It seems Takata is right this time. The Air Caraibe memo states that about 30 minutes after the UAS event the crew reset both FMGEC to get rid of the SPD LIM red flag and to regain VLS indication on the PFD.

RE 5°/CLB: The Air Caraibe crew used GPS altitude and groundspeed to maintain trajectory and speed. Prior to UAS they had disconnected the A/THR and set cruise N1 for the weight and altitude.

Fully agree with you, AZR. This condition seems to have been introduced and incorporated into the memorized drill portion of the UAS response, around 2006.

In its "Unreliable Speeds; Latest Improvements" document from September, 2006, it is indicated that the memory drill qualifying condition, "Safe Conduct of the Flight Affected?" will be "Defined in Training". But the guidance remains, if the safety of the flight is not affected, first step is to level off and troubleshoot. Prior to 2006 the drill had "Immediate Actions" and then "Immediate Pitch and Thrust Guidance" and then a "When Flight Path Stabilized" section which required the Probe Heat to be put ON and "Attitude/Thrust - Adjust".

The December, 2007 edition, (#5), of Airbus' "Safety First" an article entitled "Unreliable Speed" was published. The article is quite thorough and well-written, making clear many points. It states, in part:

The question, as always when such changes occur and the distribution and incorporation of infomation is involved is, how are these changes incorporated into training by airlines operating Airbus equipment? As with most editorial changes, these changes were ordinary in the sense that most changes in procedures, SOPs, checklists and so on go through a pretty thorough vetting process even at the airline and are then published, incorporated into SOPs and training scripts and regimes, all of which take time to make their way to flight crews.

Here again, as this is the way almost all changes to SOPs work, we have to be mindful of hindsight bias. We can see now, that there were at the time of these changes, already UAS & ADR events occurring. The 2006 documents speak to awareness and addressing of the issues.

According to BEA IR#2 Appendix 7, "List of events on A330/A340 attributable to the blocking of at least two Pitot probes with ice, identified by Airbus as of 3 November 2009" there were ten UAS events prior to 2007. So the information would have been "out there".

Since most crews appeared to have kept the aircraft level while troubleshooting, (we don't know this for certain but it appears so), it would be interesting though likely difficult to determine given the passage of time, if crews who had one of the listed UAS events had had either training in the changed procedure or were at least aware of the changes and knew how to do the updated drill.

When? When Airbus intro'd an airplane that required the FD's be followed. If the FD's are not followed, it sometimes confuses the Autothrust system, etc. The only real way to "fly" the bus requires one to turn the A/P, A/T and F/D's all off. Otherwise, you're mixing things up and confusing both the co-pilot and FiFI/Henri/HAL.

AP is also lost if ADR DISAGREE, could it have been reengaged to also follow the reappearing FD bars ?
But the Air Caraibes memo shows AP can be reengaged when VLS are not even computed ...

But the Airbus procedure is quite clear : If you choose to NOT follow the FD, turn them OFF.

HN39 (or CONF or A33Zab):

If I might ask (without going to the memo), how did they reset the FMGEC's and how did they know, procedurally, to do it?

(BTW: saw your earlier question, and yes you can get the same 'latched' SPD LIM situation by inputting two airspeed discrepancies with no failure. Using a single offside ADR failure is just quicker than typing on an IOS keypad, but at least one side must incorporate the speed discrepancy, 2 or 3 ADR 'failures' and revivals will not do it. Once on the ground, you can reset both the SPD LIM & FC law by cycling the generators off and on.)

OK465;
Sorry, I don't know more than the memo says: warnings "AUTO FLT FN1(2) FAULT" are recorded, and these are explained by the reset of the FMGEC's.

Very important.

And a 'normal' op where this required is a PRM breakout.

It's interesting that if the PNF deselects both FD's first (as required) and then the PF elects to use TOGA rather than CLB on the breakout, the FD's reappear in TOGA (due to flaps extended) and must be again deselected by the PNF.

Making radio calls, watching a TCAS target, reconfiguring, resetting the FCU by the PNF, and hand flying raw data for the PF can all be quite challenging and must be a very disciplined drill.

When the FD's are reselected after the breakout, care must be taken to not fly them until proper FMA mode indications are verified, some modes not being selectable until after re-engagement.

(edit: BTW for B44, the same requirement to turn off the FD's on a PRM breakout exists in the automated Boeing's also, because sometimes people inadvertantly do dumb things, even in Boeing's. :})

I think they would use the RESET OF COMPUTERS procedure from the QRH and were probably in touch with their maintenance through the ACARS. That reset was done 30 minutes after the initial event. 3 hours later ... PRIM1 was also reset, maybe in an attempt to go back to Normal Law.
It is also possible the maintenance was directly in touch with Airbus.

In the initial discussions re: BUSS, I believe that once it activates, no more NORMAL LAW, til she's on the ground and tended to....

CONF iture:
 

Someone knows if this memo is translated into english?

From the available documentation: (AMM FMGEC / EFCS)

AP Operational Conditions:

Quote:

---

(2) AP engagement inhibition and disengagement logics



(a) Pitch and roll angle limits

• - Roll angle
• . AP engagement is inhibited when abs(phi) > 40°
• . AP is automatically disengaged when abs(phi) > 45°.
• - Pitch angle
• . AP engagement is inhibited when theta < -10° or theta > +22°
• . AP is automatically disengaged when theta < -13° or theta > 25°.

(b) AP engagement is inhibited in flight when CAS < VLS or CAS > (VMO/MMO or VLE/VFE).

(c) AP engagement is inhibited when the FMGEC receives the "pitch angle protection active" information from the FCPC.

---

No translation I'm afraid, but I converted it to a
WORD document. Hope that helps.

OK465:
 

FCOM Procedures 22-10

Quote:

---

MANUAL FMGES RESET

MANUAL RESET OF FMGCS

On rare occasions, the FMGS may require manual resetting.
If this occurs in flight, reset one FMGC at a time.
The aircraft has two reset breakers per FMGC:
‐ The FM reset-breaker C/B resets the flight management part of the FMGC.
‐ The FMGEC reset-breaker C/B resets the flight management, flight guidance, and flight envelope parts.

Resetting the FM reset-breakers C/B or FMGEC reset-breakers C/B disconnects the onside autopilot.
The FM further resynchronizes to reset one or both FM.
Resetting the FM or FMGC reset-breaker does not increment the reset counter: There is no limitation to the number of reset-breaker resets.

---

I still think setting the attitude to what it was at FL350 and doing what the autopilot was at about 2.5 degrees nose up attitude and maintaining cruise power around 90 percent N1 or what ever your cruise power is with your conditions would be prefered to busting through altitudes because of a bad checklist. If the altimiters work, use them. Just get out the unusable airspeed checklist and don't repeat this error again. The 5 degrees nose up and climb power is still taught in some airlines. Pray for the airliners above them opposite direction. That procedure is only to be used in an emergency when control of aircraft was in doubt, not loss of airspeed.

Thanks once again A33Zab & CONF.

Using reset-breakers for a procedure makes it sound a little more like an 'old' Boeing.

Although, in the past, if you put breakers (reset type or not) on any flight deck (even as few as there are in a 330), some flight engineer would eventually figure out a valid operational reason for 'using' 'some' of them. :)

Hi VGCM66,

No subtitled version exists that I'm aware of.
But as there were questions about Mr Rosay's interview, I translated two parts where he can be seen:

On the loss of speed indications and the procedure to follow:
On the (non) reaction to the stall warning:
Hope it helps, and my english is not too bad...

What must exist in the reptilian brain of each pilot
 

Mr Rosay @ 29:15
Easy to say, i hope everybody is aware of this. But in really life ...

Unfortunatly, the reptilian brain has sometimes a snooze.
BEA wrote (1994 Tarom YR-LCA serious incident report):
Terrifying, is'n it.

I know hundreds of pilots and not one would pull back in a stall. The only pilots that pulled back in a stall are the AF new hires and one Bonanza pilot who lost an engine out of Burbank trying to return after an engine failure in front of my eyes. Of course all died in that crash too. None of my hundreds of students died by pulling up in a stall. Rethink your 80% theory.

bubbers44, that appears not to be NeoFit's theory at all, but statistical data published by BEA.....Oddly, I am speechless.

I agree with bubbers.

I was also very lucky in flying...I read, reread, and reread again "STick and Rudder" by Langweische. In it, his constant refrain was , in trouble? push forward on the stick.

and its important not to say: lower the nose...pushing forward on the stick reduces angle of attack (ok, maybe not in inverted aerobatic flight).

I drummed this into my students and one of my proudest moments was when one of my students came up to me saying he had a near midaircollision with someone at Truckee Airport (near lake tahoe california usa)...the other plane was on the wrong side of the depicted traffic pattern...they were head on converging on base leg. Mind you field elevation is 5900'msl...he avoided traffic , got the stall warning and PUSHED forward even though the mountains nearby were filling the window. an incorrect thing to do would be to pull up to avoid the mountains...but not when you are stalled or near a stall.

He landed safely, having recovered from a stall in a difficult situation.

he told me I saved his life and the lives of his family. I told him to thank Wolf gang langweische, the author of 'Stick and rudder".

From the BEA report on the Tarom incident:
It occurs to me that the Captain may have been momentarily uncertain of the direction to the nearest horizon. They were 60 degrees nose up after all.:eek:

Add a little roll and he may not have been able to see the horizon initially. This might explain the otherwise inexplicable pitch control motions.

Push it real good
 

My Dear Sirs, Mesdames, (and Any Others),

It has come to our attention that this article (posted previously) bears repeating.

Technique: The 'Panic Pull'

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Yours Ever,
Etc., etc. (Ret.)

Stick and Rudder was one of my favorite books learning to fly. Yes we all needed to know what to do and that book was very helpful. Most of my flying through commercial pilot was reading books, no ground school. I taught my self aerobatics by reading Roll around a Point by Dwayne Cole. I ended up teaching Art Scholls aerobatics class at Flabob airport in Riverside California with a one hour brush up with Art. He did the inverted spin scene or tried to in Top Gun when Goose was killed. He crashed into the Pacific off of San Clamente doing the filming. Notice at the end of Top Gun this is dedicated to the memory of Art Scholl.

Bob Hoover was a good friend of Art's. He would land at Flabob on one wheel in his Shrike just because he wanted to see him. What a great guy Bob is. We see him every year at the Reno Air Races.

I have been blessed with many legends in aviation knowing them personally.
I couldn't be happier with how my aviation career went from crop dusting to aerobatics to corporate jets and finally wide body international flying.

I thought I should add my last flight out of Miami to Tegucigalpa, Honduras with my FA wife in the jump seat. Flightlevel350.com: Free Aviation Videos, Airplane Videos and Cockpit Videos
search mhtg and look about 6 videos down with a cockpit view out of a 757 for my final 6 minutes. What a great career. This is claimed the most dangerous airport for jets in the world but I flew in there over 600 times and loved it. Never had a problem.

First wife?

The most interesting part of the Rosay interview was this:
I read this as: When one loses the speed indications in cruise do nothing (except keep the aircraft trucking on down the line.) It doesn't mean sit on your hands however.

Mr. Bubbers
 

Congratulations on an enviable (by me anyway) career. Very impressive.

The video scared the crap outta me. You did that 600 times and lived!? :D

No, second but took 20 years to find her she was not a FA when I met her, I talked her into it..

Yes, I lived and loved every bit of it. That is the most fun airport in the world. You just can't get sloppy on the approach. Just do it right.

*de-lurk*

Bubbers - I understand what you're saying, but if we're honest you're talking a different generation here, with a lot more ex-military flyers. I realise this is something of a generalisation, but from what I've read and been told, the pros of which include a tendency for better stick-and-rudder skills and knowledge of aeronautical fundamentals, the cons including occasional issues with CRM. In the US, you're also talking about a lot of pilots who came up through the crop-dusting route and the like, which comes with a lot more hands-on experience.

The fact is that over time the demographic has changed, and the explosion in numbers of jet transports and jumps in technology since the '60s means that less time is spent learning the basics and more on operating and managing the systems - which has led to a significant increase in things like "panic pulls" from line-qualified pilots. When talking of pulling into a stall, don't forget Birgenair 301 and Palm 90, neither of which involved AF or Airbus. This is an industry-wide trend and always has been.

That said, your career makes for great reading, and it's clear that you've always striven to do the right thing - for that alone my cap would be doffed.

I was wondering - I realise it's a UK document, but did you ever read Davies' "Handling The Big Jets"? I'd be interested to know how it compares with the material more prevalent in the US from the same period.

Lyman : You were asking about the sim experience a week or so back. I can't really add anything to what I originally wrote, so for convenience I'll provide the links here:

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46062...ml#post6793521

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46839...ml#post6794612

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46839...ml#post6794908

*re-lurk*

C-star for dummies (2)
 

I have deleted this post pending correction of an error. Apologies for any confusion.

Bubbers, you would not have any trouble with day aircraft carrier qualifications.:ok: Did you also fly in at night?

HN, be intrested! what means NoseDown faktor 0.85?

if every spring in the SS was right and his seat in a good position, than he just shorted his arm for 20 sec with a lot of adrenalin....

The ND side stick angles are multiplied by this factor to account for an apparent sensitivity difference ND versus NU (see graph in earlier post). The resulting SS characteristic is shown in red below. The blue points are from a graph posted by A33Zab in post #852 on page 42 of this thread.

http://i.imgur.com/QVWuc.gif

Handling the big jets was always with me. I learned a lot from it. All of my knowledge came from books through commercial license and aerobatics. I took an instrument course but it was pretty pathetic. That was the first ground school I attended. As I said I had an early interview with united with less than 200 hrs and am so glad I didn't get hired. I would have missed out on learning how to fly. I learned how to fly by gradually going up through the ranks, not as a 727 FE, Going from single engine to multi engine to charter jets to corporate jets finally airlines, I was prepared.

Sorry, coming back too late!

My previous post # 1296

Bubbers44
And sevenstrokeroll
Please, would you try to understand what I am trying to say

Lyman , Machinbird and Organfreak
Thanks a lot understanding my post.

Even if I wrote in a previous message <<stupid pilots >>�, notice that quotes are very important.
(and -please - obviously replace this in the context)

In fact, pilots never understood the vessel was stalled.
' we have engine thrust ! '
In fact, the vessel, with 13 degrees THS NU, was ' Âœparachuted '.

For me, Tarom report raised very important points (As QF72, Perpignan ...).
Did you read Tarom BEAs report?
HN39
Your graphic is very interesting.
It recalls me <<Owain Glyndwr - THS Equivalent Elevator Angle>>
(sorry, I am not able to put the link at this time)

Regards

NU or ND
 

When giving "Joyrides" ( pleasure flights ) my first flying job, I used to be asked to "Loop-the-loop" by bolder holiday makers. No-one asked for a Bunt, perhaps they did not know the word. If ever I was slightly harsh in putting the nose down, there would be squeals - never if I pulled the nose up by the same degree. ( I was not cleared for aerobatic flights by my employer and neither was the aircraft. It was a very new Licence - precious to me !)

I believe that around 1916, Frederick Lindemann had asked a number of Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service pilot trainees, who had crashed, but were now in hospital being mended after crashes ( many aircraft of that era broke up on hitting the ground). A number reported that they had stalled and /or spun whilst holding back on the joystick as hard as they could, to avoid hitting the ground...

Does anyone know the logic used by the makers of lifts (Elevators) to control the rates of acceleration both up and down, particularly in very tall buildings ? ( I would expect that the rate going down might be more gradual than going up.)

I wish the new pilots could learn how to fly like we did back then. They are missing out on some very important experience that is hard to get now. We all want to be the best at what we do.

The new pilots have a difficult time getting the experience we got. With the automation even when they get their first job they probably rarely hand fly so become autopilot monitors. Flying skills deteriorate rapidly monitoring autopilots. I have been there so shut them off to maintain pilot skills. I have been told airlines discourage hand flying automatic airplanes, that is sad.

Pilots, do not let automation control your airplane, you control it. Disconnect everything and make sure you are really in control. If you don't you become an autopilot monitor, not a pilot. I am not kidding on this one.

We were not authorized to land at TGU at night or take off. We had to visually avoid the terrain so couldn't operate then. General aviation aircraft could. My buddy who opperated our airline emails me all the time from Tegucigalpa runs another airline now out of there but don't think they can land at night either.

dozzywanabe

you mentioned "handling the big jets'

I read it about 30 years ago...still have a copy and even wrote to the author...he was kind enough to write back and I still have his letter to me.

you mentioned a US equivilent...I would say: "Fly the Wing" by Webb is every bit as good...maybe a bit more oomphy and less british...but he was an american (eastern airlines) pilot. Flew DC9's. I had the great good fortune to track him down and spoke with him for over an hour on the phone...he echoed many of the things that bubbers and I have been saying. he paid me the supreme compliment saying: 'you get it.

if money permited, I would take up a perspective pilot...tell him to fly from Pittsburgh to Chicago in a plane he had never flown. I would tell him I would handle the checklists and systems..he had to navigate and aviate.

and NO FREIGGN auto pilot.

hand fly at the max authorized altitude (remember when we called it the service ceiling?)

I would see how he could trim her up at altitude...that tells me alot about a flyer!