How interesting, the response to a jest.

This if off topic, but, in the course of the jest, please recall that there was NO visual ID in the Vincennes / AB300 incident, and while there was a VISUAL ID in the KAL 007. Given that we were talking about pictures, do you wonder at why I said it thusly? "since our Russian readers might not recoginze a commercial aircraft" (again, this is a jest) which might imply actually looking at an aircraft with a Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeball.

By the way, Zorin, you will find that KAL 007 was a Boeing aircraft- a 747. (Does it occur to you that this is why I put, in parens, the bit about it not being an A330?) Your attempted riposte might have worked better with an understanding of the facts.

In any case, Clandestino posted nice pics, so off we go, back to the discussion about ... an Airbus 330 that tied the low altitude record over the Atlantic Ocean. (And perhaps setting a record for negative altitude? :p)

Can we please get back on point? The last 5 or 6 posts or whatever are quite irrelevant and, if there was an attempt at humor, I'd venture sadly very misplaced.

Nice pics. Best-looking jet I ever flew. And PLZ note the lack of a "PNF" or the ability to leave the cockpit and take a nap.

The Viper could not enter a stall in the conventional sense due to the AoA versus Gee pitch command implementation. The AoA limit was intentionally placed at 27 degrees to allow full roll commands at that value without fear of a departure. That's with A2A configuration. With bombs and such it was a different story and our AoA limit was reduced to about 18 deg and roll command was also reduced.

So the way you got to the "deep stall" was to be clever, or stoopid, and command a max roll rate when slow, but not necessarily "riding the limiter". So you could "rate" the pitch thru the limiter and also introduce some roll-coupling for added measure. However, several of the first "deep stall" incidents resulted from climbing at a high pitch attitude while holding the one gee basic trim command. If you slowed down quickly enough, then the stabilators ran outta nose down authority - about 50 deg AoA, and the pitch moment coefficient was such that you could not lower the nose.

The Airbus deep "stall" ( can't say it's a "deep stall" such as the Viper had or the T-tail airliners) is still not clearly defined. We don't have a good graph of the pitch moment coefficients or the amount of control authority with the THS in full nose down position at extremely high AoA. What we DO HAVE is one test point that implies the A330 can remain in a stalled condition when the THS is positioned for a full nose up command AND the pilot is commanding nose up - AF447.

The AF447 maneuver closely resembles the Viper entry conditions I described. Fly nose up with decreasing airspeed and then add the THS movement to full nose up command and Voila! Fly thru the AoA protection and you're there. And I am still not convinced that the AoA protection was working normally.

I still maintain that AoA inputs can be of value even at very slow speeds. In the Viper, you hit the gee limit before the AoA limit at cruise speeds and higher. This was based on the dynamic pressure at the time. So we could get 9 gees at about 360 KCAS and 15 degrees AoA. If you "rode the limiter" down to one gee, you were at 27 deg AoA. You were also very slow, maybe 140 knots or so.

That's all for now, and thot we went thru this before.

From looking at the data in the latest report, sure looks to me like the pilot pulling nose up (and the THS at full nose up) were not enough to keep the aircraft in the nose-high attitude and thus, the full stall.

Notice the ENGINE THRUST traces vs. attitude during the stall. Every time the pilots pulled back on the throttle, the nose fell through as it should. The engines (thrust) was what kept them in the nose up attitude and in the stall, not the pilot sidestick commands OR the THS.

It's pretty alike to the way the Alpha protection works on FBW Airbuses. However, Viper is supersonic combat aircraft and A330 is long-range passenger transport, so their design specifications and sensors/flight controls architecture are certain to be different, even if end results are somewhat similar.

That's the point. It worked as designed - it shut itself down. Why in the hell would it do that? People more intimately acquainted with intricacies of Airbus protection systems might come up with more precise and more comprehensive answers, I'll just stick to one that first crossed my mind: AoA max of Airbus wing is quite affected by the mach number so AoA prot needs to "know" actual mach number to modify its activation threshold. threshold applicable to cruise might restrict flare capability, threshold applicable to approach would not activate protection at high mach before the aeroplane is stalled (provided G limit is not reached first, that is). In situation where there was no valid TAS, and therefore no mach, there could be no protection adjustment so alpha prot was lost.

Loss of protections is not such a stark condition as its name would imply. Airbus protections don't interfere with flying as long as one stays well within the envelope and are only very seldom met during regular flying. When they're gone, one can rely only on one's own wits to keep him from transgressing outside the flight envelope but that's what pilots have been doing since there were first pilots.

All the talking about three different aeroplanes in three different control laws is pretty non-sensical. Aerodynamically and performance-wise, it is the same aeroplane and flight controls feel is not much different. At least it is so in level D sim and I yet have to come across level D that doesn't closely match the aeroplane's behaviour - within the territory where test pilots dared to go.

Chances are, it were all three that kept it stalled but I doubt we'll find test pilot brave enough to check exactly how much each of them contributed to the demise of 447.

Mach effects and AoA
 

Trust me, I am very familiar with mach and AoA. I also appreciate a design of the fly-by-wire control laws that takes into account of all the aero crapola.

Until you have supersonic flow over the entire wing, then the basic AoA works like we expect. Once supersonic, we have a different shock wave flow pattern, hence the "diamond" configuration of some fighters' wings. We no longer have a "normal" shockwave front and have different pressures on the bottom and top and even parts thereof. The diamond airfoils have at least two shockwave "fronts" on top and bottom. So moving the wing or the stab changes the pressures and we get pitch authority. Ailerons have a more serious problem, but the clever engineers have figured that out.

The Airbus AoA versus mach equation seems very conservative, and I would bet my life on the AoA before the overspeed warnings and whatever "laws" and warnings that are implemented. I seriously doubt you could rip the wings off of the A330 if you exceeded the "protections"/"warning" values by .05 mach or 30 or 40 knots EAS/CAS/IAS. You might get some wing "flapping" as the shockwaves got in the way of the ailerons and spoliers, but big deal.

The shockwaves over the THS would be more of a concern to me, and I have provided Yeager's war story and the design changes to all fighters that resulted in all-moving horizontal stabilizers ( not the 'bus with a conventional elevator and the THS).

In all defense of the basic Airbus aero design, the sucker looks like an outstanding platform without all the FBW protections and plethora of alternate laws and such. i would take that beast and wring it out any day even in the "direct law". OTOH, I fully understand the FBW control surface movements and rate and mechanical/aero limts that are implemented. I would not like to fly the beast with a simple electric command of the control surface position and rate of movement. But I could!!!

As all know here, I have an extreme problem with all the "autopilot" functions and "protections" that Airbus has implemented that can get in the way of basic airmanship by the pilots and the basic aero characteristics of the jet. The jet appears to be well-designed.

It's the engine thrust...nothing more
 

Clandestino - If you will look at the FDR traces in the latest report, you will notice that at 2:11:45 the pilot had full nose-up sidestick inputs, the THS was in the process of moving to full nose up and the aircraft was fully stalled with a nose-up attitude of about 15 degrees and an AOA greater than 30 degrees. A few seconds later, the N1 falls off, bottoming out at about 2:12:07 around 60%. During this time, PF had the sidestick full back and the THS was almost full nose up BUT the attitude decreased from 15 degrees nose up to 10 degrees nose down in about 10 seconds.

Later, at around 2:14:05, with both sidesticks in full back (nose up) and the THS at full nose up, a decrees in N1 reduced the pitch from 20 degrees nose up to 5 degrees nose down. For me, this proves what was keeping the nose pitched up was the thrust not any flight control inputs or the THS because EVERY time thrust was reduced, the nose fell despite the PF actions (inputs and THS).

Every other instance where the nose started to fall were control inputs showing even with the full thrust, there was enough control to get the nose down.

Clandestino #960

A "brave test pilot " has done some of the tests. Jacques Roysay in Airbus Safety First quotes a " practical test done in flight, and well reproduced in the simulator..." of an A340 in various approaches with the Stall Warning on, at low level, going from flight idle to TOGA.
See page 8 Para 8 ( Home ) January 2011 issue.
( I suppose that it was probably not at night, in/near a Cb. and suddenly...)

The direct link to the January 2011 Airbus Safety First magazine is here.

Hi,

Some press release ... (BEA accused by a family lawyer)
Vol Rio-Paris: des familles de victimes saisissent la juge d'instruction - Libération
Google Traduction

The article (and the lawyer concerned) seems to be saying in a roundabout way that the pitot probes should have been subject to an AD rather than a service bulletin, but neglects to mention that it was AF who had chosen to delay the replacement until the next scheduled service interval - in defiance of Airbus's own recommendation that the replacement be carried out as soon as practically possible. It also neglects to mention that BUSS was a new option (that AF had elected not to fit), and the research that caused its development was also very new at the time of the AF447 crash.

It also makes the assertion that the BEA have been implicitly blaming the pilots which is not the case - if anything, the interim reports and press releases since the retrieval of the flight recorders have tended to imply a problem within Air France and the industry as a whole.

So basically it's an ambulance chaser going after bigger money by trying to get the aircraft (and it's manufacturer) blamed, or assigned more responsibility than they are already expected to share due to the pitot tube issues - they've produced no proof at all that the BEA are anything but on the level here.

This is no different than the cases where ambulance chasers in the past have tried to get manufacturers (not just Airbus) in the frame legally when the reports and evidence say there is no reason to do so as yet.

That certainly is a point of view, and well taken. The problem with it is that it reeks of the type of rhetoric the ambulance chaser is accused of using.

pot/kettle


Hindsight and the accusation of the use thereof cuts both ways. This accident makes painfully clear some things no one wants to look at, least of all a partisan.

As a flyer, I take note of the record. With upwards of three dozen UAS events, each handled in an ad hoc manner, the replacement of the Probes should have been an emergency AD, imo. One would hope that those in charge would have seen it that way after the first dozen or so events.

This alone frames the problem well. It also makes clear the approach used by the Line, the Manufacturer, and the Regulator: Roll with the data, modify procedures, and alert the crews.

Mixing bile with resentment does not produce a clear product.

Lawyers do what they do, and in doing so, present a kind of eeyew predictability that has an aroma of integrity.

It is such a shame that while the three principals present as having integrity, they do not, and seemingly, they have their cheering section as well.

The worst of this crowd is the supposed "independent" Investigator/Regulator. It is to laugh out loud, this hypocrisy.

Hindsight should destroy this practice; can there be agreement?

Hi,


To see on France 5 TV network this Sunday
Guide des programmes - France 5

The manufacturer recommended the SB be applied as soon as practically possible. AF elected to take their time over it. An AD would have resulted in the grounding of all A330 and A340s, which could be argued would have been overkill given that none of the previous incidents had resulted in an emergency situation. Again, it looks like the ball is more in AF's court than Airbus's - though as I've said before Airbus will carry some responsibility for fitting those pitot tubes in the first place (despite the fact that they passed certification). Airbus said "fix this", AF decided to delay - how can Airbus be held responsible for AF's decision?

To re-state the facts as they were prior to this accident is not "partisan" in any way - facts are facts. To state that there was no emergency situation beforehand is not cheerleading, it is just honesty.

Put another way - before this happened, if I as a mere software engineer had suggested that a 2-man relief crew with a combined number of hours in excess of 6,000 was unable to identify - let alone recover from - a high-altitude stall, I'd have been pilloried and laughed off the forum for impugning the abilities of professional airline pilots. Now we know that if the training is inadequate, that can indeed happen and the ripples of that revelation will be doing their work throughout the industry for some time to come.

In a perfect world, every incident that revealed a minor technical problem would result in an AD until the problem was fixed. But neither the world nor the aviation industry is perfect, and real politik will have to be taken into account. This situation is a million miles from the DC-10 cargo door issue (where an AD was appropriate), because the loss of pitot data results in neither structural damage nor an uncontrollable aircraft. The accusation of political machinations also rings hollow, because Airbus were not at the time in existential danger from the issue - the A330 and A340 were already a commercial success and there was little danger of jeopardising their continued success.

When there is an "as supplied" issue, one that creates a safety problem, the standard of the industry is to recall the equipment, or arrange for a refit or replacement. Air France is not in the Airframe business, and Pitot Tubes are not "livery". Airbus is clearly in the wrong, though I see your point, I simply do not agree.

"Void if altered or modified". Ring a Bell? Even with an automobile, a conveyance that can pull over to the side of the road, the vehicle is recalled to the location of Manufacturer's representative, for an approved repair or replacement of the offending kit.

The arrangement is demonstrably full of "Oh, I thought you'd take care of that" nonsense that allows for keeping in service, equipment that has demonstrably fallen short of safety minima.

You think loss of indicated airspeed is not an emergency? The only pilot who may be surprised with a life and death issue must be in test only. UAS got to be "acceptable risk", I think it has been shown that the state of affairs shows it not to be acceptable at all. Not knowing if a STALL WARN is correct? Not knowing that re select of autopilot might initiate a wild climb? These data WERE KNOWN and the pitots sat on the Bench.

You are satisfied that Airbus is free of responsibility once AF has the SB? Two things of utmost importance are absent from that opinion.

Initiative, and Follow-up.

Regulator, Airbus, Air France:

This unholy triumvirate has killed 228 people.

So now the Overspeed Protection is the latest wiggle on the worm? The lack of forthright clarity in understanding of systems by the pilots here on thread is disturbing. Someone, somewhere must know what's up.

Do they?


ps. Be careful about constantly returning to the "ill-trained" crew meme.

We do NOT know that, and pending the accuracy and content of further data, it is a thin branch on which to stand. Saying otherwise begs the lie for BEA "Not impugning the crew" with cherry picked releases. imho.

best regards

Lyman, I said I wasn't going to get into this with you any more.

No, that's quoting me selectively - I said Airbus cannot be held responsible for the somewhat lackadaisical approach to replacing the pitot tubes that AF took. Airbus are still on the hook for the pitot tube problems in the first place.

It was an unfortunate situation, but there was no cover-up here, no "unholy triumvirate". This was a problem that had a procedural solution while the mechanical solution was being applied - just like the long-dormant software bug in the 747-400's control logic that the BA crew recently discovered, a fix was designed and was in the process of being rolled out without having to ground the fleet. This is not unusual, it's just how aviation works.

Anyway, enough.

When a critical repair is delegated to others, no matter the provenance, two things:

Responsibility cannot be shrugged off, and a follow on is required for many reasons. It is not so simple as you say. Suffice to say Airbus was obviously satisfied with the protocol for replacement, and they should have been more careful.

Having identified the problem, it is not possible for Airbus to absolve responsibility for its mitigation, as we will see.

Thanks for your time and patience.

Hi,

DW
Ciel orageux sur l

Google Traduction

It's unfortunate that BEA took also in accounts real politik and by doing so become a not credible or independent investigation office

No.
The compliance time for an AD has not to be immediate.

If Airbus had said that, it would have been an AD.

@jcj - The BEA is a different institution than it was in 1979. The world learned the hard way what happens when accident investigation and repair procedures are stymied for political reasons. They were so afraid of being seen as biased following AF296 that they invited the NTSB along as impartial observers following the Air Inter crash, and to my knowledge the NTSB had nothing bad to say about thir methods. I'd like to know the source of the "large" vs. "small" argument in 2000 regarding Concorde, and I'd also like to know more details about what that means. To me, a "large" hole would imply a significant enough size to reduce lift, which never happened due to a tyre burst.

@CONF

A Service Bulletin also says "fix this" - the difference between that and an AD is that the aircraft should not be considered airworthy without the repair being done promptly (and supervised by the regulatory authority) in the case of the latter, which was not the case based on the evidence prior to AF447.

(PS. My question here : http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post6661648 remains unanswered - did you see it, and would you like to give it a go?)

Airbus covered as many bases as possible by releasing the Service Bulletin and advice to pilots for procedures to follow in the case of a UAS incident. These procedures were not followed in the case of AF447, whether due to human factors, poor training or a combination of the two. Whatever the outcome of the debate over the stall warning logic at low speed, the fact is that the aircraft would not have stalled in the first place had proper airmanship been applied, and no matter how many some may wish for evidence supporting the automatics being behind the initial zoom climb, that evidence does not exist. Instead there's plenty of evidence supporting manual input causing the zoom climb, followed by a failure to diagnose stall and an attempt to "power out" of the upset, and unless you're prepared to provide evidence that the BEA have somehow falsified the flight recorder traces, then that is the most likely conclusion.

The BEA are not content to "blame the pilots" and leave it at that, however and the presence of an in-depth human factors investigation proves that - so to say that they are protecting the regulator, manufacturer or airline is nothing short of a big, fat lie. As I said earlier, the A330 is a success and the project has broken even - what is there to "protect"?

Hi,

Nothing to do with lift .. but with flow
The Concorde problem was hole (s) in the fuel tank !
And this happened to Concorde (Washington event) long time before the Gonesse accident.

The BEA is exactly the same institution today than in 1979
Same duties .. same hierarchy ...
Or tell me what is changed .... ?

"A Big Fat Lie". If anyone has charged BEA with falsification, where is it? To my knowledge they have merely created a climate of doubt, absent the full disclosure of recorded data.

There is no evidence that the autos helped STALL the a/c, neither is there exculpatory evidence. None of either kind have been disclosed.

Since there have been well documented instances of a/c behaviour that did create dangerous flights, it would seem in the best interests of all to see, read, and hear the (complete) CVR/FDR.

Until then, the argument isn't worth the blood flow.

Except to say. Read the BEA report re: THS 'movement' at the start of the climb post handoff. Several times if necessary. Very odd, and very erm, "well-devised".

Hi,

May I ask some Airbus- related questions out of general interest?

1. Do Airbus flight controls use artificial feel units?

2. If they do, how would it behave in a scenario with unusual airspeed readings, like AF 447 had? Because an AFU needs airspeed input right?

3. Is this of any significance?

Thanks

@DA-20 monkey:

Nope - Airbus sidestick feel is implemented via passive springing. It takes more effort to deflect the further you move it from the centre, but there's no force-feedback as such.

No Dozy.
Service Bulletin = You may fix this
Airworthiness Directive = Fix this (but that does not necessarily require immediate compliance prior next flight - You might as well have a full year compliance time)

No justification to state anything like this :
"An AD would have resulted in the grounding of all A330 and A340s"

Airworthiness Directive. The owner is ordered to make the repair, with a schedule supplied by the Regulating Authority. Unlikely that the pitot r/r would have involved a RTB anyway. Clearly, the Regulator was good with the "at your leisure" pace set by Airbus. No one entity can be singled out for this egregious lapse in safety concerns. To me, all three are equally culpable.

After BA038 went in, UAL discovered a non compliance issue with the fire Bottle #5 Inspection Record in their 777 fleet. They recalled all a/c back to station for an inspection, immediately. It was deferrable, but the line chose to exercise caution.

This foot dragging by AF with the pitots is classic backscratching. It is similar to the "negotiated" relaxation of the TRENT inspections on the Qantas 380 that led to an engine explosion.

It is a cordial, "adversarial" and a negotiated diminution of safety.

@CONF

I was referring back to "The DC-10 Case", where it states that an AD to replace the cargo doors would have resulted in the grounding of all DC-10s until the repair had been carried out. Perhaps the rules have changed since then, but that was my source material.

Like dozy already answered modern airbus don't have artificial feel, A300/310 had.

IMHO this accident wolud NOT have happened with artificial feel.

Finally got around to reading this - despite the occasional endearing translation error it's good stuff and surprisingly makes the AoA situation (which I must confess confused me when described in raw numbers) understandable to a maths/physics dolt like me.

On another note though, it does rather put a spoke in the wheel of those who are saying Airbus/BAE/DGAC are trying to sweep the issue of AF447 under the rug by blaming the pilots, because in the article Airbus come out and directly state that the previous procedures (which they helped develop) were inadequate and in some cases could make a developed stall worse - in short, they're admitting - in print - that they, along with the rest of the industry, screwed up to some degree.

This seems a rather difficult 'take away'.

If the control column does not provide the
needed response, stabilizer trim may be necessary.
However, excessive use of trim can aggravate the
condition, or may result in loss of control or in high
structural loads.

How do you deetrmine the limit before it becomes 'excessive' ? Couldn't an easier rule of thumb be devised ? A simple instruction to check trim seems a more natural starting point.

What control column?

You're quoting from the "generic" recommendations, i.e not Airbus specific (the clue being the word "control column" as opposed to yoke or sidestick). I suspect the FCOM information per type will be more specific about how the trim should be used in that situation.

On 22 Sep/page 49 mm43 kindly posted the link to the Airbus Safety First magazine, with a follow-up link on page 50 by DozyWannabe. Thanks to both.

My reading of it has stalled (geddit?) at Issue 11, page 9, at the oh so simplistic stall condition & effects diagrams. They have been, of course, put together by Airbus, who IIRC only make one high-engined aircraft, the rest of their engines being underslung.

All well and good, but as happened on my initial 320 endorsement, people new to type will have come from low, on-longitudinal-centreline and high mounted engines, all of which require different stall recovery techniques, the range of which which these diagrams don't address.

At item 10, page 9, it is states that "

This generic procedure will be published as an annex to the FAA AC 120.
This new procedure has been established in the following spirit:
)- One single procedure to cover ALL stall conditions
)- Get rid of TOGA as first action
)- Focus on AoA reduction.

Bearing in mind that there will be strong recruitment pressures on airlines, and a probable need to accept less experienced aircrew, to cement the first item of this 'generic procedure' in legislation strikes me as a form of engineering conceit bordering on hubris, and will certainly bring with it deep industry-wide problems in the future.

Personally, I would require all trainees have to be exposed to the Victa 100 (not the higher powered versions, which were heavier on the controls) and be able to demonstate a continuous series of three loops without inducing stall buffet at *any point of the loop. It can & will 'bite' at *any speed and/or g-load if mishandled, and breeds a deep knowledge of airfoil behaviour that sticks with you. Cheap insurance. Oh yes, it also develops a fine 'touch', a la Gums early observations.

That isn't quite correct, the Airbus magazine report is just one publication of the outputs from the FAA Stall Recovery Training Working Group. That included at least Airbus, Boeing, ATR, Embraer and probably some others too.

Some non-Airbus reference:

Flight Path Management (Expanded Version) | Flight Safety Foundation
Stop Stalling | Flight Safety Foundation
http://flightsafety.org/asw/apr11/asw_apr11_p46-49.pdf

Yes, the simplistic diagrams don't inspire confidence, given the intended audience, however what is more scary is the conclusion (supported by various documents including from FAA) that the industry has been effectively teaching pilots to power out of a stall rather than put the nose down and start flying again.

This isn't an Airbus problem, and Airbus can only be part of the solution - though at least it looks like something is finally happening across the industry to fix this.

IF789: if I may play devil's advocate for a moment.

Even when one is trying to "power out of a stall," one still has to control pitch to prevent restall. Pitch + Power = Performance still applies. Low to the ground, seems to me that there is a risk of negative training taking place if use of power and pitch to unstall isn't well taught.

How the recovery, or return to flight away from stall when one gets a stall warning, is taught is as important as what it taught.

It was through Colgan/Buffalo that the more recent concerns re: training to STALL were made evident. Procedure (for an approach/STALL) was to advance throttles, and prevent altitude loss. This was trained as "maintaining back pressure", not increasing it. A loss of greater than 100 feet altitude was considered disqualifying.

And this was accepted training at low level.

Has the common perception of 447's crew STALL procedures been equated with "not losing altitude"? Has it morphed into "full back stick", with the STALL WARN activated for 54 seconds? One believes so, and what an outrageous position to 'push', absent full disclosure of all data.

At the last, when Captain suggests a Pull, ('Tire', in the French), pilot flying says, essentially, "I have been pulling back a long time already".
Without further elaboration by the investigators, this translates as an incorrect reaction to STALL. It most assuredly was not, since no recognition of STALL is demonstrated.

I suggest that leaving it at that, (as a non-response to the airframe's attitude) is grossly misleading, and infers a knowledge of the situation that either is non-existent, or, more likely, not released.

Here we bump into the most telling failure of the current "Investigatory" paradigm. With knowledge of problems in accepted procedures seemingly available, but 'hidden', they are not addressed, and the professional community is at a loss to make progress.

For fear of embarrassing an airline? An Airframer? This is unacceptable.

A profoundly important opportunity to increase knowledge and improve safety exists in the full and complete disclosure of 447's data. BEA are sitting on it. BEA make flying less than safe. It is my charge.

No, call it an accusation.

It doesn't matter what the response was, the fact is that they *were* stalled, and as part of the investigation (bolstered by the ColganAir accident), they discovered that approach to stall procedures and training were inadequate for dealing with a real stall.

Will the Asseline fanclub please explain to me why they are not also demanding the same release of raw data from NTSB and AAIB investigations as a matter of course?

@LW_50 - we've been through this many times before, so I'll keep it brief, but if the PF either did not hear or did not properly comprehend the PNF's callout of "Alternate Law" at the start of the sequence, he may have been subconsciously relying on the Normal Law protections to keep his AoA out of the danger zone.

Indeed, I believe PF was in "Normal Law", figuratively, if not actually. In fact, It seems consistent with the rest of his flying, this 'reliance' on the a/c's Laws. I keep in mind that turbulence alone could have augmented his "shaky" stickwork; no one here has the chops to say this "mayonnaise" was indicative of poor flying. Bear in mind that Overspeed was his working hypothesis, and we know that can work in NL. So can the autopilot dropout in Normal Law, and remain so...... If he had Overspeed on his mind, and Normal Law as his mien, that would explain alot.

Someone has not considered how much the remaining data can add to the discussion about which he has made some remarkable conclusions. And this particular one not a pilot, as it were.

Dozy, the poor attempt at humor comes across as mere snark, and is beneath you.

"It doesn't matter what the response was...." That may be the single most salient remark in these 6 threads, all respect.

Dreamliner drill...
 

Try Before You Fly: How Dreamliner Pilots Train Without Lifting Off | Autopia | Wired.com

"Anyone who's flown a Boeing 777 can get up to speed with the 787 in as few as five days as the two airplanes share a type rating for pilots. A pilot with no experience in a Boeing airplane will need as long as 22 days to receive a type rating and master the 787."

Just wondering about the relationship between sim training and that "human factors" problem...

Disclaimer: I´m not even remotely trying to put this in AB vs Boeing perspective.

I think it is possible to get to sophisticated about the 'human factors' problem. It is all very well talking about isolated detail (sidestick v yoke, angle of attack meter display), but I think the real underlying issue is the pyschological response which seems to have determined that something inexplicable was happening. In a straightforward, known, simple, deterministic system which you know doesn't embody millions of man hours of design, coding and testing, there are relatively few parameters and few possible control responses. The mental approach to problem solving in such a regime is happily constrained. In a system which you know (all that training, all those sub-modes, all those interactions and dependenciess to remember) to be complex, starting to understand the problem is polluted by the possibility that the complex intervening layer is behaving in a way which you either don't understand, or which has bust and gone outside its normal limits.

It doesn't require the complex system to in fact break, or for you to forget your training, to introduce the possibility that a stressed human mind trying to start to appreciate an unanticipated possibility never achieves sufficient confident to diagnose and then act. The awareness of a complex intervening layer is in itself sufficient to frustrate intelligent problem solving, at least in a timely way.

A 'big red button' which forced direct law, with direct law behaviour a set of memory items, would seem a reasonable last resort to offer a bemused crew.

Not forgetting appropriate display of unusual trim conditions and cancellation of any warning cancellations, naturally.