Re-training required!
 

UK news reporting that a crew from a UK major are being "sent home" for re-training following an incident where they landed in JNB with a warning light on.

Whilst I do not know anymore than this, what were they to do, perhaps hold until more lights came on, perhaps fuel press lp etc

Anybody elaborate on this "major" incident.

BBC reports
 

GPWS?

Quite staggering how stuff gets leaked to the press leading to some fact, some innuendo and a great deal of inaccuracy.

It is not my place to give chapter and verse of the incident nor is this the appropriate forum.

The crew did make a mistake, given the CAVOK conditions in which they were flying it was not dangerous. Because of the open safety culture policy within the company they filed the appropriate reports immediately after landing and in order to facilitate a rapid and full investigation were positioned back to LHR.

They co-operated fully with the investigation and after a simulator training detail were returned to line flying.

Lessons have been learnt and the facts have been promulgated to pilots within BA.

Endeavouring to learn from incidents and the promotion of an 'open' safety culture is not made easier by publication of incidents such as this in the news media. By the very nature of a news report the picture will never be completely accurate and more importantly will never convey the true situation and implications to a readership not able to understand the technicalities of operating a modern airliner.

The obsession with instant and sensational news coverage, the slow but relentless drive for CVR recordings to be made public, the desire to have 'blame' apportioned usually in order to try and extract compensation from somebody can only discourage a culture where pilots feel able to freely admit to a mistake in order that others may learn and avoid repeating that mistake with perhaps more serious consequences.

I believe that some things are best kept out of the public domain. This is but one.

I believe that BA should be praised for the swift and effective action taken.

WeeWillyWinky
 

With you 100% on that one...

Agree with WWW on this one, the public cannot possibly make an informed decision or opinion based on the technicality of this event being (not unreasonably) beyond the knowledge of 99.9% of the population.

What we learn from incidents such as this will only have maximum benefit if they are not publicised in this manner.

Which warning light?

Did they forget to reset the altimeters passing through the transition level?

The Worlds Favorite Airline with 142 on board a 744? No wonder they are doing so well!!
Wouldn't it be a better world if the vultures and ghouls in the media took reporting of this type of incident seriously and invested the same effort in educating themselves on matters of aviation as they spend dreaming up these scaremongering headlines and pursuing the unfortunates.

Loadshifta......<<The Worlds Favorite Airline with 142 on board a 744? No wonder they are doing so well!! >>.......you moved the discussion on from the relevant point! If you seem to think the above is of any importance, perhaps you need to be reminded that JNB is off-season at the moment- the weather is wet and cold. Is there any end result of useless & irrelevant points being raised, or are you just trying to get an anti-BA dig in? Bit sad if I may say!

The fact that there was 142 on a B744 is the only part of the article that was worth commenting on IMHO. The rest of it was just scaremongering tosh.

Notso...

Perhaps the handle's apt.


The comment on the number of pax was an observation, the point of my comment was directed against the media.
The comments from C Monty at this stage are only heresay and should be treated with the same scepticism.

Good grief, co-pilots...again. Wonder if they EVER look out the window?:rolleyes:

411A, Whether the co-pilot looked out the window is rather irrelevant isn't it? If the company has a rule which was being broken by the operating capt. then surely the co-pilot has an obligation to point this out.....at the very least!

Of course the capt. has the authority to change the operation as necessary. As the book says though, this authority obviously has accountability associated with it. The co-pilot would have been foolish not to speak up.

I don't know the details of this incident but, I'm a little surprised at the airline procedure which REQUIRES a missed approach from the GPWS warning even in good daylight VMC conditions which BOTH pilots have already agreed to and can reconfirm easily to their satisfaction. If they had done the missed approach and came back in for the next visual approach and the GPWS went off again what then would have been the correct procedure for them in that existing company procedure? There are enough GPWS warnings in good daylight VMC for the company policy and procedures to address this issue. The F/O did the right thing and the Capt. did the right thing, as long as he confirmed VMC,VFR for this approach. This airline's procedure for these circumstances are either poorly worded or should at least, now include that, if the missed appraoach is mandatory, the crew can disregard other GPWS warnings with the next VMC, VFR landing circuit as confirmed by the two pilots. The procedure is letting the crew down; not a need for re-training. My airline's procedure on this allows us both to confirm VMC, VFR in daylight hours. Because of the good VMC conditions, it allows you to keep the speed up,(keeping the airline happy and ATC as well!!) and this "sets you up" by putting you near the upper side of the GPWS warning envelope for Modes 2A and 4B. Nothing comes for "free" it seems!

Totally agree with Diesel

If the Capt operates outside of company S.O.P's then the
co-pilot has a right to speak out. It sounds like the co-pilot on
this flight did nothing wrong and acted as he should do when
a breach of ops has occured.

cheers

fc

Careful boys - this is Big B you are messing with...

B55 having had a GPWS alert at the end of a long flight, and LHR to NBO is a long flight you are tired and although you feel up to it reaction time is slower, a GPWS alert does just that and any pilot should follow procedures, on the second approach you are really awake and you brief that if the spurious GPWS comes on again you will continue that is good airmanship that is what we did the alert did not come back, what just what if it had been a light aircraft it happens. Stick to procedures they are there to help you in the times when your body most needs it. On the same or similar subject what would you do in VMC and TCAS tells you too climb, look out of the window before carrying out the action no way you pull up you dont look just do what you are trained to do. Believe me closing speeds of 1000 kts dont give you time to mess about it happens and yes that has happened to me as well, its even more scary when you look at the computer generation at the CAA, time in both of these circumstances you just don't have.
Rant over.

There have been numerous incidences of aircraft only just crashing ie crashing into a mountain just below the summit.

The purpose, as I understand it, is to make the reaction to ANY GPWS warning immediate and without hesitation. It might just save your life.

The distinction in response is delineated by whether one is above or below MSA.

But hey, feel free to criticise BA, co-pilots or anything else but please make sure that a) you are a pilot and know what you are talking about, b) have perfect procedures in your outfit and c) never make a mistake yourself.

I take it as read that 411A is OK on all three counts and will no doubt feel able to add some more constructive comment.

Common sense (what a novel idea) should dictate action.
For example, the only time I have had a GPWS alert was on approach to AUH, runway 13, VMC, daylight, at about 4000 feet.
For those unfamiliar, this is over the Arabian Gulf, not hills.
The First Officer (PF)...says "stupid box, no terrain here" and I concur, so we continue descent, land, and put it in the logbook.
Now, if at night, over land, IMC or VMC...different story.
But of course I can see where those at BA just might have different ideas. Wonder if there is any common sense resident there?

411A

Hindsight is always great, particularly after an accident!

A rule that says below MSA, a GPWS warning = compulsory GPWS pull up mvre would have saved MANY lives since GPWS was introduced if it had always been adhered to.

It might be "common sense" to continue in VMC, 100% SA etc., but this requires a discussion between the 2 crew members after the GPWS to ensure this has been achieved. There may not be time to have this discussion...

There would be an argument for not "pulling up" if GPWS false alerts were frequent , which I understand they were in the early days, but no longer. There are a number of false EGPWS alerts now, as we get familiar with the system, since it is less tolerant of "user error" (wrong altimeter setting, not overridden into QFE airfield / airfield not in database etc.).

At the end of a long night, if a piece of kit that your airline and regulatory authority have installed, says "pull up NOW", and it doesn't often cry foul, seems a good scheme to obey it. There are too many dead bodies from those who "thought they knew better"...

NoD