Rananim/Shaka Zulu,

I concur. 210 to 6 on ATC's request into 24L @ PMI was more of a struggle.

You can pull the gear at 270 on the 733/4/5 and the speedbrake can be left out to F10 - our SOP.

To be at 1800AGL on the GS & 210/6 from 300/10 you need to lose 90kts in ~1min = 1.5kts/sec. Quite possible with a level segment + speedbrake =~ -1kts/sec from 300 - 270, followed by gear down + speedbrake =~ -2kts/sec from 270-210. Then start down the slope...

Bit noisy though.

All within limitations.

Just like my CAP371 roster.

Next time ATC ask you for "210 to 6", the detractors now have a choice to make...rather than spit out their dummy! Make sure there isn't a tailwind.

;)

:ok:

With the very greatest of respect, from a PPL who knows that he does not have the handling skills or experience of a line pilot, deciding that an aircraft is technically capable of delivering a performance is not the same as deciding that this is an appropriate decision.

And I once "flew" the Trident 3 sim from BIG at FL330 into 27L without an orbit or extra track miles and achieved a stabilised approach at 10NM, all under the beady eye of a TRE, who had several 000 hours on the real thing.

Speedbrake, reverse, gear down etc, -15k per min for a while ....

But I wouldn't have liked to have sat in the back on the real thing.

Neither would I have liked to experience the Skavsta approach, even though it ended happliy.

Final 3 Greens,

I totally agree - on all accounts.

:ok:

Stabilised by 1000ft IFR or 500 ft VFR is what I teach and that means fully dirty on speed and on profile and never more than 1000ft/min ROD below 1000ft AGL. That way the gin stays in the glass and the punters come back for more. Remember, most modern aircraft will either go down or slow down but not both at the same time.

210 til 6nm you certainly can't do on my machine unless you've donned a stetson and spurs, in fact, the company expects us to be no more than 180 til 6nm and 160 til 4nm, the reason being obvious - safety. I'm always fully configured by 1000', even if the f/o's flying.

Any of the nonsensical flying talked of above doesn't figure in my outfit and how glad I am. If I put one foot out of line the flight data monitoring guys get to see it and the balpa rep. will ring me to discuss and if it warrants, take it further. This all makes for sensible and hopefully a much safer operation.

I find it interesting that the people who are advocating the 300kts at 10nm being a 'do-able' situation are the ones who are hanging the Skavsta crew and shooting the Ryanair so called 'Cowboys' down. The Skavsta incident was dreadful but it is not indicative of the culture as a whole within Ryanair.

Strikes me as pot calling kettle black here.

You shouldnt be pushing the envelope with passengers lives in your hands, you should not be putting yourself into situations that are 'just' do-able. Aircraft are built with multiple redundancy built in, shouldnt we be flying that way? With options open at all times? I certainly do....

Well looks like I stirred up some comments.
Just to clear up one thing: I'm Not Advocating UNSTABLE approaches.
The cut off point for me is 500 feet.
Final Flap, Vref+20, Approach Thrust and Normal Rate of Descent.
If not achieved then go-around.
But dont think for one moment that I like sitting with tight bum cheeks seeing if we are going to be stable or not.

However I do take the approach that it is VERY useful to know that your aircraft is capable and indeed you know how to RECOVER from a rushed approach. You'll be amazed how many guys won't go for the gear when they really do need to/

Just the other night, No4 with 35trackmiles, ended up being No2 with 15trackmiles. Did we get it in: Roger that.....
and yes 300kts till 10nm is fine if you have that level segment, it's the preambule

SZ

edit:

Rat 5: no it has no bearing on my name whatsoever
ArkRoyal: -300 is easier than the -700, prefer at least a mile more on the NG (depending on weight of the aircraft). Lightweight 700 on a 3degree slope doesnt even slow down with gear over 210kts

I dont think anyone here is advocating 300 knots at 10nm as an ideal scenario.But pilots must know how to adapt to an ongoing situation.He knew speed was the key,not the profile.Speed first,then recapture the profile.If you take off with the wrong runway in the FMC and go for LNAV and it turns you right when you should be going left what do you do?You adapt to the situation;the failure to see that the FMC was incorrectly programmed was a small procedural error.However,if you then religiously follow the FD commands,your error just got very big.

Same principle applies to this case;it would have been a small procedural infringement to forego the profile in order to control the inertia.The bigger and far more dangerous error was doing what he in fact did,ie.maintaining the profile because thats what the book says you must do.

184 PEOPLE. You fly a plane with just one other person and you take NO risks, when your talking 184 people, and 7 crew then you go-around, no matter how ****ty your day, week, has been.

Does it need to be re-stated, this pilot was in command of a plane with 184 people onboard.

Small errors can be accounted for, but failing to follow even the most basic safety procedures when landing a 737-800 is criminal.

The man should have his ATPL pulled. A 737 is no place for cowboys.

What follows is CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE:

The PF recalled that the PNF “brought the excess in speed to his attention several times”, but that “his call was to continue thinking at the time he would be able to rescue the approach”. The PNF made the comment that the PF was “fixated on trying to fly the aircraft on to the runway”. Because of the high speeds, he recalled, he could only select Flap 10 for the landing, at about 210 kt (standard landing flap setting is Flaps 30). At no time did he call for a Go-Around (GA). His inputs of “too high” or “too fast” were effectively being ignored. Consequently, he said, a stabilized approach was not achieved, as is required by SOP’s. In the event, a relatively smooth landing was effected in the correct touchdown zone of the dry runway at a speed of 178/180 kt, which is some 30/40 kt above the normal touchdown speed. The aircraft stopped at the end of the 2,878 metre long runway using manual braking and normal reverse thrust.

Gross negligence.

Be interesting to know how long their turnround was. Landing at 180 kts with a 20 min turnround could have worrying consequences for the next sector.

A lot of bashing sure going on in here over this one. Unfortunatley in the real world things like this happen.
Lets see...as I understand it he stopped (on the runway)did he not?
I used to brief on approach into Burbank..if we overshot the runway to be sure and grab a 6-pack as we went by the filling station at the end of the runway.
A few years later SouthWest did just that...as he stopped "in".
That is what the "I can make it mindset can get you!":E

Folks,

Nobody has answered a very important question - where is he now and what is he doing?

If he is still actively flying, then a bunch of people have a right to know about this episode.

Stay Alive

1. Ofcourse the pilots are responsible for their own actions, but interestingly it was an incident from Australia which introduced "management and corporate culture" to accident causes in investigations. Ofcourse the FO was under a lot of pressure, and I have no doubt at all about it that he would have lost his job if he would have single handedly grounded the airplane. That is company culture, or management tactics, I don't care what it's called; it is dangerous and most certainly contributing to the incident/accident. Yes Mr. O'Leary has his own responsibility of letting the pilots make their own decisions, and thus keeping his flights safe.

2. To SR71: I was in a similar situation once where during a departure a captain unexpectedly decided to wander off the SID directly towards some high mountains.
a. I called for an immediate right turn;
b. then I told ATC "XYZ turning right now"
c. then -the cpt still didn't react- I told him "I am taking over control, and if you don't let me, I'll punch you in the face"

then he let me take over and I initiated our right turn. He didn't comment on it during any stage of the rest of the flight. But he did have to speak to our fleet managament a few days later.

But indeed, if he doesn't let you take over? The only solution is to hit him, or call for the purser to the cockpit and work together.
I will do everything to prevent myself -and my crew and pax- from flying into a mountain.

P77

What about if you are the one that is mistaken about turning right? are you so sure that you judgement is always perfect?. Punching somebody in the face hardly seems a failsafe method of error management....

Calypso: If someone does not respond to any CRM, the final result is that CRM does not work. In my case he did not respond to anything: in fact, he did not say a word to any of my callouts and comments.
I don't need to go into detail about EGPWS and the different colours on your NAV-display, nor into green lines and programmed routes and GPS Primary, nor into ATC clearances, MRVA's etc. etc., do I?

Would you let your captain fly the airplane into a mountain, because there might be a slight theoretical chance that he could be right?
The question was: What happens if someone does not let you take over control? Answer: If things get serious (i.e. lifethreatening), I not only would, but I actually once have considered hitting my captain, as my previous post shows.

P77

Do you know now what led to the Captains misbehaviour? Illness or what?

I do.
After the flight he called in sick. I still found it necessary to go to my chief pilot with the story. He said something like: Oh him... well another chapter for his big file.
He was invited to drink tea upstairs, and got kind of a reprimand.
And they did try to fire him once, some years before this flight, but did not succeed, because they could not prove clearly enough for a judge in labour court, that he broke SOPs on a daily basis; for the (layman-) judge the case was too weak.

So he wasn't ill, he is one of the very few rotten apples in the cockpit.

P77