Re-training required!
 

UK news reporting that a crew from a UK major are being "sent home" for re-training following an incident where they landed in JNB with a warning light on.

Whilst I do not know anymore than this, what were they to do, perhaps hold until more lights came on, perhaps fuel press lp etc

Anybody elaborate on this "major" incident.

BBC reports
 

GPWS?

Quite staggering how stuff gets leaked to the press leading to some fact, some innuendo and a great deal of inaccuracy.

It is not my place to give chapter and verse of the incident nor is this the appropriate forum.

The crew did make a mistake, given the CAVOK conditions in which they were flying it was not dangerous. Because of the open safety culture policy within the company they filed the appropriate reports immediately after landing and in order to facilitate a rapid and full investigation were positioned back to LHR.

They co-operated fully with the investigation and after a simulator training detail were returned to line flying.

Lessons have been learnt and the facts have been promulgated to pilots within BA.

Endeavouring to learn from incidents and the promotion of an 'open' safety culture is not made easier by publication of incidents such as this in the news media. By the very nature of a news report the picture will never be completely accurate and more importantly will never convey the true situation and implications to a readership not able to understand the technicalities of operating a modern airliner.

The obsession with instant and sensational news coverage, the slow but relentless drive for CVR recordings to be made public, the desire to have 'blame' apportioned usually in order to try and extract compensation from somebody can only discourage a culture where pilots feel able to freely admit to a mistake in order that others may learn and avoid repeating that mistake with perhaps more serious consequences.

I believe that some things are best kept out of the public domain. This is but one.

I believe that BA should be praised for the swift and effective action taken.

WeeWillyWinky
 

With you 100% on that one...

Agree with WWW on this one, the public cannot possibly make an informed decision or opinion based on the technicality of this event being (not unreasonably) beyond the knowledge of 99.9% of the population.

What we learn from incidents such as this will only have maximum benefit if they are not publicised in this manner.

Which warning light?

Did they forget to reset the altimeters passing through the transition level?

The Worlds Favorite Airline with 142 on board a 744? No wonder they are doing so well!!
Wouldn't it be a better world if the vultures and ghouls in the media took reporting of this type of incident seriously and invested the same effort in educating themselves on matters of aviation as they spend dreaming up these scaremongering headlines and pursuing the unfortunates.

Loadshifta......<<The Worlds Favorite Airline with 142 on board a 744? No wonder they are doing so well!! >>.......you moved the discussion on from the relevant point! If you seem to think the above is of any importance, perhaps you need to be reminded that JNB is off-season at the moment- the weather is wet and cold. Is there any end result of useless & irrelevant points being raised, or are you just trying to get an anti-BA dig in? Bit sad if I may say!

The fact that there was 142 on a B744 is the only part of the article that was worth commenting on IMHO. The rest of it was just scaremongering tosh.

Notso...

Perhaps the handle's apt.


The comment on the number of pax was an observation, the point of my comment was directed against the media.
The comments from C Monty at this stage are only heresay and should be treated with the same scepticism.

Good grief, co-pilots...again. Wonder if they EVER look out the window?:rolleyes:

411A, Whether the co-pilot looked out the window is rather irrelevant isn't it? If the company has a rule which was being broken by the operating capt. then surely the co-pilot has an obligation to point this out.....at the very least!

Of course the capt. has the authority to change the operation as necessary. As the book says though, this authority obviously has accountability associated with it. The co-pilot would have been foolish not to speak up.

I don't know the details of this incident but, I'm a little surprised at the airline procedure which REQUIRES a missed approach from the GPWS warning even in good daylight VMC conditions which BOTH pilots have already agreed to and can reconfirm easily to their satisfaction. If they had done the missed approach and came back in for the next visual approach and the GPWS went off again what then would have been the correct procedure for them in that existing company procedure? There are enough GPWS warnings in good daylight VMC for the company policy and procedures to address this issue. The F/O did the right thing and the Capt. did the right thing, as long as he confirmed VMC,VFR for this approach. This airline's procedure for these circumstances are either poorly worded or should at least, now include that, if the missed appraoach is mandatory, the crew can disregard other GPWS warnings with the next VMC, VFR landing circuit as confirmed by the two pilots. The procedure is letting the crew down; not a need for re-training. My airline's procedure on this allows us both to confirm VMC, VFR in daylight hours. Because of the good VMC conditions, it allows you to keep the speed up,(keeping the airline happy and ATC as well!!) and this "sets you up" by putting you near the upper side of the GPWS warning envelope for Modes 2A and 4B. Nothing comes for "free" it seems!

Totally agree with Diesel

If the Capt operates outside of company S.O.P's then the
co-pilot has a right to speak out. It sounds like the co-pilot on
this flight did nothing wrong and acted as he should do when
a breach of ops has occured.

cheers

fc

Careful boys - this is Big B you are messing with...

B55 having had a GPWS alert at the end of a long flight, and LHR to NBO is a long flight you are tired and although you feel up to it reaction time is slower, a GPWS alert does just that and any pilot should follow procedures, on the second approach you are really awake and you brief that if the spurious GPWS comes on again you will continue that is good airmanship that is what we did the alert did not come back, what just what if it had been a light aircraft it happens. Stick to procedures they are there to help you in the times when your body most needs it. On the same or similar subject what would you do in VMC and TCAS tells you too climb, look out of the window before carrying out the action no way you pull up you dont look just do what you are trained to do. Believe me closing speeds of 1000 kts dont give you time to mess about it happens and yes that has happened to me as well, its even more scary when you look at the computer generation at the CAA, time in both of these circumstances you just don't have.
Rant over.

There have been numerous incidences of aircraft only just crashing ie crashing into a mountain just below the summit.

The purpose, as I understand it, is to make the reaction to ANY GPWS warning immediate and without hesitation. It might just save your life.

The distinction in response is delineated by whether one is above or below MSA.

But hey, feel free to criticise BA, co-pilots or anything else but please make sure that a) you are a pilot and know what you are talking about, b) have perfect procedures in your outfit and c) never make a mistake yourself.

I take it as read that 411A is OK on all three counts and will no doubt feel able to add some more constructive comment.

Common sense (what a novel idea) should dictate action.
For example, the only time I have had a GPWS alert was on approach to AUH, runway 13, VMC, daylight, at about 4000 feet.
For those unfamiliar, this is over the Arabian Gulf, not hills.
The First Officer (PF)...says "stupid box, no terrain here" and I concur, so we continue descent, land, and put it in the logbook.
Now, if at night, over land, IMC or VMC...different story.
But of course I can see where those at BA just might have different ideas. Wonder if there is any common sense resident there?

411A

Hindsight is always great, particularly after an accident!

A rule that says below MSA, a GPWS warning = compulsory GPWS pull up mvre would have saved MANY lives since GPWS was introduced if it had always been adhered to.

It might be "common sense" to continue in VMC, 100% SA etc., but this requires a discussion between the 2 crew members after the GPWS to ensure this has been achieved. There may not be time to have this discussion...

There would be an argument for not "pulling up" if GPWS false alerts were frequent , which I understand they were in the early days, but no longer. There are a number of false EGPWS alerts now, as we get familiar with the system, since it is less tolerant of "user error" (wrong altimeter setting, not overridden into QFE airfield / airfield not in database etc.).

At the end of a long night, if a piece of kit that your airline and regulatory authority have installed, says "pull up NOW", and it doesn't often cry foul, seems a good scheme to obey it. There are too many dead bodies from those who "thought they knew better"...

NoD

411A

I wonder how many people have crashed despite being sure of where they were.

I would suggest that the luxury of assessing the validity of the warning should be carried out having reacted spontaneously to the warning.

NigelOnDraft...
Actually we had three to confirm...that all important Flight Engineer, certainly you must remember, the guy that just "sometimes" saves your behind.
Common sense must come into play at some stage...otherwise the flight would just circle, with GPWS alerts, until someone, usually the COMMANDER, says..."wait a minute, this is BS, we approach and land, NOW. It is a shame that First Officers can only (usually) look in the book...and NOT outside.
AND, I think that this is a DIRECT result of VERY poor training, IMHO.
Some will disagree of course, BUT us older guys know the score.
AND, do not forget, the older guys are in the Chief Pilots chair, nearly always. And always, DFO.:D

PS: IF this incident was at ALL related to the outdated idea of using QFE for landing...is it not about time that BA abandoned this rather backward idea?
Tin hat at the ready...standing by for incomming.....!;)

411A, the day you leave handling events like a GPWS going off to "common sense" is the day you've lost all control of your aircrew and your airline.

Standard Operating Procedures are there for a reason. That reason is that every pilot, whether captain or FO, needs to know exactly what he may expect from the guy in the other seat, whether he's flown with him fifty times in the past two months, or never met him before a couple of hours ago. As soon as one guy decides he's not going to apply what the company teaches and trains its pilots to do, in that instant he has become a maverick; there is no team left, and the other guy is floundering, not knowing what to expect. That is an excellent basis for serious accidents to occur.

If during a flight something happens which is not covered by SOPs ("anytime we get near the ground the GPWS goes off") or you need to divert from SOPs, you stop reacting and surprising the other guy for a few minutes, you consult and brief on a course of action. That way everyone is in the loop, everyone knows what's happening, what's going to happen, and what to do.

An airline has to dictate how it wants its aircraft to be handled. So it dictates the SOPs. Now they may be good or bad. If you have a problem with any of them, you do not just forget it and go and do your own thing because you think you know better. The correct action is to raise it with the Training Committee, or the Fleet Manager, or whoever can address whatever you think is wrong.

In most airlines, you will get a sympathetic hearing, and perhaps you may be right, in which case, the SOPs will be changed, it will be promulgated around the fleet and everyone will do what you think they should. Alternatively, there may be good reasons for having the SOPs as they are, and I am sure the reasons will be clearly stated to you.

But insist on doing your own thing and you are a danger to everyone around you. In my book, that makes you prime candidate for being permanently grounded as being psychologically unfit to fly.

411A, if a GPWS goes off any time below MSA, visual or not, CAVOK or not, runway in front or not then I am off like a scalded dog. Neither I, nor the FO is omnipotent, we do not know that we have overlooked something, we may even be in a visual trap for all we know (Mt Erebus-like) and this is not the time for the luxury of questions. Or the arrogance of certainty.

Once the GPWS go-around has been converted to a standard go-around, the aircraft is clean, and we have a few moments to review the scenario we can then work out a game-plan for the next approach. Possible reasons, such as incorrect altimeter seting, radalt ramping etc. will be reviewed, and a decision made accordingly.

Thus, if the next time round, when we are BOTH watching like hawks we get a warning we will have a plan of action. CAVOK, runway in front, everything in the groove and verified, this time we might elect to continue. But it varies on the day and by circumstance.

That is how a Captain plays it. Even one like me, nowhere near as venerable in age as you. This is not some great game in which you know all the answers, but one in which you try your damndest to make the cards run in your favour, and that includes using your co-pilot who may be more aware of a developing situation than you are. Maybe you were always more aware than your co-pilot of everything going on around you; in that case, sir, I take my hat off to you, for you are a greater man than many on this board.

BA do not use QFE by the way. Also, the training is immediate go-around for any hard GPWS below MSA (and in the event above it was an EGPWS warning... still a hard warning, so no excuses, but slightly different from the ones when you used to fly in terms of visuals/aurals.). That training is 100% correct, no matter how much of an ace crew are on board at any given time.

6£ is 200% correct - 411a you are wong.

Nuff said,

WWW

Sorry gentlemen, cannot agree.
If common sense does not enter into the picture, then pilots are not needed, and Curruthers will have his automated (no pilots needed) crew.
GPWS alert below MSA, yes indeed, action required. GPWS alert well above MSA, and all concerned can agree on the aircrafts position, then action as needed, which may indeed mean continued approach. To blindly say....the box is always right...is nonsense, IMHO. Now, IF one crew member says..."something not right here" then action is indeed necessary.
My opinion anyway. Others will more than likely disagree, but have found that many just will not accept reality. These boxes installed are AIDS to navigation, certainly not the last word. That position is reserved for the respective fleet manager.

Page One of our manual states something to the effect that not all operating contingencies are addressed... and that common sense and good judgement must not be constrained in any situation....Which is to say that if the GPWS goes off in VMC conditions in broad daylight with no obvious threat of terrain proximity, then the PF would not respond with avoidance action.

This is not about "individualizing" any procedure, it's about utilizing one's reasoning ability and one's eye balls to ascertain what's an obvious false warning.

Smoke does not always indicate a fire; it could be a smoke machine. Remember?

411A

<<PS: IF this incident was at ALL related to the outdated idea of using QFE for landing...is it not about time that BA abandoned this rather backward idea?>>
Your "worldwide" experience is obviously not as great as you make out. Yes, BA do use QFE into certain airfields where it is state procedure... as do all other airlines (to my knowledge). QNH remains the standard at most airfields. The problem is that EGPWS relies on QNH being set to match aircraft altitude with terrain database...

There is always scope for common sense. My disagreement with your line of attack here is that a GPWS warning, if genuine, might require immediate action to avoid the terrain - there is not time to have a full 2 or 2 way CRM discussion in "what do you think chaps - shall we ignore it?". So a "Pull Up GA" should be flown, since all expect that...

Subsequent to this, we can now hold the CRM discussion, review the charts, position, and decide if it was genuine, a possible GPWS fault etc. Now common sense may dictate "ignoring" a further warning depending on the outcome of the above discussion.

NoD

411A, what is your opinion on following SOPs?

Do you feel that they should be followed, or forgotten about if you think you know better?

If you are going to divert from SOPs, do you think the other pilot should be kept in the loop, and if so, will you brief him before or during an alarm going off on the flightdeck?

And if an alarm goes off, will you react to it as per the book, or just decide whether you think it is spurious or not?

What role do you think an FO has if he doesn't have the faintest idea what to expect from you?

NigelOnDraft--
For example, if you were in the hold at LAM (with other aircraft above and below) and you received that GPWS (EGPWS) alert, would you climb as necessary in response to that alert?
If so, you may be in for an unpleasant surprise.

Captain Stable--
See GlueBall's post above. To blindly follow SOP's in a situation where they do not fit, is not using what I would consider "common sense".
A tough decision to make? Yes...and that is why there is a Commander on the flight deck.

MSA in the LAM hold is around 3000'. Above MSA an immediate manouevre is not called for according to the SOPs I adhere too.

I am suprised that by reading other replies that you had not understood that there is a difference in response depending on whether one is above or below MSA.

I hope, should you be unfortunate enough to have a GPWS warning, that your lightening fast 'common sense' thought processes will be enough to save your life should the warning be real.

Don't worry, M.Mouse, they will be.

And your answers to my other questions, 411A?

411A - Well you seem to have opened Pandora's Box with what may have been a less than well thought out comment. You keep coming back to "common sense"...many of the replies have shown plenty of that in commenting that having completed the GPWS go-around once they would then take time to review and replan. Indeed many have commented that on the second approach they may feel more inclined to disregard the warning. This is all emminently good sense. You however show remarkable confidence, verging on arrogance. We can ALL be wrong. Even you. By definition a GPWS warning, were it genuine, would require a very prompt response. I would respectfully suggest that even you would have insufficient time to consider whether the warning was valid. That's why we have an SOP. No-one is suggesting flying round in circles executing countless go-arounds.

I really wish you would reconsider your position. Your comments sound frankly arrogant and when coupled with the wrong character in the right hand seat, dangerous.

Captain Stable--
As I mentioned before, the only GPWS alert that I have received was reviewed at the time by me, the First Officer and the Flight Engineer...and it was decided that the warning was false, so we carried on with the approach.
Seems like a reasonable action to me, ie: everyone agreed.
The action was reported (Captains Report) to the Chief Pilot (ex-BA, by the way)...who agreed also.
Works good, lasts a long time.
Do you have a particular problem with this?

It is certainly not necessary to re-invent the wheel.

From our SOP top paragraph on QRH, which is also Airbus

EGPWS ALERTS
CAUTION
During night or IMC conditions, apply the procedure immediately. Do not delay action for diagnosis.
During daylight VMC conditions, with terrain and obstacles clearly in sight, the alert may be considered cautuionary. Take positive corrective until the alert ceases or a safe trajectory is assured.

All seems common sense to me

Me too.

At nearly every company where I have worked, when ex-BA guys were hired, their opinion usually was...."well at BA, we didn't do things that way".
It was promptly pointed out that ..."BA is NOT paying your salary, so do it OUR way, or say goodbye."

They always stayed.
Not really surprised.

Rumours abound of a simply staggering 757 incident at Oslo some
months ago involving a Scandinavian carrier - any ideas ?

411A

Can't quite make up my mind whether you have a hatred of all things BA or are just plain provocative.

Nobody in BA would claim to have the ideal method of operating an aeroplane. I do know that if I have concerns about an SOP I will be listened to and things can and do get changed.

However with reference to GPWS it would seem that you are in the minority. I hope it doesn't kill you as it has others with the same attitude and approach.

You also make arrogant statements about being the commander that frankly went out with the ark.

Something I have noticed about CRM issues is that those most in need of examining their own attitude and behaviour are usually those that believe that the rest of the world is out of step with them.

I do know that the last thing most in BA have is a closed mind.

Oh, and before you get on your other hobby horse of how experienced you are I am no spring chicken either.

Well beamer, as this is the Rumour Network, what's the gin?

M.Mouse..

Suspect that it is more of a USA vs UK idea.

Nothing wrong with the way BA plan their operations, just that some do not agree. Simple as that.