"Do it my way or be fired" is not what I would call the best CRM in practice. There are always other, sometimes better, ways of doing things. It pays always to listen.

411A, I'm disappointed to learn that you wish to evaluate every warning you get and decide first whether you think it's genuine and then act on it rather than follow published SOPs in the first place, get away from the possible danger, then evaluate and consult and plan a course of action between you.

But considering your opinion of FOs, perhaps it's not surprising that you want it all your own way and nobody ever else gets a look in.

In the first place, your attitude has been described as arrogant. That may have something in it. Probably wouldn't make you a nice person to fly with, if true. Secondly, your insistence that you want to filter every warning and then act as you see fit must leave your FO's very confused. If true, that would make you a very frustrating and confusing person to fly with. And finally, if you want to pause and think when descending into possible danger with warnings blaring at you, that would make you a very dangerous person to fly with.

Since I now know who you are, I am, thankfully, not likely ever to have to fly with you. It's well past time you retired. I wouldn't mind you writing yourself off when solo in your own machine, but you are in severe danger of writing lots of other people off as well.

For Fergineer,
No one has said that this happened at night and whether this was a GPWS or an EGPWS warning. Big differences!! Yes, the pilots are still the most dangerous part of the safety puzzle.

B55, neither did I, I said at the end of a long flight, mine was in daylight, the procedure was the same, go round, just said tired at the end of a long flight. Wether GPWS or EGPWS it has got people thinking which is good.

For fergineer,
Pilots making choices will always be the big danger area.

I've put my trust in them for the last 20 odd years, not had many wrong decisions. Hope that they that have flown with me say the same as well.

HugMonster,

Nowhere have I mentioned that I wished to "filter every warning and act as I see fit". There are indeed some warnings in aircraft operations that require immediate actions, unless a greater emergency exists. Engine fire warnings would be a good example.
However, when SOP's clearly do not fit the profile, other avenues should be tried, in agreement with the other crew members.
All companies that I have worked for have agreed, so I can see no difficulity with that way of thinking.
And, in those companies where I have worked, it was the company management (not me) that had some difficulities with ex-BA crew. As they (management) were paying the salaries, it is perfectably reasonable to expect that these ex-BA crews comply with their new companies' method of operations.
And further, you state that it is well past the time that I retire.
Why? Just because you do not agree with my opinions?
I am certainly entitled to mine, just as you are to yours.;)

I have to stand with 411a. I couldn't open the BBC link on page one, but I would like to make some general comments regarding this topic. Yes, SOP should be the Bible for every Crew, but as we all now, sometimes it is possible that we are caught in situations, which are not covered by SOP. What are we doing then? We use experience and common sense . If it was possible, that the SOP and technical systems can cover and cope with every situation, then Pilots are probably no longer needed?! Why? Because if everything is covered, Computer Algorithms can be used instead! A nightmare? Yes, indeed, because we all know, that we shouldn't always blindly follow the box, because technical systems DO fail. That's is why we should be always alert and monitor the flight, and use next to the rules of the SOP, EXPERIENCE, TRAINING BUT ALSO COMMON SENSE .

Like I said, I wasn't able to read the BBC link, but in general, if you are decending and you are CAVOK with a visibility of 30nm or greater and the GPWS comes on and the terrain flat as a pancake and the airport in sight, you PULL UP immediately, WITHOUT assesing the situation first? What kind of airmanship is that?

Some of you guys were talking about complecency and arrogance, but in my humble opinion to always follow blindly the box is complecent as well. One day we might be caught in a situation were the box is u/s and our brains as well, because of idling too long time the last couple of 'EFIS'-years. That wouldn't be in interest of any SOP on this world.

By the way, in this region here (Southeast Asia) there are airports (especially Indonesia) where visual approaches are conducted and on some of these approaches it's unfortunately almost impossible to fly in and land without a GPWS alert. :(

It is now pretty obvious that this topic is like the parable of the 12 blind men all describing the elephant from a different perspective. There are long haul crew here with numerous Human Factors issues in their workplace; 15hrs flights, all night, tired, never flown with the other pilots, etc., etc, and short haul crew and also regional crew with 4 hour flying, mostly in the daylight, in and out of the carpark in less than 8 hours. A long haul crew should be locked into a mandatory go-around with the discussion later of what to do with the next landing. They are in no position to be making choices at an airport they haven't seen for at least a month or even more. Regional crew are at the other end, with the same day, confirmed and called VMC approach into an airport they are always SA current on, with a GPWS warning that goes off because you just touched the corner of the warning envelope(usually due to higher speeds in the good VMC) and you both confirm VMC-terrain clearance okay. Both crew faced with the same choice, one crew can only do it safely one way, the other crew can do it another way, safely too. Everyone's choices are different for them and cannot be used by others here.

I must say that I agree with 411a on this. There are some warnings that you do not hesitate to react to and SOPs that specify what the company wants you to do in a given situation.

In the company that I fly for the SOP states that if a GPWS alert is triggered in DAY VMC and the Captain can exactly ascertain his position then a go-around is not required even when below MSA.

I believe this to be sensible and practiable. However if one does elect to miss an approach for one for whatever the reason there should be no critisim.

So if in day VMC the captain pauses to ascertain his position it is possible he will crash should he make a mistake.

If he flys an unnecessary go-around what danger is there?

M.Mouse

As a few events during the last few years have shown us a go-around is not always safe and simple!

I have no argument against pursuing the safest course of action, adhereing to SOPs and practising good airmanship.

However, that said, there are times when events arise that are not covered by SOPs or manuals and then the crew have to make a decision based on their knowledge.

I can illustrate such and occurence by an experience of mine. One night in cruise at FL350 while reading a flight manual;) my attention was rudely summoned by a GPWS; WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP & TO LOW TERRAIN!! After swallowing my heart I did nothing although my SOPs tell me that I should have applied full power and climbed like hell! ( In a A320 I ask you, you can't out climb a moth up there!!!:D )

In the same vein 'were I to get one on an ILS in DAY VMC with the runway and terrain insight I would most likely continue to land.

Let's assume for one moment that it's okay to carry on in day VMC, good vis., i.e. CAVOK.

Assume also that it is not okay to continue at night, in cloud etc.

If it is marginal (by which I mean, anywhere in between), where does the line lie? Let's face it - we've already by the assumptions above said there is a line.

If he has ground contact 50% of the time, does he need to go around? How about if he's "VMC on top" of a thin layer? How deep does the layer have to be?

In the mean time, the alarms start sounding. There's a pause while he evaluates the conditions, deciding whether or not to continue. That pause could be fatal in just the wrong situation.

Far better, in my book, to play it safe every time. Train in an instantaneous response. Don't program into a pilot's mind a delay in reacting to what could be a life-or-death, urgent situation. If it proves to be a spurious warning, then agree amongst yourselves that that's what you've got, and what you're going to do with it.

Two aphorisms that we've all said at one time or another. Firstly, nobody ever collided with the sky. And secondly, trust your instruments. If playing safe and taking a possibly unnecessary go-around is not butch enough for some people, then so be it. If going by the book insults your intelligence, then save it for working out why you got the problem in the first place.

It seems that there is an erroneous assumption that above MSA there is (in my company) an SOP to apply full power and climb in reaction to a GPWS. There is not.

One of the reasons that passing MSA is acknowledged by both pilots is to reinforce the awareness of the company SOP regarding GPWS warnings, which is different depending on whether one is above or below MSA.

I am calling it a day on this one.

I can say that my company's GPWS SOPs are intrinsically safe.

I can also say that other SOPs that have been mentioned here will be safe most of the time.

Captain Stable, I do get your point, but the fact is, that there never won't be a determined thin line. If there were one, then EVERY decision could be devided dowm into a YES/NO one. YES/NO is in Computer Algebra 1/0, which comes back to what I said before. If we had that situation, then Pilots could be replaced by computers, also taking out of the decision making process. But unfortunately (or fortunately) it is not as simple as that:

I had the opportunity to fly into some airport in Indonesia last year. I give you the following scenario, where a immediate Pull Up and go around is not the safest solution:

VMC, Visual Approach, Leaving 1500ft AGL in a 737 turining left base, over hilly terrain, the GPWS comes on, because at the extended base line are more hills. A DC 10 is overhead the airport at 2500 ft about to enter right downwind, a Skyhawk A-4 of the Indonesian Air force is cleared for take off, and a F-28 is approaching the airfield from the north, another B737 from the south. ATC is overloaded.

So in this case, we assest the situation and we found it is safer to land, then to go around and follow the GPWS, because we were VMC and our flightpath lead us around the hills.This particular airfiled requires a left turn towards the airfield on Missed Approach (towards then the other traffic, Right Turn and straight out definately not an option because of Terrain), I think that is when Knowledge, Experience, Training and Common Sense comes into play.

But coming back to what you said, we shouldn't talk about IMC or VMC over the top. Discussion here is out of the question. A GPWS should be followed then immediately when descending into unknown terrain below MSA.

I have to agree with Burger Thing here. In a textbook scenario there would be no variables, but in real life there are many. However most of these are already absorbed by the crew before the warning is presented. So a qualified assesment can be made if to go-around or not..

Burger Thing

How many airfields in the world is the situation you describe normal?

In the instance you describe should the wheels not have lowered correctly you could not have gone around then?

Why does the scenario conditions keep changing from the original agreed upon ?!
On an ILS at 1,000 feet agl, the crew call "visual". At 200 feet agl the GPWS calls "minimums, minimums". Does the crew go through a new process of decision making to get another answer or does the crew acknowledge the existing and still current decision of the "visual" call at 1,000 feet?

The mindset instilled by going around with a GPWS alert should avoid hesitation when the alert is genuine.

The hesitation to consider whether the alert is genuine or not could kill you.

'Minimums' Minimums' is not quite the same as 'Whoop!, Whoop!. Pull Up!, Pull Up!'

very good! but, the pilot's situation is the same. If its VMC, VFR called "visual" and the situation is unchanged, as in the initial scenario. Let me climb over the fence here... at 1,000 feet agl on the ILS the crew call "visual" and at 200 feet agl, with conditions unchanged and even on the visual glide slope for the runway, the GPWS warning calls "WHOOP, WHOOP, Pull UP"? What do you do then?

To my mind, most people here are simply arguing for SOPs to be changed.

If the rules say you go around, then you go around. If you disagree with this and can provide good reasons, then argue for a change to the SOPs.

But we do not have the freedom to pick and choose which we comply with and which we don't.

I can see the point of those who say "If I'm good VMC, can see for miles, got the ground, got the airfield, then why go around?". Yes, on the surface of it, having a brief think, applying "common sense" and continuing may appear to be be logical.

However, as has been said many times, the action on the part of the pilot needs to be instantaneous in many GPWS situations. There should be no "Errr - can I see enough? Am I where I think I am? Is that alti set correctly? What does his say over there?" because most of the time by then you'd be dead.

Common sense, for me, says react instantaneously, and go around. When you're safely out of the way of whatever bit of ground might have been wanting to share the same bit of physical space as you, consult with the other guy. Check your position with ATC if you want. Check the map hasn't shifted. Check your altis. "Blimey, mate, we've checked everything, so the machine must be wrong. We were exactly where I thought we were. OK, let's do it again, and if it goes off again I'll disregard and we can snag it when on the ground. OK?"

Training in a delay in a reaction to GPWS is about as dangerous as you can get.