Ah, but that would be quite another matter surely... training and familiarity rather than sensory overload ?

mm43,
I think you're right.... too many people read too much into the translations.

HarryMann,
"an old 3 needle analogue altimeter".
IIRC, they killed several people....
IMHO, the combined 'drum' (for the 'real figure') and one 'needle' (for the 'trend') instrument was the best solution.
I'm not sure whether the current PFD implementation is "as good".
I would like to see pilots' opinions on that, but if anything it's slightly O/T.

Hi DozyWannabe,

PF takes manual control at 2.10.06.
From 2.10.7 - 18
"The copilot sidestick is positioned:
- nose-up between neutral and ¾ of the stop position
- to the left in half-travel position then to the right in half-travel position and twice, alternatively left to the stop position then right to the half-travel position (Period of 4 seconds)."

2.11.00 PNF says "Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh"

PNF was either happy with PF's inputs for nearly 1 minute (doubtful) or unaware of the over controlling inputs.
That is one of the major disadvantages of separate Side Stick design.

That first minute, I imagine PNF just was not watching PF's inputs, or the result thereof... head-down flippig pages, maybe?

He starts giving guidance to the PF ("Watch your speed") at 2:10:27, so if he had his head down in the ECAM it wasn't for any more than 22 seconds, certainly less than a minute.

He starts making comments on the PF's flight path ("Stabilise, Go back down (descend)") between 2:10:28 and 2:10:31 - so he's starting to sound unhappy about 25 seconds after the PF takes control. He makes a direct reference to lateral controls at 2:11:00, as you say - but he's clearly aware that something's not right 30 seconds before that.

Remember that the rules state that the non-relief pilot is not to take control without the Captain's say-so under most conditions. This wasn't specific to AF's Airbus crews, it was fleet-wide.

Hope this is a helpful chart...made it for my use but figure others may benefit. I cut out the traces I wanted to analyze together and put them into one larger file. The yellow highlight is time when the stall alarm was active. Made it by superimposing the BEA trace of the stall alarm. I eyeballed the times on the quotes with larger lines indicating multiple seconds of conversation as detailed in the BEA report. Any errors, let me know.

PuraVidaTransport

It looks like the biggest error was the image hosting service you are using. I got some interesting re-directs to XXXXXX sites

But was finally able to capture your hard work so here it is for anybody else

http://fromtheflightdeck.com/MEL/PPRune/af447trace3.jpg

RE: Though I agree with much of what you say in the post that contains the above quote (and other posts you've made), I have some difficulty with your assertions -- based on the facts as we know them so far -- that: A. The aircraft's instrumentation (or lack thereof) was not a contributing factor, and B. The source of the PF's actions was "panic".

If we are investigating accidents today for the purpose of learning lessons so as to avoid, or minimise the chances of, making the same mistakes again, we have to be very careful not to over simplify what happened and why; especially when it comes to the human. Of course the actions of the PF (primarily), the PNF (a close second), and even the Captain, are the prime "causes" (in terms of specific actions at the time) of the loss of the aircraft. But, if you are saying that there is nothing to be learned here about instrumentation, display presentation, and human behaviour, in addition to your points about AF procedures and training, I think you're missing out on the notion that the ultimate goal of investigators is to try to get as close as possible to the "why" (actually "why's"). In that light I believe there is more we can learn from this event, including in the areas of displays, warnings, controls, etc; as well as the obvious ones such as CRM, procedures and training (both in terms of AF specifically and industry wide).

OOPPSS...
 

Sorry about that Lomo, the three or four times I checked it (and even now), never saw any porn or links to porn. Perhaps the link I used just works for me and my cookies OR you have some "interesting" cookies of your own ;)

If you will PM me (or perhaps a moderator) with the url that you used to fix the problem, I will edit my original post.

Be honest, I just did a Google search for an image host after noticing I couldn't just attach a photo file here. Found that one (postimage.org) first and admit, know nothing about them...all my fault and my apologies to any offended.

Grizzled
The perceived existence of a problem with instrumentation or displays misses the point. Humans have been misinterpreting instrumentation since it started being used and with any redesign (which may indeed be welcome) you will find that someone will find a way to misinterpret it. Can it be improved? - well, yes, everything can always be improved. Will it eliminate accidents like this one? - highly unlikely. It's just this, know what you are using and what it tells you.

One must also be careful not to attribute any negative connotation to the term 'panic' which was used in a purely technical sense. The nature of the state of panic and of acute stress disorder (shock - which are what I believe happened to the PF) include a form of tunnel vision in which almost every other stimulus or input is excluded except that which the person in the situation chooses to focus on. This kind of reaction shuts down verbal cognitive channels pretty effectively. It can be countered by reliance on procedures - following the procedures is a very good way of getting out of the state. The other option is training. If you are well trained you are less likely to be prone to this type of reaction (Hard training, easy execution).

With the PF though I am very sceptical that improved or different displays would have changed his reaction though this can never be known for certain. Knowing his machine more thoroughly and following the SOPs coupled with sound CRM would have been more likely to help the crew avoid the accident. Flight deck management procedure strikes me as a bit too casual. The cultural issues that arise though are much more complex - the physics or aviation issues are fairly easy to understand. However, the human factors need much more careful consideration than I believe they have been given by AF (I do believe we are on the same page on this).

Whatever the level of automation, the pilot is the person responsible for his aircraft and needs to understand and react appropriately. The airline needs to ensure that the pilot is given the support and training to do so and the CPD (Continuing Professional Development) throughout their career. The automation logic employed by Airbus is to my mind perfectly logical and suited for the environment it operates in. In certain circumstances it does remove itself but those are conditions for which it would be inappropriate. It is designed as an aid not as a replacement but it does look as if some pilots and some airlines are treating it as the latter not the former. This I need hardly mention is dangerous.

Well said; as you say, we are on the same page on most points I think.

I too believe that "culture" in this case played a most significant role. And I use that word in all the senses it is used in today's Safety Management writings: national, corporate and professional.

Re your last point: On that, I could not agree more. Many aviation safety professionals are suggesting (rightfully, IMHO) that we are just now seeing the beginning of the next major "trend" in accidents, which can generally be described as: LOC incidents resulting from a (widening) gap between what is required from the crew in an emergency situation involving loss of some significant aspect or component of computerization or FBW, and what the crew is adequately / appropriately trained for and experienced in doing.

The following is a combination of FDR traces posted in a format used to convey the data that HazelNuts39 had originally constructed from the BEA's initial report on the FDR data.

These copied traces have used the highest resolutions available and also have a Smoothed Normal Acceleration curve added to give an indication where the +/- 'g' forces were. From the commencement at 02:10:51.4 of the Stall Warning, thin dotted lines showing the 'smoothed' traces for both the AoA and Pitch Attitude angles are included.

CLMAX occurred at 02:10:56.5, and the 'g' break within a further second. Some post stall pitching oscillations matched by the AoA values took place for a few more seconds before the AoA rapidly moved toward 30 degrees and the FPA moved into negative territory.

Back earlier at the AP and ATHR disconnect(s), the traces are rather 'lumpy' - an artifact of the turbulence occurring as the aircraft commenced the initial climb.
http://oi55.tinypic.com/vr55aq.jpg
The Initial Stall Analysis is here, and HN39's description of how the initial data was constructed is in AF447 - Thread No.5 - post #70

Hi DozyWannabe,

I've never heard of that.
PF / PNF can swap roles at any time - usually one crew member is allocated the pleasure of doing the take off and landing for his records. Unusually with this crew was their relative seat positions. The more experienced senior Co-pilot was not in his natural seat (Co-pilots occupy the RHS), and may have felt some anxiety about taking control and using his non natural hand on the side stick.

@rudderrudderrat

Read the 3rd interim report. This was a very specific procedure within AF for a long-haul flight whereby the crew consists of a Captain, F/O and a relief pilot who is not a Captain. The Captain is supposed to brief the rest of the crew as to roles and responsibilities (including parameters for taking control) prior to the flight or at handover. The record suggests that this was not done.

I honestly don't think you're going to find any technical reason for this - handedness is not an issue, and as it seems relief pilots can sit in either seat it's not like F/Os get no practice with it on that side. I know some people want it to be about the sidestick, autotrim and lack of feedback but the odds are stacking up against it.

Good Morning DW,
All the hand flying practice will have been done from the co-pilot's natural position (RHS). During cruise relief, when seated in the LHS - all inputs will have done through the auto-pilot.

Occasionally, in the simulator the co-pilot will get an opportunity to hand fly from the LHS - and from what I've observed, some find it much more difficult. Try playing tennis with your non natural hand and let me know how you get on.

The side stick is a perfect device for controlling the aircraft in Normal Law (nudge to attitude and let go), but is not ideal for controlling Roll in Alternate Law (it's too sensitive and needs constant pressure until the aircraft is perfectly trimmed).

The conventional control column is able to accept both hands and is more natural than the side stick from either seat.

Edit. If there was so little difference between the handedness of the side sticks, seat positions etc., why do you think it is mandatory for Training Captains (who can occupy either seat) to additionally perform EFTO & GA procedures from the co-pilot seat in the simulator? If there was so little difference - we wouldn't bother.

So what you mean is "I prefer a conventional control column, so I'm going to keep blaming the sidestick design wherever possible".

That's fine, we're all entitled to our opinions - just don't pretend you're being objective when you've already decided you're going to fit this accident around your personal bugbears with the system.

Hi DozyWannabe,

under certain circumstances like direct law - yes. Otherwise conventional aircraft would have adopted side stick controls for weight saving and reduced engineering complexity years ago.

This AC series is designed around Normal Law - and the side stick works brilliantly well when used in this law. If the autopilot had simply disengaged with Normal Law still active - PF would not have had any difficulty keeping it straight and level.

I don't have any personal bugbears - I'm trying to explain why I think the PF had so much difficulty in hand flying in ALT LAW at high altitude.

Very interesting indeed.

Pay attention to the smoothed normal acceleration curve:

02:10:05 - 02:10:12, 7 seconds, load increase from 1,0 g to 1.4 g
02:10:12 - 02:10:40, 28 seconds, load decrease from 1.4 g to 0.8 g
02:10:40 - 02:10:55, 15 seconds, load increase from 0,8 g to 1.1 g
02:10:55 - 02:12:00, 65 seconds, load decrease from 1,1 g to 0.9 g

What the crew really felt despite their SS actions, was the initial overshooting in g in the first 7 seconds, then the correction phase for 28 seconds, then a increase again to 1,1 g in 15 seconds, followed by going below 1 g in the following 65 seconds.

Caught of guard by speed loss and AP/ATHR dropout combined with lack of training and stress might have increases the danger to follow the feel in the pants instead stick to the instruments, like we climbed too much, but now it feels like leveling.... even descending when below 1 g and do not disturb the cabin too much.....

Loose straps with impaired seating position (we do not know, wether the seatbelts of PF separated due to impact or if they had been donned inproperly). might have influenced the resistance to unload further. Best seen here also, that the erratic stick inputs of PF (after initial pitch) does not influence the big picture concerning g-loading that much. When we talk about too much backstick pressure after the initial pullup and compare it to the g loading, then the resulting aircraft response does not represent the SS inputs that clearly.

Talking about traces, the post from lampaeso is an interesting compilation of traces with cockpit communication, thanks very much for that work.
What struck me most is the fact, that the pitch came down below the horizon in several timeframes, and mostly in combination not to SS pitch ND inputs, but to big bank angles to the right in combination with full oposite SS input and even SS full NU inputs.

02:11:55, 25° RH bank, SS full left, SS full NU, pitch -10°
02:12:10, 20° RH bank, SS full left, SS full NU, pitch -10°
02:12:50, 40° RH bank, SS full left, SS half NU, pitch - 5°
02:13:00, 40° RH bank, SS full left, SS half NU, pitch -5°
02:13:55, 30° RH bank, SS full left, SS full NU, pitch -5° (double input)

Watch also the stall warning and VVI during these occasions as well as the CVR.

We have been critical of PF for stalling the thing, but as RF4 has pointed out he was trying for a couple minutes to stay right side up with the a/c seemingly not responding to left stick.

A couple weeks ago I got a ride in the back seat of a Romanian Lark glider with a long thin wing. Thermaling the beast past 30° bank found me with the stick in the opposite rear corner.

Had to unload a bit to get some more aileron authority. Many gliders lose aileron authority before they stall from a steep bank in a thermal and I am at a loss that an experienced glider pilot would not have been familiar with this.

As mentioned many times before the transition from an apparent overspeed problem to a stall problem was not recognised.

I don't think you should polarise this so much

Few, if any, are denying that PF was way below par from manual takeover to end of story... with general crew shortcomings becoming apparent.

But really, you have to stop this black and white routine, any engineer will tell you very few solutions, much in nature and certainly not accidents are so black & white

All those 3 things did play some part (notwithstanding similar accidents in the past happening without them - that is a false negative), I believe.

To start slamming a control column about like that (just think of the equivalent), would definitely have woken up the Captain upon entry, even if PNF had still stayed subdued (this accident will no doubt turn into a study case for at least pilot shock & stress behaviour as much as CRM itself).

Indeed, AF should be consulting the RAF crew selection centre (as was) about some help?

There is almost no argument that Captain would not have responded to visually seeing a full aft stick in PFs hands - end of.
No doubt he would then have looked straight at the Trimwheel, and PFD

My guess Captain had no idea that PF (had been and) was still obsessed with an UP/ DOWN mentality, and at night, was totally removed from any sense of wind over wings and AoA (something even crude Q-pot feedback could provide) :ugh:

I think PF having flown sailplanes is very much a red herring.. he was no Sully.
.

mm43, your nice graphic.... what can be the reason of the escalate pitch- (and AoA-) change, frequency whith up and down within 5 sec ... (in the beginning of stall after 2:11:00.....)is it turbulenz from outside or is it a typical self-induced pitching movement of an A330 with higher AoA?

if one will learn to find a way out of stall..... one need to understand this.... and learn to use it....

Hello grity,

They were the test pilots taking an A330 into its first stall, and the period you have referred to is what I have called the 'PRE STALL'. I believe that pitching oscillation occurs as the wing starts to lose lift and the nose drops, then momentarily recovers lift and the nose pitches up. The fact that the elevator and THS were max NU may also have had a bearing on this oscillation.

IMO the pre stall buffet the BEA tried to define is not very clear, but the pitching oscillation in hindsight appears to be the very last clue.

mm43, ok but
the elevator is not at max NU in the "pre stall" it is just oscillating between -2 and -7 deg, there is also much SS with pull and push, but I am not shure if we can decide if the oscillation is caused by the elevator or by the move of the center of lift back and forth with the losing lift or all together with turbulence ...... it is realy not easy to discriminate cause and effect....

mm43;
Thanks for another great graphic! I'm wondering what you mean by 'pre stall'. At about 2:10:56 the "gee" starts to fall while AoA is increasing through nine degrees. Isn't that an indication of stall?

grity;

Ok. The center of lift is moving, and the the cause of the pitching may be the 0.3g peak to peak shown in the Normal Acceleration trace. I suspect it will be a point of further discussion.

HN39;

Rather difficult to determine exactly what was going on. Your point is a good one, though it also seems with the synchronized oscillation of the pitch attitude and AoA angles that lift hadn't been lost.

What do you believe the Alpha Max was at 02:10:56?

I'm quite happy to change the indications on the graphic if a consensus can be reached.

Harry, I'm not polarising anything - in fact I'm being neutral to a fault. You and others are saying that feedback and/or yokes would definitely have changed the situation, but I'm saying that isn't necessarily the case. I'm not saying it definitely isn't, or that feedback is purely a throwback. I'm saying there's not enough evidence to say that feedback would have made a difference.

I'm not even saying that! Everyone has bad days at the office, it's just that a bad day at the office for an airline pilot has an almost unique potential to become a bad day for everyone on their aircraft.

To say that lack of feedback may not have been an issue is not blaming the pilots, and to say that one necessarily implies the other is a strawman argument that is beneath a lot of the more reasonable people on here.

Harry, can't you see that I'm the one trying to keep the shades of grey here by saying that the sidestick/passive feedback combo may not have (not didn't - *may not* have) played a causative role here.

That is your opinion, shared with some others - and as an opinion it is valid. My opinion (that it's a possibility, but equally that it could be a red herring), is also shared by some others and IMO equally valid. I'm not trying to argue here, I'm just trying to make sure that the parameters of debate remain open.

I disagree. See the posts on the Stony Point NWA 727 crash in the other thread. A three man crew *did* misdiagnose a stall as overspeed, *did* move the control column to its full extent, *did* stall the plane and *did* crash and die.

*You* may have picked it up in that situation, but there were and are trained pilots who aren't as good or as knowledgeable as you.

DW

Right, :ok: apologies then...

I wonder if yourself or anyone else could explain this to me:

I think I'm overspeeding, so I'm holding the stick back, I've tried a wedge load of thrust (oddly) and also now reduced it somewhat (more sensibly)

I'm also holding the stick almost fully to one side, then the other to keep the wings level, as they have a habit of rolling around in a rather airy fairy floppy fashion

Why in an overspeed situation, would this be happening, when the norm is a spiral dive (banked one way or the other and increasing) or just laterally diverging (again banked one way) ?

Don't mention it, and likewise, I'm sorry if I gave you the impression that I was being disrespectful at any point.

I don't think the PF was ever completely convinced he was overspeeding, as I think he would have argued the toss with the PNF when the latter practically bit the PF's hand off when he reached for the speedbrake lever if he did. I suspect he didn't really know what was going on and was trying to throw out ideas (which is fairly common in a dynamic problem-solving environment). I also suspect that he was suffering encroaching tunnel vision from the outset and heard neither the "Alternate Law" callout from the PNF, nor the stall warning. As such, there's a little nagging suspicion in the back of my head that he was convinced that as long as he had TOGA selected, no amount of back stick could cause him to stall.

Another thing I'm not convinced of is that he was fighting a right-roll tendency that was entirely down to external forces. After the aircraft was stalled, yes the clues were all there, but at the apex of the climb and just prior he was still slamming the stick around. I wonder whether the initial right-roll was induced by an unfortunate combination of a pocket of turbulence at the same time A/P disengaged - and because of the magnitude of the inputs what we are actually seeing prior to the stall is PIO. While I'm not going to join the chorus of those saying that failure to release the raw FDR data is tantamount to wrongdoing, I do hope that with the final report will come some traces that are of a higher resolution in the time axis - especially around the time of A/P disconnect to the apogee. That way it should be possible to determine whether the PF stick inputs were excessive inputs to combat a serious roll issue or whether PIO had a part to play.

Again, remember you're clearly a pilot with some considerable technical and aeronautical knowledge under your belt. This is no slur on them, but a lot of guys on the line do not.

PF may have had very much less hand flying at cruising level than either PNF or the Captain. And on this occasion it would have been sudden, not premeditated - and with a limited panel. (Only the PNF's instrument panel is recorded. it is assumed that the PF's panel would have been the same.)

When I asked how often pilots hand flew an A330, (let alone at cruising level, where some replies suggested that it requires more concentration) the responses were somewhere between "not if I can help it" to " my Company does not allow me to ..." ( Interesting to know the logic.)

All that I have seen of PF's gliding experience was that he had held a gliding licence some years ago. That could be quite irrelevant - or not.

Someone may know just how accurately Simulators reproduce an A330 's performance at cruising level. How easy is it to hand fly when some of your instruments failed, even before you have started ? Is the Simulator stable in rough air, or do you have to struggle to keep the wings level ? How often is this practiced ?

This kind of training was usual using a Link Trainer, fifty or more years ago, even in rather minor airlines.

One of the American trunk carriers in about 1950, was in the middle of a pay dispute with their pilots and nearly ordered their next batch of aircraft to be made without autopilots... "Make them work..." Somebody said. (They had bean counters, too !)

Speedbrakes
 

Yes PF did take the extreme step of deploying the airbrake. Hence PF actions were consistent with him being convinced of overspeed at that point.

Absolutely! Feelings of acceleration or turning are not to be taken lightly. Without any doubt they have to be crosschecked against instruments to see whether they are in accordance with the aeroplane's maneuvers or they're just illusions.

Because you say so? Because Airbus has radically redesigned rudder architecture on 330s since a couple of years ago? Because someone is unable to appreciate the difference between "controlled" and "operated" when discussing the flight controls as in "manually controlled and hydraulically operated"?

Of course it could be said but it would be a lie. There's no automatic decision making. There is no automatic take-off. More correct version would be: pilots must be able to manually fly the aeroplane out of any situation automatics put it into.
What a slippery slope! Simulators don't simulate the areas that we know nothing about because no flight testing was done (or required to be done) in them. They have to very realistically simulate stall behaviour but to check what the transport aeroplane would do if someone stubbornly insisted in pulling into stall would be asking far too much from the test pilots. Statement that simulator doesn't realistically simulate aeroplane's behaviour within normal flight envelope or different control laws is also untrue and that leaves your idea that we train in simulators just to fly simulators completely baseless.

It's not just accountants that love using simulators for training. Pilots, insurers and anyone living under the training zone appreciate it too. Face it: you want to go far, high, fast and with plenty of payload. There's no way in our Newtonian world to make an aeroplane that would do all that and still have the stall behaviour of Cessna 172. People get killed by stalling 172s, anyway.

That's the best explanation of someone's inability to chew gum and simultaneously tie his laces I've heard in a long time. Attention distribution, proper scanning and avoiding the fixation are basic pilot's survival tools, taught and checked from day one at the controls. If you suck at them, tough luck, you can not be a pilot. What AF447 crew did was the sign of the severe incapacitation, not usual and ordinary human behaviour.

Speed and altitude tapes might be digitally driven but their presentation is analogue! There might be a digital readout added but there's no need to read it while performing normal instrument scan. Patterns on modern EFIS can be recognized without much cognitive effort and you might be surprised that Airbus EFIS does include VSI needle.

I have never heard about real life pilot that had problems switching from round dials to tapes (me included). I have came across those who made painless transition from sidestick and tapes to round dials and yoke, so when reading complaints about modern aeroplanes' cockpits, I am left with the distinct what-the-heck-are-they-talking-about feeling.


It is very basic task sharing: one pilots flies, the other takes care of ECAM. It was very similar before ECAM, since we started putting two guys up front. One would fly, the other would execute the checklist. Eastern learnt the hard way what happens when everyone goes troubleshooting and no one is minding the store. So Crossair.

And then what? Prohibit by decree emergencies that overload the crew? There were thirty two cases of UAS on A330/340 fleet before AF447. Question is what made the AF447 crew overloaded and not other 32.

New pilots too - not following that old dicta is guaranteed to shorten your operational life even on modern jets with all the electronic bells and whistles. You are very unfairly pitting the ideal pilot of yesterday against the single modern crew which tragically underperformed.

That question has been asked before (I've asked it) and so far I've not seen a clear answer. The consensus (from NASA reports etc.) seems to be that even FFS systems just extrapolate from the limits of the flight envelope. To what extent those extrapolations are 'real' is still an open question.

Let's be honest.... A Link Trainer (and yes, I've "flown" one) did not yet really attempt to fully simulate the flight characteristics of a specific aircraft type, neither would it have been capable of doing so.

Agreed, but he doesn't seem convinced enough to press the point with the PNF when he chews him out for it and shuts down that avenue. The PNF's immediate following action is to defer to the Captain.

PF/PNF did fly pitch and power but it was for the low altitude UAS as they had practiced in the sim, Rio departure, 3 months prior to the incident. The key difference being the high 15 deg pitch at low altitude UAS compared with 5 deg pitch high altitude (now revised 2.5 degree). No high altitude UAS was trained for in the sim. Therefore it would appear they both applied the nearest training they had in the abscence of specific training.

Olr Carthusian

Most likely their training did fail them, very badly and fatally. In addition the displays lead to confusion. And data that might have resolved that confusion was either not presented to them at all (AoA) or was presented on a display that was not a part of their usual instrument scan - pure inertially derived speed, attitude, and so forth.

The primary cause of the whole chain of events was PF pulling NU on the stick when he should have very carefully stabilized roll without touching pitch. After that he seems to have become fixated on the concept of the plane going too fast rather than that it was actually stalled. He had no experience in training or real life with the situation into which he was thrust. And communications between crew members never cleared up the situation. Contributions by PNF were ignored. PNF tried to take over. PF grabbed back control and the plane and its freight died.

1. Communications were inadequate to absent.
2. Cockpit Resource Management was sloppy.
3. Data was inadequate.
4. Training was inadequate.

That set of inadequacies teamed up as a perfect storm of inadequacies to send AF447 and its passengers to the bottom of the ocean.

I say inadequacies rather than other words because on the whole all three factors are sufficient that the vast majority of flights take place uneventfully. And I suspect fixing even one of the problems might have saved AF447. All four should probably be fixed for best results. (Fix 4 and both 1 and 2 should end up repaired in the process. Fixing 3 is a major change to get it right. But they should be able to at least show an icon if a plane in a stall to get the message across through a non-verbal channel as well as the verbal warnings.)

There have been several references in these threads to the PF’s previous gliding experience, most recently post #625 by Linktrained, and also several suggesting that gliding training would be good for all pilots.

I cannot claim any knowledge of CAT flying, but I do know something about glider flying and gliding training, and also something about gliding accidents and what surviving pilots have said on occasion.

For the record, not all glider pilots take to their training as ideally one should. One pilot I talked to, who crashed following a cable break and spun, luckily surviving, told me he knew the tail had fallen off so that there was nothing he could do. (IMHO, like PF in AF447, he became fixated on a problem he didn’t have, and never diagnosed what he was actually dealing with.) When the nose went down, he “knew” that trying to raise it by pulling back on the stick would not work, because of his “missing tail”, but he tried anyway. When it did not succeed, and he saw the ground spinning round (his words – still did not connect it with a spin), he let go and the glider recovered from the spin itself. Hence his survival, in spite of failing to recognise what he should have been trained to understand.

Good basic training in flying, including stall and spin awareness, is no doubt an ideal that would stand any pilot of fixed wing aircraft in good stead. Unfortunately, there are some pilots who do not learn it well enough. To paraphrase Dozy, I am not saying that this was or was not the case with PF; only that his prior gliding experience (How long ago? How extensive? How good was he?) is not necessarily a useful piece of information.

HarryMann said, "No problem, miniature lightweight LED ribbons/tapes are now being used in many applications, the batteries being small enough to be encompassed within the string I should think... go on, give it a go"

Why not get a small little LED flashlight and shine it at the window when you want to see the string. It should reflect back quite nicely. Shine the light mostly upwards at the string to avoid direct flashlight reflections into your eyes.

Now, what kind of chewing gum will you use to affix the front edge of the string to the window? I suspect common transparent tape would not do to well, nor would common duct tape. Umpty degrees below zero is not compatible with most adhesives I know that won't become a permanent part of the window.

Harry, I don't mean to nag like an old fishwife, but what is your source for that assertion, and if you do have one, how old is it?

Airbus themselves have been perfectly willing to accept the possibility of their FBW aircraft being "stall-capable" in degraded control laws, and have been quite open about it since at least the mid-'90s.

Let us be clear...

EASA Airbus knows closely what a very high AoA A330 behaves like, did and does... assertions that a decent simulation of beyond the stall behaviour, couldn't be made... Pah!

Wouldn't but not couldn't... lateral and directional might have had to be a bit of a fudge, but plenty of high AoA data exists even there. CFD tunnels as well as work in many different (real) tunnels exists and a pretty reasonable model could have been built well beyond the stall, very accurate longitudinally including simulated buffet and no doubt predicted nodding or other type specific behaviour.

No, there are plenty of other reasons for not doing that... one being that the aircraft simply 'could not be put in that situation'
Another? Airlines wouldn't be interested in it...(read, pay for the extended sim or the time in it)

Just a general note - spammers and malware authors are getting depressingly good at manipulating Google results. So sometimes the first one or even two results can lead to bad sites. Doing a quick check with the Linux "whois" tool shows that postimage.com seems to be the real site. Postimage.org has a hidden registration. That is as often as not an indication of something questionable being hosted at the site. If you play with "http://www.dnsstuff.com/" over time you can develop some intuition about "good" vs "bad" sites.