Not at all. For someone like myself it provides a balanced view of the issues from the perspective of a pilot, which is something I can do my level best to empathise with and "put myself in the shoes of" based on theory and my few AEF/AEG hours (along with a career path which also primarily uses me as a cog in the mechanism, despite my training and experience giving me more latitude if I need it), but can never wholly replicate, which is why any post I make on here automatically comes with caveats.

It's good stuff as far as I'm concerned - more please!

Not quite, as always context is everything. As far as informatics (i.e computer) algebra goes, it depends on the definition of A and B. If they are both constants, then what you say is true (or to elaborate, A and B share the same value, even if they do not refer to the same "object"), that said, if two constants are defined as having the same value, then one of those constants is effectively redundant. If either are variables, then the value of either can change at a later stage, rendering the expression "A=B" transient.

(Hark at me, talking discrete maths at 2am on a Sunday morning - how rock'n'roll am I? :8)

Just noticed this - and you're right, technically it *should* be enough, and with the new stall recovery procedures one would hope this was a plugged "hole-in-the-cheese"*. However, non-practiced responses and training to correctly identify an *actual* stall still worry me. I've said this before (Hell, at this point there's very little I *haven't* said before, so thanks for putting up with me), but how much of an airline's training budget would be eaten up by once a year taking a single-engined trainer up and practicing an *actual* stall recovery or ten? As a touch-typist and guitarist I'm well aware of how much I rely on muscle memory - surely it must be similar with pilots?

* - I'm aware that the emerging new techniques in determining behaviour patterns, including our own PBL's "why-because" work, give a far more detailed and complete picture of accident sequences, however I still think the "holes-in-the-cheese" method is a great way of rendering this stuff comprehensible to the layman, as well as requiring a few paragraphs to summarise, as opposed to a dissertation! ;)

Taking your cheese holes a bit further, I would submit that any hole plugged before STALL makes improvements in STALL recovery rather a Red Herring. Nice, but doesn't obtain.

The hole to which I refer is the hole of Dependence on auto flight.

More specifically, a lack of preparation to address known possibilities for critical handling problems.

Dependence leading to disastrous initial mismanagement, highlighting a glaring insufficiency of Leadership on the Flight deck.

For me, it would be sufficient to address the procuring cause: the lack of skills in emergent situations, well ahead of Departure. (STALL, not push back).

This STALL, UA, etc, "Training" thing, sorry, is a ruse. Because what you want is more Rote drill, and SOPS; a track I predict further cements the problem in 'insolubility'.

PJ2 concludes the accident "began with the initial NOSE UP." That is not established at all, as he is in discussion with others whether "handling at drop" is indicated, or not. And that whether 2.5 or 5.0! By drill!

The STALL lacked conventional (!) cues, and "Recogniton of Approach to STALL" is well addressed in SIM; there is no evidence we should be supplying cadets with Schweizers, and spin training.

The shortfall is in Situational awareness, and that is not easy to expect, operationally, and given the aforementioned dependence on its hypnotic nemesis: Autoflight. imho.

Proviso. The Dependence to which I refer, is not flightcrews'. Crew are prevented from any reasonable solution to this dangerous dependence, and as I have pointed out: The PILOT GROUP DOES NOT SELF TRAIN.

READ: AIRBUS, AIR FRANCE.

ChristiaanJ
All this deserves that we will investigate a little more this "conspiracy"

Source:
http://bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.a...oup.report.pdf


Here is what has delayed for nearly two years the discovery of the wreck
They know that the oil stain is not that of a boat
They knows that AF447 last know position was in the vicinity of this oil stain
This could have come from AF447
What made the BEA?
The BEA note this information
After some time (other debris found .. etc. ..) make it a study of currents, etc. .. (they say themselves very difficult given the fluctuating number of parameters)
After the experts work and reports .. they assumes several points (points found by a study based on assumptions) and find that they can't connect them with the oil slick seen before
So the oil slick has nothing to do with the accident ... BEA think .. but in mean time they dunno from where (not a ship at least) come this oil :uhoh:

Remark :
BEA know that the plane had broken in pieces when contacting sea .. and BEA know it was a certain quantity of fuel aboard.

So no need to investigate further more the area ... and all are going fishing far away .....
But so what?
Where does this oil slick
The lack of curiosity and good sense of BEA has cost 2 years ... not to mention money ... is not negligible in an investigation :eek:

@jcjeant - I'm pretty sure that the BEA themselves (whose speciality is investigating accidents) would have delegated the details of precisely where to search to the oceanographic survey and research teams subcontracted to do the work, as locating objects at the bottom of the se is *their* speciality.

Why this bitterness towards the BEA from you anyway? They seem to have been doing a pretty good and transparent job so far...

Well in the wishy-washy world of software it may be acceptable to abuse math symbols, but in math "=" means what it means - A=B does not mean A is equivalent to B. There are symbols for equivalence and ways of dealing with classes of things that are equivalent. That's a different statement than equality. Maybe software is in such bad shape because the people who make it generally are not very good at math.

@deSitter: Discrete maths ≠ Pure maths. Now are you going to say something useful or just snark away?

Hi,

Transparent ? .. so far I can agree (with some reserves...)
Pretty good ? my post tell me the contrary (they were involved in the researches)

Lyman,
Is it possible that you could change your language from Inneundo to Englishendo please... a bit is OK from time to time I think, but am oft struggling with your persistent form of flowery prose.

Cannot deny that Situational Awareness will be considered, and commented upon although maybe taking a back seat to CRM

A lot of us are not............................:)

And it's not their area of expertise, so I think holding the BEA largely responsible for the time it took to locate the thing is a little unfair.

For an idea of just how difficult it is to perform that kind of work, I'd recommend doing a little research on the 1985 WHOI/IFREMER expedtion to find the last resting place of the Titanic (among other things, now that info has been declassified).

Despite their best efforts, they only found it in the last two days of a mission that lasted several weeks (they'd have found it right at the start if not for a major blunder), and that was a 900ft iron ship in two major sections on a flat abyssal plain. The AF447 recovery expedition was trying to find pulverised scraps of aluminium from an approximately 200x200ft airliner in underwater mountains, which is an order of magnitude more difficult even with the advances in technology over the last 25 years.

For those that are interested, part of the classified mission involved the US half of the team going off to search for two sunken USN nuclear subs, which were easier to find due to exact satellite positioning at the time they sank. But what the US team discovered was that far larger and more widespread than the main pieces of wreckage was a debris trail of smaller, lighter items that trailed the larger wreckage as it sank. Pick up the debris trail, went the theory - and it would lead you straight to the wreckage.

Of course, all of the debris and wreckage in these cases came to rest on a more-or-less flat plain, so the trail was much easier to find and follow than it would be on the mountainous terrain in which AF447's wreckage was thought to be. The other major problem with mountainous terrain would be the fact that even if the flight recorder pingers were working, the sonar signals could bounce off the surrounding terrain, making following the trail even *more* difficult.

Hazelnuts
Please, take a read of the post I made.

In that post, I discuss the outcome of the hypothetical that Clandestino presented, of simply applying five degrees nose up, at that altitude, as a sufficient response to UAS. It is not a critique of the AF447 events, which you and I can agree did not merely set the nose at five degrees up.

PJ2: Will need to chew on your magum opus entry before responding.

Amos: I'm gonna stay on your lawn.

Hi,

Not at all.
BEA lead the investigations.
They hired experts
The experts suggest .. don't decide
The ultimate decision for choice search areas is in the BEA hands
They lead the investigation .. they are to be responsible of their actions and decisions
Fair enough

Boring.
The whole discussion is turning in circles with stubborn defending of backyards. To each creature its feature it seems.

However, some arguments need some haircutting.

1. It is constantly argued, that most critics of the Airbus philosophy have never operated such, therefore are denied to be entitled to criticism (funnily enough many of those pretendants have not themselves either!). However, when critics appear that actually have flown A and B, they are cried down being romantic fossils wanting to go back.

A typical self serving distortion of arguments.


2. To counter the demand for certain improvement on A, the protectionists constantly bring up statistics pretending how much safety has improved. Statistics are made for a purpose, by people with an agenda. We tend to use the ones serving our cause and decrying the supposedly tampered ones that don’t.

If we start weighing statistics versus genuine concerns of involved professionals, then we are on a more than slippery slope.


3. Human error is a fact and will never go away. Trying to implement improved technology to mitigate the risk is fine, as long as we really acknowledge that this in itself can add new traps.
Implying that human error is only happening on the pilot side however is simply arrogant and dangerous. There is a widespread acceptance of pilot error, just as there is a widespread denial of design/engineering error (we all know why).

Engineers err, managers err, regulators err, as it is human. Or do they consider themselves beyond that?


Two discussed design errors:

A. The absence of feedback on primary controls seems to be such an error. The mere fact of the many critics on this thread should be concern that there is a malaise, bring up as many statistics as you want. The presence of pro (fill in any ME dictator) demonstrators can never wipe out the just as many opponents. Such issues must be addressed, belittleing them or brushing them aside approaches dictatorship.

B. The fact that an aircraft is allowed to disobey pilot inputs, even if they have screwed up badly beforehand, seems another error. As long as you need the pilot present as last resort (even just for lawyers), he has to have full authority over the system otherwise you created an operational oxymoron -> If the system malfunctions, the human has to intervene, but the system can still deny it.


Deal with it! But first reread my 3 points above ……

Lonewolf 50;

Please accept my apologies for misreading your post. I think we also agree that five degrees nose-up is not the optimum response to UAS at FL350.

P.S. Rereading your post caused me to wonder what condition would result from pitching up to 5 degrees. I think that in still air the airplane would climb until it is in 1 g level flight with pitch attitude and AoA equal to 5 degrees. Assuming constant total energy, that would be at FL375, 222 kCAS, M=0.7. The stall warning threshold in that condition is 5.7 degrees.

I don't think this has been posted here yet. In any case, Wiki items are continually updated by folk -- some informed, some not...

Air France Flight 447 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

When they start talking in terms of "absolute time", I leave it. If they don't know what time to use, then use UTC, because that's what everyone else uses.

These Wiki articles are not written by any one person and anyone can modify them. You get it 'warts and all' -- there is much good stuff in there and some useful references. If you have the time, you can modify the errors and silly bits yourself -- you only have to log-in after registering and learn the special Wiki-speak code. Certainly don't dis any Wiki item for one or more faults...sort the wheat from the chaff.

Edit -- Have checked the Wiki ref to the BEA pdf which states all times UTC yet the Wiki article is using what it calls 'absolute time' which is defined as time from planned departure. We are not told who decided to use this 'absolute time' or why, but it is defined -- maybe there is a custom in another discipline (not aviation or navigation?). I don't know but it is defined and seems not to be just sloppy reporting.

Not at all, but it does rather dent the argument somewhat when someone says a design feature makes the aircraft difficult to operate when they've never operated it.

Really? I'd like to see you provide a single example of that from a serious post on this thread or any other on the subject.

Seriously? Pot, meet kettle.

Except when you don't have any, of course - I'm still waiting for a single example of where force-feedback or lack thereof was a factor in a FBW Airbus crash. But of course, some of the design critics will always counter that it must have happened and subsequently been covered up.

Admittedly, all we have is anecdotal evidence here, but it suggests that the piloting community is split fairly evenly on the subject, with those who dislike the Airbus FBW philosophy largely from the group who fly other types. We've got at least one senior retired Captain who has flown many types, including the 'bus stating that most pilots he encountered once on the 'bus, had very little problem with it.


Who's implying that?

So why did Boeing and Airbus change their Stall Recovery procedures, and why is EASA mandating a change to the Airbus autopilot engage logic despite it having no direct bearing on this case - if the possibility of engineering error is being denied?

Not at all - enlighten us.

Engineers certainly don't. The poor bugger who signed off the JAL123 pressure bulkhead repair was proof enough of that.


Then bring your evidence, as has been asked many times by many people - because right now there doesn't seem to be any.

In other words "Some people agree with me, therefore you should take my opinion as fact even though roughly just as many do not". Great argument.

So now people who disagree with you are likened to Gaddafi/Saddam supporters. Would you like a bigger shovel?

Except in this case it didn't - we're talking about AF447, right? The system gave the pilot full pitch and trim authority via the sidestick through a feature that was specifically designed to give the pilot full authority if something goes wrong with the computers - or if they start receiving bad data. You show me where that A330 did something it was not directly ordered to do and I'll not only shut up for the duration of this thread, I'll personally mail you a cookie.

As far as I can see, Sir, the only one trying to take this thread around into old arguments and logical cul-de-sacs right now is you.

HN39A simple misunderstanding. :ok: Without your charts I'd not have had anything to work with.
As I understand what you just told me, aerodynamic performance changes (due to the air getting thinner as we go higher) would result in the aircraft transitioning from a climb to a stable, straight and level flight at FL 375 with no other control input (human or computer) than the initial nose up pitch change. (Do you assume constant total energy with or without the engine thrust change from 350 to 375 considered?)

Thanks.

Lonewolf 50,

I do not have access to a flight simulator or computer simulation. I did no more than define a condition where '1 g' requires an angle of attack of five degrees, and the combination of altitude and airspeed corresponds to the total energy at AP disconnect.