Brief off topic:

Way in the past, on a day we were flying the local DC-9, they gave us a recorder box with a microphone on a long cord attached.

The purpose was to sample cockpit noise levels.

On taxi out the guy in the right seat gave me a sly grin, opened his sliding window and hung the microphone outside.

When we got to the runway we got one of those "no delay please, keep it rolling, traffic 2 mile final" clearances to go. He quickly closed his window and off we went.

The banging noise on the right side of the fuselage prompted an "Oh $%#" from him and some momentary concern for the right engine, but it stopped after the flaps were up. Engine fine.

We figured the mic was gone, and we had a whole flight to come up with a story. However after we landed, he opened his window and reeled the still attached mic back in.

The folks who analyzed the recording were somehow unable to see the humorous aspect of this.

Be careful what you hang out. :)

(The F-4 had a yaw string for a time but it only served to scare you at high AOA so it was removed.)

Back to JC's hamsterwheel.

OK, funny story

mayby I better mean a "side window pitch string" and not a yaw-string

Perhaps it's worth bearing in mind that when computers crash it is human beings who reset, repair and reboot them.

I think what's happened is that, as the geek squad (sorry guys and gals) began to be the ones setting up airplanes, the old guard/pilot crowd had to defer to them regarding training requirements.... The geek squad then inundated them with a whole bunch of "if then else" and logic flow style training, and the piloting was forgotten.

This tragic accident has likely(hopefully!) served as a catalyst to correct that.

Grity,

I liked your picture (happy memories), but just to be precise, as noted by gums ... "AoA string" would be more appropriate.

Exactly! Thank you for sparring me the effort of explaining.

In context of AF447, only significant upset was pilot induced. That what you call "rote" are memory items for unreliable airspeed procedure. It is not upset but can turn out to be, if handled inappropriately.

I am sorry sir, but ambiguity of "STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL" aural warning is lost upon me but it is for BEA HF group to discover why crew went selectively deaf on stall warning. Granted, stickshaker and big red flashing "STALL" in the middle of PFD or as separate light somewhere on glareshield might have helped a bit but questions remain: why did the RH pilot pulled the aeroplane in the stall in the first place? Why didn't the LH pilots survival instinct kick in?

There are no control laws affecting the A330 rudder. It is mechanically controlled, with electrical: trim, yaw damping and turn coordination. Rudder is totally conventional (in the context of heavy jet) and can not be blamed for A330 resistance to spin.

No kidding... you might as well name me, sir.

You might find interesting that in my regular airline life, I have absolutely no need to look down to see any of those aforementioned parameters. They are all nicely and neatly presented in front of me on Flight Dynamics (TM) Head-up Guidance System. Inertial deceleration. Air data derived deceleration. GPS groundspeed. Inertial flightpath vector. Runway remaining in low visibility roll-out mode.

I find all of those a bit more reliable and precise than my own nether regions, sir.

However, during my A320 days, we had no HGS and crew coordination during tricky landings was even more important than nowadays, when it's bloomingly high. It was expected that PF would keep an eye on the world outside, trying to keep the aeroplane on the centerline so PNF would keep head down and monitor spoiler deployment, reverser operation and deceleration. We believed that one's sense of deceleration is not to be trusted, especially when one is struggling to maintain the control so we task shared. I don't think we were wrong.

Body rates
 

No problem, Clandestino.

I have been having a problem expressing myself lately.

Still want folks to know that the human "body rates" can help for the first second when something unusual happens. Also, you cannot depend upon gauges when you have to make very quick control inputs flying a few feet on the wing of your leader. Besides, you can't do much except take an occasional glance at the HUD or ADI to let you know you have not been in a sustained bank or whatever.

The HUD's I flew quit showing the aircraft vector once weight-on-wheels switch was activated. I agree that the speed indication is very important once you know/feel that you are slowing down. But I never needed to look at the speed "thermometer" in the first second I tapped the brakes on an icy runway. Most of my early birds did not have an "inertial" groundspeed indication, and the pneumatic pitot reading went to zero around 40 knots.

Same observation as far as skid is concerned. I'll take my butt for the first half a second, then depend upon my eyeballs to keep tracking down the centerline. And BTW, when I landed the Viper with that leading edge flap up, the flight path marker was almost useless ( I musta had 15 degrees of yaw), so I flew the ILS gauges even tho I broke outta the overcast about 1200 or so feet AGL. I simply tracked my butt down the centerline until "impact", heh heh. Next guy to try it almost pranged, as I had not yet briefed all the pilots on the 'technique". Additionally, the preferred technique ( actually "mandatory") was to land in a crab when crosswinds were high. The aileron-rudder interconnect cut out with weight-on-wheels, so trying to land "wing low" in a slip resulted in a huge yaw moment upon touchdown. Not good, to say the least, and another instructor tried it one day when messing around.

My view of the 'bus rudder is not that the FBW system has a "spin resistance" feature as we had in the Viper once our AoA was above 30 degrees. Seems to me that the basic yaw damper function and a great directional stability that is inherent in the jet's design did the trick. i would also postulate that spoilers could have compensated for adverse yaw once the crew got into uncharted territory.

I agree that the true "upset" was not loss of the pitot system or A/P disconnect. We are in the same "zone" in that regard.

The stall warning that seems to be audible in the cockpit of AF447 still puzzles me. I am not sure if the crew ignored it due to the unreliable airspeed or what. A mystery to me as well as many here.

Finally, I am overjoyed that commercial jets are finally getting good HUD's. The Shuttle didn't get one until just before Challenger, or even about the same time. My 'nam roomie was the lead astronaut for the Shuttle's HUD, and had to overcome some resistance from Crippen, Young and others of the "old guard". I was a techno-geek, and used the HUD more than most in the old days. The "inertial" vertical velocity" was especially handy, and later HUD's had inertial ground speed. Still had an easy cross-check with the steam gauges, plus the AoA indexers on each side of the HUD ( ask 'bird and RF4 and others that flew Navy jets).

Mieklour pointed out that if you get ALt 2 latched at cruise, you fly the rest of the flight in Alt 2 and you land in Alt 2. What that means, I think, is that you don't get A/P back, but I may not be reading the block diagrams correctly.

LW_50 :

According to the documents I've got, inhibition of A/P is not necessarily the case as a result of Alternate Law latching, in fact the only control law where the manuals specifically state A/P is unavailable is Direct. However, the A/P disconnect in this case was due to ADR disagree. If I recall correctly, it was possible in some cases to re-engage A/P once stability was restored, but according to the Flight article below, EASA are mandating a change to inhibit A/P for as long as ADR disagree is active. They don't say if this behaviour should be latched.

A330/340 change to inhibit autopilot if airspeed unreliable

It's curious in a way, because it appears the AF447 crew did not try to re-engage A/P, but maybe as part of the simulator testing they've discovered anomalous behaviour if you try.

Human cognitive limitations
 

Clandestino posted:
A little exercise for those that are interested.
Go back a page or two and read one of the more technical posts - say by Owain, while doing that try to recite a well known child's rhyme to yourself at the same time have someone read a paragraph of different text for you to to write down. You will find that you cannot do all of these - in fact if you concentrate on the reading YOU WILL NOT EVEN HEAR the person talking to you.

This is not selective deafness - it is because the human brain has a limited number of cognitive channels and they can only handle ONE input at a time. So aural verbal, visual verbal and speaking verbal activities all use the same single verbal cognitive channel. (see the work of Christopher Wickens).

Some people can if trained and practiced rapidly switch between various verbal inputs and outputs - but if something important happens on one input they WILL NOT HEAR the others.

Think about how many times when you are driving and there are complex lane changes and road signs... that you may have had to ask a passenger to repeat themselves.

The reason that 'steam gauges with needles' seem to be easier to read is that they are a spatial cognitive load and form patterns that can be recognized without much cognitive effort. All the glass cockpit tapes with numbers and the ECAM require visual verbal analysis; and no-one can read one thing and fully understand it while saying something else and listening and comprehending something else again. The human brain cannot do it so will just 'drop' any input that is the overload - it is perfectly possible that the pilots literally did not hear the stall warning as their verbal processing cognitive channel was already overloaded. A stick shaker or other haptic input, like someone tapping you on the shoulder when you are busy, can have an immediate attention getting effect that a voice alarm or flashing words may not.

One of the aspects I expect the BEA Human Factors investigators to look at is the cognitive workload that the ECAM and failure messages put on the pilots. Especially the aspect of overloading particular cognitive channels. Perhaps every potential emergency scenario should be subject to what is called a 'cognitive walk-through' that actually assesses the cognitive loads and identifies likely overloads.

Older pilots may well have followed a rather older but repeatedly successful dictum - disregarding all the cacophony - aviate (i.e. pitch and power), navigate, then communicate.

It mightn't pass the sim check ride - but it may have had a better outcome in the real world.

Ian W, interesting post. I read somewhere that Vietnam war pilots could get saturated with aural inputs and sometimes failed to hear an important tone or alarm such as incoming missile...

Hi Ian,

I think you're definitely on to something with your second and third sentences there, but I'd like to see what you think about an alternative theory/explanation that I posted on the R&N thread. The particular links are below.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665388 (1)

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665478 (2)

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6665527 (3)

The meat of the theory is in the third one, but the first two provide background notes as I was working through it. The first in particular lists data points in the interim report that I hadn't put together before.

In a nutshell, I'm not convinced that the ECAM messages provided that much of a distraction, except initially - the PNF calls out the most important ones at any rate. Disregard the PF for now, and focus on the PNF - he's clearly getting jumpy as soon as the PF takes manual control, but because of the informal handover, he doesn't know his boundaries of authority, so he summons the Captain to clarify. The stall warning goes off shortly afterwards and after approx. 50 seconds of letting the PF handle the aircraft, the PNF has had enough and takes control. The inputs he makes are correct, but not enough - a couple of seconds later the PF takes control back unannounced (i.e the PNF still thinks he has control) and starts pulling the nose up again. A second or two after that, the stall warning stops, with both the PNF and the PF thinking they have control. The PNF's inputs were correct (lower the nose, stabilise roll), but again - not enough. Did he think he had resolved the problem with the end of stall warning? Complicating matters even further is the arrival of the Captain - 2 seconds before the SW stops, when the PNF presumably turns round to talk to him, and as such he loses all focus on the flight controls and the PF is still pulling back.

I'm not sure if human/machine cognitive overload is the problem here so much as the level of pressure and stress on the PNF. For all my opinion's worth as a layman with an interest, could it be the human/human interface that is causing the issue?

Iain W
There are many examples of 'operatives' of machinery with 'steam gauges' ignoring them with disastrous consequences. The idea that a spatial cognitive load would work better than a visual verbal stimulus is not actually correct. We possess the ability to filter these out as well. The same goes for a stick shaker which given how the PF reacted might have been just as useless as all the other warnings. Recognising the actuality and responding appropriately is the key to dealing with a situation. This involves knowing your machine and good training. The latter aspect is vital in overcoming the psychological shock (and shock is the operative factor here) of a sudden unexpected event. A chain of command could have helped here and more decisive action by the PNF. DozyWannabee raises an important point about human/human interface. Once again we have to ask is AF's flight deck management procedure inadequate?

Dozy...

RE:

Quote:

---

I'm not sure if human/machine cognitive overload is the problem here so much as the level of pressure and stress on the PNF. For all my opinion's worth as a layman with an interest, could it be the human/human interface that is causing the issue?

---

IanW's comments and yours are not mutually exclusive. Both factors were at play here and I believe, in terms of "cause", the final report will reflect and expand upon the points expressed in IanW's excellent post, as well as your insightful observations re the PNF /PF interactions. (Just because you're a "layman" in terms of piloting, doesn't mean you have this wrong.)

HN, AoA- or side- or pitch-string a correct name is not vitalli for a 20" wool-fathom

how exact will it work outside the side window of an A330??

between 2 and 3 deg is my expectation,

so mayby it is not exact enough to deside if AoA is 4 or 5 deg, but il will react very fast every time and for sure even with slow speed (<<60kn) and you can absolute shure distinguish between highspeed and stall,

it is so easy to check out, I hope that we find a jet-captain for a honest try

wool tuft standby AofA
 

Probably pretty hard to see in the dark from inside??

Hi DozzyWannabe & IanW,

I agree with both your posts and believe it points to another couple of holes in the cheese lining up.

The auditory overload of ALT Alert, ECAM Dings, "Read ECAM" etc. possibly led to the mental exclusion of "Stall Stall". They simply didn't hear it. In a previous post (512), I mentioned another crew who didn't hear "Dual Input" for over 90 seconds.

Both pilots are provided with the FD/AP modes on their PFDs so they can monitor what the AP/FD is attempting to do - yet when manual flying without the FD, PNF has absolutely no idea what input PF is making (due Side Stick design) or what he is aiming for. PNF probably did not realise how much over controlling input was being made by PF.

Chu Chu and others - this is an interesting
This is where pilots may become obsolete. Computers doing it right can recover from singularly amazing upsets. Sure, this is a model. And with enough power you can fly a lawnmower and control it. This one is a DARPA project. So I suspect the cheats have been turned off. Only the Collins adaptive technology remains to save the plane.

Sufficient data existed on AF447. The meatware failed. It failed partly because data needed was not present in the cockpit in a form the pilots appreciated. It failed partly because the pilots were not trained to fly the plane in unusual configuration where dial-a-flight didn't work and most of the "protections" had vanished. Nor were they encouraged to practice flying the plane. Finally the software design did not permit or make feasible flying in a simulated ALT2 environment for practice.

If the airlines are not going to train pilots and provide pilots with all the equipment that might be needed when going gets tough and instruments are all you have, I for one would not want to fly the plane under those circumstances even given the otherwise sterling flight safety records they have.

ChristiaanJ, know in context was "has the data present for use". The data certainly was present on the plane. It equally certainly was not adequately presented to the crew.

Dozy, in light of Ian's fine presentation, a repeat performance indicating that the noise here obscured his message the first time, perhaps icons would be better than words. I suspect an image of a plane hanging by its nose to indicate stall might get some attention.

Only a small fraction kidding.

JD-EE
I am not sure what you are driving at - nothing connected with the plane failed after the initial pitot tube problems. The pilots were inadequately trained, their CRM was poor, they made no attempt to follow SOPs - the PF seems to have been suffering from acute stress reaction (shock). Nothing in fact to do with the machine but everything to do with the people and the airline.

The airplane was perfectly flyable and should have been flyable on instruments alone. Too many people are grasping at straws and thinking that somehow the machine or the warnings had a big impact on the accident. It didn't, the PF was the one who made the NU inputs and it wasn't because of cognitive overload and not hearing the stall warnings - there were three pilots. The PF panicked and went into shock pulling back on the stick. That's all there is to it. Air France training and cockpit procedures didn't give the PNF the authority or confidence to override the PF. By the time sufficient authority arrived (the Captain) it was too late.

The maxim that all pilots should follow - know your machine and these guys didn't. This is not the responsibility of the machine. It is the responsibility of the pilots and the airline.

I'm interested in that one, would you have a report ?

They knew exactly where the wing was going to break and all the probes of any kind would be undamaged.
Have not we seen already a F15 losing big part of the wing and a pilot bring it back for a safe landing too ?

Captain my great Captain, you may as well forget about any mechanical link for the AF447's rudder.

Agreed - I intended the cross post to suggest an "as well as" rather than "instead of", though I remain to be convinced that the PNF had much trouble understanding what the aircraft was telling him. The PF... not so much.

Old Carthusian - I don't know if it was "panic" causing the PF to make the inputs he did, but his actions certainly suggest him developing a degree of tunnel vision from the start of the sequence. We can't know if he heard the PF call out "Alternate Law", he certainly didn't interpret "Controls on the left" as the PNF saying "I have control".

Just an idle thought - how could you implement a stick-shaker on an Airbus-type side-stick?

That doesn't seem that easy, compared to a conventional yoke, at least.

Clearly the vibrational aspect of the 'shaker' is significantly important, since the aural aspects appear to be relatively easily dismissed. However, unlike a yoke, there is no significant mechanical structure to attach the shaker drive to.

If the SS were back-driven then it would be comparatively easy to implement I suppose... but it isn't.

The discussion seems to be oscillating between flight systems and instrumentation
.. and human factors.

On the latter, both Ian and Dozy make good points...and no, they're not mutually exclusive so a good contribution

Could I remind everyone, that if I remember correctly, PF had recently arrived in the cockpit from a rest period.
Do we know what this rest period consisted of?
I am suggesting that cockpit crew recently back from rest (sleep even) are not the ideal choice for immediate command, when another is up to date with the flight.
Perhaps it is rather naive or let's say simplistic thinking that freshly rested pilot is the more alert and certainly not up to speed as much as an exisiting crew member.

I think we all know that some people wake up and brighten up quickly, othjers take a lot longer - that is, those that can 'cat nap' and revive almost instantly well and those that can't.
Being one of the latter, I can imagine the lack of considered thought and action when confronted with a sudden shock - especially if not anticipating the responsibility of being placed in charge of the flight.

== Yaw strings and pitch strings at night ===

No problem, miniature lightweight LED ribbons/tapes are now being used in many applications, the batteries being small enough to be encompassed within the string I should think... go on, give it a go ;)

HarryMann.... It was the PNF who'd recently returned from rest. PF had been in his seat since departure.

Sorry, that was the PNF - we discussed it on the R&N thread, and he seems to have been fairly alert, to judge by the CVR. The PF had been in the right-hand seat since pushback. There was a suggestion that the PF had actually been on holiday in Brazil with his wife, so your suggestion could have merit in another way - should someone who has had several days off be put in a "relief pilot" role over the guy who flew the outbound leg?

Of course if neither of them had had manual handling training, that question could be academic, but I'm struck by the difference in handling approach by the two F/Os. The PNF appears to be doing as one would expect, gingerly handling the controls until the aircraft starts pointing the way he wants it to go, whereas the PF seems to be handling them with a frankly astonishing coarseness from the outset.

If you can't beat them . . .
 

The gist of many posts has been that 'modern' airline pilots aren't like they used to be, skill levels and understanding of the aircraft are lower because transport aircraft fly themselves, FBW, etc etc. Given that it seems to me unlikely that things will ever revert to the 'old days' in terms of longer training and acquired experience before new pilots reach the flight deck, maybe a different approach is needed, reflecting the "computer games" world that a lot of younger people (and some oldies!) live in today.

It has occurred to me, and apologies if this has already been suggested, that maybe a display could be made available on the PFD of a 3D model of the aircraft, as seen from the outside showing its attitude and direction of flight through the air relative to the ground. In fact something pretty similar to one of the views available in MS Flt Sim. The model, viewed either from behind or side, would be driven by the normal sensors and would replicate the actual aircraft, thus providing an easy and quick-to-assimilate visual understanding of the aircraft's behaviour. Thus, unusual attitudes in IMC or at night could be more readily recognised and countered.

On a different subject, it has been said that the flight condition AF447 was in during the final few minutes was far outside the certified flight envelope, and would never have been part of any test programme. Also the modern flight simulator does not or can not provide accurate simulations of this behaviour. But now we have actual data, traces, etc from the FDR of what happened during an A330 developed stall, could not this data be used or extrapolated by the simulator manufacturers to give more realistic aircraft pre and post stall training?

Holiday in Brazil
 

Dozy, it was posted earlier but no-one picked up on it: is it not strange that the latest BEA report makes no mention of the crew's rest status? I'm not suggesting they got up to exhausting fun and games in Rio, just asking were they properly rested in accordance with the rules?

I think the poor PF deserves to be remembered as one who underperformed on the night, for whatever reason, compared with his usual self.

Hi,

Not a big problem .. and anyways already old process
More up to date will be a holographic representation .. even with vectors .. and a nice woman voice describing all the necessary actions to be performed for recover from a stall .. a spin .. etc .:cool:
Some emergency sequences can even be programed .. so it's just to activate .. and read the newspaper .. waiting end of process
Of course .. no more joystick .. buttons .. etc .. .. but instead .. some nice touch screens
All is possible today .. :)
But ... is this very useful for pilots ?

I saw what you did there. ;)
I think Dozy had a better answer than I do, at post 564.
Ian: post #565. Well said. :)
Old Cathrusian, good points in response.
Comment: You addressed scan breakdown, Ian addressed "data channels" in the human brain. These are both matters of interest in the human engineering side of this equation.
Likewise, Old Carthusian, the following: The balance between self initiated systems knowledge growth, and training in its application to the mission seems to be a sticking point.
Dozy:
Did you get this impression from reviewing the traces?

braidet wire fibre optic or persistend material can work also, but first please the simple 2ct test with wool and daylight!

Yes. The CDB (Captain's) sidestick trace is deflected in the pitch axis no more than halfway nose down (which would be appropriate to regaining level flight or stall recovery) during the "confusing" period I refer to. The F/O's trace tells a very different story, averaging halfway back or more with a single sustained application of full back stick. The same is apparent in the lateral SS traces, stop-to-stop in the case of the F/O stick.

Thanks! Nice to agree on something... :)

I wouldn't be surprised if the PNF did, given his apparent mounting alarm until he calls "Controls on the left". The PF appears to be a definite candidate for tunnel-vision, however.

Again, a lot of people who don't like the sidestick design are making that assumption, but if that is the case then why do we have the references to going up when they should be going down and to touch the lateral controls as gently as possible by the PNF?

Barking, Tree, Wrong, Up
 

Hey GY.

Saying my goodbyes, and wanted to wish you the best. I think you knew my purpose was to get some passion flowing in an otherwise "watching Paint Dry" venue.

Anyways, for my money, the vibrating Stick is a non starter, except maybe for the girls.

The way to a Pilot's attention is through his spatial awareness. SHAKE the AIRFRAME.........

Buffet underperformed here, and why not shake the part of the airframe that the pilot has directly in tune?

His ASS. SEAT SHAKER. There's your "tactile".........Make it annoying, and DON"T turn it OFF until he gets it flying propers.

Hope we meet up some day.

Bear perhaps, with such a device, those whose erotic proclivities are via excitation in certain areas might too frequently fly to the edge of buffet because it feels interesting ... :} (Confession: This is me recycling an old joke about the attachments we assumed the ladies flying MiGs for the Soviet Air Force in the 80's had attached to their g-suits as add-ons to the leg bladders ... punch line being "and they always seem to come back from training sessions with an over G indication on the g-meter!" ) :}

All kidding aside, a seat shaker might be something to explore as a feature for SW physical sensation in SS equipped aircraft. (Perhaps AB looked into it and the test pilots gave it a thumbs down?)

I recall a couple of decades ago some USAF flight simulators we visited as we worked to upgrade a Navy helicopter motion simulators. Some used seat vibration to induce the feeling of being in flight.

This is fairly old tech. Put another way, the tech is there, but as with most tech, the fine points of application is the real tricky part.

Lyman: Adios then...
 

Well, if you're really off, then happy skies to you, and yes, poking the 'bear' (no pun intended) is often a good way of getting the creative juices flowing. I'm no fan of paint drying, grass growing or any other similar waste of time.

I would be honored to shoot the breeze with you any time.

I like the idea though - I have worked simulators with seat-shakers in the (recent) past, so that technology is readily available. Given a benign airframe, tepid into and past the stall, the idea of artificially giving the pilot buffet, that won't go away until out of the stall is a pretty good solution.

Duh! :O Thanks, I should have double-checked, going back a long time now.

At least some other suggestions about fitness for control have come out of it :D

Something was up with the PF for sure, and I agree the distinction in handling the stick seems starkly contrasted.

All these human factors are open for speculation, such as whether PNF's confidence and subsequent assertiveness was knocked a little by PF being given 'Command' ?

But it is speculation that we can never prove, in 4 minutes of extremely sparse exchanges... Not being a native French speaker I personally find the 'go up'; 'go down' comments somewhat strange for pilots*... in English it would almost certainly be 'slow down' or 'faster', or get the 'Nose down' or up. Strange as there is not an up and down control in an aircraft, that is a secondary and dependent motion, not to be taken for granted - hence another subtle sign that there was little comprehension of a stalled (and unresponding state).

*Has it been shown that the true meaning was '...(we go up) Indicative as opposed to Imperative (or even Subjunctive)

Its the channel that's important
 

From Old Carthusian
I should have made it plainer in my wording.
When the verbal cognitive channels are overloaded you can add more to them and all you do is make the effect worse. However, the analogue gauges do not require any verbal cognitive analysis so that channel is unloaded. So you can see a VSI needle move hard down and understand what it means even if the verbal cognitive channel is in overload - numbers changing though won't work as that requires a level of verbal analysis.

And I agree that does not mean that analogue gauges are always right - I lost a friend due to a misread of an old 3 needle analogue altimeter.

The French version uses words such as 'monte' (climb) and 'descend' (descend). I suggest that the BEA were under time constraints and the translation wasn't peer reviewed by AAIB / NTSB. The PF / PNF obviously knew what they were talking about as the odd English word was inserted into a French string.