS. If the ADIRU applies appropriate corrections for errors in pitot and static pressures, IAS is equal to CAS. If the pitots are blocked or at large AoA the indicated airspeed is not equal to CAS. The report refers to the captain's IAS as 'Vitesse conventionelle' or 'calculated airspeed' or 'CAS' when it means IAS.

Regarding the ACARS messages FLAG ON CAPT(F/O) PFD SPD LIM, BEA#1 says: "This message indicates the unavailability of the FMGEC's characteristic speed calculation function." There is no reference for Takata's assertion that it would be latched. IMO it could well be a temporary condition similar to the unavailability of the FD's - the SPD flag that occurs later is not latched (see IR#3 page 44). When the FD's return at 02:10:47, the F/O's airpeed (ISIS) is still 121 kt. The stall warning speed of 207 kt would have been off-scale on the F/O's PFD.

I am guessing no subtitles yet on this French reconstruction anywhere...:ugh:

?

Interesting graph HN39
So in theory it takes about 3 minutes before both angles match.
Alpha SW is below Alpha Max.
Alpha SW is not even 1 deg above the 5 deg AoA.
Where would be Alpha Stall ?
What altitude would be reached when both angles match ?

We are heading for 1300 posts now, and the oozlum burd is circling once again. SURELY wheter or not 5 degrees is 'right' or 'wrong' is immaterial in this accident? Had the crew maintained 5 degrees and crashed I would be interested!:ugh:

1301 BOAC, go play with NG guys...:)

Quote:

---

There is no reference for Takata's assertion that it would be latched. IMO it could well be a temporary condition similar to the unavailability of the FD's - the SPD flag that occurs later is not latched…

---

HN39:

This is baffling to me. There's also no reference contradicting Takata. Having done some UAS work for sim lesson plans before I retired…

I can get a ‘latched’ SPD LIM flag with NO characteristic speed info on BOTH PFD’s by simply inputting a speed discrepancy of 50 knots, failing a single ADR in use (either 1 or 2, or 3 if switched), and then reviving the ADR and removing the speed discrepancy.

I will be in a ‘latched’ alternate law of some flavor (amber hash marks), both FD’s are back, but the absence of characteristic speed info is permanent, however the SPD LIM flag remains also???

I think I have ALT2”B” OCD.

True, but do you need three minutes to get the QRH?
The stall is not clearly defined. I would put it somewhere between 9.5 and 10.5 degrees.
37353 ft after three minutes.

No it should not, but don't forget you're here in the theory territory where everything is by the book, total control of the pitch, no turbulence, above average crew who will get the right data from the right page with no delay. In practice many distractions may interfere ...
It is bringing complexity where none is needed.

I restate my position :
IMO, the procedure for UAS in cruise phase should clearly mention to adopt the usual parameters for such phase of flight :

1. PF Maintain 2.5 degrees of pitch
2. PNF Set the thrust parameters as they are usually in CRZ
3. Wait for improvement

It is a suggestion that would clarify the situation ...

"Do nothing" has been my position since July 30th 2009 in a response to Stepwilk, (Post #3990), and I have consistently maintained this position in the face of considerable opposition since.

HN39's work shows the effects of a slight increase in pitch, (2.5deg increase) and while slightly destabilizing, are benign in the short term. The point has always been, when in already-stable flight, why bother? It adds work, complexity as you say, and clearly most crews ignored the drill.

In my view, the opposition is primarily because the UAS drill and checklist is indeed confusing even to trained crews and was to this point that I have continually addressed myself, even re-designing the drill. Reverting to the simplest solution is also the safest one - do nothing - maintain pitch and power, remain calm and get out the books; even the video to which you provided a link now says this, yet the BEA maintains a position now at odds with this thinking from an ordinary A330 line pilot. What is to be done?

We're arguing the same point.

Undoubtedly, your position is right when UAS event occured in a "shinning blue sky tempest".

But would you please consider that at 02:10 UTC, the vessel was flying in ITCZ (also called F.I.T - Front Inter Tropical in another language).

+1 NeoFit

Also I remember one fellow poster (can't remember who precisely, sorry...), who said as a captain he sometimes asked his F/Os: "look at me, not the instruments, and tell me without cheating what is our pitch right now" (aircraft in cruise). IIRC many couldn't say precisely.

Perhaps that's one reason? (is it good or bad, I'm not sure)
5° & CLB, as a memory item. That is what you must know, for the time needed by the PNF to get the QRH at the right page, and crawl through the table for your aircraft current weight/alt.

I wonder if it would not be better (and simpler?) if any crew member could tell what are the current stabilized pitch & power settings, in order to maintain those should the A/P and/or A/THR drop off, for whatever reason. But as the shared experience of the above quoted captain teached me, this knowledge seems not (enough) widespread...

[edit] would like to add that, even if this question is interesting, I see it as unrelated to AF447 where the crew neither maintained standard cruise pitch&power, neither set 5° & CLB as per the published procedure if they had condidered the safe conduct of the flight was affected, which I don't think was the cas, at this point.
(and BTW yes, I'm aware of the "unsafy condithingy" brandished by totally un-agended people, based on a memo from an avionic manufacturer ; this memo was twofold IMO: to alert about potential danger and (in the mean time) to cover said manufacturer's assets)

"Are there pilots that follow the flight director blindly? Didn't happen when I was flying"

Sorry to follow my own quote but when did pilots not become pilots but follow the magenta line?

I always looked at the flight director but sometimes it gets programmed wrong as in one of my previous posts when my check airman got it so screwed up I just ignored it and flew my flight plan. He eventually caught up. No you do not follow the flight director blindly. You verify everything it is doing. To just follow it with no verification makes you not a real pilot, soory.

Neofit;
Many of us here have flown in that kind of weather, (light to moderate chop or turbulence) and we know that the pitch will vary slightly as will the thrust...in most circumstances not much but it will vary. The requirement to "set" five degrees in the checklist may not be exactly the result in the aircraft but it will be close, while the other crew member gets out the QRH and the PF. Five degrees is about 2 to 2.5 degrees above normal cruise pitch and perhaps prevents the airplane from descending if the drill required, say, "3deg" and not 5, thus preventing a possible overspeed situation from developing - it guarantees that the aircraft will at least climb and not descend. So there are some reasonable reasons behind 5deg providing it isn't held too long.

My "do nothing" view means roughly the following: Once aware of the problem, (and it may take a few moments), call the abnormal so the other crew member is aware you're aware and is alert for next actions, wait for a few moments, observe the altitude, get the FMC onto the GPS page and see if the airplane is climbing or descending and adjust pitch accordingly. In the Airbus at least, "thrust lock", which occurs when the autothrust is disconnected involuntarily, will prevent any change in the power setting. If the thrust setting was lower than cruise power when the autothrust disconnected, that will be corrected with the QRH pitch-and-power tables. In the meantime, control is maintained even if the airplane wanders a bit. It certainly isn't going to lose speed fast if the thrust is a bit low. But like the training notes say, get on with the QRH checklist smartly. The checklist provides guidance on how to ensure that the correct pitch and power are set and it takes a while as the settings slowly affect airplane performance and it stabilizes with the changes. "Do nothing" doesn't mean literally just sit there!

AlphaZuluRomeo;
It's a good exercise. But not being able to tell what the pitch and power was does not mean that all is lost and "5deg" is the only answer.

To me, it means leave the airplane alone. By all means do what is obviously necessary to maintain stable flight, but having to change something in these circumstances would be extremely rare. The energy state of the airplane was fine using the pitch-power settings just seconds before the event. Unless sudden and unexpected entry occurs into turbulence that is severe to extreme, the pitch and power settings which existed just before the event are going to be very close to, if not exactly what is needed in terms of temporary pitch and power settings while the other pilot gets out the QRH. If the airplane starts to wander downhill, gently squeeze the stick back a tiny bit and wait for the input to take effect. Tiny movements on the stick is key, regardless of the method used.

I agree that five degrees is safe, providing the crew response is timely. But I think destabilizing the airplane when it was fine before, especially when almost no one is practised at high-altitude manual flight, requires some careful thought.

Why not just hold the pitch attitude of 2.5 and cruise power until airspeed returned. The altimiters were working fine. They would have been fine if they hadn't pulled up into the obvious stall. Experienced pilots would not have had a problem. Cheap new hire pilots will.

Probably worthwhile reminding the current punters that A33Zab provided a comprehensive spreadsheet layout of essential data back in AF447 Thread No.4 post#691. Those with a screen resolution width of 1024 pixels or less should view the image directly here.

We don't know how long the UAS condition would have remained if the aircraft had maintained FL350, but at least they would have eventually "flown" out of the ITCZ.

mm43;

Thanks for the link. IIRC, the time for the airspeed to return to normal was painfully short...less than a minute? but by that time the airplane was established in the stall. In the original sim exercise, (I did two), it took about 4 minutes to slow down from 270kts to about 186kts, in level flight. At the time I never contemplated the possibility of a pitch-up and it is remarkable how quickly the energy is lost. That said, Owain Glyndwr has posted data which posit a successful recovery as low as 6000ft. He readily acknowledges that few if any transport line pilots would point the airplane down the necessary -10deg pitch to do so but the higher-level scenarios, which still require just a -10deg pitch attitude, recover successfully.

bubbers44;

Indeed, why not just hold 2.5 and make that the target in the drill?

For almost all conditions that would be fine and that is how I have argued - perhaps not "2.5", but the last-known. Clearly it is what all other crews did, to a greater or lesser degree.

What I can see out of this extended conversation is a subtle need to at least protect the airplane from going downhill. What perhaps wasn't anticipated was someone pitching up to 15deg in cruise and that has motivated my argument all along.

To me, and perhaps to most transport pilots, if it started going downhill a bit we'd just bring it back up, hopefully gently, (but that assumes that the altimeters are working!...but there's still the GPS.

Five degrees caters to all weight/altitude conditions, but I know from having looked for years and years at the ACMS data in cruise flight (A330-300) that the pitch doesn't vary much from 2.0 to 3.0 degrees even in the kind of turbulence AF447 was in. So keeping it at 2.5 and then working from there, fine-tuning it just in case that was a transient pitch attitude or power setting, is very doable.

I'm pretty sure we have to look beyond the "cheap new hire pilot" notion here. A great deal of commentary has already been offered by a number of contributors on the topic.

Certainly not, indeed. But 5°/CLB has apparently been deemed stable enough. Why not 2.5? Perhaps because you don't have an associated stable-in-all-conditions thrust setting?

I'm not advocating 5°/CLB should be applied at all time when UAS. Neither am I sure the authors of the procedure meant it that way.

If the safe conduct of the flight is affected => if above FL100 => 5°/CLB => QRH
If the safe conduct of the flight is not affected => maintain current => QRH

What means "safe conduct of the flight is affected" is, IMO, where the "problem" lies...

Once again, this is not related directly to AF447 as we have no clear indication they tried to follow any (part of) procedure.
That doesn't mean the procedure should not be improved. It should.