Flight Director distraction during recovery from an unusual attitude
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Flight Director distraction during recovery from an unusual attitude
In a 737 simulator recently. The exercise being recovery in IMC from unusual attitudes. The exercise started from level flight, flight directors on and autothrottles engaged. During the initial identification of the UA, the flight director indications were invalid with needles all over the PFD. This is to be expected. But what should you do about it? You could leave the FD's on while trying to ignore the invalid indications as a momentary distraction. Or you could switch off the FD's and remove the distraction.
The interesting part in this case, was the PF instinctively attempted to chase FD "commands" to force the aircraft right side up (for want of a better description). The PF later said the FD indications were so compelling he found himself trying to satisfy their commands instead of "looking behind" at the ADI 'little aeroplane' to gauge the correct attitude. He put this down to company SOP that FD's must be switched on for all phases of flight and commands followed.
Some operators require the FD's to be switched off during a TCAS RA to avoid distraction from unwanted commands. Perhaps the same principle should apply as the first action in identification of an unusual attitude identification. After all, it takes only a second or two to switch them off leaving a "clean screen" to focus on the ADI symbol? Comments invited.
The interesting part in this case, was the PF instinctively attempted to chase FD "commands" to force the aircraft right side up (for want of a better description). The PF later said the FD indications were so compelling he found himself trying to satisfy their commands instead of "looking behind" at the ADI 'little aeroplane' to gauge the correct attitude. He put this down to company SOP that FD's must be switched on for all phases of flight and commands followed.
Some operators require the FD's to be switched off during a TCAS RA to avoid distraction from unwanted commands. Perhaps the same principle should apply as the first action in identification of an unusual attitude identification. After all, it takes only a second or two to switch them off leaving a "clean screen" to focus on the ADI symbol? Comments invited.
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I'm on the fence about this issue. It came up on this forum fairly recently, too, and I didn't make a comment even though I usually have very strong opinions about unusual attitudes. The reason to get rid of the FD is strong and obvious. But on the other hand, every second in a UA counts, especially a nose-low and/or inverted one. You can ask the other guy to get rid of it for you, but having the mental bandwidth to make that request verbally, or for him to understand and fulfill it, also may not be there.
And "just fly through it" is naive, for the very reason you posted.
Policies requiring the FD to be always switched on are idiotic, and can only be sensible under the premise that any remaining manned aircraft control is only a temporary stopgap until complete automation arrives and the yoke/stick is replaced by a mouse.
And "just fly through it" is naive, for the very reason you posted.
Policies requiring the FD to be always switched on are idiotic, and can only be sensible under the premise that any remaining manned aircraft control is only a temporary stopgap until complete automation arrives and the yoke/stick is replaced by a mouse.
Some operators require the FD's to be switched off during a TCAS RA to avoid distraction from unwanted commands.
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I have my concerns too, regarding mental bandwidth for ordering/understanding FDs off command. However, one could try to diagnose the situation, start corrective actions and then ordering FDs off during the manoeuvre? That way you’re not wasting time to correct flight path and then taking off the nuisance of the FDs. But it is a handful...
I remember asking during the groundschool for my second commercial aircraft type: “excuse me, what is a flight director?”. I had spent a year flying my first commercial aircraft type which had no flight director, so we thought they were talking about the person who sat in Flight Ops !!
I suppose that if you have flown commercially without a F/D, it is second nature to ignore it when necessary and concentrate on the pitch and roll. However, if you have only ever had a F/D on all the time, it must be difficult to ignore it.
Maybe we now have ‘children of the flight director’? (and I don’t mean that in an unkind way.)
PS, it is not hard to ask PM for “flight directors off” in an Airbus as you are disconnecting the autopilot, ready for a TCAS RA. As well as removing incorrect directions, this also forces the A/THR to SPEED, as has been noted, which protects your flight path.
I suppose that if you have flown commercially without a F/D, it is second nature to ignore it when necessary and concentrate on the pitch and roll. However, if you have only ever had a F/D on all the time, it must be difficult to ignore it.
Maybe we now have ‘children of the flight director’? (and I don’t mean that in an unkind way.)
PS, it is not hard to ask PM for “flight directors off” in an Airbus as you are disconnecting the autopilot, ready for a TCAS RA. As well as removing incorrect directions, this also forces the A/THR to SPEED, as has been noted, which protects your flight path.
in the Airbus the FDs must be turned off in a TCAS RA to avoid the reaching high speed protection activation quicker if you get a TCAS descent in OP CLB
Re #3, #4, might be obvious, but not so by the pilot flying in the situation (good in theory, but not in practice); particularly if the FD is used for 99.99% of operations. The rarity or surprise of the event could reduce the ability to think about the situation or turn the FD off. More so because of the routine of using the FD is a ‘comfort blanket’, its hard to discard.
Extreme situations should be covered by aircraft certification; instruments must not display hazardous or misleading information, e.g. stick shake / push will (should) remove the display - according to aircraft type, …
The in-between area; upset as defined vs ADI de-clutter might have been judged as safe because the information is not misleading - it shows the required flight path, but of course this might not show the approved means of recovery.
There may not be a simple answer, particularly if current industry views on training / operation conflict with previous (outdated) certification assumptions.
But don’t expect pilots to act rationally in surprising situations, nor to plug gaps in certification / operation.
“Most capacities needed to cope with the unexpected are eroded in the continuous attempt to prepare for the expected.
Decreasing staff autonomy (higher compliance to predefined responses) increases the odds that a normal situation stays normal, but decreases the odds for recovery in case of unexpected events.
Surprises are more Surprising.” Jean Paries
Extreme situations should be covered by aircraft certification; instruments must not display hazardous or misleading information, e.g. stick shake / push will (should) remove the display - according to aircraft type, …
The in-between area; upset as defined vs ADI de-clutter might have been judged as safe because the information is not misleading - it shows the required flight path, but of course this might not show the approved means of recovery.
There may not be a simple answer, particularly if current industry views on training / operation conflict with previous (outdated) certification assumptions.
But don’t expect pilots to act rationally in surprising situations, nor to plug gaps in certification / operation.
“Most capacities needed to cope with the unexpected are eroded in the continuous attempt to prepare for the expected.
Decreasing staff autonomy (higher compliance to predefined responses) increases the odds that a normal situation stays normal, but decreases the odds for recovery in case of unexpected events.
Surprises are more Surprising.” Jean Paries
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Quite, which is all airbus FBW aircraft if one chooses to buy the option.
That said, in unusual attitudes the airbus will remove the flight directors automatically. Specifically if the pitch is greater than 25° nose up or lower than 13° nose down, or bank is greater than 45°.
That said, in unusual attitudes the airbus will remove the flight directors automatically. Specifically if the pitch is greater than 25° nose up or lower than 13° nose down, or bank is greater than 45°.
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I flew commercially without a FD for a while, and for me it's difficult to ignore it. I just feel the mental pull and it's very distracting trying to cast it aside. And if I go for a while without turning it off and I go raw data in IMC, I get this unsteady "lost" feeling for the first few minutes until I get back to a comfortable rhythm with my scan.
Maybe we now have ‘children of the flight director’? (and I don’t mean that in an unkind way.)
Salute!
Excuse me, but what is it about this "FD (flight director)" that is so important to the end result of an "upset" or just a basic takeoff/landing or approach?
Make so mistake, i have flown a very sophisticated lite that had the steering bars and such for ILS/TACAN approaches. The jet also had a great HUD, but that thing did not provide steering "commands", only where the glideslope and centerline was with respect to my posotion in space. Piece of cake, and my LEF video ( over on the profile link) shows the ILS presentation.
Seems to me that first thing if you wind up in an "unusual" attitude is determine up versus down and roll using basic attitude refence gauge or the flatscreen so the dark half is between your feet and the light grey or blue is at the top.. Then while doing that, move the power lever(s) depending on whether speed is increasing or decreasing. Huh?
Does the FD tell you to reduce power? I don't think so. And vice versa.
If you look at the few HUD tapes of the shuttle approaches that are on line, you can see the difference between what Hal thot was perfect and what the pilo tdid. I personally know several of those folks (and flew with one of them way back) and they have the same opinion about the "FD". Good for basic clues, but not to blindly follow.
Gums opines...
Excuse me, but what is it about this "FD (flight director)" that is so important to the end result of an "upset" or just a basic takeoff/landing or approach?
Make so mistake, i have flown a very sophisticated lite that had the steering bars and such for ILS/TACAN approaches. The jet also had a great HUD, but that thing did not provide steering "commands", only where the glideslope and centerline was with respect to my posotion in space. Piece of cake, and my LEF video ( over on the profile link) shows the ILS presentation.
Seems to me that first thing if you wind up in an "unusual" attitude is determine up versus down and roll using basic attitude refence gauge or the flatscreen so the dark half is between your feet and the light grey or blue is at the top.. Then while doing that, move the power lever(s) depending on whether speed is increasing or decreasing. Huh?
Does the FD tell you to reduce power? I don't think so. And vice versa.
If you look at the few HUD tapes of the shuttle approaches that are on line, you can see the difference between what Hal thot was perfect and what the pilo tdid. I personally know several of those folks (and flew with one of them way back) and they have the same opinion about the "FD". Good for basic clues, but not to blindly follow.
Gums opines...
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Hi Gums,
My first 10 years of commercial aviation was on AC types which only had the flight director turned on for ILS approaches. For the first 30 years we never had the FD on for any take offs. (minimum Alt for engagement was AA - often it was much later) In those days "pilot error" was high in the accident records.
Nowadays, the FD is on continuously from takeoff to landing. The big advantage is that each pilot knows the intention of the other by monitoring the FD modes. The big disadvantage is the erosion of basic flying skills. However we seem to need those basic flying skills far less frequently than we need good crew co-operation and monitoring of each other.
During an upset recovery, the FD can uselessly give incorrect "orders" (e.g. the climbing VS order for AF447 during the stall). Some pilots become fixated on the FD.
I couldn't agree more.
Excuse me, but what is it about this "FD (flight director)" that is so important to the end result of an "upset" or just a basic takeoff/landing or approach?
Nowadays, the FD is on continuously from takeoff to landing. The big advantage is that each pilot knows the intention of the other by monitoring the FD modes. The big disadvantage is the erosion of basic flying skills. However we seem to need those basic flying skills far less frequently than we need good crew co-operation and monitoring of each other.
During an upset recovery, the FD can uselessly give incorrect "orders" (e.g. the climbing VS order for AF447 during the stall). Some pilots become fixated on the FD.
Good for basic clues, but not to blindly follow.
Thanks, Golden
My prolly tiny problem is "what is the FD directing you to do?" Somebody has to tell the thing what it is you should be dong, right?
My SLUF had a FD for instrument approaches, basic nav and terrain following. The ADI had needles and the HUD had a little symbol ( tadpole) that you were supposed to center within the flight path marker. In those old days when the earth was still cooling, but solid state avionics were emerging from eggs, the ILS and TACAN "directions" on the ADI were not heavily dampened and you would wind up doing "s" turns that got smaller and smaller. The HUD "tadpole" was not as bad. In all modes we had the raw vertical deviation for ILS and left-right for INS NAV, TACAN and ILS. To wit, from the Manual ( FCOM for the commercial heavy pilots):
Anyways, thanks for the education from you and many others here. I was blessed to fly a variety of sophisticated systems and in between I had a few years in the Dragonfly with minimal avionics, no computers and basic "Cessna" flight controls.
Gums sends...
My prolly tiny problem is "what is the FD directing you to do?" Somebody has to tell the thing what it is you should be dong, right?
My SLUF had a FD for instrument approaches, basic nav and terrain following. The ADI had needles and the HUD had a little symbol ( tadpole) that you were supposed to center within the flight path marker. In those old days when the earth was still cooling, but solid state avionics were emerging from eggs, the ILS and TACAN "directions" on the ADI were not heavily dampened and you would wind up doing "s" turns that got smaller and smaller. The HUD "tadpole" was not as bad. In all modes we had the raw vertical deviation for ILS and left-right for INS NAV, TACAN and ILS. To wit, from the Manual ( FCOM for the commercial heavy pilots):
Anyways, thanks for the education from you and many others here. I was blessed to fly a variety of sophisticated systems and in between I had a few years in the Dragonfly with minimal avionics, no computers and basic "Cessna" flight controls.
Gums sends...
Last edited by gums; 23rd Jan 2019 at 15:21. Reason: formatting
Several posts relate the FD issue to ‘Children of the magenta’ … which concludes ‘Click, Click’, requiring disconnecting / switching automation off.
The assumption is that the crew will be able to identify the need for change (switch off) and have confidence in deviating from the norm; yet in the same instance they were unable to avoid or mitigate the approach to an ‘upset’ situation.
There is a similar assumption in the belief that ‘back to basics’ will provide preventative or recovery measures. Some pilots may be able to manage, but they are probably not the ones being ‘upset’.
The industry increasingly relies on automation, aircraft are built with that aim, many operations and thus training depend on it. Changing back to basics - training, has a high cost, thus few if any operators are willing to change - it’s not required by regulation.
We have to accept what already exists and work around that. Modern designs are adapted for automation - FD bars are automatically removed. The residual problem is with those aircraft types where the systems were designed in a different era, with different assumptions about pilot capability and training effectiveness. The reality is that this ‘old world’ is the minority, and those operators and aircraft types have to accommodate regulations based on modern assumptions - catch 22.
There are no simple answers; teach ‘click-click’, but don’t depend on it. Teach look-through, but pilots will be distracted.
A generalised approach might require avoidance of the situation, but how is that taught. Or require pilots to manage startle and surprise, how; easy to require, impossible to be sure of success.
Oh well, let’s just jump through the hoop; …
/ close cynical thoughts / open optimistic mode / - view the human as an asset, capable of much more than we might credit.
The assumption is that the crew will be able to identify the need for change (switch off) and have confidence in deviating from the norm; yet in the same instance they were unable to avoid or mitigate the approach to an ‘upset’ situation.
There is a similar assumption in the belief that ‘back to basics’ will provide preventative or recovery measures. Some pilots may be able to manage, but they are probably not the ones being ‘upset’.
The industry increasingly relies on automation, aircraft are built with that aim, many operations and thus training depend on it. Changing back to basics - training, has a high cost, thus few if any operators are willing to change - it’s not required by regulation.
We have to accept what already exists and work around that. Modern designs are adapted for automation - FD bars are automatically removed. The residual problem is with those aircraft types where the systems were designed in a different era, with different assumptions about pilot capability and training effectiveness. The reality is that this ‘old world’ is the minority, and those operators and aircraft types have to accommodate regulations based on modern assumptions - catch 22.
There are no simple answers; teach ‘click-click’, but don’t depend on it. Teach look-through, but pilots will be distracted.
A generalised approach might require avoidance of the situation, but how is that taught. Or require pilots to manage startle and surprise, how; easy to require, impossible to be sure of success.
Oh well, let’s just jump through the hoop; …
/ close cynical thoughts / open optimistic mode / - view the human as an asset, capable of much more than we might credit.
Last edited by PEI_3721; 24th Jan 2019 at 12:59. Reason: typo
Salute PEI !
You are touching upon some philosophy and $$$ for the commercial airline business.
How many $$$ are saved by one JT610 accident?
Unfortunately, after my brief experience as a basic line jock, I had three assignments in a row to the initial units of three jets. The muckety mucks decided I should be an instructor pilot, so my last 15 years was as an IP with only a few months as a pilot in a combat unit. One of those tours did not have two seat "family" models, so good ground school and good in-flight "advice" for the newbies was essential.
I do not feel that the new kids on the block cannot learn the lessons that served so many well since Orville and Wilbur. In the A-7D, circa 1970, we first saw the "systems management" aspect of our trade. Granted, my "one heart" tribe ( single seat, single engine) saw this way ahead of the commercial airline folks and our fellow military transport folks that had "crews". We had to be everything and handle all the aspects of the mission. Automation was drastically increased from the 50's and 60's legasy fighters and recce planes. But you still had to know all the systems and the overall aircraft avionics architecture. And did I mention the hydraulics, engine and electrical system stuff with no "flight engineer"?
We found that most pilots and the newbies could learn the systems and to exploit the new automation without a GIB as the F-4 folks had. The autopilot helped, but the nav systems and pilot-vehicle-interface ergonomics progress was the biggie. In the Viper, we began to see the "Atari" generation. Those youngsters had zero problems with our avionics and lack of a co-pilot or GIB. Some of the dinosaurs had to adapt, but I soloed folks older than me ( and that was really old! heh heh).
I would love to see more basics during checkouts and upgrades to new types. Get a "feel" for the plane and worry about the FMS and such after a few flights. So PEi's comment about dealing with "upsets" rings very strongly with me:
I agree about the "natural" sticks being able to handle really harsh events, but I also feel from personal experience checking out folks that well-executed training courses can make a difference down the road when that "upset" occurs.
Gums steps off soap box...
You are touching upon some philosophy and $$$ for the commercial airline business.
How many $$$ are saved by one JT610 accident?
Unfortunately, after my brief experience as a basic line jock, I had three assignments in a row to the initial units of three jets. The muckety mucks decided I should be an instructor pilot, so my last 15 years was as an IP with only a few months as a pilot in a combat unit. One of those tours did not have two seat "family" models, so good ground school and good in-flight "advice" for the newbies was essential.
I do not feel that the new kids on the block cannot learn the lessons that served so many well since Orville and Wilbur. In the A-7D, circa 1970, we first saw the "systems management" aspect of our trade. Granted, my "one heart" tribe ( single seat, single engine) saw this way ahead of the commercial airline folks and our fellow military transport folks that had "crews". We had to be everything and handle all the aspects of the mission. Automation was drastically increased from the 50's and 60's legasy fighters and recce planes. But you still had to know all the systems and the overall aircraft avionics architecture. And did I mention the hydraulics, engine and electrical system stuff with no "flight engineer"?
We found that most pilots and the newbies could learn the systems and to exploit the new automation without a GIB as the F-4 folks had. The autopilot helped, but the nav systems and pilot-vehicle-interface ergonomics progress was the biggie. In the Viper, we began to see the "Atari" generation. Those youngsters had zero problems with our avionics and lack of a co-pilot or GIB. Some of the dinosaurs had to adapt, but I soloed folks older than me ( and that was really old! heh heh).
I would love to see more basics during checkouts and upgrades to new types. Get a "feel" for the plane and worry about the FMS and such after a few flights. So PEi's comment about dealing with "upsets" rings very strongly with me:
There is a similar assumption in the belief that ‘back to basics’ will provide preventative or recovery measures. Some pilots may be able to manage, but they are probably not the ones being ‘upset’.
Gums steps off soap box...
Last edited by gums; 24th Jan 2019 at 13:38. Reason: spell and factual accuracy
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Embraers with HUD switch to a special "upset recovery" mode on the HUD outside certain pitch/roll parameters. I do think tat removes the FD as well but am not completely sure. Helpful for recovery and necessary, as the simple green horizon line would be either stuck to the top or bottom and without a color difference between "up" and "down" wouldn't give a clear indication where "up" is when banked steeply.
Pilots should be able to look "through" the FD and use brown/blue, sky pointer and the red chevrons as a cue where to roll/pitch to recover.
Pilots should be able to look "through" the FD and use brown/blue, sky pointer and the red chevrons as a cue where to roll/pitch to recover.
Fair point. I have not flown one so equipped yet.
Problem with Children of the FD is that some are not even looking at basic pitch and roll at all* - those scales may as well be absent for all the attention they are given by some........which is presumably how upsets occur in the first place?
* I am not blaming anybody, the training needs to change.
Problem with Children of the FD is that some are not even looking at basic pitch and roll at all* - those scales may as well be absent for all the attention they are given by some........which is presumably how upsets occur in the first place?
* I am not blaming anybody, the training needs to change.
The trouble with a procedure for an "if you get an UA, turn the FD off" procedure is that the aircraft may well be in the stall/UA and have relatively "normal" attitudes - e.g. AF447.
The FD was commanding fly up commands, and the crew faced a stall warning at similar time, with a 3° pitch (although subsequently it was mostly awry with higher pitch attitudes).
Airbuses and Embraers are smart in some areas (like dropping the FDs in extreme attitudes) but you still need to see through the FD in relatively normal attitudes at times. You may be in an upset and not have an extreme attitude.
The FD was commanding fly up commands, and the crew faced a stall warning at similar time, with a 3° pitch (although subsequently it was mostly awry with higher pitch attitudes).
Airbuses and Embraers are smart in some areas (like dropping the FDs in extreme attitudes) but you still need to see through the FD in relatively normal attitudes at times. You may be in an upset and not have an extreme attitude.
Teach look-through, but pilots will be distracted.