reply to Count Niemantznarr:

yes whilst in testing recovery by an experienced test pilot can be done but in practise a number of tridents and other aircraft have been lost in a `super stall`;

ASN Aircraft accident Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 1C G-ARPY Felthorpe

ASN Aircraft accident Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 1C G-ARPI Staines

ASN Aircraft accident Canadair CRJ100 (CL-600-2B19) C-FCRJ Byers, KS

I agree we've gone as far as we can with what we know.However,training issues havent really surfaced.Full stalls are trained in flight school.In airlines,only the approach to stall is trained and minimum altitude loss is always emphasized.This might lead to a dangerous mindset for newish pilots;the altitude loss is as important as recovery.Significant altitude loss is a dead cert at altitude.High altitude upset recovery also rarely trained.Other training issues that I can think of;crews anxiety over busting altitude when facing speed loss at altitude.Crews have been known to wait for ATC clearance before descending.Turn off airway and DESCEND IMMEDIATELY.The use of weather radar has been addressed but they knew there was weather up ahead.Tilt,gain and brightness control are possible traps.Captain's rest already discussed.

Combine the gaps in training with airline-endorsed automation reliance and the peculiarities of the Airbus and you have enough ammunition to establish a strong case for pilot error with strong and genuine mitigating circs.

Rananim:
In the case at hand the captain should have ordered that the nose be lowered 15-20 degrees nose down and he should have reached over and set cruise-descent power while telling the pilots to ignore airspeed indications.

Although the turn off airway is the ICAO method, in this case it could have resulted in increased disorientation. Wings level was critical until a safe, stable configuration was assured.

The Perpignan A320 report says something quite critical - the THS only moves once the elevators are driven beyond neutral.

It's not enough just to push the stick forward, the elevators have to go past the neutral setting.

I don't know if the A330 works the same way. But that would explain why the THS stayed put despite nose-down stick.

Too much to read but if all else fails turn all ADIRS off. Make direct law happen and fly it like a cessna. Stick forward and centered. Fulll power. Wings level and recover. Otherwise 80%and 2.5 nose up. Airline industry no training for UAs or chamber (depress) runs. What a joke. Don't be near rec max (coffin corner). And go around the weather. 100 mm plus who gives a !!!!. ATC are advisory only. Do what you need too do. No one one on the ground will save you. You are the pilot. If not, get out of the cockpit and let the big bIg boys (well trained ie Sully) do it for you. The moral of the story is don't fly into thumderstorms! Any questions?
One hint Power plus Attitude equals performance. Descend and get some CLs

Complete and utter nonsense, Count Numbnuts! The VC10 did not have 'droops', the maximum altitude for flying with slats/flaps extended was 20000ft. Flying with flap/slat at 20/OUT or even 14.5/OUT at such heights at flap limiting speed burns a colossal amount of fuel; it would NEVER have been an airline's policy.

I look forward to some sane comments once the report has been fully released. Meanwhile, I hope that pilots will be encouraged to learn more about their aeroplanes and systems rather than becoming dumbed-down auto flight system and ECAM monitors.

MRGTC.............

I agree with your solutions, but I would point out that civilian airline pilots trained in the 50s, 60s, 70s, and possibly 80s, were trained well. They had 'airmanship'.

I have flown with many ex-forces pilots who were bordering on useless. I think some of them had only kept their jobs because they were, in UK parlance, 'civil servants'.

Please don't presume to be superior - you (possibly) are not.:)

Hi, MRGTC, I got my training in the military. If I may ...
Considering that they were night, IFR, turning off the ADIRS turns off the attitude reference system. Not so sharp to get rid of the attitude indicator in night IFR flying in bad weather. Deliberate partial panel with 200 pax aboard is below average headwork, don't you think? Also, you might note that the back up instrument panel doesn't have a VSI. I'd leave them fancy electric flight instruments on.
It isn't one. Ya don't fly a Phantom like a C-130 either.
You talking about stall recovery or stall prevention?

If stalled, nose up and power may or may not get me out of it, depends on what I was doing when I stalled, and how close to critical AoA I am. I'd suggest dropping the nose, wings level, until flying again, and then adjust power and attitude to regain level flight.

As to Power and attitude. You can go back to this crash, the discussions on this forum, since about 02 June 2009, and find "fly power and attitude" as advice being the running refrain from the Greek Chorus.
When flying toward a line of thunderstorms? :confused: That's what AF 447 was doing.

In the military, they taught us that you go over, around, or through the bottom third of (If you had no way out and could not find a place to land) thunderstorms. Descending into one when way up in the sky ... no, they didn't teach us, and I am pretty sure they didn't teach you that.

Cheers.

Tick, tock, tick, tock ............ :E

Deliberate partial panel not much fun without a turn indicator......

captainsmiffy:

Reminds me of an old Monty Python sketch

"No, not much fun in Stalingrad."

No, not much fun in the goo, in and around CBs in partial panel, or worse ... :uhoh:

I have followed this thread from the start and some posts suggest that the problem with AF447 (and in many other incidents) may have been caused by an ice blocked pitot-tube. But my question is, Airbus must clearly have tested what a blocked pitot tube would tell the computers to do at that flight level and with that speed? Why is it that I always get the feeling that the FBW software always freaks out when the tubes are blocked and putting the crew in "what the heck is it doing now" mode. There have been so many incidents and crashes in the past by this IAS measuring device so I cannot understand why this still is a problem?

I know that IAS and GroundSpeed are totally different things as the aircraft can be flying in heavy headwind etc, but getting an indication of a sudden drop in IAS from 275 kt to 60 kt must definately be verifiable with GPS data in combination of the known headwind prior to the drop and in that way give the pilots a reading that they have NOT lost the speeds.

There must be another way to measure the aircraft's speed through the wind than just putting the trust in 3 heated tubes that seem to clog more often that wanted.

Full backstick & full power almost all the way down.

Is it possible that all the PF saw was the altimeter unwinding at a rapid rate & held full back stick & full power to recover, saying to himself that the computer won't let the aircraft stall?

Isn't that the EGPWS & windshear recovery technique as well?

QF72 style ADIRU failure = nose up
 

The QF72 incident and the earlier QF71 could have been fresh in the minds of the AF447 crew. I recall that the QF72 ADIRU fail caused false warnings of over speed, stall, underspeed, AoA. The QF72 A330 was cruising at mid day in good weather and the erronous flight instrument readings and warnings were immediately obvious and corrected.

As noted by the BEA there were some significant differences between the computer fail of AF447 and QF72. However there was some overlap in symptoms.

The point is that ADIRU malfunction should have been a known issue to the AF crew and they presumably would have had corrective procedures. Unfortunately the ADIRU fail procedures were inappropriate/exacerbating to their true predicament of pitot icing. It would explain the counter-intuitive behaviour of the pilots apparently ignoring the flight instuments and stall warnings and pulling the nose up.

Disagree, and agree with bubbers .........

I can't believe two guys would sit there and only pass the few sparse comments that have been released, knowing what they said ( if only m***de ! ) would help understand what might have been going on on their heads and why they then took the actions that they did.

We are being treated as mushrooms at the moment, and vested interests may well prevail to sit on the full story,releasing only that which suits them - liability issues will be raising their ugly heads already, and it would be naive to think otherwise.

But then I'm a cynic.

The FAA Stall Recovery Procedure:
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/1048360...0Procedure.pdf
Addopted by Airbus Industrie
(if link doesn't work, please copy past it to your browser).

Read the latest Airbus Safety First magazine here for an extended discussion about the new stalling procedure:

http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%...ary%202011.pdf

A pilot needs to be taught this ......? :ugh:

ExSp, why don't they release more information about what they know? The CVR will explain a lot of what happened. They seem to be reluctant to release a lot of results of the CVR and FDR. Eventually I guess they will have to release it. Until then all we can do is speculate about the little released. They have it all now and probably are laughing at our speculations.

Procedure? PROCEDURE?

How about CONDITIONED REFLEX?
:rolleyes: