For crying out loud, of course you are biased. At least I admit to it.


Va Bien Quixote......

bon chance

If, by "biased", you mean "not inclined to immediately suspect any French institution of skulduggery", then I'm guilty as charged - otherwise I'd say I'm fairly neutral. All I ask is evidence of the supposed dots you are joining.

How else am I supposed to understand what you're getting at?

There is no reason - none - for the BEA to fudge anything here even if they wanted to (the A330 is already a successful airliner, and all the evidence so far suggests that they are throwing everything they can at the investigative process). I ask again, what is it that you think you're "defending" here?

Hi,

I will repeat (I posted already about)
On a pure legal sense .. AF is not a culprit concerning the Pitot tubes
It was not a law to force AF to change or replace the Pitot tubes.. it was only recommendations
You can't break a law if this law don't exist !
AF bear not responsibility concerning the Pitot tubes .. in the legal sense

jcj:

The point I'm trying to make is that the pitot tube issues mean that Airbus is going to have to share responsibility in some way, I wasn't saying that AF should hold all responsibility for that. The way Lyman puts it, you'd think Airbus was going to be completely absolved - all I was saying is that they can't be.

So I went away for a week of real work and return, only to find this thread appears to have rewound several weeks to repeat a topic already hung, drawn and quartered - or at least it seemed so.

Here's where I thought we were:

a) All the adults seemed to agree that the 'zoom-climb' was induced by PF action. The stick-trace shows PF NU inputs, that correspond with control surface movements, that correspond with altitude change...

b) The NU inputs were not continuous (at this point) and hence not sufficient to demand a trim input from the THS. However later in the event, PF did pull, long and hard NU, such that the THS moved, as demanded, to off-load what the pilot appeared to desire.

c) That the "auto-flight", protections or any other computer induced skulduggery had anything much to do with what went wrong seems to be absent from all the evidence so far, excepting that at autopilot release the aircraft needed a mild roll correction.

d) We have seen that certain contributors here have an amazing ability to add 2+2 and get -47, in other words theories with little basis in fact, but equally little to dispute them, which in the mind of the author therefore gives them legitimacy... much to the frustration of many others. Just because something is possible does not mean it is likely. The shortest route between two points is the straight-line. While it is true we do not have all the 'dots', those that we do have, are pretty convincing.

Anyway, I'm not sure I'm contributing much here, except to get my mind straight, so I'll shut-up for a bit longer.

Contributing something?!? Are you kidding!? That's an excellent summary Garage Years! Concise, and spot on, by my read....

IFLY_INDIGO
Right.

Night, IFR, lots of clouds, near large buildups, fly by looking outside the window for your visual reference.

For whom do you fly, sir? :confused:

GY

Are you at all interested in what PNF meant: "What was that?" How about PF: "I think we have some crazy speed".....

You are satisfied with the presumption that the THS stayed where it was due lack of loiter at NU with the Stick?

As a sound professional whose goal is to challenge and improve the industry, you seem easily satisfied.

In a difficult investigation into a vehicular homicide locally, the defense team was frustrated by lack of witness production by the Prosecution at Trial.

Our firm found a witness who had been interviewed, and the report taken and memorialized by the State Police. It was not produced at discovery, and the upshot was that it had been hidden from the accused's counsel.

The case was dropped, with prejudice.

I am no longer trusting of the folks who are charged with Public Duty.
Certainly not when they own a financial stake in the airframe manufacturer. BEA does just that, they share a stake in the future well being of a firm that thus far has been shown to be negligent in some areas related to AF447.

Are you ffs kidding me? 2+2=47?

How do you work that out? How does the BEA, an independent government department, "share a stake" in a publicly-held international corporation that manufactures airliners?

By your logic, we should also be suspicious of the NTSB's neutrality towards Boeing (which, although nominally publicly-held, relies on government contracts to shore up the lean times in the civil market).

So please, provide some direct evidence that the BEA has any stake in the outcome of the investigation, or leave the subject alone.

Dozy,
Please stop feeding the troll.....
I would like to put him on my 'ignore' list, but since he changes his ID continuously, and then pollutes the thread yet again, that isn't practical, if one tries to follow the posts.

Dozy. NTSB? Suspicious? You must live in dreamland, or have nil experience in PUBLIC/PRIVATE partnering. The government of FRANCE owns a 15 per cent financial stake in Airbus, and BEA is an arm of the executive duty of the government.

You make assumptions that are amusing, as does Mr. Concorde.

Two weeks ago, a popular politician was found to have been behind a loan guarantee to a private Company. The Company has since gone Bankrupt, and has lost hundreds of millions of PUBLIC MONEY.

You are naive beyond belief, and trusting in areas patently populated with menace, greed, and public gullibility.

NTSB? Like the time when presented with new evidence in an ongoing investigation rejected it, because the leader was to start his vacation?

You are as a child.

Troll?
 

I think the advice to ignore Lyman (in his/their current manifestation) is wise. If Lyman is not a Troll but an Aviation Professional it is very strange that "he" chooses to communicate in a way that does not reflect the economic and efficient use of language essential to, and respected by, the Aviation Community.

If "he" truly believes in the ideas that "he" seems to be trying to get accross to others then why does he not understand about signal-to-noise ratio?

I have to say, after many months with Bearfoil and Lyman posts, however open-minded I do try to be, finding it all very enervating :(

To my mind the disquieting thing here is how the design of a machine and the attendant training culture appears to have put a cognitive boundary between the crew and physical reality. It seems that three intelligent and well trained men sat dumbfounded and incomprehending unable to discern which signals were real and which were artefacts.

Lyman wrote:
If you are an ambulance chaser related, you can't never accept a pilot's error verdict. There is no money to be made. Wasn't it you or early incarnation against the NTSB final report of the American Airlines Flight 587? :=

Just wondering aloud.

Lyman... exasperated!

Hi Lyman, well I thought we had said our goodbyes, but here you are....

As a sound professional I am constrained by the limits of the data presented to me. I cannot analyze what I do not have recorded, I cannot simulate that which I cannot hear, etc. In other words, beyond a certain point I am making !!!!! up. I try to avoid that.

I appreciate the comments you mention might be sound related, but don't I have enough information to definitively state what is or isn't going on? I think not. Can I hazard a guess?

Perhaps...

PNF: "What was that?" --- no, here I can't. Having heard the stall warning from the FWC, it is hard to imagine this being misunderstood, if that is your implication. The Cricket_Stall warning is a unique dual-tone that is interrupted by the spoken word "Stall" repeated every second, so you get something like, "de-da-de-da-STALL-de-da-de-da-STALL...etc". It's alarming and clear. Anyone that ignored that is pretty focused! Did the PNF hear something else? See something else?


PNF: "I think we have some crazy speed" --- yes, my guess is something like this > Once in the stall, the vertical speed would have introduced an unusual and unfamiliar wind-rush sound. Given the AoA, this sound would have had an unusual direction and I suspect character. Perhaps this was mistaken for overspeed. A stall-induced, vertical speed sound is NOT simulated in any flight simulator I have ever been inside.

As for where the THS stayed. Surely we have discussed the behavior? You hold NU for long enough and the THS trims NU, hold ND for long enough and THS trims down. What else do you need to be told?

Somewhere earlier in this or the other thread some of our french friends had explained this to be an expression more or less equivalent to "what the *beep*?"
He's surprised to get a stall warning, but he knows exactly what he's hearing.
I concur that not paying attention to certain posts is probably the only way to prevent this hamster wheel from turning until any sane person participating will be exhausted.

Yes, sound. Of course PNF recognized the STALL click click click STALL...etc. I think in this case, the sound attenuated prior to the cricket clicks. A "Nibble" then.

'Crazy Speed'. I had an open aux window in a 402 at 200+ knots, the sound was impressive. When it slammed shut, it broke, and it was hard to concentrate on the flying.

I think PNF was unimpressed with PF's PITCH control, and I am suspicious that it was due to other than his ordinarily (assumed) quality of manual flight.

So many things do not add up, here. It is easy to allow a prejudice to explain it away....."stirring Mayonnaise". "Twitchy ailerons" "Ham handed" etc. ad nauseum.

I will always assume everything was working as expected, until the proof is shown me. The released data is highly prejudicial, and I am used to it, I write it, and I defend it, and I attack it. It is "Jargon". Those unaware of the domain are excused their naive acceptance of "as written".

The PITCH, dependent "as it was" on PF's "Constant back stick" shows no follow on by the THS, and you cannot explain it. No one has. One second is all it takes for the slab to articulate and trim out the elevator. One cannot stir mayonnaise and have the THS refuse to move, the Bus is not built that way. Neither is the sharp AoA change due only PF's hand. I say that without evidence, how can that be? A frozen THS and an additive elevator input to PF's explains the unknowns perfectly, and these have not been eliminated. Unless and until I see (or hear) conclusive evidence, there is no conclusion.

BEA have concluded "nothing". Funny that? I wish for an open minded discussion, not slander and schoolyard name calling from purported 'heroes' of aviation. But I won't hold my breath.

I appreciate your comments; they are valuable as your name calling is useless.

The THS appears not to have moved from a/p loss to STALL, up or down. One circumstance explains that, and I have seen no evidence favoring or negating that very thing.

Unless........We will find out, won't we?

signal: The THS did not move from -3 degrees until the STALL. Consistent with Overspeed Protection.

signal: Pilots were alarmed at rate of climb. Consistent with automatic increase to Pilot's inputs of UP elevator in Overspeed Protection.

No Lyman - the THS does not move much prior to the stall because there is no reason for it to move. The THS is a surface that is designed to compensate for long-term changes in attitude. It therefore follows that in order to move it a significant amount, the demand has to be made and held for a significant period of time.

Reading the traces, it does just that, when the PF goes from "making mayonnaise" with the sidestick (where it moved slightly following a general nose-up trend in the inputs made) to holding the thing back against the stops for the best part of a minute.

The computer did not order an overspeed protection sequence because there was no overspeed situation detected by the sensors and instruments. Are you seriously accusing the BEA of wilfully deleting an overspeed warning trace from the CVR? If so I'd have to see some pretty significant evidence before I'd be inclined to take you seriously. Your suppositions have now crossed the line into unadulterated fantasy.

I've decided to do as I've been asked and henceforth leave you alone. If that means this thread becomes an endless circle-jerk between yourself and the Michel Asseline fan club making up ever more lurid theories about how it must have been the computers at fault, I no longer care.

Dozy

Not only did the THS not move much, it did not move at all. I consider a climb of three thousand feet a "long term change in attitude". I do not accuse BEA of deletion at all; if O/P exists, it is unreported. Until the CVR is released, you need to stop making assumptions first of all that I accuse anyone of wrongdoing, and secondly, that you understand exactly what transpired.

You are quite right in another regard, my attempts to keep the collective mind ajar are futile, and have cost me dearly in the good will of ones I had befriended, and befriended me. For this I am sad......

I will not soon understand why posters here consider themselves better judges of content than the owners of the website. My questions are unanswered except by a sniff and an opinion, I see no proofs offered.

I have not demeaned or attacked, I have asked only questions that have yet to be answered by proofs. If you are offended by my crack about being naif, then so be it. You are trusting to a fault. I have long accepted that the pilots effed up, you seem unwilling to allow others to question the airframe at all.

I am more (or at least equally) interested in "je suis en toga, hein ?" and "On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?" [I'm in toga, no? But we've got the engines, what's going on ?]

"crazy speed" - crazy high or crazy low ? They never acknowledge stall, unless the toga comment is reference to that, so maybe they thought they were overspeed - but they engaged toga, to respond to overspeed. Really ???

I am satsified that from basic aerodynamics, the control surface movement required to achieve the same climb demand at high airspeed (initial climb) will be less than that required at low airspeed (later), and hence the likelihood that THS will need to move to unload it will also differ. Further, I am sure that the sims have data to replicate that. Finally, I'm sure BEA haven't faked the sim data lining up with the real data - too easy to get found out, and why not just fake the FDR data at issue if you are going to fake stuff...

Those in industry are not necessarily any more trustworthy. The biggest and most suspicious missing information for me, is in the actions of AF. My consipiracy theories ? - below:


AF released new UAS procedure days after the crash - with what changes and why ? - we are not told. Think we'll ever be ?

Rumour posted on these threads was that based on the ACARS info only (all they had at the time) they threw the scenario at line crews in the sim, and they crashed. Where are the reports of those sim tests ? What could the industry be learning from the debriefs ? Silence. Information suppressed. Clearly no lessons to learn... or just too embarrassing for AF ?

Which airlines pushed back against the AI recommendation for pitot change - was it just AF or others too ? Did others put pressure on Airbus via AF ? Where was the regulator in all that - just letting them sort a safety mod out amongst themselves when the cash flow was convenient ? Think we'll ever find out ?

AF pushed back against the pitot change because they wanted proof the new ones were better. Maybe that doesn't hang them, but in the meantime they flew on with known-bad pitots. Who signed off on that risk and decision ? Where is the risk assessment for not replacing the pitots ? Does it say "procedures and crew will handle UAS" ? Did they quality check said procedures and crew in assessing that risk ? [the crews that allegedly failed to handle UAS in sim afterwards, and the procedure so well written that pilots on here with all the time in the world to analyse it can't even agree what it meant]. You reckon we're going to see that assessment from AF ? Ya think maybe it might be otherwise engaged in a meeting with Mr Shredder (if it ever existed) ?

Then there's that cross-industry working group on stall. Conveniently reporting just after BEA (but maybe not the public) find out that 447 was another stall - so not to worry, look we've already found and fixed the problem... But look at that document. Target audience - line pilots. Content - pretty diagrams showing what AOA is. WTF ??? You mean line pilots don't know that ??? Repeated statements that stall is an AOA problem, not airspeed. WTF ??? You mean line pilots have been trained that stall is purely about speed ?? And conditioned not to lose altitude in stall for fear of failing the check ?

Pilots:
a) not trained to know what AOA is (hence no need for airlines to order the AOA display option)
b) trained that stall is about airspeed (going too slow)
c) trained not to lose alt in stall (pull up)

Result:
"stall stall". "I'm in TOGA". "We've got the engines". [Pulls back. Why aren't we going up?]


Oh, and after all that rant, yes, there was something wrong with the plane too. The pitots were a bit s**t in bad weather. As we've known for 2 yrs, remedial action taken, and as AF already knew before the event - because Airbus told them, proactively. Also, if you take the plane so far outside the envelope that no mfr engineer or test pilot or sim can tell you what will happen... some of the warning logic turns out to be screwy. And, er, that's it. No control reversal or controls ineffective (actually I'm not 100% sure on those), no departure into spin, no bits falling off... In fact following stall, plane did better than might be expected.


End of the day, AF litany is "the pilots did as they were trained". Yep. That's because, in response to a single instrument failure, you trained them to crash.

And that, sir, is the real scandal, that's what needs fixing - way before looking at stall warning logic at 30deg+ AOA. And by all acounts it is an industry wide problem, not just AF.

infrequentflyer789

Without exception, exactly so. We knew all that, and the lack of redress/mitigation is another hole in the ground. My expectations are far too high.

If the numb, led by the greedy, supported by the regulator can keep those chain saws juggled, how can anyone expect to see actual improvements in the logic/airframe? One can't.

By the way, I have been trying to herd as many as I can back to the 20 seconds around a/p drop, mostly without success. So I completely agree that the interminable wheel action of the STALL, TOGA, "SUPERSTALL" brigade is an abject waste.

Are we truly in that deep?

Whether 447 oversped or no, we see it in action elsewhere, and it debriefs as some form of "best guess" remediation, by those who are demonstrably unclear on the concept.

We should be encouraged: Airbus did "Consult with Pilots"......

answer
 

a few weeks ago i have ask a question,meant to be answered by lyman.
did he answer it ?
no
am i surprised he did`nt ?
yes,because he reacts to every post immediatley and the anwer was only "yes" or "no".
no,because he had his reason not to answer.


soonce again:

do you think every commercial pilot on the whole wide world would have put AF447 into a climb to the stars ?

"J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non ..."
 

BEA no.3, Appendix 1:

Whats that horn noise
 

If you read my original post I proposed that you watched the YouTube video of the three crew in a landing aircraft not noticing the undercarriage up warning horn. Landing with undercarriage up is dangerous :This is why [undercarriage up] Warning quite literally trumps a whole host of others"

The crew in the YouTube video were just doing a routine landing and they had a cognitive overload. It can happen the next time you try to talk on a hands-free cell phone and drive. It is almost certain to happen immediately after an automation failure and 'automation surprise'. The reason stick pushers and shakers work better than an aural warning is that they are transmitted to the brain through the haptic channel. Just like when you are concentrating on something and you 'don't hear' someone talking to you - but you react immediately if they tap you on the shoulder.

Now the question to be addressed is _why_ did all three pilots react like this. just like the crew in that YouTube video. The fact that in both cases a full crew disregard an urgent aural warning should be an indication of a cognitive problem with aural warnings. Could it be that certain character types are more susceptible to cognitive tunneling when given more workload or in non-normal situations? Perhaps there was a lack of training in a particular aspect such as flying in alternate law at cruise level - so attention was tunneled to that task?

Whatever the reason was for them ignoring what to an observer is a warning that "quite literally trumps all others" - it shows that this type of warning can remain unnoticed by crews. This cognitive issue needs to be considered at the design stage and may result in a requirement for crew selection or specific (re)training.

Blaming the three pilots and ignoring the problem won't make it go away.

Pitot probes are fixed pointing forwards and were so ever since there were first installed on the aeroplane. They don't handle extreme AoAs well, such as were met in AF447 case. So far no one has come with a good reason why should they be swiveling or gimballed so they can detect downward speed - we use VSI's for that.

Viper is supersonic single-engine aroplane with cropped delta wing plus chines. It has 1/5 of A330 installed thrust and 1/12 of its weight. A330 and F-16 have very different mission profiles, maneuverability/stability and stall characteristics. What works for one is not necessarily useful on the other.

So the Airbus designers installed the probes that don't work so far outside the flight envelope that noone even had an idea that aeroplane is capable of going that far out. Also they meet all certification criteria but in use get clogged in conditions we don't even know what they are. Welcome to the real world.

Human beings don't have cognitive channels. You might try improving your theory by including sensory channels in it. However, I doubt that pilots "hearing channels" were overloaded with anything else when stall warning went off.
BS. It's not an experiment, it's an instructional video most pilot have seen at one or another CRM lecture.
Nope. They really know a lot about cognitive overload, they just choose not to believe any unfounded theory about it, put forward by zealous and ignorant.

Most probably because pitot2 succumbed to icing first. As the pilot in the right hand seat was designated PF, AP2 connected to ADR2 was engaged. Recorded speeds are from ADRs 1 and 3, which meets legal minima of two speeds been recorded.

Investigation of other UAS events was made easier by other crews bringing the aeroplane back unscathed to earth and with it the QAR, which records far more parameters but doesn't have to comply with survivability requirements applicable to FDR.

I don't know about you sir, but I am not of such importance to be addressed direct by the investigation authorities. Rather I read their investigation reports that are made public and open to everyone's scrutiny. Their sole purpose is improving the aviation safety through disseminating information. They're not there to assign the blame or responsibility to anyone or anything and are not supposed to have any entertainment value. To understand and make good use of them, one needs to understand aeronautics well. To paraphrase Euclid: "There is no royal way to aeronautics".

Approaching accident reports with mind so open that the brains fall out is not conductive to learning anything from them. Lot of posts here remind me of an aphorism made by certain Teutonic, mustached gentleman:

Again, name me a single person on this thread who is doing so. Even the BEA aren't!

(my bold)

With respect to the very different stall characteristics, you know this to be true how?

Well, for a start the A330's airframe is designed to be a stable platform under normal flight conditions, and judging by the stall profile remains relatively stable in stall conditions too. The F-16 on the other hand is not stable without computer assistance even under normal flight conditions.

When a/c is STALLED, do the F-16's stabilators migrate to, and remain at, FULLNU?

Spot the difference!
 

F-16:
http://www.militarypower.com.br/avi-F16-01.jpg



Airbus 330:

http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/...s-A330-001.jpg

You've guessed it right... it's an aspect ratio. :E

That's roll, then, what about the close couple?

Nice pictures.

The difference I spotted immediately was ... no Frenchman at the controls of the Viper. :E


Nice pics.

Perhaps the A330 should have crosshairs superimposed, since our Russian readers might not recoginze a commercial aircraft without one ... (KAL 007 reference, and yes, I know it wasn't an A330 ... )

And now

Coat, hat, doorway ... Taxi!!!!! :eek:

well, that might bring back scales;
Photos: Airbus A330-322 Aircraft Pictures | !!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I'm not sure I'd point my finger in that direction when talking about downing civilian Airbuses...

Very unfortunate choice wolf.

To clarify:

USA : 1 (Iran Air A300)
Iraqi insurgents : 0 (Despite an attempt on a DHL A300)

philip2412 (re: #938)

"Does Lyman think that all commercial pilots in the world would start a climb to the stars?"

Sorry, I took that for rhetorical insult. 2nd look shows it to be a sincere attempt at insult.

No pilot would initiate such a climb, obviously. Your reference to the "intention" of 'to the stars' makes it ridiculous.......


These guys did not do so. Nor would anyone.

It is not the flying machines but the pilots and it is happening all over.

Accident: South East T154 at Moscow on Dec 4th 2010, two of three engines out in flight

Two assertions but only one is true:

"A good pilot is a well trained pilot."

"A well trained pilot is a good pilot."

One is not necessarily so. Can you guess which one?