BAe LIMIT THE 146 TO FL260 DUE ENGINE ICING.
Guest
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Tarjet: Is that all you could think up?
What about:
737's that roll inverted and dive into the ground, all by themselves
747's that mysteriously explode in flight
Embraer 145s that break in half on landing
Fokker 100s that lose their mainwheels
Any Airbus having a bad computer day
The list goes on...
Funny, I have been flying it for a couple of years now and have never had a flap fault, or water in the E&E bay, or a door "fall" of its hinges, or had the AP fail to capture. Like any aircraft, it has its idiosyncrasies. Just had a mate on the phone last night complaining about the "idiosyncrasies" of the 737 he flies, which frankly make the 146 look quite clever. Oh, and another point... try comparing accident rates between the two types (look at hull loss for example). 146 wins that argument too.
Belgique:
The PE article is CRAP.
For example:
>> The landing had to be made automatically <<
Really? No autoland in this baby.
>> The cause is easy enough to identify – a broken or damaged engine oil seal which allows organophosphates from the engine oil to enter the cabin via the air conditioning system. <<
WRONG. The oil companies tell us that the organophosphates only separate out from the oil at very high temperatures, typically 400C if memory serves correctly. Not likely in an AC pack. I am told that extensive testing carried out in the UK failed to find any trace of organophosphates in the blood of those affected by fumes incidents.
>> Rollbacks – another quirk unique to the 146 – occur when all engine power is lost at altitude <<
NONSENSE. It might be one engine, it might be all four, and the situation is easily recoverable. If you read the report on the one serious incident of rollback, you will find some serious crew errors in the way in which that flight was handled- their "recovery" actually made the problem worse, and was not the action recommended in the SOPs.
>> ...and are also caused by the same design deficiency. <<
Rollbacks are caused by fumes in cabin? BULL! The two problems are COMPLETELY unrelated. Rollback is caused by ICING!!!
>>The fumes incidents are likely to get worse as the aircraft age and get more leaky. <<
RUBBISH! The age of the engine has NOTHING to do with the age of the airframe- we have some 20 year old airframes with one or more new engines! Also, any leaking seals and the engine is immediately pulled.
>> He’s one of a growing band of engineers and scientists who believe that the 207 BAe 146’s flying world-wide should be grounded. <<
Hope he wants to ground 757/767 and MD80 aircraft as well, because they have also had several documented fumes incidents!!!
You should all know better than to believe this stuff!
What about:
737's that roll inverted and dive into the ground, all by themselves
747's that mysteriously explode in flight
Embraer 145s that break in half on landing
Fokker 100s that lose their mainwheels
Any Airbus having a bad computer day
The list goes on...
Funny, I have been flying it for a couple of years now and have never had a flap fault, or water in the E&E bay, or a door "fall" of its hinges, or had the AP fail to capture. Like any aircraft, it has its idiosyncrasies. Just had a mate on the phone last night complaining about the "idiosyncrasies" of the 737 he flies, which frankly make the 146 look quite clever. Oh, and another point... try comparing accident rates between the two types (look at hull loss for example). 146 wins that argument too.
Belgique:
The PE article is CRAP.
For example:
>> The landing had to be made automatically <<
Really? No autoland in this baby.
>> The cause is easy enough to identify – a broken or damaged engine oil seal which allows organophosphates from the engine oil to enter the cabin via the air conditioning system. <<
WRONG. The oil companies tell us that the organophosphates only separate out from the oil at very high temperatures, typically 400C if memory serves correctly. Not likely in an AC pack. I am told that extensive testing carried out in the UK failed to find any trace of organophosphates in the blood of those affected by fumes incidents.
>> Rollbacks – another quirk unique to the 146 – occur when all engine power is lost at altitude <<
NONSENSE. It might be one engine, it might be all four, and the situation is easily recoverable. If you read the report on the one serious incident of rollback, you will find some serious crew errors in the way in which that flight was handled- their "recovery" actually made the problem worse, and was not the action recommended in the SOPs.
>> ...and are also caused by the same design deficiency. <<
Rollbacks are caused by fumes in cabin? BULL! The two problems are COMPLETELY unrelated. Rollback is caused by ICING!!!
>>The fumes incidents are likely to get worse as the aircraft age and get more leaky. <<
RUBBISH! The age of the engine has NOTHING to do with the age of the airframe- we have some 20 year old airframes with one or more new engines! Also, any leaking seals and the engine is immediately pulled.
>> He’s one of a growing band of engineers and scientists who believe that the 207 BAe 146’s flying world-wide should be grounded. <<
Hope he wants to ground 757/767 and MD80 aircraft as well, because they have also had several documented fumes incidents!!!
You should all know better than to believe this stuff!
Guest
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RD,
When I first read the title - the Flying Gas Chamber - I though it was all going to be about you.
To me the article scans well. But its credibility - and in turn yours - depends on:
1. Whether the Birmingham incident ever really happened.
2. Whether it was reported correctly by PE.
If it did happen it must have been the subject of a CAA incident report which must have been circulated to all operators. So if anyone has seen one or has a copy, could they please post here.
When I first read the title - the Flying Gas Chamber - I though it was all going to be about you.
To me the article scans well. But its credibility - and in turn yours - depends on:
1. Whether the Birmingham incident ever really happened.
2. Whether it was reported correctly by PE.
If it did happen it must have been the subject of a CAA incident report which must have been circulated to all operators. So if anyone has seen one or has a copy, could they please post here.
Guest
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Effendi
Thank you, I don't think much of you, either.
You miss the point. There have been incident(s), but the point I was making was that the PE article is innacurrate. I have pointed the errors out, they are easily verifiable and they cast serious doubt on the credibility of the reporting. My credibility is not established (or otherwise) by any incidents that have occurred. What I have provided is some facts- check them for yourself.
But then, maybe you would rather not let the facts get in the way of a good story???
As is often the case with journos, a kernel of truth is used to construct an outrageous lie.
Thank you, I don't think much of you, either.
You miss the point. There have been incident(s), but the point I was making was that the PE article is innacurrate. I have pointed the errors out, they are easily verifiable and they cast serious doubt on the credibility of the reporting. My credibility is not established (or otherwise) by any incidents that have occurred. What I have provided is some facts- check them for yourself.
But then, maybe you would rather not let the facts get in the way of a good story???
As is often the case with journos, a kernel of truth is used to construct an outrageous lie.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Some raw data for RAW DATA
>> The landing had to be made automatically <<
Really? No autoland in this baby. but see the CAA report (below) for specifics
>> The cause is easy enough to identify - a broken or damaged engine oil seal which allows organophosphates from the engine oil to enter the cabin via the air conditioning system. <<
WRONG. The oil companies tell us that the organophosphates only separate out from the oil at very high temperatures, typically 400C if memory serves correctly. Not likely in an AC pack. I am told that extensive testing carried out in the UK failed to find any trace of organophosphates in the blood of those affected by fumes incidents. (vol 3 senate data-Mobil-see below at bottom) Mon- ortho & di-ortho are 10 & 5 times more toxic than tri-ortho (TOCP) respectv. & in much larger quantities as you can see (below at bottom). The oil's OPs are in a synthesis mixture and not a compound requiring high-temps to separate out. Apart from the fact that the OP's don't have to separate out before you breathe them in, the oil temperature reached before passing via the leaky seals is actually quite sufficient to provide OP-laden mist into the cabin. Your individual metabolism does the rest. That's been established - as has the need to correct the situation. It's not attacks of mass hysteria occurring to flight-crews. It's a reaction to airborne toxins (inhibitors), but admittedly some people are more allergic than others. The oil companies can also tell you that their QC is such that no contaminants can find their way into AVGAS either. Yeah, right.
>> Rollbacks - another quirk unique to the 146 - occur when all engine power is lost at altitude <<
NONSENSE. It might be one engine, it might be all four, and the situation is easily recoverable. If you read the report on the one serious incident of rollback, you will find some serious crew errors in the way in which that flight was handled- their "recovery" actually made the problem worse, and was not the action recommended in the SOPs. There's been many more than one "serious" roll-back incident and that is despite the altitude restrictions having been in for quite some time and many (if not most) engines being modded.
>> ...and are also caused by the same design deficiency. << I think that he's here talking generally about the wisdom of putting a Chinook engine core on an airliner, changing the intake, increasing the fan-speeds and throughflow, whacking on an aircon and additional bleeds and running it in the non-designed high altitude environment, glossing over the TC testing and then optimistically expecting no systematic glitches when you run it in a different speed regime.
Rollbacks are caused by fumes in cabin? BULL! The two problems are COMPLETELY unrelated. Rollback is caused by ICING!!! He didn't really say that (see above)
>>The fumes incidents are likely to get worse as the aircraft age and get more leaky. << I think he may be referring to the ducting here. The oily contamination residues in the ducting should be cleaned after a cabin-air contamination incident - but it isn't. Anyway I don't think anyone would claim that tolerances tighten, nor that aircraft improve, with age
RUBBISH! The age of the engine has NOTHING to do with the age of the airframe- we have some 20 year old airframes with one or more new engines! Also, any leaking seals and the engine is immediately pulled.
>> He's one of a growing band of engineers and scientists who believe that the 207 BAe 146's flying world-wide should be grounded. <<
Hope he wants to ground 757/767 and MD80 aircraft as well, because they have also had several documented fumes incidents!!! Nothing to the extent of the BAe146 - despite attempts not to acknowledge the problem.
You should all know better than to believe this stuff! Well perhaps they'd prefer this stuff:
Date: 05.11.2000
A/C Type: BAE146
Location Occ Num 200008340
Flt Phase FLIGHT Location Info
Occ Classification Serious Incidents
Event(s) Smoke / Fumes (not engine)
Crew Illness / Incapacitation
SERIOUS INCIDENT: P2 incapacitated by noxious fumes. P1 performance also impaired.
Passengers and positioning crew reported oily/petrol smell in rear cabin after take-off which soon dissipated.
20mins prior to landing, P1 left the flight deck to go to the toilet. P2 did likewise on P1's return. 5mins later, P1 felt nauseous and had difficulty concentrating. Simultaneously, P2 became unwell with highly dilated pupils. P2 required assistance applying oxygen mask, his hands were trembling and he had difficulty communicating. P1 then noticed his depth of vision was impaired. Autopilot remained selected for landing which P1 managed to control despite nausea increasing. Both flight crew hospitalised on arrival. Subject to AAIB Field investigation..
____________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________
Number Of Records: 1
****** End of Report ******
TCP SUMMARY
· TCP is a necessary component in jet engine oils. It is used as an antiwear additive to increase load-carrying capacity and tolerance to increasing speed of rotating or sliding motion. The antiwear properties of TCP for this critical application are unique and no replacement has been identified that will meet the stringent performance requirements for jet turbine oil. For many years, it was also thought that reducing the number and variety of compounds in the TCP would also reduce its performance.1-3
· The TCP used in jet engine oil is a very complex mixture. The conventional TCP used in Mobil Jet II is a complex mixture prepared primarily from m and p cresol. However, other substituted phenols as well as xylenols are present in the synthesis mixture. We have identified 10 phenols and xylenols, as well as low levels of ortho cresol and phenol, in hydrolyzed in conventional TCP4. Ortho cresol was present at about 0.16%, m + p cresol combined at 80% and other phenols at 17%. Thus the number of triaryl phosphate in TCP is very high and is not limited to the ten that can be formed from ortho, meta and para cresol.
It is not practical to measure all of the triaryl phosphate compounds present because standards do not exist for most of them. However, their concentrations can be computed by statistical procedures from the compounds present in hydrolysates. The various phenols and xylenols have virtually the same reactivity. This procedure has been used for many years5. In the TCP additive, TOCP levels are calculated to be < 5ppb, mono ortho cresyl phosphate ~ 3070 ppm, and diortho cresyl phosphate ~ 6 ppm. These values are reduced by 33 fold after dilution in the oil.
In JEO 291, a recently developed low toxicity TCP4 is used. The hydrolysates of this TCP are ~ 99% m and p cresol and ortho cresol is only ~ 0.06%4; virtually all of the ortho substituted phenols and xylenols are eliminated. TOCP is calculated to be < 1 ppb, mono ortho cresol TCP ~ 1760 ppm, and diortho cresyl TCP ~ 1.1 ppm. Even though molecular diversity is reduced in this TCP, its anti-wear performance is excellent, thus dispelling some concerns raised years ago.3
TCP is an organo phosphate that is very different from those used as insecticides. Both TCP and the organo phosphate insecticides can inhibit cholinesterase enzymes in blood plasma, red blood cells and the nervous system. The blood cell enzymes have no known function in the body, and inhibition of these enzymes is indicative of exposure to an inhibitor but not of toxicity. In general, the plasma enzyme is inhibited the most - and nervous system enzyme (including brain) the least. The insecticides owe their killing power to the inhibition of cholinesterase (specifically acetyl cholinesterase) in the nervous system of target insects as well as in non-target animals, including people, and these toxicants are far more potent in this behavior than is TCP. For example, parathion is more than 2500 times as acutely toxic (eg. rat oral LD5O) than is TCP6. The insecticides have recently been characterized as being capable, in people, of causing lasting neurological/psychological effects on intellect, mood,
>> The landing had to be made automatically <<
Really? No autoland in this baby. but see the CAA report (below) for specifics
>> The cause is easy enough to identify - a broken or damaged engine oil seal which allows organophosphates from the engine oil to enter the cabin via the air conditioning system. <<
WRONG. The oil companies tell us that the organophosphates only separate out from the oil at very high temperatures, typically 400C if memory serves correctly. Not likely in an AC pack. I am told that extensive testing carried out in the UK failed to find any trace of organophosphates in the blood of those affected by fumes incidents. (vol 3 senate data-Mobil-see below at bottom) Mon- ortho & di-ortho are 10 & 5 times more toxic than tri-ortho (TOCP) respectv. & in much larger quantities as you can see (below at bottom). The oil's OPs are in a synthesis mixture and not a compound requiring high-temps to separate out. Apart from the fact that the OP's don't have to separate out before you breathe them in, the oil temperature reached before passing via the leaky seals is actually quite sufficient to provide OP-laden mist into the cabin. Your individual metabolism does the rest. That's been established - as has the need to correct the situation. It's not attacks of mass hysteria occurring to flight-crews. It's a reaction to airborne toxins (inhibitors), but admittedly some people are more allergic than others. The oil companies can also tell you that their QC is such that no contaminants can find their way into AVGAS either. Yeah, right.
>> Rollbacks - another quirk unique to the 146 - occur when all engine power is lost at altitude <<
NONSENSE. It might be one engine, it might be all four, and the situation is easily recoverable. If you read the report on the one serious incident of rollback, you will find some serious crew errors in the way in which that flight was handled- their "recovery" actually made the problem worse, and was not the action recommended in the SOPs. There's been many more than one "serious" roll-back incident and that is despite the altitude restrictions having been in for quite some time and many (if not most) engines being modded.
>> ...and are also caused by the same design deficiency. << I think that he's here talking generally about the wisdom of putting a Chinook engine core on an airliner, changing the intake, increasing the fan-speeds and throughflow, whacking on an aircon and additional bleeds and running it in the non-designed high altitude environment, glossing over the TC testing and then optimistically expecting no systematic glitches when you run it in a different speed regime.
Rollbacks are caused by fumes in cabin? BULL! The two problems are COMPLETELY unrelated. Rollback is caused by ICING!!! He didn't really say that (see above)
>>The fumes incidents are likely to get worse as the aircraft age and get more leaky. << I think he may be referring to the ducting here. The oily contamination residues in the ducting should be cleaned after a cabin-air contamination incident - but it isn't. Anyway I don't think anyone would claim that tolerances tighten, nor that aircraft improve, with age
RUBBISH! The age of the engine has NOTHING to do with the age of the airframe- we have some 20 year old airframes with one or more new engines! Also, any leaking seals and the engine is immediately pulled.
>> He's one of a growing band of engineers and scientists who believe that the 207 BAe 146's flying world-wide should be grounded. <<
Hope he wants to ground 757/767 and MD80 aircraft as well, because they have also had several documented fumes incidents!!! Nothing to the extent of the BAe146 - despite attempts not to acknowledge the problem.
You should all know better than to believe this stuff! Well perhaps they'd prefer this stuff:
Date: 05.11.2000
A/C Type: BAE146
Location Occ Num 200008340
Flt Phase FLIGHT Location Info
Occ Classification Serious Incidents
Event(s) Smoke / Fumes (not engine)
Crew Illness / Incapacitation
SERIOUS INCIDENT: P2 incapacitated by noxious fumes. P1 performance also impaired.
Passengers and positioning crew reported oily/petrol smell in rear cabin after take-off which soon dissipated.
20mins prior to landing, P1 left the flight deck to go to the toilet. P2 did likewise on P1's return. 5mins later, P1 felt nauseous and had difficulty concentrating. Simultaneously, P2 became unwell with highly dilated pupils. P2 required assistance applying oxygen mask, his hands were trembling and he had difficulty communicating. P1 then noticed his depth of vision was impaired. Autopilot remained selected for landing which P1 managed to control despite nausea increasing. Both flight crew hospitalised on arrival. Subject to AAIB Field investigation..
____________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________
Number Of Records: 1
****** End of Report ******
TCP SUMMARY
· TCP is a necessary component in jet engine oils. It is used as an antiwear additive to increase load-carrying capacity and tolerance to increasing speed of rotating or sliding motion. The antiwear properties of TCP for this critical application are unique and no replacement has been identified that will meet the stringent performance requirements for jet turbine oil. For many years, it was also thought that reducing the number and variety of compounds in the TCP would also reduce its performance.1-3
· The TCP used in jet engine oil is a very complex mixture. The conventional TCP used in Mobil Jet II is a complex mixture prepared primarily from m and p cresol. However, other substituted phenols as well as xylenols are present in the synthesis mixture. We have identified 10 phenols and xylenols, as well as low levels of ortho cresol and phenol, in hydrolyzed in conventional TCP4. Ortho cresol was present at about 0.16%, m + p cresol combined at 80% and other phenols at 17%. Thus the number of triaryl phosphate in TCP is very high and is not limited to the ten that can be formed from ortho, meta and para cresol.
It is not practical to measure all of the triaryl phosphate compounds present because standards do not exist for most of them. However, their concentrations can be computed by statistical procedures from the compounds present in hydrolysates. The various phenols and xylenols have virtually the same reactivity. This procedure has been used for many years5. In the TCP additive, TOCP levels are calculated to be < 5ppb, mono ortho cresyl phosphate ~ 3070 ppm, and diortho cresyl phosphate ~ 6 ppm. These values are reduced by 33 fold after dilution in the oil.
In JEO 291, a recently developed low toxicity TCP4 is used. The hydrolysates of this TCP are ~ 99% m and p cresol and ortho cresol is only ~ 0.06%4; virtually all of the ortho substituted phenols and xylenols are eliminated. TOCP is calculated to be < 1 ppb, mono ortho cresol TCP ~ 1760 ppm, and diortho cresyl TCP ~ 1.1 ppm. Even though molecular diversity is reduced in this TCP, its anti-wear performance is excellent, thus dispelling some concerns raised years ago.3
TCP is an organo phosphate that is very different from those used as insecticides. Both TCP and the organo phosphate insecticides can inhibit cholinesterase enzymes in blood plasma, red blood cells and the nervous system. The blood cell enzymes have no known function in the body, and inhibition of these enzymes is indicative of exposure to an inhibitor but not of toxicity. In general, the plasma enzyme is inhibited the most - and nervous system enzyme (including brain) the least. The insecticides owe their killing power to the inhibition of cholinesterase (specifically acetyl cholinesterase) in the nervous system of target insects as well as in non-target animals, including people, and these toxicants are far more potent in this behavior than is TCP. For example, parathion is more than 2500 times as acutely toxic (eg. rat oral LD5O) than is TCP6. The insecticides have recently been characterized as being capable, in people, of causing lasting neurological/psychological effects on intellect, mood,
Guest
Posts: n/a
Overtalk,
Nice to see some believable raw data at last.
So the Private Eye reporting of events was correct - as I suspected. Maybe now that PE have informed RD of events that as a 146 captain he should have known about, he will stop prevaricating an address the issue. 3 incidents of two incapacitated pilots. Both aircrew and passengers put at risk. Who knows, he could be next.
The industry must accept the dangers and urgently seek a solution. If there isn't one, the lives of aircrew and passengers must NOT be further endangered and the planes should be retired.
Nice to see some believable raw data at last.
So the Private Eye reporting of events was correct - as I suspected. Maybe now that PE have informed RD of events that as a 146 captain he should have known about, he will stop prevaricating an address the issue. 3 incidents of two incapacitated pilots. Both aircrew and passengers put at risk. Who knows, he could be next.
The industry must accept the dangers and urgently seek a solution. If there isn't one, the lives of aircrew and passengers must NOT be further endangered and the planes should be retired.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Funny thing about nerve poisons like organo-phosphates, oxygenating the victim once they've been exposed doesn't help alleviate the effects of the exposure. It may even hinder recovery because of the red-cell stimulus (increased metabolic rate due to the increased oxygen partial pressures throughout the body).
It's a bit like spraying an electrical fire with kero - or so I've been told. But I'm no clinician so I'd tend to go with the traditional treatment (oxygen, stretcher and body-bag).
It's a bit like spraying an electrical fire with kero - or so I've been told. But I'm no clinician so I'd tend to go with the traditional treatment (oxygen, stretcher and body-bag).
Guest
Posts: n/a
Effendi, PE is believable because that is what you want to believe. In essence RD is correct, and I can back this with 14 years on type. Some people with nothing much to do, and not much up top to do it with just seem to love to knock a British product be it aircraft, car or whatever.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Croqueteer,
PE is believeable because its backed up by the CAA incident report. Nothing to do with what I WANT to believe. Did the incident happen? Yes
Should the problem be addressed? Yes.
Is it a safety issue? Yes.
Have there been 3 incidents of multiple pilot incapacitation? Yes.
Is the safety of passengers and crew an issue? Yes.
Can the captain of a a BAe 146 guarantee that he can fly himself, his crew and his passengers to their destination without being overcome by fumes? NO.
PE is believeable because its backed up by the CAA incident report. Nothing to do with what I WANT to believe. Did the incident happen? Yes
Should the problem be addressed? Yes.
Is it a safety issue? Yes.
Have there been 3 incidents of multiple pilot incapacitation? Yes.
Is the safety of passengers and crew an issue? Yes.
Can the captain of a a BAe 146 guarantee that he can fly himself, his crew and his passengers to their destination without being overcome by fumes? NO.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Well, I don't have the time or inclination to play "my expert vs your expert" with Overtalk. Suffice it to say that not every expert agrees with the Australian paper he so glibly quotes, and the oil companies (who are not bandits as he implies) also have a different take on the situation. If it were that clear-cut, the 146 would not be flying today. If the evidence was there, and was not debateable, it'd be grounded.
Just to correct a couple of points:
>> There's been many more than one "serious" roll-back incident and that is despite the altitude restrictions having been in for quite some time and many (if not most) engines being modded. <<
No modded engine has rolled back, and there have been few serious incidents. Feel free to quote the incidents that you are thinking of.
>> The oily contamination residues in the ducting should be cleaned after a cabin-air contamination incident - but it isn't. <<
Oh yes it is!! Our aircraft are rejected for service if there is ANY oil contamination in the ducts. They are inspected regularly.
>> Anyway I don't think anyone would claim that tolerances tighten, nor that aircraft improve, with age <<
If a twenty year old airframe has new engines fitted, have tolerances improved or worsened?
>>Autopilot remained selected for landing <<
I say again for those who might be unsure, the 146 is not equipped with autoland. The 146 that is the subject of this report DEFINITELY does not have it! The pilot landed it. If the autopilot was engaged all the way to the ground, there would have been a large smoking hole in the ground.
Maybe I'll get all my files on this out of the attic tommorrow. Or maybe I'll just go biking.
Effendi, you just don't get it, do you. Statistically, there are many, many more likely causes of death in an aircraft than a fumes incident (which has never killed anyone). But you are strangely silent on the other killers I have mentioned, such as 737 rudders and 747 fuel tanks. That you are so keen to put down the 146, which has to my knowledge never killed a passenger, tells me that your motivation is not safety.
I'll believe you are interested in safety when you apply the same effort to bashing the 737 and 747.
EDDNHopper: 146 only, RJ is immune.
Finally, let me just reverse Effendis argument:
Did the (737 rudder/747 fuel tank) incident happen? Yes
Should the problem be addressed? Yes.
Is it a safety issue? Yes.
Have there been (more than) 3 incidents of (737 rudder hardover)? Yes.
Is the safety of passengers and crew an issue? Yes.
Can the captain of a (737) guarantee that he can fly himself, his crew and his passengers to their destination (if he has a rudder hardover)? NO.
What a silly game...
Just to correct a couple of points:
>> There's been many more than one "serious" roll-back incident and that is despite the altitude restrictions having been in for quite some time and many (if not most) engines being modded. <<
No modded engine has rolled back, and there have been few serious incidents. Feel free to quote the incidents that you are thinking of.
>> The oily contamination residues in the ducting should be cleaned after a cabin-air contamination incident - but it isn't. <<
Oh yes it is!! Our aircraft are rejected for service if there is ANY oil contamination in the ducts. They are inspected regularly.
>> Anyway I don't think anyone would claim that tolerances tighten, nor that aircraft improve, with age <<
If a twenty year old airframe has new engines fitted, have tolerances improved or worsened?
>>Autopilot remained selected for landing <<
I say again for those who might be unsure, the 146 is not equipped with autoland. The 146 that is the subject of this report DEFINITELY does not have it! The pilot landed it. If the autopilot was engaged all the way to the ground, there would have been a large smoking hole in the ground.
Maybe I'll get all my files on this out of the attic tommorrow. Or maybe I'll just go biking.
Effendi, you just don't get it, do you. Statistically, there are many, many more likely causes of death in an aircraft than a fumes incident (which has never killed anyone). But you are strangely silent on the other killers I have mentioned, such as 737 rudders and 747 fuel tanks. That you are so keen to put down the 146, which has to my knowledge never killed a passenger, tells me that your motivation is not safety.
I'll believe you are interested in safety when you apply the same effort to bashing the 737 and 747.
EDDNHopper: 146 only, RJ is immune.
Finally, let me just reverse Effendis argument:
Did the (737 rudder/747 fuel tank) incident happen? Yes
Should the problem be addressed? Yes.
Is it a safety issue? Yes.
Have there been (more than) 3 incidents of (737 rudder hardover)? Yes.
Is the safety of passengers and crew an issue? Yes.
Can the captain of a (737) guarantee that he can fly himself, his crew and his passengers to their destination (if he has a rudder hardover)? NO.
What a silly game...
Guest
Posts: n/a
raw data,
if it's not boeing (or airbus) i'm not going.....
I flew "the baby" as you call it and i can assure you that the 73 is a jewel compared to the kid you talk about.
No offence but one day you will fly something better and you will understand.
happy landings!
if it's not boeing (or airbus) i'm not going.....
I flew "the baby" as you call it and i can assure you that the 73 is a jewel compared to the kid you talk about.
No offence but one day you will fly something better and you will understand.
happy landings!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Raw Data,
all i said about your little "baby" is true (and you know it)and frankly things like doors falling off hinges should not have been certified in the first place.
When you have the fortune of flying a 737 you will understand what i mean by "user friendly,logical,safe,reliable and so on..."
Rudder hardovers?At least Boeing is doing something about something which has never even been proved wrong!
all i said about your little "baby" is true (and you know it)and frankly things like doors falling off hinges should not have been certified in the first place.
When you have the fortune of flying a 737 you will understand what i mean by "user friendly,logical,safe,reliable and so on..."
Rudder hardovers?At least Boeing is doing something about something which has never even been proved wrong!
Guest
Posts: n/a
RD- Check your facts.
<<the Australian paper he so glibly quotes, and the oil companies (who are not bandits as he implies) also have a different take on the situation.>>
I have followed some of this debate & the paper you refer to appears to be (and indicated in overtalk's post) in part data provided by Mobil to Government Senate Inquiry in Australia.
<<the Australian paper he so glibly quotes, and the oil companies (who are not bandits as he implies) also have a different take on the situation.>>
I have followed some of this debate & the paper you refer to appears to be (and indicated in overtalk's post) in part data provided by Mobil to Government Senate Inquiry in Australia.
Guest
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Thanks tarjet, but I have already experienced the 737-300 from the left seat.
Very nice, docile, easy to fly. Doesn't land particularly well, but not bad if you get it right. Simple panels and switchery. Compared to a 146, very limited in what it can do. Very good at straight and level though.
The problem with doors you mention must be a very old problem. I have never heard of it happening, and it wasn't mentioned in the conversion a few years ago. Exactly when DID this happen, how many times, and was anyone hurt?
Still, I'd rather have a door dismount (on the ground) than the roof and most of the forward fuselage peel off in flight. Oh, but that's different, right?
Boeing did NOTHING about hardovers (simply blamed the pilots or wake turbulence for each incident) until forced to do so. As far as I know, the rudder actuator HAS been shown to be at fault (and has been re-designed). You should know that! BAe are far more compliant when it comes to
safety- they have done an enormous amount of work on this long before they were compelled to do so.
Finally, as some Boeings have had fumes incidents, and as the potential for disaster is far higher if a 757/767 crew becomes incapacitated (more pax), presumably you would like to see that fleet grounded?
flightsim- Yes, you are correct, he was quoting from the Aussie Senate enquiry. My point was that the info that came to light in that enquiry is not exhaustive or definitive, and not everyone agrees with their findings. If it were so clear-cut, the aircraft would be gathering cobwebs in a hangar.
Simply issuing a report on Government letterhead does not guarantee accuracy or a correct conclusion!
Very nice, docile, easy to fly. Doesn't land particularly well, but not bad if you get it right. Simple panels and switchery. Compared to a 146, very limited in what it can do. Very good at straight and level though.
The problem with doors you mention must be a very old problem. I have never heard of it happening, and it wasn't mentioned in the conversion a few years ago. Exactly when DID this happen, how many times, and was anyone hurt?
Still, I'd rather have a door dismount (on the ground) than the roof and most of the forward fuselage peel off in flight. Oh, but that's different, right?
Boeing did NOTHING about hardovers (simply blamed the pilots or wake turbulence for each incident) until forced to do so. As far as I know, the rudder actuator HAS been shown to be at fault (and has been re-designed). You should know that! BAe are far more compliant when it comes to
safety- they have done an enormous amount of work on this long before they were compelled to do so.
Finally, as some Boeings have had fumes incidents, and as the potential for disaster is far higher if a 757/767 crew becomes incapacitated (more pax), presumably you would like to see that fleet grounded?
flightsim- Yes, you are correct, he was quoting from the Aussie Senate enquiry. My point was that the info that came to light in that enquiry is not exhaustive or definitive, and not everyone agrees with their findings. If it were so clear-cut, the aircraft would be gathering cobwebs in a hangar.
Simply issuing a report on Government letterhead does not guarantee accuracy or a correct conclusion!
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It's a shame this has deteriorated into a slanging match. I'm sure all parties are correct to a certain extent. My understanding is that roll back is a very real but also rare phenomenon occurring in very specific conditions. The RJ is not effected by it. The information is readily available from BAe and all companies should give extensive training in avoiding the conditions that can cause it. engine mods remove the problem all together. Similarly the pitch oscillation problem is an ice related condition which is real but rare and not as deadly as the ATR control reversal problem for example. Not deadly at all in fact and a fix has been found. The air quality issue is again quite openly publicised and the All Operators Memos from BAe cover the causes and the solution in detail. Incidentally they have also just discovered a possible problem with nose wheel centring on landing related to incorrect oleo charge. The information relating to all these problems, including a list and analyisis of all incidents is readily available so why not do some sensible research instead of wild speculation? By the way you might not be aware that some ERJ 145 operators have experienced air contamination problems. That aircraft also has a pitch trim problem. Name any aircraft that does not carry some mods to compensate for post production problems and someone will pop up to correct you. What matters is that the Manufacturer works with the Authority and the Operators to get them fixed, either by modification,operating procedure or both.