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Neofit
It seems to me that this test has been conducted.
The only way to get out of stall was engine idle Hi Neofit, Do you have any more information on the stall tests you can share with us? |
I have seen no report indicating that the plane was handed off in an unstable or stalled condition. The plane was slightly nose down and slightly banked at AP disconnect. The airframe was flown into a stall entirely due to the actions of the PF.
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aguadalte
Yes I am an A340/A330 Captain like you! If you want to call me a "pen pusher" because I try to know my A/C so be it. I would have expected the same professionalism from you. You claim this incident occurred when flap was selected from 1 to 0, on a heavy A340 10 kts above S speed and now you are trying to say especially when crossing the 200kts automatic flap up sequence. Does it ring a bell? You also claimed that you cannot see if the spoilers operate, that is incorrect as you can see that on the Flight control page when you carry out the flight control checks. But there again you have said that you need tactile feedback. As the A/C commander you are required to know your A/C. Blaming maintenance action and then FBW for hiding something, amazing. Did you not wonder why you had the Alpha Lock and investigate? |
As SLF said the plane if left untouched would have probably flown out of the short UAS problem fine. The PF did all the wrong things no professional pilot would do and put it into a full stall. This has been repeated so many times on this thread. How many pilots do you know would do what he did? Of my hundreds of fellow pilots, zero. However they all knew how to handfly an airplane at any altitude safely.
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Actually yes, if we divide the aviation world into its fundamental break point....those who have soloed and those who haven't. What I find so absolutely perplexing is actions so fundamentally incorrect that even a student pilot wouldn't make them.
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DozyWannabe/Amos2
The Welsh Wingman is on holiday with his grandchildren in Florida, but I doubt that he would have any idea what "Indie" music is (I had to ask!).
Please remember that, whilst he tries to contribute in as widely accessible language as possible, he comes from a very different world/era to you (and so do I!). This is where he learnt his airmanship, deck landing 45 year ago on carriers that were "so large" (!) that one or two may have carried Swordfish FAA squadrons when initially commissioned into the Royal Navy a generation earlier. Pilot's Cockpit Layout - Buccaneer S.Mk.2B No pretty glass cockpit or even pretty AoA indicators, whether standard or optional, but instead AoA trained on audio ADD (cross-referenced to ASI/AUW) whilst optically focussed on the carrier centre-line. I flew with him, years later with the same airline, both as a F/O (and later as a Captain in the RHS, oh how times have changed...) in the RHS of several B741s. The point he is making in relation to "feedback" and yoke v (dead) SS is relevant because, as I have previously discussed with him via PM, it relates to the pivotal question of what inhibited the more experienced (if not PIC) PNF from taking control of the aircraft no later than 2H 10 31. It may have made no difference, but we definitely know the consequences of his not doing so (even if the CDB had rectified the position after 2H 11 43, it was by that stage well beyond "a logbook entry" and outside of safe flight ...). Did the absence of a clearly visible yoke in front of the PF or SS interconnected feedback to the LHS SS make a difference to the PNF, or was it all in his DNA/training? It may be that a visible RHS yoke and interconnected LHS SS, unambiguously visibly spelling out the PF's commands, may have made no difference to the PNF's actions/omissions whatsoever, but the question has to be asked in the context of AF447 and the CRM/cockpit discipline issues that are under scrutiny. I think it was the Welsh Wingman who first drew attention to Stony Point in these threads, so he has never suggested that it is the panacea for all ills (even without more recent "yoke" repetition with Colgan Air and West Caribbean) and he has no "agenda" to pursue. Trust this clarifies? I suggest you PM him regarding these issues. |
PJ2 @ #3327
Sorry for delayed reply.
I could not agree more, particularly with your following paragraph: "I think that is what was meant when someone else here said that automation was an assistant to the pilot; it is most certainly not a third or fourth pilot but as that dangerous mentality gets even more established, especially with managements and pilots who have flown nothing but automated aircraft, the way back becomes very difficult because fear builds upon fear and soon one is afraid to fly. Seen it, and I doubt very much whether this was ever the original intent of those who contemplated using microprocessors to solve the problems of flight." The erroneous perception of automation seems to seep into airline cultures, training and SOPs, and I hope the "human factors" experts do not duck their challenge and spell it out. For all the improvements in safety, particularly in relation to collisions and CFIT (as you say), I would be surprised if this incident (a temporary UAS issue) would have brought down an airliner 25 years ago in the same conditions (whether Concorde/A300/TriStar/DC10/B747, to cover the then range of major manufacturers). Why it is so frustrating...... |
J.O.
"Only the desperate would try to turn an incident caused by a maintenance error into an excuse to blame the manufacturer for a bad design. That's like saying it was MD's fault that the engine fell off of the DC-10 at Chicago, even though it was American Airlines that did improper engine changes. :ugh:"
It was both, of course, re: AA191. Redundancy in the power to the LHS stick shaker and the RHS stick shaker not being optional, to overcome both design flaws (in addition to no leading edge slats lock), would likely have broken the chain of causation (irrespective of the AA maintenance misbehaviour that caused the engine separation). Always a chain of causation....... |
Originally Posted by TJHarwood
(Post 6674370)
For all the improvements in safety, particularly in relation to collisions and CFIT (as you say), I would be surprised if this incident (a temporary UAS issue) would have brought down an airliner 25 years ago in the same conditions (whether Concorde/A300/TriStar/DC10/B747, to cover the then range of major manufacturers).
The West Caribbean MD-80 was an older airframe design with newer avionics. It amuses me that a lot of the Airbus bashers don't seem to be aware that an old design, with yokes, stalled into the ground from cruise altitude, and not only that - unlike the Airbus, the autopilot *did* play a part in trimming the airframe towards the stall, although in that case it was due to being overweight (with engine anti-ice on). Also in that case, the PNF noticed they were in a stall, said so to the Captain and was roundly ignored - possibly because the Captain had become fixated on the EPR gauges and assumed a flameout. Also in that case, the Captain (who failed to recognise the stall), also spent the entire descent hauling back on the control column (which again, the PNF could see, but did not feel able to do anything other than give advice). This Captain was no rookie, but it was alleged that because of West Caribbean's financial problems (a result of which was that the pilots had not been paid for 6 months(!)), he had been forced to take on a second job as a bartender and this probably affected his ability to take the required rest. |
iceman50:
Yes I am an A340/A330 Captain like you! If you want to call me a "pen pusher" because I try to know my A/C so be it. I would have expected the same professionalism from you. Further, next time you go to your flight sim session ask your TRI/TRE to offer you a take-off on the said conditions (if he can duplicate it, because second to AI this is something that was not supposed to happen...) and pay attention to the attitude of the aircraft while you clean up. I just came today from EWR and took-off with "only" 218Tons and during flap retraction it was easy to see a >10º up ATT while crossing the 200kt automatic flap retraction. Now imagine your aircraft doing it with the increased drag of an open spoiler plus FBW compensation on opposite wing. All I can say is that it was a combination of factors during slat/flap retraction, and I have learned from that. Because of your disbelieve, I have located my CR and ASR of that flight and I have nothing to change to my first post. icemen50, we're drifting out of this thread, and I really don't think we're going anywhere. You may believe what I said, or not. I really don't care...it want make it change what happened... |
aguadalte
As you have said this is drifting of topic so we shall agree to disagree. |
I know aguadalte is both a captain and a gentleman. I do not know iceman so can't comment.
However it seems that this little spat highlights the real issue. Too many Pilots are not in tune with their aircraft, they only think they are. You can't both be right. |
see the last 3 post - which is kind of frightening from the perspective of a SLF!
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see the last 3 post - which is kind of frightening from the perspective of a SLF! |
Originally Posted by SC
Too many Pilots are not in tune with their aircraft, they only think they are.
After a serious event like Hamburg you learn that the manufacturer did not consider as necessary to advise the pilots that after a brief rebound on one main gear, only half deflection of the control surfaces will be available, which means that the very next second the airplane will respond in a very different way to the same sidestick input. |
Along those lines per rudderrat and CONFiture.
The a/c experienced a VS (UP) of 1000 fpm, with the Nose PITCHED down between 3-4 degrees off cruise, just three seconds prior to releasing AutoFlight. So let us relinquish the slander of "Had he only kept hands OFF"....etc. The airframe required handling, stop. Pursuant "surprise" responses, as above from CONFiture, a quick disconnect in that ambient would have most of the pseudo sticks here p-ing their pants. Some perspective at least, if Respect is impossible. Puravida's excellent graph shows "What's that?" (PNF) occurring prior to the STALLSTALL.....Any responses from the current crop of detective? |
Lyman
According to the CVR transcript, the STALL STALL occured before the
"Qu’est-ce que c’est que ça?" ... What's that? You disagree? |
oldchina. I have no opinion. BEA reported STALL, then .6 seconds later, "What's that?" Tight timing for an exclamation of "What's that?" if only related to STALL WARN.
Have you considered the exclamation may be in response to BUFFET? That would mean the PNF reacts to BUFFET, then STALLWARN sounds, (w/o cricket). My point is that puravida has the exclamation prior to SV STALL..... Of course the best, but still inconclusive, is that the exclamation post dates the STALL, but without excluding the possibility he was reacting to BUFFET, or some other artifact on the CVR. BEA will do what they have to do, but without a complete, fully transcribed and indexed CVR, whatever conclusion they publish will not be ironclad, v/v the CVR. There is an additional possibility from the French: "What is that?.......THAT!!" As if he may be pointing to something and for emphasis, "SEE, THIS!"....... Or, he may be pointing to his ear, ("you hear?") etc...... I'd be wary of jumping to conclusions, of course. |
Lyman
See that you are back! From the BEA Interim Report #3: The bold depicted is my addition. At 2 h 10 min 05, the sudden drop in the measured airspeeds, likely due to the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals, caused autopilot and autothrust disconnection (the thrust was then locked) and the change in the flight control law from normal to alternate. The presence of turbulence, shown by the inputs by the AP to control the roll in the previous seconds, led on disconnection to the airplane beginning a roll to the right of up to about 8°. The PF copilot said “I have the controls” and made rapid and high amplitude lateral, almost stop to stop, inputs. He also made a nose-up input that increased the airplane’s pitch attitude up to 11° in ten seconds. The Flight Directors were not disengaged by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared. At 2 h 10 min 10, the PF’s nose-up inputs increased the angle of attack and the stall warning triggered twice transitorily. Probably in reaction to this warning, the PNF exclaimed “what is that?”. The PF then said “We haven’t got good ... We haven’t got a good display ... of speed” and the PNF “We’ve lost the speeds”. The angle of attack recorded was around 5°, for a theoretical stall warning threshold trigger value of slightly over 4°. The crew identified the loss of the speed displays but neither of the two copilots called out the associated procedure. The “Unreliable IAS” emergency manoeuvre requires as a first step to disconnect the automatic flight controls and disengage the Flight Directors. The two copilots had only been trained for the emergency manoeuvre at lower levels, in the course of which the pitch attitude to adopt is 10° or 15°. However, an OSV note described the problems of the loss of speed indications up to then on the A330/A340 fleet in cruise and recalled the procedures to apply. This note had been distributed to all the flight crew in the A330/A340 division. Between 2 h 10 min 18 and 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read the ECAM messages in a disordered way but mentioned the loss of autothrust and the change to alternate law. The thrust lock function was de-activated. The PNF called out and triggered the wing anti-icing. The PNF then drew the PF’s attention to the speed. At that moment, the two recorded speeds (the one displayed on the left on the PFD and that on the ISIS) were below 100 kt and the vertical speed reached a maximum of 7,000 ft/min. The airplane’s longitudinal movements resulted from the inputs by the PF, who in addition continued to make high amplitude lateral inputs to control the roll, below 10° to the right and to the left. Reading the three instruments (the two PFD’s and the ISIS), the PNF noticed that the airplane was climbing and asked the PF several times to descend. The latter then made several nose-down inputs that resulted in a reduction in the pitch attitude and the vertical speed, whose values nevertheless still remained excessive; the airplane then being near 37,000 ft and continuing to climb, without any intervention from the PNF. Although the REC MAX had been a permanent preoccupation before the AP disconnection, neither of the two copilots made any reference to it. At around 2 h 10 min 34, the speed displayed on the left side became valid again and was then 215 kt; the speed on the ISIS was still incorrect. The airplane had then lost about 60 kt since the autopilot disconnection and the beginning of the climb, which is consistent with the increase in altitude of around 2,000 ft. Have you considered the exclamation may be in response to BUFFET? That would mean the PNF reacts to BUFFET, then STALLWARN sounds, (w/o cricket). My point is that puravida has the exclamation prior to SV STALL..... Of course the best, but still inconclusive, is that the exclamation post dates the STALL, but without excluding the possibility he was reacting to BUFFET, or some other artifact on the CVR. BEA will do what they have to do, but without a complete, fully transcribed and indexed CVR, whatever conclusion they publish will not be ironclad, v/v the CVR. There is an additional possibility from the French: "What is that?.......THAT!!" As if he may be pointing to something and for emphasis, "SEE, THIS!"....... Or, he may be pointing to his ear, ("you hear?") etc...... As to the technical aspects of the actual airplane, that is something to be debated by the Airbus pilots and Airbus, the manufacturer. Hopefully this debate will lead to smart, well thought out improvements to bring flight safety to a higher level. When you think of the number of commercial aircraft, all makes and models, in the air at any given time, 24, 7, 365, the safety is really very good, but there is always room to improve as it is not 100%, but not far off. |
Garageyears
Left-seat/right-seat - pretty much everyone reading this post has a mouse sitting just to the right of their keyboard I'd bet. Switch the mouse to the left-side and leave it there for the rest of the day. For the first few minutes things are a little 'confused' - 4 hours later it will feel normal. Not everyone. I'm left hnaded, but have extreme difficulty using the mouse/trackball/touchpad with my left hand. In 50 years of flying, I've never had problems with a yoke or sidestick from either seat. Go figure. |
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