A no automation Zero Zero Landing with finesse
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An extract from the SAFO stated that a recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors and “the FAA believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations.”
Manual flying without first switching off FD information will not increase basic handling or instrument flying skills.
An excellent review of the topic, but sadly one that is at odds with many so-called top training airlines. Their philosophy is opposite to the 2 statements. A problem occurs, perhaps with a manual flight manoeuvre e.g. a visually flown circuit with FD's & A/T off. There is an increase in GA's. Solution? Ban the whole damn thing. Mandatory use of FD's at all times: discouragement of shortened manual circuits; mandatory LNAV/VNAV guidance to medium finals on visual circuits; recommended use of automatics to fly visual circuits; the only raw data flying in the TR sim is the mandatory raw data ILS; reduced manual flying in TR syllabi i.e. no raw data GH. Everything is FD or full automatics.
It is very common, even if briefed, DO NOT rotate to the pitch bar on lift off, especially on engine failure. Rotate to an attitude pause, and THEN the pitch bar. So often the pitch bar is above the ideal attitude and so the speed falls, and on SE that is not a bon ideé. You watch guys porpoise their way up the first 300' and settle at what was the correct ideal attitude all along. If only they had paused on first rotation the FD 'would have followed them'. The dog would wag the tail. Same with slaloming down the ILS chasing the LOC FD.
The correct philosophy, as stated, is follow the FD if the guidance is correct, or re-program it or switch it off. How do you know it is correct unless you scan the basic instruments that are feeding into the FD. Once you have confidence that is kosher, then use it as a tool. The best computer should be between your ears. That is too often forgotten and not enough good data & programs are downloaded and updated often enough. Manual practice will help in that regard and also as a healthy 'reboot'. One way the sports players keep sharp is practice, then play and keep the skills tined with gentle practice. Under stress they can draw on those skills and confidence gained during the practice and succeed. In many accidents we detect headless chickens and arms flashing around like an orangutang on acid.
A competent pilot under stress should not be operating at 100%, you hope. The better the training and more confidence the pilot has the more capacity they will have in a non-normal scenario to manage & handle it. Assessment & decision making will still be possible while you handle the a/c. It's easy if HAL is in CMD, but you should be able to manually stabilise the a/c enough to think outside basic control functions.
Many airlines say that non FD pure manual base training is sufficient to ingrain those skills; and then forbid such heresy ever again. They also say that a line flight is not the place to practice; that's what sims are for. Maybe if you give enough opportunity, but they don't. In any case it shouldn't be 'practicing on the line' it should be maintaining a basic skill that was gained and never lost.
There are airlines that follow this idea and we don't hear them trumpet their high levels of training & skills. There are others who straight-jacket their crews in rigid SOP's and claim a supreme level of training. It's an interesting and open debate with 2 very defined camps. It is a topic that a professional training symposium could debate over a 2 day conference of other topics, and a show of hands amongst the delegates would be an interesting finale. Has that ever happened? There have been lectures from both camps; there have been published learnings as per the FAA above; has there been an open debate? Without a learned opinion from the training and regulatory departments how can a solution be found to move forward in an improving and evolutionary manner?
Manual flying without first switching off FD information will not increase basic handling or instrument flying skills.
An excellent review of the topic, but sadly one that is at odds with many so-called top training airlines. Their philosophy is opposite to the 2 statements. A problem occurs, perhaps with a manual flight manoeuvre e.g. a visually flown circuit with FD's & A/T off. There is an increase in GA's. Solution? Ban the whole damn thing. Mandatory use of FD's at all times: discouragement of shortened manual circuits; mandatory LNAV/VNAV guidance to medium finals on visual circuits; recommended use of automatics to fly visual circuits; the only raw data flying in the TR sim is the mandatory raw data ILS; reduced manual flying in TR syllabi i.e. no raw data GH. Everything is FD or full automatics.
It is very common, even if briefed, DO NOT rotate to the pitch bar on lift off, especially on engine failure. Rotate to an attitude pause, and THEN the pitch bar. So often the pitch bar is above the ideal attitude and so the speed falls, and on SE that is not a bon ideé. You watch guys porpoise their way up the first 300' and settle at what was the correct ideal attitude all along. If only they had paused on first rotation the FD 'would have followed them'. The dog would wag the tail. Same with slaloming down the ILS chasing the LOC FD.
The correct philosophy, as stated, is follow the FD if the guidance is correct, or re-program it or switch it off. How do you know it is correct unless you scan the basic instruments that are feeding into the FD. Once you have confidence that is kosher, then use it as a tool. The best computer should be between your ears. That is too often forgotten and not enough good data & programs are downloaded and updated often enough. Manual practice will help in that regard and also as a healthy 'reboot'. One way the sports players keep sharp is practice, then play and keep the skills tined with gentle practice. Under stress they can draw on those skills and confidence gained during the practice and succeed. In many accidents we detect headless chickens and arms flashing around like an orangutang on acid.
A competent pilot under stress should not be operating at 100%, you hope. The better the training and more confidence the pilot has the more capacity they will have in a non-normal scenario to manage & handle it. Assessment & decision making will still be possible while you handle the a/c. It's easy if HAL is in CMD, but you should be able to manually stabilise the a/c enough to think outside basic control functions.
Many airlines say that non FD pure manual base training is sufficient to ingrain those skills; and then forbid such heresy ever again. They also say that a line flight is not the place to practice; that's what sims are for. Maybe if you give enough opportunity, but they don't. In any case it shouldn't be 'practicing on the line' it should be maintaining a basic skill that was gained and never lost.
There are airlines that follow this idea and we don't hear them trumpet their high levels of training & skills. There are others who straight-jacket their crews in rigid SOP's and claim a supreme level of training. It's an interesting and open debate with 2 very defined camps. It is a topic that a professional training symposium could debate over a 2 day conference of other topics, and a show of hands amongst the delegates would be an interesting finale. Has that ever happened? There have been lectures from both camps; there have been published learnings as per the FAA above; has there been an open debate? Without a learned opinion from the training and regulatory departments how can a solution be found to move forward in an improving and evolutionary manner?
I REALLY SHOULDN'T BE HERE
One observation I would make is that the modern European SH loco environment is frequently not a great context in which to encourage an FO to practice their manual, un-directed hand flying skills. In a previous company, flying to regional airports, I was more than happy, and indeed encouraged FOs to practice their skills.
Where I am now, SH from a busy London airport, tiring rosters, tight block times, minimum spacing between departures and arrivals, operating at all hours of the day, lots of destinations which are infrequently visited - I rarely see good opportunities for guys to practice basic flying skills. I am glad that my past gave me plenty of opportunity for hand flying, but looking across the cockpit at younger guys having joined straight onto shiny autojet from flying school, unfortunately they won't have the opportunity to develop that reserve of experience for that super rare event. Having said that I do think that the current system equips them well for the 99.9% routine day job and those risks more usually posed in that environment.
Where I am now, SH from a busy London airport, tiring rosters, tight block times, minimum spacing between departures and arrivals, operating at all hours of the day, lots of destinations which are infrequently visited - I rarely see good opportunities for guys to practice basic flying skills. I am glad that my past gave me plenty of opportunity for hand flying, but looking across the cockpit at younger guys having joined straight onto shiny autojet from flying school, unfortunately they won't have the opportunity to develop that reserve of experience for that super rare event. Having said that I do think that the current system equips them well for the 99.9% routine day job and those risks more usually posed in that environment.
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One observation I would make is that the modern European SH loco environment is frequently not a great context in which to encourage an FO to practice their manual, un-directed hand flying skills. In a previous company, flying to regional airports, I was more than happy, and indeed encouraged FOs to practice their skills.
That's sad, & curious, because i would have thought it an ideal multi-sector environment to hone skills and keep them tuned. I note you comment about regional airport flying, and indeed in my apprenticeship days, it was in that kind of flying, including the Med airport & Greek islands, that we maximised manual flying. LGW, MAN, STN, LTN etc. didn't stop us. What we did do was use good judgment when it was appropriate to do so. After a night TFS back into UK was not a good time, but over a 4 day block with 1 captain it became a matter of pride for both to demonstrate their skills at a variety of airports. Low fuel low drag CDA's from TOD was the target. Spool up before OM and it was beer time.
Many EU SH LOCO's operate in & out of regional airports all the time. If not tired then do it. It should be your judgement.
That's sad, & curious, because i would have thought it an ideal multi-sector environment to hone skills and keep them tuned. I note you comment about regional airport flying, and indeed in my apprenticeship days, it was in that kind of flying, including the Med airport & Greek islands, that we maximised manual flying. LGW, MAN, STN, LTN etc. didn't stop us. What we did do was use good judgment when it was appropriate to do so. After a night TFS back into UK was not a good time, but over a 4 day block with 1 captain it became a matter of pride for both to demonstrate their skills at a variety of airports. Low fuel low drag CDA's from TOD was the target. Spool up before OM and it was beer time.
Many EU SH LOCO's operate in & out of regional airports all the time. If not tired then do it. It should be your judgement.
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The height of arrogance being the failure to appreciate that we are all "children of magenta" even those of us weaned on the first generation of jets and older. The accident statistics have failed to provide much evidence to the contrary.
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Bear with me on this: and there will be others with more inside knowledge. Please criticise any facts. This is one a basic review of the program.
I was watching a Nat Geo documentary on fighter dog-fights. The period under review was from end WW2 to end Vietnam and was about USAF pilots and techniques. After the many victories towards the end of WW2 and in Korea, plus others, it was accepted that the ground victories were because the skies were owned by USAF & allies. The greater skill in dog-fighting, plus better training & armaments was the winner. This was achieved with Mk.1 eyeball use of guns. I can't remember if it was the Korean conflict, but the kill/loss ratio was 750/75. Then came missile technology and the ability to kill at medium range without dog-fighting. 'The powers that were' declared that missile technology no longer required pilots to be taught close counter dog-fighting tactics and it was removed from fighter pilot training.
The reaction from the 'old farts' was predicable, and the quote from one senior pilot was that the decisions had been made by people who had outlived their usefulness or had been promoted above their capabilities. Easy to say, I know.
The F4 was introduced without guns; only missiles & bombs in dual roles. It's performance was astonishing from previous jet fighters, but it's opposition in Vietnam were Migs, with missiles & guns. After a few years in Vietnam USAF did not have ownership of the skies as they wished, and they wondered why they had fired huge number of missiles for few kills. They needed to get closer to the enemy a/c, but if they were too close they couldn't fire the missiles. They needed guns & dog-fight skills. The USAF were flying with one kind of strategy, but the enemy was using another. This due to the weapons & skills.
It was then deemed necessary to reintroduce basic dog-flight skills and Top Gun was born. The pilot was reduced in the very basics of manual aerial combat and became less reliant on the long range automatic lock-on electronic/radar missile kill tactic. They had to be able to do both. Once again, in conflicts USAF regained ownership of the skies. Back to Basics. Have guns returned, or another close encounter weapon?
Watching this it sounded familiar to what many of us have been discussing about the demise of the modern commercial MPA piloting skills. The Powers That Be have allowed automatics to replace basic skills; not enough education about the automatic systems, and not enough skill to take over when necessary. It seems, perhaps history is being repeated, but what will be the motivation to reverse it? Accident statistics are the driving force in the civil world. Risk/Cost equations.
I appreciate it may be considered apples & oranges by some, but IMHO the comparison might be more oranges & tangerines.
I was watching a Nat Geo documentary on fighter dog-fights. The period under review was from end WW2 to end Vietnam and was about USAF pilots and techniques. After the many victories towards the end of WW2 and in Korea, plus others, it was accepted that the ground victories were because the skies were owned by USAF & allies. The greater skill in dog-fighting, plus better training & armaments was the winner. This was achieved with Mk.1 eyeball use of guns. I can't remember if it was the Korean conflict, but the kill/loss ratio was 750/75. Then came missile technology and the ability to kill at medium range without dog-fighting. 'The powers that were' declared that missile technology no longer required pilots to be taught close counter dog-fighting tactics and it was removed from fighter pilot training.
The reaction from the 'old farts' was predicable, and the quote from one senior pilot was that the decisions had been made by people who had outlived their usefulness or had been promoted above their capabilities. Easy to say, I know.
The F4 was introduced without guns; only missiles & bombs in dual roles. It's performance was astonishing from previous jet fighters, but it's opposition in Vietnam were Migs, with missiles & guns. After a few years in Vietnam USAF did not have ownership of the skies as they wished, and they wondered why they had fired huge number of missiles for few kills. They needed to get closer to the enemy a/c, but if they were too close they couldn't fire the missiles. They needed guns & dog-fight skills. The USAF were flying with one kind of strategy, but the enemy was using another. This due to the weapons & skills.
It was then deemed necessary to reintroduce basic dog-flight skills and Top Gun was born. The pilot was reduced in the very basics of manual aerial combat and became less reliant on the long range automatic lock-on electronic/radar missile kill tactic. They had to be able to do both. Once again, in conflicts USAF regained ownership of the skies. Back to Basics. Have guns returned, or another close encounter weapon?
Watching this it sounded familiar to what many of us have been discussing about the demise of the modern commercial MPA piloting skills. The Powers That Be have allowed automatics to replace basic skills; not enough education about the automatic systems, and not enough skill to take over when necessary. It seems, perhaps history is being repeated, but what will be the motivation to reverse it? Accident statistics are the driving force in the civil world. Risk/Cost equations.
I appreciate it may be considered apples & oranges by some, but IMHO the comparison might be more oranges & tangerines.
Thread Starter
Watching this it sounded familiar to what many of us have been discussing about the demise of the modern commercial MPA piloting skills. The Powers That Be have allowed automatics to replace basic skills; not enough education about the automatic systems, and not enough skill to take over when necessary
"Contrary to a lot of comment you will hear, this is not a function of the atrophying of manual motor skills, it is brain skills and awareness that has been lost. I would qualify that statement about loss of manual skills by saying that flying on instruments is a skill that needs frequent practice, because it requires sophisticated cognitive skills. But even in instrument flying, it is not the loss of motor skills that's the killer, it's the loss of that ability to recognise, believe, and understand what the instruments are telling you.
But the loss of these skills is being covered up by the cleverness and reliability of flight management systems and the autopilot/autothrottle systems they direct. Even the pilots don't know whether they've lost these skills or not. They don't find out until the automatics fail. And with the stress of a systems failure reducing your brain's capacity to take good decisions, that's a bad time to find out you no longer have the skills to cope.
Just a simple analogy for you about loss of skills: I recently discovered I had forgotten how to do long division. I don't need the skill any more because my calculator has rendered it redundant. But my life and the lives of those around me do not depend on these atrophied skills of mine.
Whereas a pilot's cognition of what's going on, gleaned from raw data sources when that's all there is left, is essential for survival. The training regime pilots are required to undergo is the underlying cause of Air France 447. The training regime is not set by the airlines, it is set by the world's civil aviation authorities. They have failed to update pilot training requirements to take account of the massive changes in the nature of an airline pilot's job with the arrival of modern, highly automated aircraft.
So it's the world's civil aviation authorities who, above others, shoulder the responsibility for Air France 447, and for the six other loss-of-control flights since 2000. Let me list them. And remember these have been the cause of 976 unnecessary deaths:
2010 Ethopian Airlines Boeing 737-800 in the Mediterranean Sea near Beirut.
2009 Yemenia Airbus A310-300, in the Indian Ocean near the Comoros Islands.
2009 Air France A330-300, South Atlantic
2007 Adam Air Boeing 737-400, Java sea near Sulawesi
2006 Armavia Airbus A320, Black Sea near Sochi
2004 Flash Airlines 737-300, Red Sea near Sharm el-Sheikh
2000 Gulf Air A320-200, Arabian Gulf near Bahrain
This has to stop, and a modernised system of training for pilots that recognises how automation is causing essential skills to atrophy, is the only way of doing it.
Centaurus,
Words of wisdom indeed. But a responsible airline can programme more than the minimum recurrent training defined by the regulatory authorities. It needs little in the way extra expense, only imaginative training routines. However, this presupposes a company where the flight operations department has sufficient clout. It can be done.
Words of wisdom indeed. But a responsible airline can programme more than the minimum recurrent training defined by the regulatory authorities. It needs little in the way extra expense, only imaginative training routines. However, this presupposes a company where the flight operations department has sufficient clout. It can be done.
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I was not trying to re-open a longtime circular debate about this subject. I suspect all has been said than needs to be said on it. Whether anything will come of it is another matter. My observation was that the Powers that Be in the military made the same mistake as is being made now in the civil world. The difference is they realised later on and had some motivation to correct it. Lives were at stake and wars needed winning. I doubt the civil world will have the same level on incentive, but there does need to be a shift in emphasis.
Thread Starter
I was not trying to re-open a longtime circular debate about this subject
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I did hear one interesting comment from an oldie, who used to pole manually around the sky in & out of some challenging places; thus he is on our side, but...
he had come to the conclusion that some airlines were satisfied that if they could teach their cadets to use the autopilot to bring the a/c into landing configuration at 1000'-500' and in the slot then they should be capable of disconnecting and completing the last 60secs of a gravity defying challenge without screwing it up too often. If this was achieved on 99.99999999% of the flights everyday with only a couple of G/A's then job done. They had kept their side of the bargain with the pax. Every 6 months the pilots jumped through historic hoops and the XAA was satisfied. It s going to be very difficult to shake them from that philosophy. There does not appear to be any incentive. Sadly he might be correct. Those CP's who like to encourage their crews to be more pilot than operator are free to do so, but it will not be easy to mandate it across the board. What is disheartening is that there are some operators who forbid/discourage those with the manual piloting skills to use them.
he had come to the conclusion that some airlines were satisfied that if they could teach their cadets to use the autopilot to bring the a/c into landing configuration at 1000'-500' and in the slot then they should be capable of disconnecting and completing the last 60secs of a gravity defying challenge without screwing it up too often. If this was achieved on 99.99999999% of the flights everyday with only a couple of G/A's then job done. They had kept their side of the bargain with the pax. Every 6 months the pilots jumped through historic hoops and the XAA was satisfied. It s going to be very difficult to shake them from that philosophy. There does not appear to be any incentive. Sadly he might be correct. Those CP's who like to encourage their crews to be more pilot than operator are free to do so, but it will not be easy to mandate it across the board. What is disheartening is that there are some operators who forbid/discourage those with the manual piloting skills to use them.
A difficulty in resolving circular debates is having a clear and universally acceptable understanding of the problem.
Many posts choose to categorise the list of accidents above as loss of control and thus relate this to manual flight practice, training, or degrading cognitive skills. There is support for this view in The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit.
Similarly there are alternative categorisations with causal factors such as insufficient awareness, illusion, disorientation, or startle; these categories can also be related to training and experience depending on viewpoint. We are biased by our experiences and operations, that's normal; but these same biases may prevent agreement on solutions.
Most of the views are based on accident outcomes: 'the aircraft crashed because the crew could not recover the situation'. These overlook aspects of how the situation was encountered, the preceding events, and thus opportunities for avoiding unwanted situations.
The difficulties above are typical of seeking improvement in complex operational systems, which may resist conventional (single point of view) solutions.
The industry is being exposed to 'new' ways of approaching safety, but because these involve change they may be difficult to implement. The industry may suffer a subconscious illusion of 'we are safe enough' because of a low accident rate, an old style of safety thinking, conflict between safety and economics, and belief that safety can be 'regulated' and human performance can be improved with training, all without considering the operating environment.
If this is so, then it is necessary to resolve these issues before we are able to break out of circular debates of operational safety. The higher echelons of the industry need to adapt their safety thoughts, both on the current and evolving safety issues, and not just rely on the sharp end becoming even more adaptable in a constraining regulatory environment.
Some 'break out' reading, particularly sections 1, and pages 34 - 40, 56 - 59, section 5 (page 75),
Connecting the Dots - No Single Way.
Sorry no solutions, but if we change our thinking we might progress.
Many posts choose to categorise the list of accidents above as loss of control and thus relate this to manual flight practice, training, or degrading cognitive skills. There is support for this view in The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit.
Similarly there are alternative categorisations with causal factors such as insufficient awareness, illusion, disorientation, or startle; these categories can also be related to training and experience depending on viewpoint. We are biased by our experiences and operations, that's normal; but these same biases may prevent agreement on solutions.
Most of the views are based on accident outcomes: 'the aircraft crashed because the crew could not recover the situation'. These overlook aspects of how the situation was encountered, the preceding events, and thus opportunities for avoiding unwanted situations.
The difficulties above are typical of seeking improvement in complex operational systems, which may resist conventional (single point of view) solutions.
The industry is being exposed to 'new' ways of approaching safety, but because these involve change they may be difficult to implement. The industry may suffer a subconscious illusion of 'we are safe enough' because of a low accident rate, an old style of safety thinking, conflict between safety and economics, and belief that safety can be 'regulated' and human performance can be improved with training, all without considering the operating environment.
If this is so, then it is necessary to resolve these issues before we are able to break out of circular debates of operational safety. The higher echelons of the industry need to adapt their safety thoughts, both on the current and evolving safety issues, and not just rely on the sharp end becoming even more adaptable in a constraining regulatory environment.
Some 'break out' reading, particularly sections 1, and pages 34 - 40, 56 - 59, section 5 (page 75),
Connecting the Dots - No Single Way.
Sorry no solutions, but if we change our thinking we might progress.
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I recently went through 767 school, yet again and presumably for the last time. My sim partner was coming to the airplane for the first time, after 20+ years on the Airbus 320. We had to constantly remind him to put his hand on the throttles. To say he had no scan would be an understatement. It was a very tough training exercise, not least because the standard company training profile cannot be altered. If it’s Tuesday, this must be Belgium…or non-ILS day, or whatever. The company idea is that if you need extra training, they will provide that at the end of the course. In this gentleman’s case, I’m pretty sure I could have worked out most of his kinks with a two hour sim block at the beginning…just for basic instrument stuff. The man was not a dummy. But he had become inured by years of flying an airplane that does everything for him.
Contrast that with one of my very favorite first officers, a woman who, with her husband, owns a small airport and several light airplanes. She cut her teeth flying auto parts around in Lears on the back side of the clock, and regularly tootles around the family patch in a Luscombe. Her ability to hand fly the MD80 is a joy; it is literally fun to watch her work. Autopilot/autothrottle off in the downwind, and when it comes time for the 500 foot call, all you need to do is fold down the top of your newspaper, make the speed and sink calls, and go back to your article. Obviously I’m being slightly facetious there, but in fact, no matter what the condition, the airplane is going to go where you want it to go, without a word spoken. When we were getting a line check last year from the FAA, I waited until she had called for LNAV after the takeoff, then I leaned back toward the Fed and said, “Watch this”. Sure enough, all the way through the RNAV departure turns, with maybe 0.1 nm lateral deviation in the 90˚ turn. I have seen many autopilots that couldn’t hold those tolerances.
What’s the difference? My MD80 friend has a genuine feel for the airplane, and I’m pretty sure that’s any airplane. My sim partner, not so much. She has probably never let any airplane fly her; he had become accustomed to an airplane that would, without some opposing effort, gladly fly him.
Contrast that with one of my very favorite first officers, a woman who, with her husband, owns a small airport and several light airplanes. She cut her teeth flying auto parts around in Lears on the back side of the clock, and regularly tootles around the family patch in a Luscombe. Her ability to hand fly the MD80 is a joy; it is literally fun to watch her work. Autopilot/autothrottle off in the downwind, and when it comes time for the 500 foot call, all you need to do is fold down the top of your newspaper, make the speed and sink calls, and go back to your article. Obviously I’m being slightly facetious there, but in fact, no matter what the condition, the airplane is going to go where you want it to go, without a word spoken. When we were getting a line check last year from the FAA, I waited until she had called for LNAV after the takeoff, then I leaned back toward the Fed and said, “Watch this”. Sure enough, all the way through the RNAV departure turns, with maybe 0.1 nm lateral deviation in the 90˚ turn. I have seen many autopilots that couldn’t hold those tolerances.
What’s the difference? My MD80 friend has a genuine feel for the airplane, and I’m pretty sure that’s any airplane. My sim partner, not so much. She has probably never let any airplane fly her; he had become accustomed to an airplane that would, without some opposing effort, gladly fly him.
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My confusion is this. What Mansfield describes is the way it was, and IMHO he way art should still be. It was the way I was taught & the way everyone flew in my outfit. Captains demonstrated it and we apprentices follow suit. It was what our pilot management expected of the crews. Plus, the network required such skills for the airfields down route, and the basic kit of the a/c also required a high manual skill set.
What has happened is that the a/c have become technically more sophisticated, more capable in automatics, and the airfields have become more updated in their equipment. It is possible to manoeuvre the a/c to 3nm finals via automatics and then disconnect, when the a/c is in full & stable landing configuration, and perform the role of a real pilot for 45secs as you bring your steed back to earth. Job done. Indeed that is a necessary skill, but it has caused the earlier required skills to become museum pieces. Why, because those other skills are not taught, no demonstrated, not encouraged nor expected by some flight ops management. There are some operators who hold true to classic standards, but there are far too many who do not and create a fleet of trained monkeys. What is sadly true is that a pilot, from old school with high level basic skills, joins an airline of the restrictive kind and is no longer allowed to demonstrate his skills on line even for his own enjoyment and latterly for the education of the apprentice. The airline wants max use of full automatics.
It is a tragedy, and it will bite them one day.
What has happened is that the a/c have become technically more sophisticated, more capable in automatics, and the airfields have become more updated in their equipment. It is possible to manoeuvre the a/c to 3nm finals via automatics and then disconnect, when the a/c is in full & stable landing configuration, and perform the role of a real pilot for 45secs as you bring your steed back to earth. Job done. Indeed that is a necessary skill, but it has caused the earlier required skills to become museum pieces. Why, because those other skills are not taught, no demonstrated, not encouraged nor expected by some flight ops management. There are some operators who hold true to classic standards, but there are far too many who do not and create a fleet of trained monkeys. What is sadly true is that a pilot, from old school with high level basic skills, joins an airline of the restrictive kind and is no longer allowed to demonstrate his skills on line even for his own enjoyment and latterly for the education of the apprentice. The airline wants max use of full automatics.
It is a tragedy, and it will bite them one day.
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Tragic, isn't it ?
I look back fondly to flying freight on the L188 and B727 35 years or so ago. Back of the clock, next to no traffic, and the stick and rudder/IF skills were honed and rehoned ... and it was all a great deal of good clean fun. Autopilot ? .. only of use when eating one's meal.
Sometimes I wonder whether I should have transitioned to the Airbus .. not often, though.
I look back fondly to flying freight on the L188 and B727 35 years or so ago. Back of the clock, next to no traffic, and the stick and rudder/IF skills were honed and rehoned ... and it was all a great deal of good clean fun. Autopilot ? .. only of use when eating one's meal.
Sometimes I wonder whether I should have transitioned to the Airbus .. not often, though.
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I can remember driving vehicles that required double declutching for gear changes, using 'heel and toe' to do so when braking ... those days are also long gone - should they be brought back?
The problem is that the FMC manufacturers still believe that the pilot can pick up the bag of bolts when their software fails and seamlessly go from fully automatic back to double declutching. The software is designed so that the more difficult to cope with cases and the 'who would have ever thought that could happen' cases result in the FMC software 'going into alternate mode' and 'you have control'.
The philosophical question that is now faced is 'which way to go now?'. One way most often seen on here is to ensure that flight crews retain their manual flying skills, the art of flying so that the FMC is not an essential for safe flight but an aid for the crew. However, this is not the way that aircraft are now being designed and the FMC (and other avionics) are being designed so that there are less 'otherwise' cases where the crew needs to take over. Indeed, the 787 is claimed to have a defensive approach to the human interface to recover from erroneous crew inputs. The ultimate direction this moves in is the partially crewed or uncrewed aircraft - or full automation.
In human factors terms the pilot has moved already from 'in-the-loop' to 'on-the-loop'. The next step to human 'out-of-the-loop' or autonomous flight is already the case in some military UAS. The direction of development of the future of flying is being decided now; the decision should not be left to accountants.
The problem is that the FMC manufacturers still believe that the pilot can pick up the bag of bolts when their software fails and seamlessly go from fully automatic back to double declutching. The software is designed so that the more difficult to cope with cases and the 'who would have ever thought that could happen' cases result in the FMC software 'going into alternate mode' and 'you have control'.
The philosophical question that is now faced is 'which way to go now?'. One way most often seen on here is to ensure that flight crews retain their manual flying skills, the art of flying so that the FMC is not an essential for safe flight but an aid for the crew. However, this is not the way that aircraft are now being designed and the FMC (and other avionics) are being designed so that there are less 'otherwise' cases where the crew needs to take over. Indeed, the 787 is claimed to have a defensive approach to the human interface to recover from erroneous crew inputs. The ultimate direction this moves in is the partially crewed or uncrewed aircraft - or full automation.
In human factors terms the pilot has moved already from 'in-the-loop' to 'on-the-loop'. The next step to human 'out-of-the-loop' or autonomous flight is already the case in some military UAS. The direction of development of the future of flying is being decided now; the decision should not be left to accountants.
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Centaurus (#1),
Not being a techie, I've never ventured on this turf before: my home ground being Military Avation Forum, "Gaining a R.A.F. Pilot's Brevet in WWII" Thread.
What a wonderful story ! Yet the old "seat of the pants" method still has its uses. I did my first 60 hours on the "Arnold Scheme" with the US Army Air Corps in Florida. The ASIs had been taken out of our Stearman (back) cockpits. We were taught to fly by feel and Attitude alone. As most of us had never been off the ground in our young lives, we felt no pain. Did any other Air Forces do this ? Does the USAF do it now ? Never occurred to me to ask, will do so on "Pilot's Brevet" shortly.
On that Thread, read Padhist's: "RAE Bedford. Blind Landing Experimental Unit" (Page 113, #2258).* It ties in nicely with your story of what the human pilot can do (at its very best).
Yet the old idea often came to my aid in Monsoon cu-nims in Burma ! And it is arguable that it might have saved AF447. As I see it, each of the three pilots was quite capable of flying the thing out of trouble if they'd only ignored the Flight instruments on the panel and simply "flown Attitude", as I had to at Carlstrom Field all those years ago. But none even thought of doing so - they'd been brain-washed into being no more than simple Systems Managers.
Note * above: my weary tale starts Page 114, #2262 (advt.)
Not being a techie, I've never ventured on this turf before: my home ground being Military Avation Forum, "Gaining a R.A.F. Pilot's Brevet in WWII" Thread.
What a wonderful story ! Yet the old "seat of the pants" method still has its uses. I did my first 60 hours on the "Arnold Scheme" with the US Army Air Corps in Florida. The ASIs had been taken out of our Stearman (back) cockpits. We were taught to fly by feel and Attitude alone. As most of us had never been off the ground in our young lives, we felt no pain. Did any other Air Forces do this ? Does the USAF do it now ? Never occurred to me to ask, will do so on "Pilot's Brevet" shortly.
On that Thread, read Padhist's: "RAE Bedford. Blind Landing Experimental Unit" (Page 113, #2258).* It ties in nicely with your story of what the human pilot can do (at its very best).
Yet the old idea often came to my aid in Monsoon cu-nims in Burma ! And it is arguable that it might have saved AF447. As I see it, each of the three pilots was quite capable of flying the thing out of trouble if they'd only ignored the Flight instruments on the panel and simply "flown Attitude", as I had to at Carlstrom Field all those years ago. But none even thought of doing so - they'd been brain-washed into being no more than simple Systems Managers.
Note * above: my weary tale starts Page 114, #2262 (advt.)
Man / RAT, ' flying as an art' , but art has no boundaries, no set format; we know what it is because we 'know what we like'. 
Ian W, expectation - 'the pilot can pick up the bag of bolts' . Yes.
The industry chooses to automate functions to mitigate less reliable human activity, yet when automation fails the industry then expects the 'less reliable human' to manage the situation and blames then when they cannot meet that expectation.
We are unlikely to progress safety until this line of thinking changes. Not that the industry is unsafe, but there is increasing need to maintain and improve the current standards as aviation expands, yet this expansion is driven by the same automation which the human is expected to manage in all circumstances. Round and round.
'On the loop' or 'out of the loop', like art depends on what you see. A backward, reminiscent view (I include my self in that age group) may see the flying loop, whereas today the issue is more a flight and systems management loop. The future has to include the human loop; not just the crew, but the interactions of design and certification ... the manufacturer, regulator, and investigator loop.
I fear that we will never catch up, never break out of the circular argument, because it will always be some loop or other.
The required safety activity could be described as 'loop management', but more practically, how to manage the unexpected. Yet this form of management is exactly what has been discussed under flight experience, and the current problems of low levels of experience, - manufacturer, regulator, operator, and finally the crew.
I still argue the need for experienced thinkers; starting with the regulators and management - top down. But as long as they believe that they can manage their 'loop' with bottom up regulatory constraint and more training the industry will continue to be surprised.
Danny, to add to the 'been there, done that, T shirt', etc; I probably occupied Padhist's house and job some 15 years later, but instead of evaluating automation the task was to map human capability if the autos failed. The human is more capable than many believed.
And then a further 15 years later certificating a highly reliable, but cheap autoland system, being surprised by unexpected in-service failures. Crews did not follow the abnormal procedure as landing below 50 ft in fog was judged safer than a GA - it may have been; and that the system failures were 'caused' by the crew's apprehension - 'white knuckling' the controls and inadvertently disconnecting the autos! Lack of confidence , low experience ... C'est la vie.
Ian W, expectation - 'the pilot can pick up the bag of bolts' . Yes.
The industry chooses to automate functions to mitigate less reliable human activity, yet when automation fails the industry then expects the 'less reliable human' to manage the situation and blames then when they cannot meet that expectation.
We are unlikely to progress safety until this line of thinking changes. Not that the industry is unsafe, but there is increasing need to maintain and improve the current standards as aviation expands, yet this expansion is driven by the same automation which the human is expected to manage in all circumstances. Round and round.
'On the loop' or 'out of the loop', like art depends on what you see. A backward, reminiscent view (I include my self in that age group) may see the flying loop, whereas today the issue is more a flight and systems management loop. The future has to include the human loop; not just the crew, but the interactions of design and certification ... the manufacturer, regulator, and investigator loop.
I fear that we will never catch up, never break out of the circular argument, because it will always be some loop or other.
The required safety activity could be described as 'loop management', but more practically, how to manage the unexpected. Yet this form of management is exactly what has been discussed under flight experience, and the current problems of low levels of experience, - manufacturer, regulator, operator, and finally the crew.
I still argue the need for experienced thinkers; starting with the regulators and management - top down. But as long as they believe that they can manage their 'loop' with bottom up regulatory constraint and more training the industry will continue to be surprised.
Danny, to add to the 'been there, done that, T shirt', etc; I probably occupied Padhist's house and job some 15 years later, but instead of evaluating automation the task was to map human capability if the autos failed. The human is more capable than many believed.
And then a further 15 years later certificating a highly reliable, but cheap autoland system, being surprised by unexpected in-service failures. Crews did not follow the abnormal procedure as landing below 50 ft in fog was judged safer than a GA - it may have been; and that the system failures were 'caused' by the crew's apprehension - 'white knuckling' the controls and inadvertently disconnecting the autos! Lack of confidence , low experience ... C'est la vie.
Last edited by safetypee; 11th May 2017 at 17:30.
I vaguely recall an arcticle in "Flying" in the late 60's early 70's.
It seems they gave, as an experiment, some ab initio students their first 5 hours totaly on instruments.
I assume this gave them a good scan but wonder what effect this had on their later VFR training.
I can't remember what the conclusions drawn from the experiment were.
When I started training... looking at the instruments was initialy discouraged. Looking around was encouraged. LOL
It seems they gave, as an experiment, some ab initio students their first 5 hours totaly on instruments.
I assume this gave them a good scan but wonder what effect this had on their later VFR training.
I can't remember what the conclusions drawn from the experiment were.
When I started training... looking at the instruments was initialy discouraged. Looking around was encouraged. LOL
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I can remember driving vehicles that required double declutching for gear changes ..... The problem is that the FMC manufacturers still believe that the pilot can pick up the bag of bolts when their software fails and seamlessly go from fully automatic back to double declutching.
Therein lies the difference .. the synchro/auto gearbox doesn't fail back to a Road Ranger box reversionary mode. The aircraft, on the other hand, does .. ergo, if the pilot is not up to speed on the day then it all turns to custard on occasion.
I have a non-synchro truck licence .. my proficiency probably isn't pretty .. but, if necessary, I can drive one. Same philosophy.. why let a skill (which may have a value) atrophy ? ... with a sideline consideration that risk probabilities should drive the decision to a large extent .. ergo, the truck thing isn't all that important .. while the aircraft AFCS failure still is until, and unless, systems reliability can get up amongst the structural failure probabilities ..
Yes, it costs in money and time .. as safetypee observes, it's largely to do with risk management and desired outcomes. I might look back to yesteryear wistfully but I was only too happy to do an autoland at the end of a long tour in lousy weather conditions ....
Therein lies the difference .. the synchro/auto gearbox doesn't fail back to a Road Ranger box reversionary mode. The aircraft, on the other hand, does .. ergo, if the pilot is not up to speed on the day then it all turns to custard on occasion.
I have a non-synchro truck licence .. my proficiency probably isn't pretty .. but, if necessary, I can drive one. Same philosophy.. why let a skill (which may have a value) atrophy ? ... with a sideline consideration that risk probabilities should drive the decision to a large extent .. ergo, the truck thing isn't all that important .. while the aircraft AFCS failure still is until, and unless, systems reliability can get up amongst the structural failure probabilities ..
Yes, it costs in money and time .. as safetypee observes, it's largely to do with risk management and desired outcomes. I might look back to yesteryear wistfully but I was only too happy to do an autoland at the end of a long tour in lousy weather conditions ....
There is a way to deal with this which can satisfy all parties, but it needs more radical thinking than most pilots are currently prepared to contemplate. Readers will think I am flogging a dead hobby-horse but here goes....
We are talking about maintaining (and to an increasing extent, initially acquiring) basic aircraft manoeuvring skills, in a world where those in charge of operations believe automation is capable of doing this manoeuvring more consistently and efficiently than the human pilots. They prefer to regard crew members as system operators whose presence is primarily concerned with economic efficiency and satisfying regulatory needs. They write rules and procedures for crews to deal with what they BELIEVE are the most demanding circumstances - even if in reality they are not.
If one thinks that way, then basic manual flying skills become a low priority, because for what THEY consider to be demanding situations, the automation is required to be used anyway. This is despite the fact that automation CAN'T actually solve all problems and may actually create an even more demanding situation by dumping a problem back into an unprepared crew's hands, as John T just said. This is belatedly being recognised by some of those at the top.
From the currently prevailing perspective, it is a "given" that automation reduces pilot workload and improves efficiency. So it follows that deliberately using less than maximum automation is unacceptable, because it adds to the workload of the PF. Normally the PF is also responsible for the overall management of the flight which must be a higher priority. With manual flying on instruments especially, the less it is practised, the more concentration it requires on very short term inputs and responses, which must divert attention from overall situational awareness and "flight management". It's a vicious circle and inevitably, managements increasingly regard it as unacceptable, especially if the PF in question may be an inexperienced F/O, or if it is done merely for personal satisfaction.
But IF pilots themselves are also willing to be open-minded, this "automation must always be used because it's needed in our limiting cases" attitude is vulnerable to two facts. These are (1) there is also a second pilot (PM), and (2) the vast majority of the time conditions are NOT close to "limits".
The fundamental objection to manual practice is that it diverts PF's mental resources from the more important overall management task. But if you can make the philosophical leap that it's not necessary for the PF simultaneously to have overall responsibility for management, that doesn't matter. The PM's basic workload isn't much affected by whether or not the automatics are being used. Some readers will recognise where I am going with this......!
Although it will be heresy to most, if you routinely separate overall management responsibility from aircraft handling, it is easy to make manual practice in appropriate conditions entirely consistent with getting maximum benefit from automation when needed. Leaving aside all other aspects, routinely using a pilot-in-charge monitored approach procedure would make it much more acceptable to practice manual flying, and especially it opens up the route to more rapid acquisition of skills by low experience pilots. As others have said, it's largely to do with risk management and desired outcomes. Instead of an "all or nothing" situation - give the leg away or not - as a Captain you can have much more control of how much freedom you are giving an F/O to learn and practice.
While many people are horrified by the idea of a 20 year old with 225 hours, a CPL and an IR, being in the right seat of the latest, most sophisticated aircraft in high density short sector operations, let alone with an ex-military Captain who has never heard of CRM, that was exactly my initial situation over 50 years ago. The "delegated flying" used by my operator then resulted in cadets like me building at least that element of their experience extremely rapidly.
Line flying became effectively an extension of training, as Captains who had no formal training responsibility were supervising this learning and experience building process, using their own discretion as to how much freedom they allowed us to dispense with autopilot, flight director etc. on any individual occasion. But it has to be seen as an entire package of procedures, limits and recommendations.
There is a very informal discussion going on elsewhere among a group of experienced pilots including former manufacturers test pilots and instructors, to try and evaluate a "best practice" recommendation that covers this. I'm open to making the current version available for comment if there's a desire to see it and discuss it seriously, but not if it is just going to get "flamed" as would happen in Rumours and News. JT, as moderator what do you think?
We are talking about maintaining (and to an increasing extent, initially acquiring) basic aircraft manoeuvring skills, in a world where those in charge of operations believe automation is capable of doing this manoeuvring more consistently and efficiently than the human pilots. They prefer to regard crew members as system operators whose presence is primarily concerned with economic efficiency and satisfying regulatory needs. They write rules and procedures for crews to deal with what they BELIEVE are the most demanding circumstances - even if in reality they are not.
If one thinks that way, then basic manual flying skills become a low priority, because for what THEY consider to be demanding situations, the automation is required to be used anyway. This is despite the fact that automation CAN'T actually solve all problems and may actually create an even more demanding situation by dumping a problem back into an unprepared crew's hands, as John T just said. This is belatedly being recognised by some of those at the top.
From the currently prevailing perspective, it is a "given" that automation reduces pilot workload and improves efficiency. So it follows that deliberately using less than maximum automation is unacceptable, because it adds to the workload of the PF. Normally the PF is also responsible for the overall management of the flight which must be a higher priority. With manual flying on instruments especially, the less it is practised, the more concentration it requires on very short term inputs and responses, which must divert attention from overall situational awareness and "flight management". It's a vicious circle and inevitably, managements increasingly regard it as unacceptable, especially if the PF in question may be an inexperienced F/O, or if it is done merely for personal satisfaction.
But IF pilots themselves are also willing to be open-minded, this "automation must always be used because it's needed in our limiting cases" attitude is vulnerable to two facts. These are (1) there is also a second pilot (PM), and (2) the vast majority of the time conditions are NOT close to "limits".
The fundamental objection to manual practice is that it diverts PF's mental resources from the more important overall management task. But if you can make the philosophical leap that it's not necessary for the PF simultaneously to have overall responsibility for management, that doesn't matter. The PM's basic workload isn't much affected by whether or not the automatics are being used. Some readers will recognise where I am going with this......!
Although it will be heresy to most, if you routinely separate overall management responsibility from aircraft handling, it is easy to make manual practice in appropriate conditions entirely consistent with getting maximum benefit from automation when needed. Leaving aside all other aspects, routinely using a pilot-in-charge monitored approach procedure would make it much more acceptable to practice manual flying, and especially it opens up the route to more rapid acquisition of skills by low experience pilots. As others have said, it's largely to do with risk management and desired outcomes. Instead of an "all or nothing" situation - give the leg away or not - as a Captain you can have much more control of how much freedom you are giving an F/O to learn and practice.
While many people are horrified by the idea of a 20 year old with 225 hours, a CPL and an IR, being in the right seat of the latest, most sophisticated aircraft in high density short sector operations, let alone with an ex-military Captain who has never heard of CRM, that was exactly my initial situation over 50 years ago. The "delegated flying" used by my operator then resulted in cadets like me building at least that element of their experience extremely rapidly.
Line flying became effectively an extension of training, as Captains who had no formal training responsibility were supervising this learning and experience building process, using their own discretion as to how much freedom they allowed us to dispense with autopilot, flight director etc. on any individual occasion. But it has to be seen as an entire package of procedures, limits and recommendations.
There is a very informal discussion going on elsewhere among a group of experienced pilots including former manufacturers test pilots and instructors, to try and evaluate a "best practice" recommendation that covers this. I'm open to making the current version available for comment if there's a desire to see it and discuss it seriously, but not if it is just going to get "flamed" as would happen in Rumours and News. JT, as moderator what do you think?