The news report was utter rubbish, and included unnecessary sensationalism. And Miles O'Brien wondered why the media gets no respect from the pros.

The passengers were never pressed into the backs of their seats, since the aircraft was losing speed. They were never held only by their seatbelts, since that would require negative G's, which they never would have seen as a result of the maneuvers described in the BEA "note".

The initial pitch up would not have been much different than experienced when rotating for taking off. The ride over the top would have certainly been noticed, when they went from a high rate of climb to high rate of descent, but passenger's behinds would have always been solidly in their seats, not dangling from their seatbelts, as suggested in the article.

Once descending, the rate of descent didn't change, so passengers would have only sensed that the nose was pointed up, somewhat like an initial climbout on takeoff on say a DC-10 or 757. There also would have been heavy buffeting. Given that they were flying at night in a storm, the passengers would have had no outside references to know what was happening, and would not have known they were falling. A clue would have been the change in cabin pressure, but how many passengers would connect that with rapid descent?

They weren't falling like a leaf, in the sense of fluttering to earth. As far as the why, that is for the accident report to answer. Like the Colgan Air pilot in Buffalo, they didn't take what should have been an almost reflexive action on hearing the stall warning, namely push the nose down.

The PF knew he was pulling up, but are you sure the PNF knew it? It's not quite as obvious what the other guy is doing with sidesticks, particularly if you are concentrating on a checklist.

Yes, it's easy to say when you know what the end result was, and have had a long time to ponder the situation. Obviously, they were pros, and they were confused about what was happening. The question is why the PF decided to pull back the stick in the first place, since that would indicate what he initially thought was wrong, and set his frame of mind about what needed to be done. It often takes time for someone under great stress to notice things going on around them, since they tend to focus on specific problems with a form of mental tunnel vision. They can therefore miss clues that would be obvious to those not under stress.

Quote: Quote:
The manufacturer Thales was well aware of the catastrophic consequences of a failure of the speed sensors as early as 2005. At the time, the French company concluded that such a failure could "cause plane crashes."

A total of 32 cases are known in which A330 crews got into difficulties because the speed sensors failed. In all the cases, the planes had pitot sensors from Thales, which were significantly more prone to failure than a rival model from an American manufacturer.

But none of the responsible parties intervened. In 2007, Airbus merely "recommended" that the sensors be replaced. Air France took that as a reason not to carry out the costly work -- and it even got official blessing for doing so. The European Aviation Safety Agency wrote that it currently saw "no unsafe condition that warrants a mandatory modification of the Thales pitot tubes."
More rubbish from Der Spiegel. Air France was in the process of changing out the pitot tubes. They received their first shipment of replacement parts a week before the accident, but had not applied them to that particular aircraft.

As to why they did nothing for two years, consider that they were told that there was no safety problem by both the manufacturer and the regulator, and they must have agreed, so why do anything? It's not as though pitot tubes are that expensive when compared to other costs. It was only after a few other incidents that they took action on their own to start the replacements.

Elledan, the Dutch news site is wrong. To be sure of climbing over an ITCZ "lightning storm," the AF flight crew would have to have assumed they might well have to climb as high as 55,000 feet or so, and to do that, they'd have needed the Space Shuttle, not an Airbus. Their sudden climb to 380 had nothing to do with any attempt to top a thunderstorm.

ST27

"The PF knew he was pulling up, but are you sure the PNF knew it? It's not quite as obvious what the other guy is doing with sidesticks, particularly if you are concentrating on a checklist."

It took me three pages to catch up and catch this statement, the rest mostly rehash, argument, etc.

Inferred in this statement are some very basic questions as to where cockpit management and aviating clash. If it turns out that PF was handling the situation poorly (and we have no idea if that is the case), then we have single pilot crew. Not trashing that concept, but ST27 points to a fundamental flaw (perhaps?) in allowing (mandating) a review of procedures developed by folks who were clueless re: the situation to hand. A fully qualified Pilot, rather than assisting in the aviating, is doing a checklist that arguably has no bearing on the current problem(s). Additionally, the procedure requires to distract the PF from his focus?

Here is an identified evidence of the Airline, the Manufacturer, the a/c, and the F/O distracting the recovery. At all times by the book, or memory of the book. PF and F/O were writing a new book, and the old book was horning in, inexcusably.

So in preventing the popular conclusion that all responsible parties were remotely engaged in sabotage by reflex, perhaps the authority will give it up?

Secrecy is Power, make no mistake, and at some time, even the apologists for the archaic dance of power will have to become vocal. Other than to say, "it is complicated".

Thanks to ST27
bear

Some people are better than others at maintaining good situational awareness. I would not belittle training and experience. But even very experienced pilots can become disorientated, as indicated by many sad examples among the accident investigation reports I have studied over the years.

Therefore, IMHO, any instrument which might work counter-intuitively in unusual circumstances, significantly increases the risk of disorientation and its associated consequences if those unusual circumstances should arise.

It remains my tentative view that the stall warning (the one at 2h10min51, perhaps; but mainly the one at 2h1202-17) could well have seemed to indicate that the nose-down inputs were for some reason causing the aeroplane to enter a stall, so discouraging the PF from developing the very inputs which might have led to an exit from the stall.

According to the preliminary report the angle of attack "n’est pas présentée aux pilotes": ie, the instruments did not include an AoA indicator. No longer trusting the airspeed or other indicators ("je n’ai plus aucune indication", and "on n’a aucune indication qui soit valable") it may have seemed to the PF that he faced two risks: going too fast for the airframe, or going too slow for the AoA. He seems to have discounted the second of those risks despite the stall warnings. So stated, this was an irrational response. Therefore, it is probable that something made it appear rational at the time. I suggest that he discounted it partly because of the stall warnings or, rather, because of the timing of the stall warnings and their seeming linkage to his nose-down commands.

Not so fast....Air France was well aware that the pitot tubes where a problem and sat on there hands. Yes, they had ordered them, but in hindsight too late. The fact that AF pilots refused to fly with the Thales pitot tubes after the accident because they were "aware of the problem" suggests that AF was not listening to there own pilots, or the pilots kept quiet...

000tfm000

For the present, the times are merely landmarks, suggestive only of snapshots of aspect, response, input, etc. Just prior the Stall Warning that the pilot is rumored to have disobeyed, he is trending out of a high deck angle, and accelerating. This is the result of a Stall, and he will have known that he is in a Stall. Now you may argue that the alert (only an alert) has dissuaded him from continuing the recovery. Given the sparse frame work of such an argument, I will say that to be 'dissuaded from continued recovery' in the midst of physical cues that affirm it, defames our PF further.

Counsel?

The one at 2h10min51 happened well over 60 kt, so there it wasn't switching back on from a deactivated state.
The second one was, but here no further information about what happened in the next 1m30s is given at all. Maybe he was discouraged, but maybe he kept pushing ND to no avail. We simply don't know because the report doesn't say.

From ST27:If like me you click on the flight map when woken by turbulence, you might notice a drop in altitude/airspeed...

From ST27:Yes, but as you yourself point out they waited two years to do so because EASA told them, quote: "...[that it saw] no unsafe condition that warrants a mandatory modification of the Thales pitot tubes." So whether you blame AF for ignoring the soft Airbus recommendation, or AB for its soft recommendation, or EASA for its hard statement, clearly when even the manufacturer of a part says its a problem these things should not happen. EASA should be focused on one thing only - SAFETY. At least EASA - unlike the FAA - is not operator funded, so it has no excuse.

Who was PF?
 

A number of news articles have stated that the PF was the relief pilot, who was the youngest of the crew, had the least amount of experience on type (800 hrs), and the least total flying time. If that is true, and with the captain going for rest, that would leave the FO as PNF. The FO had the most time on type of all the crew (4500 hrs).

None of the BEA reports have stated who was flying at the time of the upset. Perhaps the media obtained the information as a result of a leak. However, this arrangement seems odd to me.

Can anyone familiar with how work would be assigned on trans-ocean flights comment on whether this would be a typical assignment, given that they were about to fly into the ITCZ?

Actually, I believe there is enough information to determine why the aircraft entered an initial climb after the disconnects - the pilot commanded it to.

Now, I also think that the report is missing some information but the BEA has shared when power settings changed. After the initial AP/THR discconect, no mention of a power change is made - so it is probably at the setting for FL350 and M0.8. The first input is a pilot commanded climb with a max recorded rate of 7,000ft/min. By the time they reached FL375 nose down had reduced that rate of ascent to 700ft/min (I believe that the plane was still climbing at that point albeit much slower than initially).

Without an increase in thrust, there is a trade of speed for altitude. Most likely pilot commanded but turbulence/updrafts may have played a part too. I think if there was an intent to climb over any weather then a thrust setting change would have been made by the PF and none is noted by the BEA.

At 2h10m51s the stall warn sounded. It probably hasn't stalled at this point - the BEA indicates the last 3m30s were stalled and the recording finished at 2h14m28s. That makes the stall a 'fact' at 2h10m58.

John.

Who was PF?
 

According to this article, Bonin was the PF. As you suggest this could very well be pure speculation on the part of the journalist - or possibly based on a leak? 'Baby' pilot at controls of doomed Air France Airbus | The Australian

Deliberate climb to get out of icing but with no reliable speed mismanaged thrust ?

Yeah, that's what I figured. Pilots can fly around a storm, but they can't fly over one. No idea why this news site (usually very reputable) made such a big blunder. Their claim struck me as odd as it was never coined as a possibility elsewhere, especially not on this site :)

The current conclusion seems to draw towards pilot error with equipment failures and gaps in training as likely contributions. The nose-up inputs especially seem beyond merely curious. I really wonder whether there might be anything about that on the CVR.

The trouble is when a pilot is given "a leg" which is more or less what happened when the second officer was PF after the captain had gone down to have some shut-eye, there seems to be a attitude that as PF he hangs on to the decision making and controls even though the real first officer is more qualified and senior in succession. "My leg" is not carte blanche to be in command unless of course the captain is PF.

Clearly in the Air France case the experienced first officer as PNF should have taken control immediately things went wrong. Of course there was no guarantee the F/O could have saved the aircraft either but the political correctness of "my leg" needs to be examined. In my era the captain would at his discretion offer the F/O a take off and/ or a landing. It was never a case of "your leg" with all that implies. It was always the captain's "leg". Every sector was under the command of the captain and supported by his F/O.

Now it is almost seen as an insult to the first officer if the captain decides to take over control of the F/O's "leg". In the case of the Air France accident it is this politically correct mind-set that may have caused the real first officer to assume the subordinate role as PNF while the second officer lost control of the situation.

This is indeed an interesting observation, worthy of a study in itself. Where I work, we have a general inkling that CRM has gone 'bonkers'. It certainly was baffling to me why the Captain did not jump back into the seat and 'take over', until explained this way...

Some unfortunatelty try to do it , it ends up badly most of the time.

In my years as ATC the one I remember best was a transatlantic bound 747 from a major European airline (now defunct) who decided against the 60-80NM dogleg that everyone else was doing to avoid a line of CBs above Belgium. He asked to climb to FL390 to keep its route , then when above dropped down 5 or 6 thousanfds feet right inside. His voice was shaken afterwards. The incident report must still be out somewhere.

2 weeks a go an A320 tried the same thing above Germany, with same results. 3xmayday, dropped 4000ft etc..
Rare events , sure ,but not unheard of.

Allocation of (PF) flight legs to crew.
 

A37575:

It is not a right that every other leg belongs to the F / O or 2nd Captain.

It is the Commander's decision to allocate the legs, if he wants to.

The decision of the Captain, to go to the "bunk" so early in the flight seems strange to me, however he must have had a reason.

Not really, as I think has been mentioned earlier in the thread if it's pure timing we're questioning here then if the Captain had "second break" the timing makes sense.

On the broader issue of him being "off watch" during the ITCZ crossing, personally, I think you have to take into account the fact that he left two fully rated pilots up front - not cruise only copilots. If we're saying a Captain shouldn't ever leave the Flight Deck because inclement weather is forecast in the cruise how do we suggest handling say, traversing Asia or Indonesia during the monsoon season or the North Atlantic if there's forecast of occasional severe CAT all the way across the pond......two Captain ops/no in flight rest :eek:????

(BTW am I alone in often not being able to see the last page of the thread?)

Dumb question
 

Maybe a dumb question from a dumb SLF - wouldn't it make sense to have a mechanism that blows into the Pitot tube from the inside to test if it is clogged? If there is higher resistance than its clogged and disregard readings. Maybe it can also be cleaned that way...?