Gulf Air tried it and ended up in the sea.

But they were doing the 360 at 600 ft at night!

How many flights did the aeroplane do before receiving the proper inspection for flap overspeed? Hundreds?

I didn't say 'landed by chance'. I said 'landed SAFELY by chance'. That's not the same thing. This could all have gone very badly wrong, and it's a shame to see (some) of the (alleged) professionals here trying to excuse it.

Its not SOP.
A GA is SOP.

Konkordski
No ones trying to excuse such a crappy bit of flying.

As long as we entrust piloting to humans there will be stuff like this. Thankfully not as frequently as in the past.

EVERYone f**ks up from time to time.

He'll have learned some things that he ought to have known that day. Good. The fact that he plonked it down and stopped it neatly after such a crappy approach wasn't luck despite what you say.

Time to move on methinks.:rolleyes:

I think what certain posters are trying to say Brain fade is that it is one thing executing such an approach wilfully and in contravention of certain protocols that we all ought to adhere to when operating commercially. If this approach was shot as an act of parting machismo/bravado - call it what you want - frankly, I'd be pretty pissed off, if as a fare-paying passenger, I got some aerobatics thrown into the equation as well. I didn't sign up for that when I clicked on www.expedia.com.

It is quite another if it was a temporary aberration.

IMHO, the anecdotal and circumstantial evidence suggests a whiff of the former.

I do agree though that landing at 180kts flaps 10 and doing a good job wasn't luck. After all, I'd hope that I put it down nicely at 210kts flaps up if circumstances demanded it and the runway was computed as long enough.

Exceeding Vfe though is pretty silly. Departing subsequently without a check is inexcusable regardless of what interpretation you chose to attach to the actions of the crew prior to touchdown.

:mad:

SR-

Frankly, I agree.

If we assume that no two people are the same and that they are unlikely to have exactly the same amount of bravery, then basically no two pilots should ever fly with other.



Back to the thread. It seems the unfortunate co-joe had a classic Catch 22 situation.

If he grabbed the tech log and refused to go he would most likely have gone the same way as the girl who refused to fly with a skipper, i.e. fired.

If he did nothing there are those here ( from other operators )who want him fired.

Its seems he found the best solution for the situation ( company ) he found himself in. Do nothing say nothing and for God's sake keep the show on the road. He still has his job.

quote:
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But they were doing the 360 at 600 ft at night!
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Its not SOP.
A GA is SOP.
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Then, to make maxalt happy, I can change my suggestion in:
"Is'nt it simpler to say, earlier, when the approach path has gone, thousands feet below, (with MEAs, Wx, etc.; well ahead of the possible future GA) 'why don't we perform an holding pattern over...?"
Fly safe
DOVES

The question of F/O interaction/intervention poses a pratical consideration.

1. F/O is brand new on line, a new boy on the block, not yet steeped in the experience of others, which would breed confidence to say something. Thus says nothing, or not enough, in timidity. I'm sure he said plenty, but to little effect. Looking death in the face is scary.

2. The F/O is senior with lots of confidence and is coming up for a command course. He speaks up, tries to take control, fails and grounds the a/c so disrupting the schedule. Is this being "not company minded" commercially? or showing good command initiative? In the cut throat world of these companies it would be a difficult thought process.

3. What of the F/O inbetween, semi-senior, perhaps less to lose and have the nouse to step in?

I'm surprised someone hasn't opened the male/female F/O can of worms. Would one have behaved differently from the other? Either way, "shut up gringo." is sexless.

Hm?

The Beauvais guys finished their 360 turn at 200 feet 1/4 of a mile off centreline and the g/a calls for straight ahead climb.
When they commenced it, the nose was pointing at the tower so they buzzed it.

This whole issue beggars belief. First, the Captain knew full well what he was doing and continued with the "get in itis". Second the F/O, no matter how junior, did little to stop it when he could simply have pushed the TOGA button. It would have been very difficult, even for this clown, to have landed an 800 with TOGA thrust!

There are two major issues arising from this.

One, any F/O who isn't prepared to speak up when his own life is in danger doesn't deserve to be driving a pram let alone an aeroplane. They BOTH conspired to fly a possible unairworthy a/c back to STN and then allowed others to fly it for how long we dont know.

Two, the invisible culture at FR certainly has contributed to this incident and to the 'hear no evil speak no evil" culture as espoused by our friend, the Hairy Smelly One.

We all know that CD (who DID have the balls to question an asshole Capt) was sacked on the direct instructions of MOL five days after MD, chairman of the IALPA branch, was sacked. In those five days FR laid down the law to all its pilots that nobody was safe (CD was the Chief Pilot's daughter, remember?). The LHC culture was set in stone that day and nobody has had the balls to really challenge it since then, John Goss an honourable exception (but even he didn't win his case.)

There are many hundreds of excellent pilots in Ryanair. However, the culture they are working in stinks to high heaven and the IAA is utterly spineless in doing anything about the situation. Don't think they don't know what's going on, as they certainly do. If any evidence of their attitude is required just see the letter in Flight from their PRO a few weeks ago. For example, didn the IAA investigate the issues leading to the MD and CD sackings? We all know they did, but they never reported? I wonder why?

However at the end of the day all this can be stopped right away by the FR pilots. All they have to do is to report ALL issues to the company and copy same to the IAA. Even those jellyfish would be forced to act then. Isn't there a Freedom of Information Act in Ireland?

Sidstar:

Manual flight in a boeing 737 is without autothrottle. Thus pushing TOGA only changes flightdirector mode.

Sleeper

A simple & effective way for a FO to pull a Captain back into safety is to make a RT call to ATC.

State: Flight no., Rank, - Objections to flight profile & Captains actions.

This also serves as a recorded backup for later claims.

Regards.

It might be worth considering that the F/O didn't notice the 270KT with flap 5 exceedance.Rushed stressful approaches can max-out the most accomplished experienced operator and this guy,don't forget, was way outside his comfort zone and may well not have noticed an exceedance of only a few seconds in duration. I know most info is IRS derived but,if the sideslip was of any magnitude would the IAS be 100% accurate,maybe no exceedance was visible? Not trying to defend anybody but the poor guy was less likely to rock the boat and strand everyone in Skavsta for "only" a Cowboy approach followed by a flap 10 landing.When the monitoring system first came in pretty much everyone knew that a breaker behind the F/O marked WQAR meant watch your ass if you had a "hot" approach;they all have it now, but it amazes me they could have niavely believed they would get away with it if they knew the system was in-situ.Incidentally it is possible to land safely from where they started down without any abnormal control inputs/exceedances and respecting the RYR" approach-gate"( ie configured/spooled up/stable 500' VMC)it merely requires the application of the correct technique,( dirty&down not down &dirty or worse still half&half,which is what they tried).Seen it in the sim,wouldn't recommend it as a normal technique, but yes,they could have got in with no histrionics if they had applied a better method of flying the damn thing.I never met the Captain so have no idea if the boozing&fornicating(oh yes please!) accusations have any foundation, but those who pooh-pooh the broken marriage scenario obviously aint been there. . .yet.Command of an aircraft is not the place to be with a troubled mind ,but how many of us really call in sick if we are distracted/pissed off/ angry? and no I'm not just talking about RYR.Hell there are guys I have flown with who seemed to be having a crisis every day. . .what do you do? phone the CAA/IAA and ask to have them grounded/commited? I suspect most of us try and get through the day as pleasantly/normally as possible and leave it at that,unless it is someone we regularly fly with and it starts to grate.

As a last resort,and I do mean a LAST /"you ain't gonna kill me you son of a bitch" resort, a call to ATC that you are going around/deviating to avoid a storm/whatever, is infinitely preferable to wrestling for control.I have only had to do it once in my career when one a**-hole(and that is believe me a kind description of the Captain concerned )wanted to fly straight through a line squall over the Pyrenees and ignored my pleas that I most certainly didn't want to ;it worked, but the ambience for the remainder of the flight and subsequent sector was in itself a pretty big flight safety hazard.I never filed a report,and neither did he,which kind of said it all.I'm happy to say that no F/O has felt the need to do the same to me,in spite of my best efforts on occasions. . .

762
"less than perfect" my :mad:

I think SR 71 has it right:
So maybe these guys didn't know what they were doing while airborne (or the FO didn't know just how bad the Capt was handling the approach or whatever). But they knew perfectly well what they were doing on the ground, namely prioritising a timely departure after a v short turnaround over basic mandatory checks or at the very least mandatory log entries. And they knew perfectly well what they then did at STN, namely keep their mouths shut and let their colleagues fly the plane, which they knew shouldn't have flown before appropriate maintenance had been carried out. "Own up later", well that's not a very brave thing to do if it happens after your're being confronted with the evidence, which in this case can only be described as the aviation equivalent of the proverbial smoking gun.
:yuk:

Everyone is crucifying them for leaving Skavsta having exceeded VFE for flap 5; as I've said before the Captain may have stretched/stressed the F/O (and possibly himself)so much on this sh*t approach that no one noticed what may have been a (relatively)short excursion over the limiting speed. They probably took time to enjoy the wonderful unaccustomed view afforded by 12° nose down AND a bit of side-slip.It must have looked quite gob-smacking.Boeing's are a bit tougher than come apart at the seams because of one exceedance 10% over a limit so lets stop fixating on them"intentionally leaving Skavsta/leaving the A/C for their fellow pilots "in an unairworthy state p l e a s e . . . Personally I would be more worried by the side-loads they generated on the fin by the Tiger Moth sideslip attempt.If CSA is a bit bent when I next fly it, guess I'll know why.

captplaystation
 

Another FR Captain?

So 10% is hardly worth mentioning then? When would you make a log remark? 15%? 20%? Why have they put speed limits on the 737 in the first place when it's a "tough" aircraft?

Some replies are almost amusing. Scary, but amusing.