Forward Slipping a 737-800
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Here's a link that gives some idea about the stresses Boeing engineers were thinking about when they design an aircraft's vertical fin...So long as you're not abrupt with th flight controls, a forward slip is well within the design limits. Which answers the intent of this post. Design limits can be exceeded when "Over Yaw" is induced by abrupt inputs to the rudder. What's far worse is to abruptly cycle the rudder in both directions. However, I think a Boeing would BEND but not BREAK with such inputs. Just a guess. But perhaps, Bugg Smasher, our resident test pilot will try this one on for us on his next trip.
It's reassuring to know that Boeing aircraft are designed to handle full rudder (steady state sideslip) in one direction, followed by full deflection in the opposite direction from steady state sideslip times a factor of 150%!!! That's one tough bird. What must be avoided is aburptness and the resulting "Over Yaw" that being abrupt creates. It would be Gameover on an Airbus. I believe an Airbus is designed to handle the stress of sideslip in one direction only.
http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB001_U...n%20Boeing.pdf
It's reassuring to know that Boeing aircraft are designed to handle full rudder (steady state sideslip) in one direction, followed by full deflection in the opposite direction from steady state sideslip times a factor of 150%!!! That's one tough bird. What must be avoided is aburptness and the resulting "Over Yaw" that being abrupt creates. It would be Gameover on an Airbus. I believe an Airbus is designed to handle the stress of sideslip in one direction only.
http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB001_U...n%20Boeing.pdf
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Excellent link dvt, a must read for everyone. As can be seen from the bulletin, the sideslip maneuver produces no unusual stresses on the tail whatsoever.
With that, I now stow my ‘resident test pilot’ wings safely in my desk drawer, and go out to drone along the night skies secure in the knowledge that if something is going to break, it’s not likely to be the fin. Anyone out there who wants to give multiple full rudder reversals a go, please make sure someone on the ground has a video camera.
With that, I now stow my ‘resident test pilot’ wings safely in my desk drawer, and go out to drone along the night skies secure in the knowledge that if something is going to break, it’s not likely to be the fin. Anyone out there who wants to give multiple full rudder reversals a go, please make sure someone on the ground has a video camera.
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buggsmasher,
Not an easy question to address and certainly one wherein generalisation may be more distracting than illuminating. While the present thread has, as its interest, fin loads, the following more general comments may be of some use ...
The Type Certificate Data Sheets will give an indication of the design standards which were applicable to a particular type. A review of the relevant issue (and the host of anciliary documentation) will give you an overview of the certification requirements applicable at the time ... Then there is the issue of design variations, concessions, equivalent safety determinations and the like .. Upshot is that, unless one is with the design organisation it is near impossible to find out just what was or wasn't done, especially in respect of matters extending beyond the minimum requirements. To a large extent the Industry relies on the professional integrity of the design organisation and the assessing regulatory body to give us some measure of protection .. and we have seen a few major screwups over the years where such reliance was proved to have been misplaced in the hard light of inservice experience.
It is important to realise that the people within the design and certification areas are just as human and fallible as everyone else. I have seen very competent engineers make assumptions which are quite reasonable to an engineer but which are materially at variance with what happens in the real world environment. Further, with modern design of large aircraft, as the projects become larger and discipline specialisations increasingly focussed .. there is the problem of overall design project management and what might slip through the cracks ....
To me the principal guiding light ought to be for the operator (and the operator's pilots) to follow the guidance which is laid down by the manufacturer (and ought to be in the operator's prescriptive documentation) .. for the simple reason that such guidance is based on the (usually unidentified) assumptions made in the design and certification processes. It really comes down to a matter of trying to walk through a minefield with marked safety pathways .. certainly you can step off the marked path and not have a problem ... or, conversely, do so and have a big problem ... difficulty is that you have no way of knowing outcome probabilities in the absence of data. It all comes down to a matter of sensible risk management and risk minimisation practices.
While being of sufficient modesty not to reproduce his comment here ... the earlier observation made by HOMER SIMPSONS LOVECHILD does, I think, sum up my thoughts precisely ....
My own worries tend to look less toward static strength problems (although the failure characteristics of composites can present some excitement) and more to the fatigue consequences of operation and maintenance practices which are at variance with the assumptions made within the original design and on-going MRB systems .. and we have seen a number of fatals over the years due to precisely this consideration. Having been involved in earlier lives as an engineer at both ends of the process I can only urge a conservative operation of the inservice article ... there are just too many imponderables and, as airframe lives are pushed out way beyond original life cycle projections, too many opportunities for spectacular outcomes.
In respect of your monsoonal observations, this is an example of the sort of situations which give rise to longer term cumulative structural concerns.
Scanning through the IFALPA/Boeing article in the link above suggests to me that Boeing, also, echoes HOMER SIMPSONS LOVECHILD's sentiments .....
This answer is probably not at all what you wanted ..... sorry about that... but, then again, if you have a TP background .. you know all too well all of what I have said above ...
Not an easy question to address and certainly one wherein generalisation may be more distracting than illuminating. While the present thread has, as its interest, fin loads, the following more general comments may be of some use ...
The Type Certificate Data Sheets will give an indication of the design standards which were applicable to a particular type. A review of the relevant issue (and the host of anciliary documentation) will give you an overview of the certification requirements applicable at the time ... Then there is the issue of design variations, concessions, equivalent safety determinations and the like .. Upshot is that, unless one is with the design organisation it is near impossible to find out just what was or wasn't done, especially in respect of matters extending beyond the minimum requirements. To a large extent the Industry relies on the professional integrity of the design organisation and the assessing regulatory body to give us some measure of protection .. and we have seen a few major screwups over the years where such reliance was proved to have been misplaced in the hard light of inservice experience.
It is important to realise that the people within the design and certification areas are just as human and fallible as everyone else. I have seen very competent engineers make assumptions which are quite reasonable to an engineer but which are materially at variance with what happens in the real world environment. Further, with modern design of large aircraft, as the projects become larger and discipline specialisations increasingly focussed .. there is the problem of overall design project management and what might slip through the cracks ....
To me the principal guiding light ought to be for the operator (and the operator's pilots) to follow the guidance which is laid down by the manufacturer (and ought to be in the operator's prescriptive documentation) .. for the simple reason that such guidance is based on the (usually unidentified) assumptions made in the design and certification processes. It really comes down to a matter of trying to walk through a minefield with marked safety pathways .. certainly you can step off the marked path and not have a problem ... or, conversely, do so and have a big problem ... difficulty is that you have no way of knowing outcome probabilities in the absence of data. It all comes down to a matter of sensible risk management and risk minimisation practices.
While being of sufficient modesty not to reproduce his comment here ... the earlier observation made by HOMER SIMPSONS LOVECHILD does, I think, sum up my thoughts precisely ....
My own worries tend to look less toward static strength problems (although the failure characteristics of composites can present some excitement) and more to the fatigue consequences of operation and maintenance practices which are at variance with the assumptions made within the original design and on-going MRB systems .. and we have seen a number of fatals over the years due to precisely this consideration. Having been involved in earlier lives as an engineer at both ends of the process I can only urge a conservative operation of the inservice article ... there are just too many imponderables and, as airframe lives are pushed out way beyond original life cycle projections, too many opportunities for spectacular outcomes.
In respect of your monsoonal observations, this is an example of the sort of situations which give rise to longer term cumulative structural concerns.
Scanning through the IFALPA/Boeing article in the link above suggests to me that Boeing, also, echoes HOMER SIMPSONS LOVECHILD's sentiments .....
This answer is probably not at all what you wanted ..... sorry about that... but, then again, if you have a TP background .. you know all too well all of what I have said above ...
I realise this thread started with reference to the B737-800, however Airbus has recently provided some timely information on the subject of JAR/FAR 25 certification of yaw control.
Basically, the most severe 'in service' encounter of lateral gusts, rolling maneouvre and asymmetrical engine failure must be taken into account. The aircraft structure must be able to sustain a design limit load of 1.5 without permanent deformation or failure over a period of 3 seconds.
There are further requirements/ considerations....
Basically, the most severe 'in service' encounter of lateral gusts, rolling maneouvre and asymmetrical engine failure must be taken into account. The aircraft structure must be able to sustain a design limit load of 1.5 without permanent deformation or failure over a period of 3 seconds.
There are further requirements/ considerations....
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"Boy, if the manufacturer don't recomend doin' something,dont go stikin' yer dick in there!! "
I agree j_t, with all of your comments; proceeding with great circumspection in light of potentially significant hidden and/or known design flaws, cumulative airframe stresses and faulty maintenance practices, contributes greatly to a pilot’s potential seniority. Re Homer Simpson’s comment quoted above, however, most manufacturers do in fact recommend slipping the aircraft, albeit in the context of a crosswind landing. The Boeing bulletin kindly linked by dvt indicates that this maneuver may be safely accomplished throughout the flight envelope.
In my view, therefore, if dvt wants to side-forward slip his 737 till the cows come home, I see no safety-related reason not to. That the passengers might view things from a different angle is a horse, of course, of an entirely different color.
I agree j_t, with all of your comments; proceeding with great circumspection in light of potentially significant hidden and/or known design flaws, cumulative airframe stresses and faulty maintenance practices, contributes greatly to a pilot’s potential seniority. Re Homer Simpson’s comment quoted above, however, most manufacturers do in fact recommend slipping the aircraft, albeit in the context of a crosswind landing. The Boeing bulletin kindly linked by dvt indicates that this maneuver may be safely accomplished throughout the flight envelope.
In my view, therefore, if dvt wants to side-forward slip his 737 till the cows come home, I see no safety-related reason not to. That the passengers might view things from a different angle is a horse, of course, of an entirely different color.
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Here's what Airbus says about their design considerations...
http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB002_U...n%20Airbus.pdf
Basically, it seems they've designed their tail structures to the MINIMUM requirements specified by FAR/JAR 25. Boeing by contrast, has gone beyond the minimum requirements. I've always been partial to Boeings anyways. This is just one more reason to justify my prejudice.
However, Boeing points out, that while their tails are designed to handle a great deal of sideslip stress, the engine mounts are not designed to that same level. Cyclical over yaw, may overstress the mounts. Large sideslip angles, via abrupt inputs, may cause engine surge and stall at high power settings. Reason enough to be smooth on the flight controls at all times. This does not mean, that a forward slip can't be a smooth, controlled and useful manuever. I still see no reason to remove it from my "BAG". At least on Boeings. However, those of you flying Airbus' "made of glass", may want to keep your bank limiters set to 10 degrees and ask for long finals.
"If it ain't a BOEING, I ain't GOING."
http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB002_U...n%20Airbus.pdf
Basically, it seems they've designed their tail structures to the MINIMUM requirements specified by FAR/JAR 25. Boeing by contrast, has gone beyond the minimum requirements. I've always been partial to Boeings anyways. This is just one more reason to justify my prejudice.
However, Boeing points out, that while their tails are designed to handle a great deal of sideslip stress, the engine mounts are not designed to that same level. Cyclical over yaw, may overstress the mounts. Large sideslip angles, via abrupt inputs, may cause engine surge and stall at high power settings. Reason enough to be smooth on the flight controls at all times. This does not mean, that a forward slip can't be a smooth, controlled and useful manuever. I still see no reason to remove it from my "BAG". At least on Boeings. However, those of you flying Airbus' "made of glass", may want to keep your bank limiters set to 10 degrees and ask for long finals.
"If it ain't a BOEING, I ain't GOING."
Sorry dvt, didn't mean to step on your prejudices! For myself, I've had a choice for years as to which type to fly, but after sifting the B.S. have decided to eat my meals in comfort with a tray table and sidestick readily to hand.
However you do make a good and valid point that the Boeing is capable of rudder reversal from the steady state sideslip...
My reservations on slipping large, swept wing aircraft are the same as others have stated; largely concerned with control response, material fatigue, airmanship and comfort.
Dire circumstances notwithstanding, perhaps it is better to recognise the 'high and hot' situation earlier and do something more appropriate than resorting to side/forward-slipping. A go-around could be pro-active management of an unstable approach.
However you do make a good and valid point that the Boeing is capable of rudder reversal from the steady state sideslip...
My reservations on slipping large, swept wing aircraft are the same as others have stated; largely concerned with control response, material fatigue, airmanship and comfort.
Dire circumstances notwithstanding, perhaps it is better to recognise the 'high and hot' situation earlier and do something more appropriate than resorting to side/forward-slipping. A go-around could be pro-active management of an unstable approach.
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spleener,
You do not provide details of the Airbus data to which you refer. However, your description suggests that you are referring to design static loads. Some problems relate to whether the prescribed loads are, in fact, the most severe or merely presumed extreme loads .. quite apart from the potential for dynamic responses giving rise to higher loads than are obtained by steady or smooth/steady control inputs ....
bugg smasher,
I have no problem with slipping .. quite clearly the manoeuvre is a necessary function of getting from A to B. My concern is only with some of the thread's comments which infer that ill-considered pilot control inputs do not present a potential problem ... as to whether the SLF might be adversely impressed by substantial slipping is another consideration altogether.
dvt,
Again the problem (regardless of flight loads under consideration) relates to whether the design standard prescription is, or is not, sufficiently conservative to cover all reasonably expected real world situations. There have been instances in the past where the design standards have been found wanting and beefed up somewhat ... tailplane ice-related stalling, prescription of sharp-edged gust profiles, and earlier fatigue spectra assumptions come to mind, for instance. I wouldn't suggest that one ought to avoid slip manoeuvres .. merely that one ought to be conservatively cautious in large aeroplanes ... small trainers, such as the beloved SuperCub and like ilk on the other hand, are far more suited to heavy handed slip inputs.
As to the situation where the aircraft is held high or whatever ... if one cannot reconfigure to a higher drag and achieve a steeper profile at lower speed, then a precautionary early miss or orbit is probably the better option. My experience is limited to dinosaur Boeings .... there was no problem in achieving 1-1.5 nm/1000 when that was necessary ... provided that one was well ahead of the game plan and dirtied up early ... this might need to have been effected at 10,000-12,000 feet on occasion ... but it works just fine. The pilot who is just along for the ride and enjoys surprises, however, is an accident just waiting to happen sooner or later.
This has been a fun thread, though .....
You do not provide details of the Airbus data to which you refer. However, your description suggests that you are referring to design static loads. Some problems relate to whether the prescribed loads are, in fact, the most severe or merely presumed extreme loads .. quite apart from the potential for dynamic responses giving rise to higher loads than are obtained by steady or smooth/steady control inputs ....
bugg smasher,
I have no problem with slipping .. quite clearly the manoeuvre is a necessary function of getting from A to B. My concern is only with some of the thread's comments which infer that ill-considered pilot control inputs do not present a potential problem ... as to whether the SLF might be adversely impressed by substantial slipping is another consideration altogether.
dvt,
Again the problem (regardless of flight loads under consideration) relates to whether the design standard prescription is, or is not, sufficiently conservative to cover all reasonably expected real world situations. There have been instances in the past where the design standards have been found wanting and beefed up somewhat ... tailplane ice-related stalling, prescription of sharp-edged gust profiles, and earlier fatigue spectra assumptions come to mind, for instance. I wouldn't suggest that one ought to avoid slip manoeuvres .. merely that one ought to be conservatively cautious in large aeroplanes ... small trainers, such as the beloved SuperCub and like ilk on the other hand, are far more suited to heavy handed slip inputs.
As to the situation where the aircraft is held high or whatever ... if one cannot reconfigure to a higher drag and achieve a steeper profile at lower speed, then a precautionary early miss or orbit is probably the better option. My experience is limited to dinosaur Boeings .... there was no problem in achieving 1-1.5 nm/1000 when that was necessary ... provided that one was well ahead of the game plan and dirtied up early ... this might need to have been effected at 10,000-12,000 feet on occasion ... but it works just fine. The pilot who is just along for the ride and enjoys surprises, however, is an accident just waiting to happen sooner or later.
This has been a fun thread, though .....
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People - inside aviation and otherwise - have grown more conscious of tail loads and airframe life issues after AA587. Metal fatigue and corrosion-related accidents in a maturing fleet amplify this awareness.
As J_T observes, the ability of an airframe to reach maximum service life is directly relates to how much abuse it has taken along the way.
I predict a move toward 'life-history' FDRs in nearly all future-build transport airframes, accumulating a 'perpetual' trail of g-loads and impulse events which may then be used to make refurb decisions along the way and then, finally, to determine the final flight date for the aircraft chassis. This use of LHFDRs will give 'tail-cover' for regulators, operators and insurers at a lower cost than the alternatives of 'excessive maintenance' or operation until a fatigue related accident/incident occurs.
Should make it MUCH harder to gloss over the barrel rolls.
As J_T observes, the ability of an airframe to reach maximum service life is directly relates to how much abuse it has taken along the way.
I predict a move toward 'life-history' FDRs in nearly all future-build transport airframes, accumulating a 'perpetual' trail of g-loads and impulse events which may then be used to make refurb decisions along the way and then, finally, to determine the final flight date for the aircraft chassis. This use of LHFDRs will give 'tail-cover' for regulators, operators and insurers at a lower cost than the alternatives of 'excessive maintenance' or operation until a fatigue related accident/incident occurs.
Should make it MUCH harder to gloss over the barrel rolls.
arcinz
I like the concept of life-history FDR's, it seems logical to not only track maintenance but also the loads the airframe has experienced over its life. For smoother operators this could reduce costs and increase resale and for those who perform such sideslip manouvers - well lets just say you would know what you were insuring or buying.
dvt,
Why are you so agro that no one else supports the use of this technique. Did you do it on a check and are now having to answer to your company Gods?
I've had a fellow pilot select FLT and cross it up on final - hot and high, CRM non-existent - it's not fun for the other bloke. I know the aircraft can do it, but it ain't a good idea for more than just structural reasons.
If operating as a crew then you shouldn't surprise the other half, even if you do inform him of your intentions I doubt (time is limited unless you planned this from ToD?) he has time you consent or undertands to what extent you intend to do. It really sounds like you would be better flying solo.
Granted the Vnav data of late has gotten worse and worse but how do you miss manage your energy state so badly that this manouver is required. OK so your flying into a "Salad Bowl", big deal, on this occasion just be a bit more reserved.
Good luck with the company if they are trying to haul your ass.
I like the concept of life-history FDR's, it seems logical to not only track maintenance but also the loads the airframe has experienced over its life. For smoother operators this could reduce costs and increase resale and for those who perform such sideslip manouvers - well lets just say you would know what you were insuring or buying.
dvt,
Why are you so agro that no one else supports the use of this technique. Did you do it on a check and are now having to answer to your company Gods?
I've had a fellow pilot select FLT and cross it up on final - hot and high, CRM non-existent - it's not fun for the other bloke. I know the aircraft can do it, but it ain't a good idea for more than just structural reasons.
If operating as a crew then you shouldn't surprise the other half, even if you do inform him of your intentions I doubt (time is limited unless you planned this from ToD?) he has time you consent or undertands to what extent you intend to do. It really sounds like you would be better flying solo.
Granted the Vnav data of late has gotten worse and worse but how do you miss manage your energy state so badly that this manouver is required. OK so your flying into a "Salad Bowl", big deal, on this occasion just be a bit more reserved.
Good luck with the company if they are trying to haul your ass.
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Thanks Mudd Skipper.
I post facts. You post opinion. I'll take your opinion for what it cost me. Squat! If you had any real experience in Central/South America you'd have understood my post better.
For all intents and purposes this thread is finished. Boeing and Airbus have stated their position on the appropriate use of rudder. See my previous links. A forward slip is WELL within the envelop on a Boeing and within the enevelop on an Airbus.
Fini non?
Good Bye All.
I post facts. You post opinion. I'll take your opinion for what it cost me. Squat! If you had any real experience in Central/South America you'd have understood my post better.
For all intents and purposes this thread is finished. Boeing and Airbus have stated their position on the appropriate use of rudder. See my previous links. A forward slip is WELL within the envelop on a Boeing and within the enevelop on an Airbus.
Fini non?
Good Bye All.
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.. perhaps the sideslip issue has been well canvassed .. but, surely, the thread can move onto other new threads involving difficult approaches and ways and means of getting around the problems while still maintaining a high level of risk management ?
A quote from Air Publication 1979A, Cadets' Handbook of Elementary Flying Training !st Edition April 1943 - issued by command of the Air Council;
Page 85 chapter 14 entitled SIDESLIPPING.
"General Principles.
The manoeuvre known as sideslipping may be roughly described as making the aircraft descend through the air broadside on, while gliding. The direction in which the aircraft travels is at an angle to the direction in which the nose is pointing. We can sideslip in a turn as well as flying straight.
The advantage of the sideslip is that it permits us to increase our rate of descent, that is, to lose height more quickly, without increasing our forward speed.
By varying the amount of slip, we can vary the rate of descent......the degree to which any aircraft can be sidelipped depends on the extent to which the rudder is capable of overcoming the "weathercocking" of the aircraft, provided by the air pressure on the fin and keel surfaces This imposes a limit to the amount of bank which can usefully be applied and thus to the amount of sideslip....."
There is more - but by now you will have got the picture.
Reference to another old RAF manual of the World War 2 era, also has advice on sideslipping - but no trace can be found of the term "forward slipping".
Publication 129, the Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual - Part 1 Landplanes - dated November 1937 and reprinted June 1938, has this to say at Chapter 3 Basic Flying -paragraph 116 under the heading SIDESLIPPING.
"A sideslip means a state of equilibrium in which the aeroplane is travelling in a direction at an angle to that in which the nose is pointing. The unintentional slip is bad flying, but the intentional sideslip is a valuable manoeuvre to increase the rate of descent in a glide without gaining speed"....etc etc
So there you are. No such animal as a forward slip - not in those far gone days, anyway.
Page 85 chapter 14 entitled SIDESLIPPING.
"General Principles.
The manoeuvre known as sideslipping may be roughly described as making the aircraft descend through the air broadside on, while gliding. The direction in which the aircraft travels is at an angle to the direction in which the nose is pointing. We can sideslip in a turn as well as flying straight.
The advantage of the sideslip is that it permits us to increase our rate of descent, that is, to lose height more quickly, without increasing our forward speed.
By varying the amount of slip, we can vary the rate of descent......the degree to which any aircraft can be sidelipped depends on the extent to which the rudder is capable of overcoming the "weathercocking" of the aircraft, provided by the air pressure on the fin and keel surfaces This imposes a limit to the amount of bank which can usefully be applied and thus to the amount of sideslip....."
There is more - but by now you will have got the picture.
Reference to another old RAF manual of the World War 2 era, also has advice on sideslipping - but no trace can be found of the term "forward slipping".
Publication 129, the Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual - Part 1 Landplanes - dated November 1937 and reprinted June 1938, has this to say at Chapter 3 Basic Flying -paragraph 116 under the heading SIDESLIPPING.
"A sideslip means a state of equilibrium in which the aeroplane is travelling in a direction at an angle to that in which the nose is pointing. The unintentional slip is bad flying, but the intentional sideslip is a valuable manoeuvre to increase the rate of descent in a glide without gaining speed"....etc etc
So there you are. No such animal as a forward slip - not in those far gone days, anyway.
Moderator
.. an Americanism, John .... I noted some FAA references in an earlier post ... if you like I can give you copies next week when I am back in town ....
Bring on life history DFR's.
It really is a brilliant idea. If there is one person operating foward slips and trying to justify it, then there is probably ten or more others doing the same.
No I have not flown in Central America, just a little country we call Papua New Guinea - short one way jet strips at several thousand feet and Wellington in NZ can be fun on good days too. Sorry not a pi*** contest but I would suggest things can become local SoP's but that doesn't mean they are good airmanship (whatever that means).
Personally I would not wish to fly or buy an aircraft which has been pushed harder than required, as an SoP. Fortunatly my ops generally buys new aircraft and we fly in a reasonable conservative world.
Cheers
My best to the Kids
It really is a brilliant idea. If there is one person operating foward slips and trying to justify it, then there is probably ten or more others doing the same.
No I have not flown in Central America, just a little country we call Papua New Guinea - short one way jet strips at several thousand feet and Wellington in NZ can be fun on good days too. Sorry not a pi*** contest but I would suggest things can become local SoP's but that doesn't mean they are good airmanship (whatever that means).
Personally I would not wish to fly or buy an aircraft which has been pushed harder than required, as an SoP. Fortunatly my ops generally buys new aircraft and we fly in a reasonable conservative world.
Cheers
My best to the Kids
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"Life history recorders" are a fact of life in many operations and will likely increase in use.
The devices are generally called quick access recorders or similar and provide a convenient means for the operator to monitor such things as performance, engine operation etc ... and operational exceedances. The former are a great boon to tech services engineering people ... while the last, with sensible management and union practices, can be a useful flight standards management tool.
The devices are generally called quick access recorders or similar and provide a convenient means for the operator to monitor such things as performance, engine operation etc ... and operational exceedances. The former are a great boon to tech services engineering people ... while the last, with sensible management and union practices, can be a useful flight standards management tool.
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A forward slip is WELL within the envelop on a Boeing
Now it's time for DVT to go back to MS Flt sim and practice his/her short field landings in the Concorde.
At least this line of rationale is reassuring to a PPL who travels as pax rather a lot and would feel very uncomfortable about anyone needing to slip an airliner, certainly whe he should be stabilised.
