Burger, given that a company's SOPs state that, below MSA if you get an unexpected and unexplained hard GPWS warning you go around, do you still maintain that it can be ignored?

On the next approach, as Sick Squid says, you are all at a higher level of awareness, you have discussed and checked out all possible contributing factors, and eliminated them, if it triggers again it is probably spurious and you can (by agreement in the interim briefing) ignore it.

All the above course of action is what I would have described as using common sense. Deciding on the spur of the moment without evaluating anything except the view, without consulting with the other crew member(s), without checking your instruments' integrity and continued functioning, ignoring SOPs and the Ops Manual is NOT what I would call common sense.

FORM TWO TEAMS!
 

RIGHT NOW! FORM UP IN TWO TEAMS! Supermarket trollies on the right, Nigels on the left.

This should get the keyboards clacking!

Recent BA Shorthaul 'incident', from BASIS:

Position: around 50' over the threshold of the intended runway of landing at xxx, good VMC

Cockpit situation: Handling pilot - both hands on control column to flare and land, iaw BA sops. Non handling pilot - hands on lap (or somewhere)

Event: EGPWS Hard terrain warning, due to totally erroneous 'map shift'

SOP: PULL UP and Go-AROUND

Crew reaction: SOP

I almost hesitate to say this, but I'm tending to agree a bit with 411A (damn, I said it).

Supermarket trollies - your challenge - a PA to explain to the pax how you saved their lives by avoiding hitting the hill on the runway at xxx

Nigels - ????

It would be NICE if repliers could announce which team they are playing for!

Walt

M.Mouse and also notso fantastic. I didn't want to be mischievous but I wanted to provoke a bit, granted. I felt that notso fantastic's point of view is a bit too simple by giving the impression that the whole problematic (or number of pilots) can be devided into to parties. Those who follow always under every circumstances the SOP, because the SOP covers EVERY situation sufficently, and the other party who have a slightly different opinion about it and are potential dangerous fools.

Believe me guys, I wish we could cover all situations and have for every problems a written SOP solution. But I wholeheartly believe, that is not the case. How much easier (and safer) our job would be.

Sick Squid, I agree, it it a good discussion.

Burger- that's fine and a very valid opinion, but just remember, you step outside SOPs and you lay yourself open to immediate dismissal, prosecution by your licensing authority, and yourself and the employer open to open-ended legal action by passengers and anyone affected on the ground. People have one thing in mind these days: 'how can I get lots of money out of someone.....anyone?'. So take that decision not to follow procedures VERY carefully, and don't rush it!

Both hands on the column at 50'?!
 

Slightly, no very much 'off topic' but, Fl_lt_wlt_mitty you cannot be serious?

One hand on the control column and one on the throttles to either vary the thrust or execute the GA, especially at 50' surely?:confused:

Ya, notso fantastic, good point.

To follow on from Notso's point, I haven't seen anyone here say you must ALWAYS follow SOPs. If I were on final approach after everything had gone wrong, one engine out, no hydraulics, no electrics, fuel down to 100 kgs, rubber jungle hanging out down the back and my wife going into labour, I don't think an EGPWS warning in VMC would make ME go around...

But if you do, you'd better be darned sure you're right, and it had better be a provable life-saver to do so. The Emerald HS748 @ STN was a case in point. The skipper went against all training there - and he was right to do so.

Quite agree, Captain Stable, but didn't he lose his job?

So if I understand it correctly, crews at BA are allowed to make the instantanious decision that they are inside the MSA-sector AND above the MSA, allowing them to disregard GPWS warnings (even in IMC), but when they are on the ILS over flat terrain with the RWY CLEARLY in sight and more then 10 km visibility they have to go around when there is a GPWS warning!!! :rolleyes:

This doesn't make sense to me, so I'm with 411A on this one!

Perhaps BA should have a second look at this particular SOP!:cool:

Regards,
Sabenaboy (flying for a new employer)

Seems contributers cannot stay on the point of the original post. If the aircraft is good VMC with the runway and all terrain in sight why not continue for a landing (my company SOP). If the situation is in any doubt whatsoever then head for the Moon as soon as possible. Could it be that many of the contributers are so conditioned to "heads down" approaches, even in VMC that they are no longer bothering to clear the approach area visually? (I see many examples of this).
If the approach is IFR or marginal VFR then 90 percent of my scan is inside the cockpit, if the approach is VFR 90 percent of my scan is outside the cockpit precisely so that I can look out for terrain and other aircraft. Do we not teach this as the safest mode of flight anymore? (rhetorical question, I know we do not).
If I have been monitoring the flight path of the aircraft visually for 5 miles with the terrain and runway in sight and a GPWS warning takes place I am in a simple position to assess its relevance. If it is dark and stormy then the GPWS gets instant response. It is quite simple really if you use common-sense (My God, I am agreeing with 411A).
By the way, if GPWS is needed by long-range crews as a crutch because they are tired at the end of a long leg should we not be discussing duty regulations? What are these "tired" crew members going to do if a real emergency, with no "talking prompts" occurs?

If my wife was going into labour with triplets, Captain Stable, I would consider it.

Max Cont - I'm not sure, but I don't think so - I stand to be corrected on that by anyone who knows better.

Sabenaboy - I have not at any point quoted BA SOPs as I don't know them (I don't work for BA). But as I have said time and again, if an SOP is wrong, any pilot is free to challenge it and ask for it to be changed. What you are not free to do is just ignore it because you happen to disagree with it. If it is wrong, or could be better, then why not have it be changed, and your opinion vindicated? That way, everyone in the fleet will be doing it your way instead of you confusing the pilot you're with at the time. Why is this so difficult for people to understand?

PS bugg smasher - I can entirely empathise with your point :D

Just to add a slight wrinkle, EGPWS procedures as originally drafted by Boeing do not permit terrain warnings to be ignored when in day VMC, they must always be responded to by immediately executing the escape maneuver.

It is implicit that they trust the new level of technology more than the rapid subjective judgements of the crew.

Stable, it would be nice if it was so simple to change an SOP. Unfortunately, this usually involves changing the ideas of a training organisation which is not easy because of all the vested interests involved. Then, if you succeed with the training organisation they normally need to get changes in SOP's approved by their government regulatory organisation. All in all, this is not as simple a matter as you suggest. I can vouch for this from personal experience.

SOPs have become the academic substitute for what used to be called AIRMANSHIP. Do you remember that subject? Unfortunately, airmanship is very difficult to teach because it usually involves on the job training from an experienced instructor. The substitute for airmanship is SOPs because these can be printed in a book and taught by any "know-nothing" ground school instructor. The theory is that if you provide enough conservative SOPs and make people obey them all the time then people will never get themselves into trouble. Therefore you do not need to teach them how to get out of trouble. This simplifies training and saves money.

As we well know, as soon as a pilot leaves the gate he is operating in a dynamic area where the SOPs often times do not fit perfectly. At that point it is the pilot's experience that resolves the discrepencies to ensure the safest and most cost effective operation. Most of the time these slight deviations from SOP never even get noticed because both pilots agree that what is being done is sensible under the circumstances. Surely, you don't really think that the incident under discussion is the only time an event of this type has taken place over the last year!

The SOP is the skeleton to which experience and knowledge adds the flesh. Both are necessary for a properly functioning body. The final comment might be the old saying "Rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools".

Well spoken Boing. In support of your argument, I would offer as evidence the airlines ‘over there’ that train politically-correct individuals up to command at little more than post-infancy stage. SOPs are an absolute necessity in these operations, an essential crutch if you will, and at first blush appear to be doing a most effective job.

But as we have all too often seen, when events transpire to place these pilots outside the four carefully-defined corners of the Good Book of Rules, something which Murphy will always do at one point or another, things tend to get very nasty indeed.

Max Cont:

No - he has not long ago retired at retirement age after a most successful career.

I THINK it was worked out that had he followed 'SOPs' his burning wing would have separated on the downwing leg, with probable total loss of life.

Both hands on the column at 50'?!

Slightly, no very much 'off topic' but, Fl_lt_wlt_mitty you cannot be serious?

One hand on the control column and one on the throttles to either vary the thrust or execute the GA, especially at 50' surely?


Hope it doesn't cause you any loss of sleep, Blue Eagle, but an (overpaid) BA captain once explained to me (at great length) over a few beers in SFO that only BA knew how to land, and that there ain't no hands near the throttles during the landing! Something to do with not being allowed, as captain, to apply your own reverse, I think. Should make the odd bounced landing a bit of a scramble, what!

Perhaps the Nigels could comment - or they may choose to stay silent!


Anyway - where are the teams?

Mitty

Did you make that up? Whether you did or not I am afraid your recollections are flawed regarding throttle handling.

Sounds like the chap you spoke to was a bit of a plonker, they are easily recognised because most companies have a few. :D :D

Thank you for that re-assurance, M Mouse. I presume from that that you are BA?

I have to say that your company does seem to have more than the average:cool:

It wasn't, by any chance, you in that go-round I mentioned?

Re: Training
 

As the Captain of the Emerald 748 at STN. I was unable to comment during the long AAIB enquiry which endorsed my decision to land back on the runway. First of all in the company flying manual it stated that if it was at the captains discretion to land back on if this was the safer option and therefore no SOP's were countermanded. There was no fire warning either audible or visual yet the engine had exploded the number one turbine disc had exited the cowling,the engine was in two halves, the wing and undercarriage was on fire. The sensible and safe option was to re-land on the long runway at STN, as confirmed by the AAIB, bearing in mind it was a small HS748 and not a large heavy aircraft. On the roll out, the fire warning bell sounded. The 90 page report makes more of the uncontained engine failure and recomendations regarding modifications to the Dart engine.
There have been similar incidents to mine, in particular the F27 of Quebec Air. The crew decided to take the problem into the air and crashed in flames one minute forty two seconds later. I on the other hand decided to land back on in accordance with the flying manual and no one was injured. The credit must go to my crew who all acted impeccably and professionally in the most frightening of circumstances. At the scene of the accident, the AAIB inspectors and my Chief Pilot said " we have no argument with your decision" I was flying again three days later.