P2 Engine handling.
Only half a speed-brake
The correct terminology gets complex when trainers and cruise captain FOs enter the team, not needed now. Perhaps for the sake of this specific discussion, we could narrow it down to
PIC (rank) who is seated on LHS. Has the ultimate authority and final responsibility
F/O (rank) who is seated on RHS.
There are only two cases,
i)
PIC acts as PF and is steering the plane, TLs included. Despite some black-and-white academics, indeed he is monitoring the inside of the cockpit as well, and that means not just the PFD.
FO is the PM. His responsibility to monitor and clearly announce. He follows any sequence of drills in the support role as required.
ii)
FO is the PF who is steering the plane. Any of the trained, rehearsed and briefed trajectories which will be selected to match the events unfolding.
PIC assumes the role of PM. He will execute the support actions for the FO during any drill which is being called by either of them or might follow automatically in the SOP sequence.
Dissecting the immediate moment after a failure, for both GO and STOP, requires us to describe who will
+ observe
+ announce
+ respond
+ confirm
+ evaluate
+ decide
+ declare
+ approve
+ overrule
+ act
+ correct
For clarity, it's best also to say whose hands are guarding the TLs at the moment of failure.
Respecting a bit of slightly different flavouring here and there, we have
- the 'traditional' setup (the whole world except BA and ..... ?) sufficiently described in #18 above,
- something in between (?)
- the BA standard.
PIC (rank) who is seated on LHS. Has the ultimate authority and final responsibility
F/O (rank) who is seated on RHS.
There are only two cases,
i)
PIC acts as PF and is steering the plane, TLs included. Despite some black-and-white academics, indeed he is monitoring the inside of the cockpit as well, and that means not just the PFD.
FO is the PM. His responsibility to monitor and clearly announce. He follows any sequence of drills in the support role as required.
ii)
FO is the PF who is steering the plane. Any of the trained, rehearsed and briefed trajectories which will be selected to match the events unfolding.
PIC assumes the role of PM. He will execute the support actions for the FO during any drill which is being called by either of them or might follow automatically in the SOP sequence.
Dissecting the immediate moment after a failure, for both GO and STOP, requires us to describe who will
+ observe
+ announce
+ respond
+ confirm
+ evaluate
+ decide
+ declare
+ approve
+ overrule
+ act
+ correct
For clarity, it's best also to say whose hands are guarding the TLs at the moment of failure.
Respecting a bit of slightly different flavouring here and there, we have
- the 'traditional' setup (the whole world except BA and ..... ?) sufficiently described in #18 above,
- something in between (?)
- the BA standard.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 24th Nov 2022 at 20:33.
When I flew charter business jets we used to brief that either pilot could initiate or call for a reject regardless of PF/PM or PIC status.
When I joined my first airline this changed to the Captain is God principle that only the PIC decides the reject. I still don’t fully agree with that concept.
US based employer so we don’t use or can’t even have ‘low’ time FO’s and at least on a Boeing everything is well within reach of the RH pilot. Spoilers can easily be briefed as an “if I forget then you do it” item and that applies regardless of PF/PM status.
The whole caveat with the PIC-decides model as that the SIC is still expected to execute the reject when the Captain is either incapacitated or otherwise incapable of making the correct decision as a Master warning at 80kts isn’t really the time or place to have a meaningful discussion about the philosophy of Boeing.
When I joined my first airline this changed to the Captain is God principle that only the PIC decides the reject. I still don’t fully agree with that concept.
US based employer so we don’t use or can’t even have ‘low’ time FO’s and at least on a Boeing everything is well within reach of the RH pilot. Spoilers can easily be briefed as an “if I forget then you do it” item and that applies regardless of PF/PM status.
The whole caveat with the PIC-decides model as that the SIC is still expected to execute the reject when the Captain is either incapacitated or otherwise incapable of making the correct decision as a Master warning at 80kts isn’t really the time or place to have a meaningful discussion about the philosophy of Boeing.
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BA is no better or worse than any other airline. Neither are their pilots.
Thread Starter
In my 30 + years in a Big Airline or since, I can recollect no incidents/accidents caused by an F/O calling Stop. Surely if you are P2 in a two crew flight deck your training should cover all possible scenarios in the event of incapacitation, We covered Co pilot 2 Eng handling and Go Arounds on the B747 Conversion.
It all seems faintly foolish to see airlines not confident in their co pilots ability to Reject a take off or even taxing, which I witnessed when jumps seating in the USA, some years ago.
It all seems faintly foolish to see airlines not confident in their co pilots ability to Reject a take off or even taxing, which I witnessed when jumps seating in the USA, some years ago.
The decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility of
the captain, and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should
initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously.
This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.
the captain, and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should
initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously.
This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.
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The decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility of
the captain, and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should
initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously.
This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.
the captain, and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should
initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously.
This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.
What Boeing says isn’t chiseled in stone and brought down the mountain by Mozes himself.
TOGA switches shouldn’t disconnect critical thinking.
Let’s take the Lima example. Assuming the PIC was PF it’s feasible the PM called for a reject for something the PF had not seen and without a caution or warning.
Equally feasible the SIC was PF and rejected.
TOGA switches shouldn’t disconnect critical thinking.
Let’s take the Lima example. Assuming the PIC was PF it’s feasible the PM called for a reject for something the PF had not seen and without a caution or warning.
Equally feasible the SIC was PF and rejected.
Well, yes. We expect the RHS PM to call any malfunctions to allow the Cp to make the decision to stop and we do allow (require) the RHS PM to call stop for Eng failure or any fire.
Only half a speed-brake
Without any insider knowledge, I would assume the average path of FO in BA (pardon the terminology):
JFO SH- year 1 to 3
FO SH - year 4 and 5
FO LH - year 5 to 7
FO Lh - year 8 to 12 (good bids).
command course therafter
as opposed to EU LCC/ACMI path
FO P2F - year 1 and 2 (bonded salary)
FO - year 3 - 5
CAPT - year 6 onwards (fleet expansion times).
There's a signigicant overlap of experience and training received between BA FOs and CAPTs elsewhere, surely they are both qualified and capable to make the correct call. I would also suggest that apart for the loud bang cases, any FO who's inside 2 years from joining the type (4 recurrent SIMS) would be cautious and careful to take a non-reversible action to the extent that the PIC's call to execute it might come simultaneously.
If the best-practice operators can sort the responsibilites for a 2-captain or CP-INST crew, surely BA can sort theirs with FOs. Moreover if SOP exist for it.
To be completely square, if there is a risk of making a wrong call, or not making the good one, imagine this crew:
FO PM 15 years total aviation, 12 years BA, 4 years on-type (37 y.o.)
CP PF 35 years total aviation, 20 years BA, 2 years on-type (57 y.o.)
The probability in such setup is heavily skewed for the FO to make the correct decision faster and more coherently. BA decide to empower them, their choice.
That being said and returning to the original inquiry:
Anywhere else the decision rests with the commander and the action pertains to him too. If some airlines authorize an FO to make a call to stop, still the captain's action is what confirms it thus he retains a vetting chance (final decision). Removing that from the PIC is unique to BA, a single point when the scratching gets audible.
JFO SH- year 1 to 3
FO SH - year 4 and 5
FO LH - year 5 to 7
FO Lh - year 8 to 12 (good bids).
command course therafter
as opposed to EU LCC/ACMI path
FO P2F - year 1 and 2 (bonded salary)
FO - year 3 - 5
CAPT - year 6 onwards (fleet expansion times).
There's a signigicant overlap of experience and training received between BA FOs and CAPTs elsewhere, surely they are both qualified and capable to make the correct call. I would also suggest that apart for the loud bang cases, any FO who's inside 2 years from joining the type (4 recurrent SIMS) would be cautious and careful to take a non-reversible action to the extent that the PIC's call to execute it might come simultaneously.
If the best-practice operators can sort the responsibilites for a 2-captain or CP-INST crew, surely BA can sort theirs with FOs. Moreover if SOP exist for it.
To be completely square, if there is a risk of making a wrong call, or not making the good one, imagine this crew:
FO PM 15 years total aviation, 12 years BA, 4 years on-type (37 y.o.)
CP PF 35 years total aviation, 20 years BA, 2 years on-type (57 y.o.)
The probability in such setup is heavily skewed for the FO to make the correct decision faster and more coherently. BA decide to empower them, their choice.
That being said and returning to the original inquiry:
Anywhere else the decision rests with the commander and the action pertains to him too. If some airlines authorize an FO to make a call to stop, still the captain's action is what confirms it thus he retains a vetting chance (final decision). Removing that from the PIC is unique to BA, a single point when the scratching gets audible.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 26th Nov 2022 at 16:44.
Just to answer some questions above, at the Big Airline. There is a Capt and an F/O. P1 = PF for T/O, cruise and LDG. and P2 = PF for the approach. F/O’s are trained to the same handling standards as Capts from day 1. Sectors are shared 50:50, some sectors have to be Capt as P1 (eg LVOPS) or the Capt may elect to be P1 in a gnarly day depending on F/O experience.
F/O’s have a very specific list of things they can call stop for, either as PF or PM, anything else is brought to the attention of the Capt for a call of stop or continue. Once stop is called by either pilot it cannot be countermanded, an RTO is performed. Likewise if a go around is called by either pilot it must be performed.
It may be different to how other airlines do it but it works (as do other methods), it also makes the transition from right to left seat easier as the pilot has already had experience of decision making in critical phases of flight and as P1US for day to day ops.
The strap line used to be at BA recruitment that FO’s are recruited as future Captains, the man and boy ethos was dropped long ago, partly because of lessons learned from the the PI crash. There is still of course a cockpit authority gradient but it is shallower than at some airlines.
ATB
LD
F/O’s have a very specific list of things they can call stop for, either as PF or PM, anything else is brought to the attention of the Capt for a call of stop or continue. Once stop is called by either pilot it cannot be countermanded, an RTO is performed. Likewise if a go around is called by either pilot it must be performed.
It may be different to how other airlines do it but it works (as do other methods), it also makes the transition from right to left seat easier as the pilot has already had experience of decision making in critical phases of flight and as P1US for day to day ops.
The strap line used to be at BA recruitment that FO’s are recruited as future Captains, the man and boy ethos was dropped long ago, partly because of lessons learned from the the PI crash. There is still of course a cockpit authority gradient but it is shallower than at some airlines.
ATB
LD
LD, You are correct except that the strap line used by BA recruitment that FO’s are recruited as future Captains was used long before the Papa India crash.
Only half a speed-brake
Then the only cognitive dissonance is between the salary they pay and talent they claim to hire? From day 0 being told you are better than others, mon dieu.
Papa India had nowt to do with pilot selection as P2 was one of a course where a third were chopped and the week before his flat and course mate had lowered land flap at noise cutback instead of retracting all TE flap. He went on to fly Concorde..a fleet that had a chop rate of 40% at times.
The accident was a training and incredibly ignorant flying procedures accident which was covered up at the inquiry.
Unless they have been recently released the testimonies are still secret.
Smell the jet fuel.
The accident was a training and incredibly ignorant flying procedures accident which was covered up at the inquiry.
Unless they have been recently released the testimonies are still secret.
Smell the jet fuel.
I think that what you trained for and execute with your current operator normally seems more “right” than other operators who may do it differently. I think the key here is training: if the SOPs work, and they do seem to with both approaches discussed here, then what’s the problem? There are valid arguments either way, but as professionals we adapt to requirements.
A certain large fleet in a certain large airline is close to changing from PM handled reverse and speedbrakes to PF handled, over a quarter of a century after the type was introduced. If adequately trained and practiced (and that’s going to need a LOT of both, IMO) then it should make no difference...
A certain large fleet in a certain large airline is close to changing from PM handled reverse and speedbrakes to PF handled, over a quarter of a century after the type was introduced. If adequately trained and practiced (and that’s going to need a LOT of both, IMO) then it should make no difference...
Maybe it doesn’t really matter. Airlines will decide whether to follow the manufacturer’s guidance or not. Somewhere other than BA I fly with F/O’s who experience varies from 300 hrs and three months to 10,000 hrs plus and fifteen years experience.
I’ve never once had one of them moaning about not being allowed to call stop, and nor did I worry when I was an f/o. We just get on with it and abide by the SOPs, a bit like calling “positive climb” not “positive rate”. Just because BA choose to train their F/O’s to call stop doesn’t make the training better, it just makes it different.
I’ve never once had one of them moaning about not being allowed to call stop, and nor did I worry when I was an f/o. We just get on with it and abide by the SOPs, a bit like calling “positive climb” not “positive rate”. Just because BA choose to train their F/O’s to call stop doesn’t make the training better, it just makes it different.
