Gerard C, thank you for your response.
OK, difficult, challenging ... requires either different technique or more effort than hand flying in normal law. Right?
If that's the case, this mode of flying would need to be practiced in order for pilots to develop a feel for doing it when required.
Agree?
Do you say this under the assumption that most pilots do not get the opportunity to hand fly the A330 in Alt 2 law at cruise altitude?

I think OK456's points are worth accomodating.
Understood. Most pilots you know will also take the correction out as they approach the desired altitude. You make a correction for a deviation that you notice, then you make a counter correction to re-establish the performance you require (Airspeed, Alt, etc). While the trace shows a series of corrections and counter corrections in roll, the same cannot be said for pitch.

mm43
Thanks, will need to look at that again when I am on a PC that loads images. (Bear, reserve further comment for you until I have done so).
That got me chortling.

The answer does not necessarily lie in any cockpit. It may lie in any number of dark corners of "the system" as it currently operates.

Lonewolf

"That would explain the initial NOSE UP"....

If so then, my friend, that is HUGE. Because post "INITIAL NOSE UP", is territory that is covered well by Yourself and F4. A combination of Pilot inputs and g sensitive commands may have nibbled 447's way up to 17PU.

On the graph, with the NOSE pitching down (and the altitude increasing), is evidence of the disconnect between PF, his instruments, the FCS, and the Weather. IMHO.

Clandestino,

Your unabated insistence on the instrument flying is appreciated.

That indirectly suggests the importance of adequate training, and in this case, the impact of the the lack of it, which is mentioned in the BEA Report.

Here it is again: the training has the role of getting the important elements into the pilots reflexes to the point that they can do what's needed without any hesitation, or doubt, regardless of the external disruptions, or conditions.

A reminder seem to be in order though, of the failure of some of the instrument indications, which compounded the lack of adequate training. So far there are the comments on the CVR transcript that speak, and hopefully the recovery and processing of data left on some of the recovered computers will allow restoring the indications on the PF (right side) Instruments which were not recorded by the FDR.

Not quite. (note: my conversion to italic in quote)

The THS position is an indication of how far a main longitudinal (NU/ND) control surface deflection is, which would be a confirmation on the action needed, if in doubt, which was plenty that night.

But even a well trained, well aware, good pilot taking the quick initiative of a full ND stick, I am quite sure would have taken a quick glance to the THS wheel, and its position indicator, just to confirm once more for himself, in a fraction of a second, where things are, before acting with the stick....

Furthermore: if I take the reference to THS at its full NU position, when the a/c was already in full Stall, we can only refer to Stall Recovery, not Stall Avoidance, as the procedure to be applied.

Stall Recovery points again to incomplete training, and practicing, as the ND is counter-intuitive and counter-reflex to the reflex of holding altitude - altitude is known that is being lost.

Developing reflexes similar to, or for Stall Recovery is done for military pilots, in addition to those for holding altitude, and it is not just by telling them what needs be done, but by hours and days of practicing.

Perhaps an analogy is called - "the skater/hokey player/ice figure skater" analogy:

"Skating" cannot be taught just by telling one how to do skate. It needs practicing, so that one develops reflexes that add to, or counter those of walking.

Furthermore, a good Hockey Player skating reflexes will not make him instantly an ice-figure skater. It again, requires more than the understanding of what need be done, it requires practicing, and building adequate reflexes.

We could in fairness narrow down such a number to those "at night, and turbulence"

I was moved by your Saint-Exupery previous reference, but your reference to Kant is not less, it's more.... Kierkegaard next? :)

That is important, but alone will not do it.... as there is a lot, lot more than that to it...

.
That is depressingly similar to the statistics and response to the known O ring issue on the Space Shuttle solid boosters.

A back up safety system that has prevented disaster 30 times does not prove that the systme is safe.

Personally a 3% chance of buying the farm if a known fault occurrs is a disturbing thought.

Who said this is not as important as what it means:

"The Pilot, if input ND would cause the THS to follow." (POST STALL).

That is categorically incorrect. No "sustained input" would budge that THS off NUFULL. Neither would it have moved UP if there was room left for it.

I think it was FUNCTIONALLY locked. takata told us so, and I believe him.
It was essentially unavailable, PARKED in NU. No excuses for STALLSTALL, but once STALLED, this a/c was done. IMHO.

It is shown in airtren's and mm43's graphs. Why the THS moves only that one time, and directly to FULLNU? And then STAYS PUT?

The g traces. And ALTERNATE LAW COMMANDMENTS.

If so, and I truly believe it to be the case, that might limit the Pilot's options?

I think the PF's insistence on NU had a (good) reason, and simply because we can't see it, does not make it laughable.

I also think his efforts at flying had zero to do with what he may have thought of a long litany of numpties may have in the way of judgment for him. (To include myself, with respect).

Bear, I don't think your'e right about that. Alt 2 latched does not mean "flight control locked and no longer able to be moved." The THS movement lags behind Side stick commands, since the elevators are the flight control surfaces that first adjust to meet the change in condition called for by the Side Stick.

This order of operations aids and abets smooth flight. The elevators first change, and THS then adjusts (unless in Direct law) to the new demand to reduce the need for elevator deflection. This sequential set of flight surface changes creates a new equilibrium point, from which the next control deflection change is made.

With that in mind, unless we can conclude that, at a certain AoA, elevators lost the ability to change the airflow, and thus could not initiate that order of operations wherein the THS adjusts to the new position, then your statement that the THS could no longer be moved cannot be agreed.

Also, in the incipient, early stall time period, when the aircraft first stalled (within the first minute and while there was still some momentum carrying the aircraft up, see HN39's graph two threads ago for that relationship) there is ample reason to believe, and energy available, and the THS at a low enough angle, to recover from the stalling regime with sustained nose down.

You misunderstand, and I was less than clear. The THS was FUNCTIONALLY unavailable. It was "LOCKED" by "DESIGN". Not a deliberate blunder, but a blunder, due blind spot created by belief in a less than "best" system.

a/p LOSS - STALL...............Phase ONE (my description)

STALL-STALL - THS migration........Phase TWO (again, mine)

Rest of Descent - Impact...... Phase THREE. (my label).

Look at how clearly the THS movements occupy the PHASE TWO, and are absent from ONE, and THREE?


The THS is inhibited above 1.25g and below .75 g.

Where are the 'Disinhibited' g regions? Climbing, she was gyrating, experiencing g excursions. At Apogee, she was 'docile'/g compliant, and the THS rumbles UP. Descending, she bucks, ROLLS, and nods, g non compliant (per THS LOgIC). THS UNAVAILABLE BY (lack of) DESIGN.

This is opinion, and to grow it wants an FBW (330) wonk, and that is NOT ME.

(You inject: "But she was recoverable, and Pilot.....". That is not germane to the THS FUNCTION as relates 'g'.....) Yes the PF commanded NU, and the THS complied; stipulated, and rejected as not relevant? Availability of THS is this topic, for me, relative to DESIGN.

Maybe a different thread, for my opinion goes beyond what we see, here, even in the traces. We could set up an exercise independent of this accident, because DESIGN is a concrete thing, and can disguise itself in "traces". OR PF inouts, etc. Mixing a theoretical with an actual may not be appropriate?

Bear, you lost me. The "locked" descriptive seems not to mesh with the design feature that leaves open control of the THS, to move up or down, via the trim wheels regardless of elevator position or AoA. (If that isn't the case, it means my understanding is deficient).

No further comment.

It must be a complete waste of time building simulators with full motion in your case then.

AIRCRAFT WITH SOFTWARE
 

All the posts show that we only look at the failures of the aeronautical skills, without interest at software reality.
To be sure of the way of flying of such an aircraft with software beside the Captain and the FOs, it is MANDATORY to use computer science rules.

The safety of any software is very complex to establish, but possible.

Find there an short but very important extract of the Inquiry Board report after the first flight of Ariane 5 launcher who ended in a failure (Chairman of the Board J.L. LIONS, Académie des Sciences, Médall Fields) :

:bored:
"The view had been taken that software should be considered correct until it is shown to be at fault. [...]
The Board is in favour of the opposite view, that software should be assumed to be faulty until applying the currently accepted best practice methods can demonstrate that it is correct".

With all due respect, that's a straw man argument. Full-motion simulators are there to teach you a measure of how the aircraft responds and how it feels - and as such are as valuable in teaching sticking to the instruments *in spite* of what you feel as they are teaching when that feel is a positive reinforcement of technique.

Once upon a time there was an expression "flying by the seat of one's pants" that was accepted and even admired. We stopped believing in that nonsense long ago and there is no turning back.

Fly by the seat of one's pants

Hi DozyWannabe,

With all due respect, experienced pilots miss the absent acceleration clues in full motion simulator.

Some complain of motion sickness during turns on the ground. (The real heading doesn't change despite what the visual is doing.)
Some find it more difficult to keep straight on the runway due to the missing side ways acceleration sensation.
Some find it more difficult to judge the flare rate due to the missing vertical acceleration.
Some are too enthusiastic with pitch change during TCAS RA events due no sensation of delta g.

Most of us modify our inputs by what we feel as well as what the flight instruments say. Even autopilot inputs are modified using accelerometers.

What do you dream at night?

Next time, give it a try, include also your capacity to sense deceleration, you'll see how effective and simple it is really. Your pax will love it too you know.

I'm well aware, and I'm certainly not going to argue the toss with you on that count, having no full-motion simulator experience (although I have nearly lost my lunch when my AEF instructor demonstrated a barrel roll and half-loop (Immelmann Turn) in a Chipmunk, so I know something of the phenomenon... :) )

However, the point I was trying to make was this - based on my understanding, as trained pilots it is ultimately at your discretion as to how much emphasis you place on your physical sensations versus what the instruments are telling you. Based on what I was taught before I succumbed to long hair, rock music and pacifism (in no particular order) and washed out of the Air Cadets as a result (in fact, somewhere in the dustiest recesses of my Mum's loft is a box containing my Cranwell prospectus and completed application form - lest anyone think I was never serious), it is a rare occasion indeed where your instruments are more likely to give a false impression than your inner ear. Even if one of the instruments in the scan is giving you faulty information, there should be enough information provided by the others to keep you right-side-up and give you a sporting chance of getting back to terra firma in one piece.

There have been more than a few examples in the last couple of decades where pilots have mishandled airliners due in whole or in part to failing to trust their instruments, most or all of which were functioning normally (Flash Airlines and Birgenair to name a couple). Don't get me wrong, I understand the importance of feel in the tactile channel, but on the other hand I think that safe airliner operation is more than feasible without it. I also think that the arguments for retaining autotrim in Alternate Law outweigh the arguments against - with the proviso that the behaviour of the systems in Alternate Law are taught properly (which, according to PJ2 in the R&N thread, they are and always have been based on Airbus's own training materials):



@Bearfoil/Lyman/Will Fraser:

That is an out-and-out misrepresentation. What takata posted was this (emphasis mine):

Sustained nose-down input at the apogee and/or rolling the trim wheel forward manually would therefore have been perfectly successful in trimming *down* at high-g loading.

I'm now more than a little suspicious of your continued attempts to sow misinformation in this thread and the others.

I am afraid for all those arguing otherwise and suggesting that perceived acceleration is a valuable tool in evaluating your situation that Clandestino is right. If you ignore your instruments you run into a dangerous game where you can misperceive with great ease. This has been proved again and again and it can even vary within an individual depending on their physical and mental state. The only way to ensure safe flying is reference to your instruments.
With reference to those arguing that the displays were somehow confusing, this is rather a training/human problem. You work with your equipment as it is not as you would like it to be and if you enter a new cockpit environment you take time to lean the differences. These gentlemen were familiar with the cockpit environment though and as such should have responded appropriately. The reason they didn't is due to human psychology not machine failure.

"pawned" I believe is the current youthful vernacular?

Once again, the original purpose of the discussion on these threads have been twisted for whatever purpose.
It is entirely possible to see a point where all knowledgeable contributors no longer post due to the possibility of their postings being taken, re submitted falsely and then distributed further.

So that's false

even though the majority of the descent was between those figures anyway.

So look at the g accels again 2:10:51/2:11:46. As the THS is cranking in FULLNU, the g decreases "accordingly".

No further comment.

In fairness, that statement is not 100% false - the inhibiting bellow a certain g is true.

It can be amended, see bellow:

THS auto-trim is conditional to the load factor as follows:

THS auto-trim is limited between 'actual setting' and 2 degrees ND, when the load factor is above 1.3g.

THS auto-trim is inhibited/frozen when the load factor is bellow 0.5g.

Note: I used values from the copy of FCOM I had access to - "load factors" numbers seem to vary depending on documents referred (mine has 1.3g, and 0.5g).

BEA Report shows that Normal Acceleration varied within 1.65g to 0.6g range.

Roulishollandais,

So far, I don't think there is an indication within the perspective available on this forum that there is any software problem/bug.

If you see such an indication, please be specific.

In general, software is written according to system architecture and system block, or component functions, calculations and parameters specifications.

If any mechanism failed in its expected behavior - like the Stall Warning - there is no indication so far that it was because of a software problem or bug.

It is known it was because of NCDs (non calculated data) - due to icing and extreme AoA, which have inhibited certain sensors.

@airtren - The point is that the high-g number to which Lyman/Bearfoil/Will Fraser referred to is false and he was misrepresenting Takata's post (which was a very cheeky move, seeing as takata has not contributed since the 5th thread and as such was not here to refute the claims that our prolific water-muddying poster was making).

It won't autotrim any further nose-up over 1.25g, but the only limit for no autotrim whatsoever is 0.5g. If what you say is correct, and the FDR values indicate 1.65g max and 0.6g min, then there was nothing stopping autotrim from commanding the THS *nose-down* at any point. The other implication from takata's post was that manual THS trim is not subject to those restrictions, and that even if 0.5g was achieved, the manual trim wheels could still have commanded nose-down at any point. Now I remember from the very early days of the investigation that the THS nose-up trim stopped at 13 degrees with a theoretical maximum of 14. Could the g-loading demand limitation have kicked in to prevent it from moving that last degree in the wrong direction?

Either way, it is becoming increasingly clear to me that our prolific friend is looking more like the kind of sciolist that the big red letters at the bottom of every page caution us all about with every post he makes, and I'm hoping the mods will do some digging of their own to confirm or refute that idea. I may not be a pilot, but at least I'm honest about my intentions.

Old Carthusian,

The reading of your post seems to indicate an implying that there was no problem with any of the cockpit instruments, and all the pilots had to do is just follow them.

That would not be aligned with the BEA Report which states very clearly all the information known up to this time about which left side and backup instrument indications were and which were NOT available or functioning correctly and for how long, based on FDR and CVR data.

As the right side instruments are not recorded on the FDR, the availability of information will be clearer if that data can be reconstructed from other sources.

Furthermore, you seem to imply that there was a training problem in flying using instruments.

The lapsus in their training seem to be less, or none about how to use the instruments. It was mostly about how to handle the airplane at high altitude in loss of speed indications conditions, and then in stall approach and stall conditions.

Hi,

Little more ...

jcjeant

HazelNuts39

g 'demand'. g 'command'. g 'limit'. g 'inhibit'.

Pick an axis (of the three), and explain how you get 'muddy water'? Better still, consider the three dimensional expression of this LOC. I'll wait.

Consider that TRIM is not an excursion, it is DWELL. It is anti maneuver, not pro. Different? No, opposite.

Dozywannabe,

Did you read "the" post?

The possible alternative to your interpretation is that the poster simply didn't recall accurately the FCOM text, or Takata's posted data, and posted information as he best could remember, at the excitement of his momentous recollection and inspiration. .... It is an opinion, with a number of disclaimers, as clearly stated by the author ...

Misinterpretation of data, lapses in memory are not uncommon even on official corporate or inter-corporate industry wide, or international standardization body forae, or mailing lists, on which the membership is very strict, and the technical level and content is as high as it can be.

They are in abundance on this Forum, and nobody gets or should be kicked out or censored for that, IMO.

This is a public domain Forum for discussion, with Aviation focus, with an open membership that is a lot wider than the professional variety of the Aviation industry in itself, which is very wide as it is, so stricter technical guidelines for information than those specified by the rules of the Forum do not seem to fit.

So personally, I don't have one bit of worry that anyone could intentionally hijack this thread and drive it into the ditch by injecting certain information. At the rate of posting, at the number and technical level of contributing members, and with the open public availability of Airbus documents and BEA reports, that's out of question. And of course don't worry, with someone that posts under what I perceive an enthusiastic drive to find explanations, rather than a mischievous intention to cause damage.
Ignoring, if bothered, is in such a Forum case a choice, IMO a lot less polluting, or image harmful than personal attacks.

Hm.... I am warming up, it's probably enough of a personal opinion.... so, can we relax now?:) and enjoy the technical dialog on the Forum?

There were several posts several pages back on this thread, based on data from Airbus documentation and the BEA report, including some graphs, with a discussion on the effect of the Elevator ND deflection, depending on the THS NU, Neutral or ND position, which I think captured well the effects of the THS.

Airtren
You seem to be chasing after a barrel full of red herrings. There is no evidence to indicate that the right and left displays were showing different information (which is what you seem to be implying - apologies if I am wrong in attributing this meaning to your post). The aircrew following proper scan procedures including the artificial horizon would have been rapidly appraised of the situation. In fact there are implications that the PNF did have some clue but didn't take any action. The PF did not perform a proper scan which suggests psychological issues and training issues. If the crew had followed SOPs, CRM and the procedure for UAS this accident wouldn't have happened. This is a training and CRM issue nothing else. I take it you have flown at night using instruments? If so you will know exactly what I am talking about when I talk about instrument flying.

Hi,

They had an artificial horizon or a half artificial horizon :confused:
I ask again for be sure to understand how the PF was able to give commands to level wings (if the many lateral commands had this means .. of course) and not able to give enough nose down elevators commands .. viewing the artificial horizon display ......

Old Carthusian;
Perhaps the human factors group which the BEA's Alain Bouillard has implemented and directed to investigate these questions will learn why this was so. I wonder if there was a "cockpit gradient" issue - two F/O's do not have the same nature of authority and decision-making that a Captain/FO crew do. The discussion, which I know has been had here, about who was in command "really", as well as actually, is only part of this notion. In fact I get the subtle sense that the gradient was from right to left - higher in the right seat even though he was the junior crew member.

IIRC, clear direction was not provided by the captain on which crew member was to command the airplane, vice who was just going to fly.

Making a firm decision in such circumstances can be problematic depending upon company policies, training and even personalities.

Some airlines do not utilize two First Officers in Long Haul operations and provide two separate crews - Captain and F/O, to relieve the first crew. Whether this will turn up as an issue or even a comment we cannot say depending upon other factors that the Human Factors Group will discover.

Stall Warning
 

jcjeant:

The Stall Warning logic itself is not at fault here.
It's the 'reducing' AoA value to 0° when CAS <60Kts by the ADIRUs which stopped the warning.
(We know they have changed that, don't know if its a part of the optional BUSS mod or if it is a separate -mandatory- mod)

Anyway this will be a legal case, who's to blame?
and I think we already suspect who will be blamed (for operating outside specs) at the end.

PJ2

My thoughts are very much along the same lines as yours with added psychological factors. I don't feel that I have enough information to articulate these in full yet. I do suspect that the Human Factors group is possibly going to be the vital element in establishing the cause of the accident though.

My comments on SOPs, training and CRM are because I feel that what has so far emerged supports this line of thinking.

Hi A33Zab
Would you (if you may) elaborate on the changes which have been made?
- what was changed, what is the new "logic"?
- when did that change took place, and why (mandatory? issuer?)

Thanks :)

To those who seek to defend Bear/Lieman:
 

Personally I have now TOTALLY given up reading any of the "selective reading disorder" originated posts by Bear/Lyingman/whatever, however I DO BELIEVE he is not in this for the good of aviation at all, but for the aggrandizement of Bear/Lyingman/whatever... glory in the screen pixels seems to be the only intent. Which is entirely sad and distracting to the well intended who post here.

Some here will have forgotten how adamant Bear was that the V/S was "torn off" early in the accident sequence... on and on, page after page, recurring at painful regularity, despite many who provided meaningful analysis on how that was not at all likely... and it wasn't/didn't.

Here we are again, on some "evil autotrim campaign" - autotrim "locked", babble, blah, etc.

The simple fact is the traces show that ND commands (few though they were) continued to control the pitch attitude, the THS had NOT locked the aircraft NU, and the damn thing was commanded NU on average all the way into the Ocean. If you like, autotrim, through a time-lagged smoothing function, attempted to offload the elevator demand COMMANDED BY THE PF... nothing more, subject a few limits to prevent stupid things happening. There are momentary periods where the "g" limit was reached, but the MEAN 'g' load was nowhere near the limit and as such the THS system was (hello!) AVAILABLE. It didn't move the THS, because the pilot did not demand it so... he asked for NU and got it. End of story.

There is an undeniable problem with any forum member who attempts to hide his identify be attempting to create a new one. Unless psycho-Bear/Lyingman/whatever can rationally explain why he did this (other than as an attempt to hide) then I'd suggest that this tactic alone is grounds to have his rantings eliminated from grown-up discussion.

And no, I'm not the board moderator, so by all means mods delete this post if it is deemed out of line. I have learned to skip over any post originated by our Troll, but the responses to his posts are a little hard to avoid, since several folks answering the loon have mostly worthwhile contributions.

Having stuck with this thread for 2+ years now, I'll be damned if I am driven away now, but seriously Bear - get off this stupid campaign that the airplane DID IT. The airplane did what the PF asked. Why he asked is a valid question, how to avoid someone making that same sequence of requests of the aircraft is valid, but to continuously infer, jumping from one theory to another, that the aircraft did anything without the pilots input demand is plain misleading. People screw up - professionals and non alike, in this case the result had a very bad outcome. Get over it.

Let's see, one wearing a costume derides another wearing a costume for having more than one.

Do you think you have some manner of "call-sign?" A sussable ID?

This is an anonymous forum. You are straightforward and righteous, you have worn only one disguise?

The THS is inhibited >1.25, <.5. I mentioned .75. My Bad. I try attribution, and am "sowing pollution"?

"TRIMMABLE" HORIZONTAL STABILISER. That is not a correct designation, in design, practice, and Training. In fact, it is opposite what is trained.

What is trained is to leave the wheel alone, Only in DIRECT LAW challenge the virginity of the wheel and assault her with your palm.

NOT TRIMMABLE.

'TRIMMABLE' is an adjective, and describes a state of "readiness" or "availability".

"Subject to COMMAND". So the computer "commands" it, automatically, in its design. The PILOT is discouraged from COMMANDING it.

Parse? Words have meanings, and read with patience can be found to be used inappropriately, and perhaps dangerously so.

It is a TRIMMING Horizontal Stabiliser. In this discrepancy, patiently seen, can be a wealth of discussion as to how this system (AB) works, by design, application, and culture.

TRIMMABLE.....Optional. TRIMMING......MANDATORY.

In the climb, the pilot commanded NOSE UP, and the THS did not move. The THS was responding ("not responding") per design, not part of PF's quiver, for the moment (his 'bad').

At STALL, the THS responded immediately, and to the maximum, NOSE UP.

By DESIGN. Responding to PF NOSE UP? Or to gain loading for the airframe when it was less than 1g? Both?

Later, it went 'Dormant' at NOSE UP all the way down.

Posit. The a/c was UPSET at the loss of a/p, and LOC happened soon after ~ . With LOSS OF CONTROL, a design that trims in elevator for its retention when maneuvering is the order of the day? Hmmm.....

The THS, as it moves, changes the flight characteristics of the airframe, it changes the ANGLE OF INCIDENCE of the aircraft, as well as its PITCH.

This is why ANGLE OF INCIDENCE is considered separate from AoA, for it is a critical component of AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE.

Until one separates these two concepts AOI, AOA, the manner of control cannot be explained.

The HS is a VARIABLE INCIDENCE TAILPLANE, and focusing on its elevator chasing is missing the point, in a deadly way. Is this trained? Or is the training, merely, "don't touch that", and on your way?

Its a shame that a technical thread can deterioate so badly because we don't all communicate under the same politeness.

In most of the forums that I have been, multiple user IDs are verbotten unless specifically permitted by the management. The worst is when a multiple ID user has more than one active at any one time seemingly to support their own opinions.

Thus I avoid all technical back and forth arguments where I suspect that this is going on.

Loma

For goodness' sake. Technical/Anonymous forum is an oxymoron.

If you want white papers, credibility, and professional integrity, there are other places.

"PopGun69" is a revered aluminium laminator of astrolabes on to TRIDENTs and MUST be respected for his contributions, etc....

We are what we are, and I do my best at all times to be respectful. I don't issue edicts as to behavior, or moral judgment on imaginary slights.

The reason I stay is because I know what it is. If anyone here flies pursuant to my opinions, they need a mental/medical. Likewise you. And all the others.

I keep my skin thick, my mouth reasonably clean, and practice respect.

My disrespect I reserve for machines, and you will have noticed I do not throw mud at the dead.

The a/c is a gd DEVICE. It is not someone's puppy, or girlfriend. Drama is best reserved to make a point, not to cast aspersions into the ether, at those who are unknown to the caster.

get a grip?

Lyingman: You've seen this > http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46062...ml#post6650540

Tell me WEHRE in these traces does the THS NOT follow the ELEVATOR?

From 2.10.45 the elevators are continuously NU to some greater or lesser extent, but NU they stay. So does the THS... why wouldn't it?

You are correct. Why do you ask me your question? It is the job of the THS to "follow the elevators". Agreed?


You find that appropriate? The thrust of my disagreement is not with you, but with the design.

Let me pose a question. Say that with the dgrd to AL2, the THS was inhibited, no "TRIM". In fact, no TRIM til Degaulle, and some mx attentions. Do you see a possibly better result?

I do. What do you think? Does the TRIM TANK have baffles? I honestly don't know? Will you make an attempt to understand my position?

Many here see a wall because the PF input NU. Because he did, they refuse to even discuss other possibilities.

447 is done. They are lost. Who is at fault? The only thing left is to change what we can, not fossilize ourselves in pointless personality attack.

"Lyingman"? Do you understand how immature that makes you appear?

Old Carthusian,

I appreciate the apology, as that puts us in line with interpreting the data, which means staying within the "technical" realm, and not the "how", or "why" I am interpreting the data the way I do, which is in the "personal" realm.

This thread is about discussing elements that members consider important, and pertinent to the AF 447 airplane accident, and your post was just that.

Therefore, my apology is due, if my sloppiness in writing my post has made it look more than simply an iteration of some of the content of the BEA Report.