Pilot-in-charge "monitored approach" new thread
Thread Starter
Pilot-in-charge "monitored approach" new thread
This thread contains discussion of the subject which has been mixed up with one on a contaminated runway accident in Rumours and News.
The next post will contain all the relevant comments from that thread merged into one post. Hopefully those original posters will not object?
The next post will contain all the relevant comments from that thread merged into one post. Hopefully those original posters will not object?
Thread Starter
Original posts..
Airbubba: Reminds me of that wacko 'monitored approach' some carriers were using a while back for low viz operations. One pilot would fly the plane to minimums and then hand over control to the other pilot to do the landing.
This widely-circulated item from the 1990's is probably parody but after reading some recent flight ops bulletins, I'm not so sure: (quotes fake BA bulletin)
Peekay 4: That's still SOP for many carriers, I believe (in Europe, and U.S. regionals). Monitored approaches isn't inherently good/bad; there's pros and cons to everything.
ExSp33db1rd: Waiting in Idlewild - yes, Idlewild - Customs hall one day, a Pan Am ( Ahh ! ) Captain approached my Captain and asked if "You's guys did that monitored approach stuff ?" ( BEA, the airline that was experimenting with monitored approach was the other airline that merged with BOAC to form the present British Airways
My Captain said No. Well, said the Clipper Skipper, PanAm has used the monitored approach system since day one. Really ? we replied. Yes, said the Clipper Skipper, pointing to his First Officer - I fly, he monitors. QED.
Vessbot: I'm at a regional in the US and use the monitored approach for Cat II ILS. Autopilot mandatory, FO acts as PF until he calls Minimums at which point the Captain takes control and lands if he sees the runway. (I say CA and FO because the roles are not reversible for Cat II)
I didn't know how to feel about this when I first learned about it and was a bit skeptical of the last-minute monkey motion, but I see the rationale, which is that the Captain has more reaction time once going visual if he's already outside looking for the runway, than he would if transitioning from instruments to outside.
RAT_5: quotes fake bulletin: I checked; it is not April 1st. Is this for real? Please. This is straight out of a Ronnie Barker sketch or a tongue tripping soliloquy by Sir Humphrey from Yes Minister. If it is true it woud question the sanity and education of the writer, and also of the Flt Ops manager who signed off on it to be published. Please say it ain't so.
Basil: I've flown mil and several airlines; monitored approach, one man band etc etc.
Remember: Your last company is history; just do what the ops manual for your present company says.
The people who used to piss me off were those who'd arrive and then bitch about the existing SOP.
p.s. *** British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice *** is bollox.
Herod: Both my last two companies used the monitored approach technique for all low-vis ops. The FO flew the approach/monitored the A/P, up until DH, at which point the captain, who has been looking out as well as monitoring the FO/AP combination, takes over for landing. Makes a lot of sense, since the captain has an easier job transitioning to the visual at a critical moment.
slast: The so-called "British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice" is a fabrication from the mid 1970s created by a BOAC pilot, who circulated it in a slightly different format as part of an unsuccessful campaign against the merger of BOAC, BEA and several other smaller carriers into British Airways. I have all the original files from that period.
Rather than "wacko", a balanced and more comprehensive description can be found on the respected Eurocontrol / ICAO / Flight Safety Foundation Skybrary site, Monitored Approach - SKYbrary Aviation Safety.
The NTSB said in a 2000 accident report that "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."
It's also likely that for example UPS 1354 pilots Capt. Cerea Beal and F/O Shanda Fanning would still be alive if they had been using this procedure. It is specifically designed to protect against many of the contributory factors in that accident, particularly having both pilots "head-up" seeking visual cues as the aircraft approaches DH. This weakness in traditional procedures was recognised in NTSB studies going back as far as 1976. There's much more about these issues on the picma.org.uk website.
413X3: Capt landing in low vis sounds like an insurance thing.
Eckhard: The same notice was 're-issued' by some joker in the late 1990s. At that time, the 747 Classic fleet was the only remaining* BA unit that didn't routinely fly monitored approaches. (I think they did for weather worse than Cat1 *and I don't know about CCDE.) When the Classic fleet did eventually 'catch up', someone posted the notice as a tongue-in-cheek riposte.
Having flown for different airlines and experienced both approach methods, I would agree with most of the others that the monitored approach unloads the Landing Pilot and informs him/her at an earlier stage as to the likelihood of a landing or go-around. The other crew member will be locked on to the instruments and will perform a go-around if there is no clear communication or any ambiguity at minima.
sudden twang: It was rewritten in '89 or 90 I was said jokers Co and saw him typing it.
Check Airman: I see the benefit of a monitored approach in dodgy weather, but I think it'd be quite a pain in the rear to do every approach that way.
Pontius: It's not a pain in the rear at all. Hand over control just before TOD, take over control either around 1000' when visual and all is stable or at minimums (if applicable). It's really very, very easy and takes just a few minutes to get used to. I much prefer it to the 'whole sector'-type flight that you're used to. Horses, courses etc etc.
BEagle: However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets.... Perhaps because they don't have any of this headshrinker horse$hit to worry about and are fully capable of 'going visual' after an IMC approach?
Basil: Entirely different sort of operation however, as I said before: 'JDI!'
Check Airman: Point taken, but if the CA does the approach until all is stable, when does a new FO (or CA) on type get to learn from his mistakes? Getting burned is part of the learning process, and if you get the plane handed to you on a silver platter, so to speak, when do you learn how NOT to set up for an approach, and how to fix it when you've done it incorrectly?
Basil: I was FO on an aircraft following a very big merger.
We operated the monitored approach system. My captain came from a company where they did not.
C: "D'you mind if I fly my own approach?"
FO: (In warning tone) "Well, YOU'RE the Captain."
FO: (on short finals) "YOU'RE HIGH AND FAST ON A SHORT WET RUNWAY!"
Despite warning, Capt lands and bursts all maingear tyres. I thought we were going off the end.
Funny old thing; I never heard another word about it. JFDI!
Pontius: Normally if the captain was PF on the first sector then the FO would do the approach for the captain's landing. On the next sector (all things being equal, weather etc) the FO would be the PF and the captain would do the approach for the FO's landing. The nice thing about this procedure is you get to have a 'play' on every sector and the FO's still get to practice all the things they'd practice in a non-'monitored' approach i.e. they still get to learn from their mistakes.
Pontius (quotes However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets.... etc) Ahh, the dinosaur arrives. Having done both I can assure you that the colleagues with whom I fly are just as capable of 'going visual' after an IMC as I was when I flew single-seat fighter jets. They have to contend with other issues that are not applicable to nimble, agile fighter aircraft and yet they seem to get it done really quite satisfactorily. The fact that you refer to effective management of crew resources as "headshrinker horse$hit" is ample indication of your luddite and old-fashioned views which have little place in modern aviation.
Check Airman: Fair enough. On the west coast of the Atlantic, the prevailing theory is "your leg, your controls"- up to and including the next approach after you've messed up the first one. Obviously, the PM is will speak up if he's not comfortable, but it's not atypical for a CA to sit back and watch the FO mess up (within reason), and use it as a teaching moment.
Exeng: I did not like the introduction of monitored approaches in Big. For low vis it was correct and was trained for every six months. For all ops - quite bonkers in my opinion. Good vis in howling winds and I fly the aircraft to about 500 ft where the F/O takes over to land - well it may not have the best possible outcome will it - some F/O's or Captains will do well and some won't.
LittleMo; (quotes Basil) Maybe better and safer CRM should have been applied?
'Do you mind if I do my own approach?' - 'Well captain the RVR/wind/etc is xxx and SOP states that we should rather do a monitored'
'YOU'RE' HIGH AND FAST ON A SHORT WET RUNWAY' - ' Speed is Vref plus twenty, slope 1 dot fly down'...'Go Around'
The burst tires and almost over running the runway are as much your fault for not calling the go around
RAT 5: quotes Good vis in howling winds and I fly the aircraft to about 500 ft where the F/O takes over to land.
Monitored approaches: I knew of these, but was flying for an airline (B737 family) where they were not in use. F/O was PF single channel ILS. Procedure was for PM to search for lights <500'. At +100 nothing seen, nothing said; at "minimums" PF looked up, sawing nothing and went around. However, as PM, I had been looking out all the time and seen the whole situation. Our 2nd approach was a briefed monitored approach, like our LVO ILS, except a man land by me. It worked a treat.
Many years later, for various reasons, but primarily a safety & success aspect, the monitored approach for precision & NPA's was introduced; but with bad weather parameters. i.e. only when necessary due weather. In that case PF would use AP. It was very relaxed, more so than the previous PF all the way to landing in limiting weather technique. The head-down to head up close to the ground can cause some delay in 'deciding'.
Using a monitored approach for all approaches seems over kill, and especially in the scenario quoted; last minute switch for PF in strong winds. In a couple of runway excursions, in strong x-winds & gusts, one of the contributory factors in the accident report was that PF disconnected the AP too late in the approach; they were not feeling the air during the approach, and how the a/c was behaving came as a surprise too late it be in tune with the environment.
One size fits all may not be the best.
Pontius: I humbly suggest that if the winds were howling that much then the FO probably would not be doing the landing and this would have been discussed beforehand. If the weather is okay then the take-over would normally be around 1000', with plenty of time to get a feel for it. If the weather is at or close to limits then it will be the FO flying the approach for the captain's landing. As you say, plenty of opportunity for captains to cock it up but I suppose it has to be assumed, when designing these procedures, that someone is allegedly more capable and it seems reasonable to assume the captain will reach those lofty expectations.
Slast: Re: However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets....
DH has an RVR associated with it: typically 200ft may be 550m or 1800ft RVR. Sure, transition from a defined cloudbase isn't much of a problem but most other conditions are, since the RVR values you're given aren't necessarily or even usually the "real" RVR that represents what you can actually see. The illustration below with different touchdown, midpoint and rollout RVRs (700/400/900m) shows why RVR readings don't tell you the actual RVR: definition "the distance over which a pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of the runway can see the runway surface markings delineating the runway or identifying its centre line." Anyone like to give an answer to the question at the bottom of the picture?
At DH you are required to to decide, based on what you can see, whether the aircraft trajectory - position and rate of change of position - is satisfactory to continue. The USAF Instrument Pilots School and other research organisations showed decades ago that (1) you need to assess whatever visual cues you can see for 3 seconds before you can make a judgement of where the aircraft is actually going, and (2) to tell whether its vertical path is correct you need to be able to see the touchdown zone.
So when it really matters, with minimum legal RVR, you have no chance of seeing touchdown zone lights at DH. Even if the atmosphere has a uniform 1800ft RVR, when your wheels are at 200ft, your eyes are going to be at least 4000 ft from the touchdown point so you can only see a few approach lights. 3 seconds earlier, when you really need to start the assessment you'll see even less.
So even if you are right on the glideslope at DH, if your vertical trajectory isn't also 100% right, you won't be able to detect it until you get a lot lower - by which time it may be too late to correct it. Illustrated below.
This is a major cause of poor visibility accidents, recognised decades ago and was one of the driving factors behind the development of autoland systems.
slast: Since this thread seems to be drifting anyway.....
There's often muddled thinking about lots of issues regarding "monitored approaches". I use the term Skybrary term "PicMA", partly because just "monitored approach" can be taken to imply that the "traditional" PF/PM flying doesn't include monitoring, which obviously it does.
The case for using PicMA for all routine IFR approaches, not just "when needed", is the same as preparing for an engine failure on every takeoff - you just can't tell in advance when it will be needed. If you've only prepared for a nice sunny day and reality turns sour, s**t happens. Many accident reports prove this, and they ALWAYS blame the crew. UPS 1354 crew for example "expected to be visual at 1000ft aal". But if you're prepared for the worst and it turns out to be a lovely day, nothing's lost.
Similarly there are lots of accidents in "good" conditions where monitoring has broken down - the PM has recognised that the situation is unsatisfactory (e.g. high / fast ) but been unable to convince the PF, who has the higher effective authority, and got caught between the need to help the PF who believes the problem can be resolved, and his/her own judgment that in fact it won't be solved in time. Either could be correct, but the PM's view is fail-safe (safe if wrong), the PF's is fail-dangerous. In a PicMA the PM definitely has the authority to impose the safer option. See post 33 this thread! It's very easy and facile to be smug and say "should have applied better CRM, it wouldn't have happened to me". OK, congratulations, but most of us are a bit more fallible.
The smart way to look at this issue is that you want to standardise on a default operation for the worst risks (which relate to visual transition) and build in flexibility to deal with other real world factors. PicMA operations optimise the IFR approaches which are where public transport risks are highest. So a "best practice" application would start by assuming it's going to be a worst case - rubbish visibility to DH, F/O flying to DH and G/A if needed, Captain takes control when satisfied landing is safe.
The worst case won't actually occur most of the time, so the intelligent way is then to allow your crews (especially Captains) to be professionals and allow the control change at a higher altitude when appropriate. That may well apply with the "strong crosswind but good visibility scenario. For example the following would cover the "good vis but howling gusty crosswind scenario: "At the Captain's discretion, he/she may resume control above DH/MDA provided
a) the aircraft is established on final approach in stable landing configuration,
b) the probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference is nil (e.g. touchdown point is visible), and
c) the probability of a go-around due to other factors is low (e.g. runway clear etc).
Another muddled issue is "F/Os won't get experience/ role reversal" etc. There's absolutely no logical reason why using PicMA as your standard everyday procedure should inhibit this in any way. The distribution of T/Os and landings etc. can be identical to that using traditional PM/PF flying. Many traditional operators write the PF duties under the title "Captain" and the PM duties under "First Officer" or "co-pilot", and no-one says that means F/Os can't do takeoffs and landings there. What certainly does happen in PicMA based operation is that if you have Captains who don't give legs away, their F/Os may not get landings but they do get pretty good at shooting approaches because they get to do a lot of them!
RAT 5: So there you are on a CAVOK day drifting down into quiet skies for a downwind visual join CDA to a spool up at 1000' in the slot intercepting finals. Lovely & Rewarding. You've been thinking ahead and planning what to do after VNAV has placed you where you want to be at 10,000 even as low as 5000'. Perhaps you wanted to hand fly from 10,000. In the case where the other chappie is going to takeover and kiss the ground where is the point of handover? Surely it should then be TOD. IT also makes for an interesting brief. The GA could be made by either pilot, but executed by only 1. Who briefs it?
Monitored approaches on dodgy days could be better & appropriate; depends on the dogdiness. Monitored approaches on clear days does seem open to discussion. I can well understand some will that it allows for early correction of hot/high approaches as the other chap is not going to out the a/c where you want it to make your greaser on the white patches; shades of B737 off the end in india, and TSL, & glide medium fall landing in Sweden come to mind where PM (F/O) was not assertive enough to stop the prang & near prang, all occurring in good weather.
I suspect there will remain 2 camps; reason being only the minority will have sampled both options.
pontius: I'm now doing a job where, as PF, I fly the whole thing and I handle the TRs. I still much prefer the system alluded to above i.e. 'monitored approach' on every sector and PM wiggles the TRs.
Max Angle: Well the thread seems to have well and truly drifted SO, as someone who moved to Big A some years ago from an airline that operated "conventionally" I agree with Exeng, monitored approach for all ops is bonkers as is PM doing the reverse.
Jet Jockey A4: ... And IMHO if you fly an aircraft with a HUD, or HUD/EVS this should negate the use of monitored approaches. But now we are so far off thread...
Basil: (quotes LittleMo criticism of "Maybe better and safer CRM should have been applied? etc)
Ah, yes, all very well to say sitting quietly on the ground; rather different in the situation.
Suppose ol' skip doesn't go-around: should I fight him for control? Up until then, I hadn't realised that the tvat couldn't fly.
I may say that was a period during which I preferred to fly with check/training captains because I knew they would follow SOPs.
Our company was bending over backwards to accommodate some difficult and barely competent people.*
* If any of you read this, you know who you are and some of you were a dangerous PITA.
Silverstrata: The 'spoof' BA handling SOP can hardly be described as a complete fabrication. Having been forced to adopt this SOP many years ago, it quite accurately describes the monitored approach procedure, albeit in a deliberately convoluted tongue-twisting fashion. And yes, the wording was indeed based upon a typical Ronnie Barker sketch.
Basil: Sorry, silverstrata, I have to disagree there. The spoof made a functional system look like madness.
Correctly used in appropriate circumstances, it worked very well. We used it flying an aircraft without autoland into airfields, some of which only had a VOR or NDB approach and, even on a man-land ILS, it was very useful.
Was it useful for an autoland? Probably less so.
UK019: Well I look at it this way: The important thing about SOPs is that everyone is doing the same thing, and unless an SOP is clearly ill-designed or unsafe (and one would hope the regulator would have something to say about that) then they usually work well – whatever they are - because they are familiar, ingrained in the airline’s culture and understood by all. As far as I can see, more accidents are caused by a failure to follow the SOPs – again, whatever they are - than by the SOPs themselves.
Some years ago, I was sent for line training on a new type with another operator which used BA SOPs. We were asked to stay on for a month or two after we’d checked out (our aircraft had yet to be delivered) so I got a good exposure. It was just fine thank you very much, and yes, PM selected reverse. Yeah, it was a bit odd at first but I soon became accustomed to it. And although SOPs are not designed for pilots' enjoyment, I did rather like the fact that you got to handle the aircraft on every sector. When I returned to my own airline we adopted our own company SOPs, and that was fine too. As long as everyone is doing the same, whatever the particular protocols and philosophy are, then you know what to expect.
LittleMo: perhaps it is easier to say sitting on the ground but the fact remains, CRM is about your actions to manage this situation. I feel for you, it couldn't have been nice flying for a company with that kind of culture.
However, If he didn't go around on your call, maybe transmitting on TWR frequency "xxx is going around" would get some response, but if still none then, "xxx please note for the record that the captain refused to go around from this unstable approach should anything happen"
I've actually heard that radio call in real life and guess what, the guy went around. Sure you'll have a bun fight on your hands when you land but rather sort it then that land and blow tires and endanger pax.
Alpine Flyer: As for monitored approaches, they work great although I don't see a necessity to use them in fair weather.
slast: The "monitored approach" aspects of this thread have little to do with the original topic. If people want to continue it I'd be happy to copy the relevant comments to a new one in the "Tech Log" forum which would be more appropriate than "Rumours and News" and leave this one for the actual subject of the NTSB report in question. But only if there are a few indications of agreement that it would meet with approval.
Steve
Basil: Steve, as you know very well, in certain company, when the subject of "monitored approach" is raised it's like a red rag to a bull. Aah, happy daze
slast: Basil, that's why I suggested moving it - let those who want to talk about slippery runways etc. do so in peace!
vapilot2004: I think this would be a very interesting discussion in Tech Log - with many of the participants potentially gaining some insight (such as myself) from it.
Basil: (re new topic location) I'd agree. Whether or not in favour of the 'Monitored Approach', the discussion of MA raises CRM aspects of advocacy and assertion on the flight deck which, no matter the particular SOP followed, are an important part of flight safety.
I still replay events where I should have, could have but didn't.
A separate thread in Tech would, I think, be a good move.
p.s. I know all multi-crew approaches are monitored. In this case "monitored approach" is just shorthand for a particular SOP.
This widely-circulated item from the 1990's is probably parody but after reading some recent flight ops bulletins, I'm not so sure: (quotes fake BA bulletin)
Peekay 4: That's still SOP for many carriers, I believe (in Europe, and U.S. regionals). Monitored approaches isn't inherently good/bad; there's pros and cons to everything.
ExSp33db1rd: Waiting in Idlewild - yes, Idlewild - Customs hall one day, a Pan Am ( Ahh ! ) Captain approached my Captain and asked if "You's guys did that monitored approach stuff ?" ( BEA, the airline that was experimenting with monitored approach was the other airline that merged with BOAC to form the present British Airways
My Captain said No. Well, said the Clipper Skipper, PanAm has used the monitored approach system since day one. Really ? we replied. Yes, said the Clipper Skipper, pointing to his First Officer - I fly, he monitors. QED.
Vessbot: I'm at a regional in the US and use the monitored approach for Cat II ILS. Autopilot mandatory, FO acts as PF until he calls Minimums at which point the Captain takes control and lands if he sees the runway. (I say CA and FO because the roles are not reversible for Cat II)
I didn't know how to feel about this when I first learned about it and was a bit skeptical of the last-minute monkey motion, but I see the rationale, which is that the Captain has more reaction time once going visual if he's already outside looking for the runway, than he would if transitioning from instruments to outside.
RAT_5: quotes fake bulletin: I checked; it is not April 1st. Is this for real? Please. This is straight out of a Ronnie Barker sketch or a tongue tripping soliloquy by Sir Humphrey from Yes Minister. If it is true it woud question the sanity and education of the writer, and also of the Flt Ops manager who signed off on it to be published. Please say it ain't so.
Basil: I've flown mil and several airlines; monitored approach, one man band etc etc.
Remember: Your last company is history; just do what the ops manual for your present company says.
The people who used to piss me off were those who'd arrive and then bitch about the existing SOP.
p.s. *** British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice *** is bollox.
Herod: Both my last two companies used the monitored approach technique for all low-vis ops. The FO flew the approach/monitored the A/P, up until DH, at which point the captain, who has been looking out as well as monitoring the FO/AP combination, takes over for landing. Makes a lot of sense, since the captain has an easier job transitioning to the visual at a critical moment.
slast: The so-called "British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice" is a fabrication from the mid 1970s created by a BOAC pilot, who circulated it in a slightly different format as part of an unsuccessful campaign against the merger of BOAC, BEA and several other smaller carriers into British Airways. I have all the original files from that period.
Rather than "wacko", a balanced and more comprehensive description can be found on the respected Eurocontrol / ICAO / Flight Safety Foundation Skybrary site, Monitored Approach - SKYbrary Aviation Safety.
The NTSB said in a 2000 accident report that "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."
It's also likely that for example UPS 1354 pilots Capt. Cerea Beal and F/O Shanda Fanning would still be alive if they had been using this procedure. It is specifically designed to protect against many of the contributory factors in that accident, particularly having both pilots "head-up" seeking visual cues as the aircraft approaches DH. This weakness in traditional procedures was recognised in NTSB studies going back as far as 1976. There's much more about these issues on the picma.org.uk website.
413X3: Capt landing in low vis sounds like an insurance thing.
Eckhard: The same notice was 're-issued' by some joker in the late 1990s. At that time, the 747 Classic fleet was the only remaining* BA unit that didn't routinely fly monitored approaches. (I think they did for weather worse than Cat1 *and I don't know about CCDE.) When the Classic fleet did eventually 'catch up', someone posted the notice as a tongue-in-cheek riposte.
Having flown for different airlines and experienced both approach methods, I would agree with most of the others that the monitored approach unloads the Landing Pilot and informs him/her at an earlier stage as to the likelihood of a landing or go-around. The other crew member will be locked on to the instruments and will perform a go-around if there is no clear communication or any ambiguity at minima.
sudden twang: It was rewritten in '89 or 90 I was said jokers Co and saw him typing it.
Check Airman: I see the benefit of a monitored approach in dodgy weather, but I think it'd be quite a pain in the rear to do every approach that way.
Pontius: It's not a pain in the rear at all. Hand over control just before TOD, take over control either around 1000' when visual and all is stable or at minimums (if applicable). It's really very, very easy and takes just a few minutes to get used to. I much prefer it to the 'whole sector'-type flight that you're used to. Horses, courses etc etc.
BEagle: However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets.... Perhaps because they don't have any of this headshrinker horse$hit to worry about and are fully capable of 'going visual' after an IMC approach?
Basil: Entirely different sort of operation however, as I said before: 'JDI!'
Check Airman: Point taken, but if the CA does the approach until all is stable, when does a new FO (or CA) on type get to learn from his mistakes? Getting burned is part of the learning process, and if you get the plane handed to you on a silver platter, so to speak, when do you learn how NOT to set up for an approach, and how to fix it when you've done it incorrectly?
Basil: I was FO on an aircraft following a very big merger.
We operated the monitored approach system. My captain came from a company where they did not.
C: "D'you mind if I fly my own approach?"
FO: (In warning tone) "Well, YOU'RE the Captain."
FO: (on short finals) "YOU'RE HIGH AND FAST ON A SHORT WET RUNWAY!"
Despite warning, Capt lands and bursts all maingear tyres. I thought we were going off the end.
Funny old thing; I never heard another word about it. JFDI!
Pontius: Normally if the captain was PF on the first sector then the FO would do the approach for the captain's landing. On the next sector (all things being equal, weather etc) the FO would be the PF and the captain would do the approach for the FO's landing. The nice thing about this procedure is you get to have a 'play' on every sector and the FO's still get to practice all the things they'd practice in a non-'monitored' approach i.e. they still get to learn from their mistakes.
Pontius (quotes However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets.... etc) Ahh, the dinosaur arrives. Having done both I can assure you that the colleagues with whom I fly are just as capable of 'going visual' after an IMC as I was when I flew single-seat fighter jets. They have to contend with other issues that are not applicable to nimble, agile fighter aircraft and yet they seem to get it done really quite satisfactorily. The fact that you refer to effective management of crew resources as "headshrinker horse$hit" is ample indication of your luddite and old-fashioned views which have little place in modern aviation.
Check Airman: Fair enough. On the west coast of the Atlantic, the prevailing theory is "your leg, your controls"- up to and including the next approach after you've messed up the first one. Obviously, the PM is will speak up if he's not comfortable, but it's not atypical for a CA to sit back and watch the FO mess up (within reason), and use it as a teaching moment.
Exeng: I did not like the introduction of monitored approaches in Big. For low vis it was correct and was trained for every six months. For all ops - quite bonkers in my opinion. Good vis in howling winds and I fly the aircraft to about 500 ft where the F/O takes over to land - well it may not have the best possible outcome will it - some F/O's or Captains will do well and some won't.
LittleMo; (quotes Basil) Maybe better and safer CRM should have been applied?
'Do you mind if I do my own approach?' - 'Well captain the RVR/wind/etc is xxx and SOP states that we should rather do a monitored'
'YOU'RE' HIGH AND FAST ON A SHORT WET RUNWAY' - ' Speed is Vref plus twenty, slope 1 dot fly down'...'Go Around'
The burst tires and almost over running the runway are as much your fault for not calling the go around
RAT 5: quotes Good vis in howling winds and I fly the aircraft to about 500 ft where the F/O takes over to land.
Monitored approaches: I knew of these, but was flying for an airline (B737 family) where they were not in use. F/O was PF single channel ILS. Procedure was for PM to search for lights <500'. At +100 nothing seen, nothing said; at "minimums" PF looked up, sawing nothing and went around. However, as PM, I had been looking out all the time and seen the whole situation. Our 2nd approach was a briefed monitored approach, like our LVO ILS, except a man land by me. It worked a treat.
Many years later, for various reasons, but primarily a safety & success aspect, the monitored approach for precision & NPA's was introduced; but with bad weather parameters. i.e. only when necessary due weather. In that case PF would use AP. It was very relaxed, more so than the previous PF all the way to landing in limiting weather technique. The head-down to head up close to the ground can cause some delay in 'deciding'.
Using a monitored approach for all approaches seems over kill, and especially in the scenario quoted; last minute switch for PF in strong winds. In a couple of runway excursions, in strong x-winds & gusts, one of the contributory factors in the accident report was that PF disconnected the AP too late in the approach; they were not feeling the air during the approach, and how the a/c was behaving came as a surprise too late it be in tune with the environment.
One size fits all may not be the best.
Pontius: I humbly suggest that if the winds were howling that much then the FO probably would not be doing the landing and this would have been discussed beforehand. If the weather is okay then the take-over would normally be around 1000', with plenty of time to get a feel for it. If the weather is at or close to limits then it will be the FO flying the approach for the captain's landing. As you say, plenty of opportunity for captains to cock it up but I suppose it has to be assumed, when designing these procedures, that someone is allegedly more capable and it seems reasonable to assume the captain will reach those lofty expectations.
Slast: Re: However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets....
DH has an RVR associated with it: typically 200ft may be 550m or 1800ft RVR. Sure, transition from a defined cloudbase isn't much of a problem but most other conditions are, since the RVR values you're given aren't necessarily or even usually the "real" RVR that represents what you can actually see. The illustration below with different touchdown, midpoint and rollout RVRs (700/400/900m) shows why RVR readings don't tell you the actual RVR: definition "the distance over which a pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of the runway can see the runway surface markings delineating the runway or identifying its centre line." Anyone like to give an answer to the question at the bottom of the picture?
At DH you are required to to decide, based on what you can see, whether the aircraft trajectory - position and rate of change of position - is satisfactory to continue. The USAF Instrument Pilots School and other research organisations showed decades ago that (1) you need to assess whatever visual cues you can see for 3 seconds before you can make a judgement of where the aircraft is actually going, and (2) to tell whether its vertical path is correct you need to be able to see the touchdown zone.
So when it really matters, with minimum legal RVR, you have no chance of seeing touchdown zone lights at DH. Even if the atmosphere has a uniform 1800ft RVR, when your wheels are at 200ft, your eyes are going to be at least 4000 ft from the touchdown point so you can only see a few approach lights. 3 seconds earlier, when you really need to start the assessment you'll see even less.
So even if you are right on the glideslope at DH, if your vertical trajectory isn't also 100% right, you won't be able to detect it until you get a lot lower - by which time it may be too late to correct it. Illustrated below.
This is a major cause of poor visibility accidents, recognised decades ago and was one of the driving factors behind the development of autoland systems.
slast: Since this thread seems to be drifting anyway.....
There's often muddled thinking about lots of issues regarding "monitored approaches". I use the term Skybrary term "PicMA", partly because just "monitored approach" can be taken to imply that the "traditional" PF/PM flying doesn't include monitoring, which obviously it does.
The case for using PicMA for all routine IFR approaches, not just "when needed", is the same as preparing for an engine failure on every takeoff - you just can't tell in advance when it will be needed. If you've only prepared for a nice sunny day and reality turns sour, s**t happens. Many accident reports prove this, and they ALWAYS blame the crew. UPS 1354 crew for example "expected to be visual at 1000ft aal". But if you're prepared for the worst and it turns out to be a lovely day, nothing's lost.
Similarly there are lots of accidents in "good" conditions where monitoring has broken down - the PM has recognised that the situation is unsatisfactory (e.g. high / fast ) but been unable to convince the PF, who has the higher effective authority, and got caught between the need to help the PF who believes the problem can be resolved, and his/her own judgment that in fact it won't be solved in time. Either could be correct, but the PM's view is fail-safe (safe if wrong), the PF's is fail-dangerous. In a PicMA the PM definitely has the authority to impose the safer option. See post 33 this thread! It's very easy and facile to be smug and say "should have applied better CRM, it wouldn't have happened to me". OK, congratulations, but most of us are a bit more fallible.
The smart way to look at this issue is that you want to standardise on a default operation for the worst risks (which relate to visual transition) and build in flexibility to deal with other real world factors. PicMA operations optimise the IFR approaches which are where public transport risks are highest. So a "best practice" application would start by assuming it's going to be a worst case - rubbish visibility to DH, F/O flying to DH and G/A if needed, Captain takes control when satisfied landing is safe.
The worst case won't actually occur most of the time, so the intelligent way is then to allow your crews (especially Captains) to be professionals and allow the control change at a higher altitude when appropriate. That may well apply with the "strong crosswind but good visibility scenario. For example the following would cover the "good vis but howling gusty crosswind scenario: "At the Captain's discretion, he/she may resume control above DH/MDA provided
a) the aircraft is established on final approach in stable landing configuration,
b) the probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference is nil (e.g. touchdown point is visible), and
c) the probability of a go-around due to other factors is low (e.g. runway clear etc).
Another muddled issue is "F/Os won't get experience/ role reversal" etc. There's absolutely no logical reason why using PicMA as your standard everyday procedure should inhibit this in any way. The distribution of T/Os and landings etc. can be identical to that using traditional PM/PF flying. Many traditional operators write the PF duties under the title "Captain" and the PM duties under "First Officer" or "co-pilot", and no-one says that means F/Os can't do takeoffs and landings there. What certainly does happen in PicMA based operation is that if you have Captains who don't give legs away, their F/Os may not get landings but they do get pretty good at shooting approaches because they get to do a lot of them!
RAT 5: So there you are on a CAVOK day drifting down into quiet skies for a downwind visual join CDA to a spool up at 1000' in the slot intercepting finals. Lovely & Rewarding. You've been thinking ahead and planning what to do after VNAV has placed you where you want to be at 10,000 even as low as 5000'. Perhaps you wanted to hand fly from 10,000. In the case where the other chappie is going to takeover and kiss the ground where is the point of handover? Surely it should then be TOD. IT also makes for an interesting brief. The GA could be made by either pilot, but executed by only 1. Who briefs it?
Monitored approaches on dodgy days could be better & appropriate; depends on the dogdiness. Monitored approaches on clear days does seem open to discussion. I can well understand some will that it allows for early correction of hot/high approaches as the other chap is not going to out the a/c where you want it to make your greaser on the white patches; shades of B737 off the end in india, and TSL, & glide medium fall landing in Sweden come to mind where PM (F/O) was not assertive enough to stop the prang & near prang, all occurring in good weather.
I suspect there will remain 2 camps; reason being only the minority will have sampled both options.
pontius: I'm now doing a job where, as PF, I fly the whole thing and I handle the TRs. I still much prefer the system alluded to above i.e. 'monitored approach' on every sector and PM wiggles the TRs.
Max Angle: Well the thread seems to have well and truly drifted SO, as someone who moved to Big A some years ago from an airline that operated "conventionally" I agree with Exeng, monitored approach for all ops is bonkers as is PM doing the reverse.
Jet Jockey A4: ... And IMHO if you fly an aircraft with a HUD, or HUD/EVS this should negate the use of monitored approaches. But now we are so far off thread...
Basil: (quotes LittleMo criticism of "Maybe better and safer CRM should have been applied? etc)
Ah, yes, all very well to say sitting quietly on the ground; rather different in the situation.
Suppose ol' skip doesn't go-around: should I fight him for control? Up until then, I hadn't realised that the tvat couldn't fly.
I may say that was a period during which I preferred to fly with check/training captains because I knew they would follow SOPs.
Our company was bending over backwards to accommodate some difficult and barely competent people.*
* If any of you read this, you know who you are and some of you were a dangerous PITA.
Silverstrata: The 'spoof' BA handling SOP can hardly be described as a complete fabrication. Having been forced to adopt this SOP many years ago, it quite accurately describes the monitored approach procedure, albeit in a deliberately convoluted tongue-twisting fashion. And yes, the wording was indeed based upon a typical Ronnie Barker sketch.
Basil: Sorry, silverstrata, I have to disagree there. The spoof made a functional system look like madness.
Correctly used in appropriate circumstances, it worked very well. We used it flying an aircraft without autoland into airfields, some of which only had a VOR or NDB approach and, even on a man-land ILS, it was very useful.
Was it useful for an autoland? Probably less so.
UK019: Well I look at it this way: The important thing about SOPs is that everyone is doing the same thing, and unless an SOP is clearly ill-designed or unsafe (and one would hope the regulator would have something to say about that) then they usually work well – whatever they are - because they are familiar, ingrained in the airline’s culture and understood by all. As far as I can see, more accidents are caused by a failure to follow the SOPs – again, whatever they are - than by the SOPs themselves.
Some years ago, I was sent for line training on a new type with another operator which used BA SOPs. We were asked to stay on for a month or two after we’d checked out (our aircraft had yet to be delivered) so I got a good exposure. It was just fine thank you very much, and yes, PM selected reverse. Yeah, it was a bit odd at first but I soon became accustomed to it. And although SOPs are not designed for pilots' enjoyment, I did rather like the fact that you got to handle the aircraft on every sector. When I returned to my own airline we adopted our own company SOPs, and that was fine too. As long as everyone is doing the same, whatever the particular protocols and philosophy are, then you know what to expect.
LittleMo: perhaps it is easier to say sitting on the ground but the fact remains, CRM is about your actions to manage this situation. I feel for you, it couldn't have been nice flying for a company with that kind of culture.
However, If he didn't go around on your call, maybe transmitting on TWR frequency "xxx is going around" would get some response, but if still none then, "xxx please note for the record that the captain refused to go around from this unstable approach should anything happen"
I've actually heard that radio call in real life and guess what, the guy went around. Sure you'll have a bun fight on your hands when you land but rather sort it then that land and blow tires and endanger pax.
Alpine Flyer: As for monitored approaches, they work great although I don't see a necessity to use them in fair weather.
slast: The "monitored approach" aspects of this thread have little to do with the original topic. If people want to continue it I'd be happy to copy the relevant comments to a new one in the "Tech Log" forum which would be more appropriate than "Rumours and News" and leave this one for the actual subject of the NTSB report in question. But only if there are a few indications of agreement that it would meet with approval.
Steve
Basil: Steve, as you know very well, in certain company, when the subject of "monitored approach" is raised it's like a red rag to a bull. Aah, happy daze
slast: Basil, that's why I suggested moving it - let those who want to talk about slippery runways etc. do so in peace!
vapilot2004: I think this would be a very interesting discussion in Tech Log - with many of the participants potentially gaining some insight (such as myself) from it.
Basil: (re new topic location) I'd agree. Whether or not in favour of the 'Monitored Approach', the discussion of MA raises CRM aspects of advocacy and assertion on the flight deck which, no matter the particular SOP followed, are an important part of flight safety.
I still replay events where I should have, could have but didn't.
A separate thread in Tech would, I think, be a good move.
p.s. I know all multi-crew approaches are monitored. In this case "monitored approach" is just shorthand for a particular SOP.
Last edited by slast; 4th Oct 2016 at 17:58.
Psychophysiological entity
BEagle: However do military fighter pilots cope with 200 ft decision heights when flying single seat jets....
Talking of British Eagle
They did trials of MAP's in the mid 60's. The men from the ministry of planes used to hop on board from time to time to see how it was going. It seemed to be liked by the small group of crews that were part of the assessment. Needles to say us ordinary mortals tried it and as a young'un, I found handing over at the fun moment a bit disappointing.
Dog Tired
A less intuitive SOP could not be imagined. Madness to hand over at minimums.
Half of the brain is doing the work and half working out what might happen next.
We tried it (major airline 330/320/757s) and dumped it after a year, thank God.
Half of the brain is doing the work and half working out what might happen next.
We tried it (major airline 330/320/757s) and dumped it after a year, thank God.
As indicated by TA, the value of the procedure depends on the type of approach being flown and the aircraft systems.
There may be less value for a fully automatic approach and landing, and particularly in Cat 3- where the minima more likely ensure that the required visual reference is always seen.
For NPAs which involve manual flight or transition from auto to a manual landing then the procedure has the advantages of shared workload and specific monitoring tasks. The change of control is not a significant issue because of the higher DHs associated with these operations, and a non event for auto-to-manual land.
Another area of benefit is in low vis operations like Cat 2, where the minima in particular weather formations ( e.g. clearing fog) can result in late acquisition of the visual reference or even loss of the required reference below DH. In these circumstances the PF commands and controls the GA, and the PM continues the monitoring task; minimum disruption, maximising safety, clear cut duties and shared workload.
Don't discard a useful procedure because of normal 'auto' operations, have it handy for the non-normal or emergency operation.
Know before you go.
There may be less value for a fully automatic approach and landing, and particularly in Cat 3- where the minima more likely ensure that the required visual reference is always seen.
For NPAs which involve manual flight or transition from auto to a manual landing then the procedure has the advantages of shared workload and specific monitoring tasks. The change of control is not a significant issue because of the higher DHs associated with these operations, and a non event for auto-to-manual land.
Another area of benefit is in low vis operations like Cat 2, where the minima in particular weather formations ( e.g. clearing fog) can result in late acquisition of the visual reference or even loss of the required reference below DH. In these circumstances the PF commands and controls the GA, and the PM continues the monitoring task; minimum disruption, maximising safety, clear cut duties and shared workload.
Don't discard a useful procedure because of normal 'auto' operations, have it handy for the non-normal or emergency operation.
Know before you go.
I have flown:
- non-monitored approaches (CAT I Bizjet)
- Monitored approaches below certain Wx minima only (Cat 3a 737 Loco)
- Monitored approaches at all times (Cat 3b Big Airlines 777)
I very much dislike the first option - in a Cat I aircraft right at Cat I minima, looking up at DA and transitioning to visual is no fun. Ditto at minimum vis for an NPA.
The second option I experienced only as the FO who would always fly the approach and go around, but worked very well in close to limiting conditions and was a good balance.
The third I have less than a year's experience of on the line but as a long haul pilot I enjoy it. One gets some stick time every sector and when knackered after a long night flight it is nice to take the jet with someone else having put it in the slot for landing for you. There is a minor professional pride thing if you fly a nice visual of the other person landing it but on balance I rather enjoy it. Not necessarily sure I'd think the same way if I were doing 4 sector short haul days the same way but I won't know until I've tried it. The way it's done in low vis seems a bit odd compared with elsewhere but I'm yet to do it in anger so am withholding my judgement.
- non-monitored approaches (CAT I Bizjet)
- Monitored approaches below certain Wx minima only (Cat 3a 737 Loco)
- Monitored approaches at all times (Cat 3b Big Airlines 777)
I very much dislike the first option - in a Cat I aircraft right at Cat I minima, looking up at DA and transitioning to visual is no fun. Ditto at minimum vis for an NPA.
The second option I experienced only as the FO who would always fly the approach and go around, but worked very well in close to limiting conditions and was a good balance.
The third I have less than a year's experience of on the line but as a long haul pilot I enjoy it. One gets some stick time every sector and when knackered after a long night flight it is nice to take the jet with someone else having put it in the slot for landing for you. There is a minor professional pride thing if you fly a nice visual of the other person landing it but on balance I rather enjoy it. Not necessarily sure I'd think the same way if I were doing 4 sector short haul days the same way but I won't know until I've tried it. The way it's done in low vis seems a bit odd compared with elsewhere but I'm yet to do it in anger so am withholding my judgement.
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What is the point to have a monitored approach at all times with a Cat IIIb aircraft without a visual requirement to land, who is actually landing and where does the transfer happen ?
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dkz - In my (monitored approach) company, for any autoland the P1 takes control at 1000R. Makes sense as instead of the P2 flying the G/A, the autopilot does it instead.
Thread Starter
There have always actually been 3 quite different issues addressed by this procedure - workload distribution, cross-cockpit authority gradient, and visual transition at low altitude. Most comments address only the last of these but the other two are actually just as important.
There are lots of accidents and serious incidents in "relatively good" conditions, i.e. weather reported not very close to limits, and in these the crew are almost held to be the prime culprits. Even if the event isn't catastrophic (e.g. landing at wrong airport in VMC) it's usually career-limiting.
In a current review of over 100 reports from the last 25 years where crew "failure" was the primary cause, 39% of the crews had not considered poor weather likely and found themselves unprepared for what they encountered. In many of these, vertical guidance was available, but just wasn't used by either pilot, apparently in part because the PM had been looking out, seen "something", and not returned to monitoring instruments when the PF also went "outside" (e.g. UPS 1354?).
Hence the NTSB recommendations (in the study of ILS accidents in the USA exactly 40 years ago!) that "flightcrew coordination procedures [should] limit sighting callouts to those visual cues which are associated with the runway environment. Unrequired callouts which can result in the premature abandonment of instrument procedures should be prohibited".
The same study also recommended that "flightcrew coordination procedures [should] insure continuous monitoring of the aircraft's instruments from the OM to landing....... procedures which require a transfer or exchange of visual scanning responsibilities should require that the appropriate crew member announce that he is relinquishing previously assigned duties or responsibilities". Does ANY operator have such callouts?
It's also clear that while much lip service is paid to it, CRM training doesn't solve the problem of cross-cockpit monitoring breakdowns. Conventionally the PM's job is both "assist the PF" AND "obstruct the PF if what he/she is trying to do is wrong". Making the switch is a difficult call, especially for junior F/Os - the PM is betting his/her judgement of the situation against the boss. Odds are the boss is right, but not always and the report falgs up a "monitoring/challenging" failure.
Hence yet another NTSB statement and associated recommendation (in 2000): "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."
Final approach for autoland cases are actually a bit of a red herring - the biggest safety problem with these seems to be failure of the PF to initiate a go-around correctly when needed, and confusing "landing" actions with "go-around" actions. (Maybe an issue in recent B777 at DXB?) Again this risk can be reduced if one pilot is set up with go-around as no 1 task.
Cat3b autolands are actually a vanishingly small percentage of the total airline ops, and are not where "crew failures" wreck aircraft - it's always in "better" weather but with fewer facilities in the air or on the ground. Anyway if anyone knows of an accident during a low vis. autoland please send me the reference.
So as far as routine use is concerned, IMHO it's smarter to be prepared for the worst by assuming you'll need an MA, reverting to "conventional" when you've found it's really not needed, than the other way round. Just like you prepare for engine failure on every takeoff......
There are lots of accidents and serious incidents in "relatively good" conditions, i.e. weather reported not very close to limits, and in these the crew are almost held to be the prime culprits. Even if the event isn't catastrophic (e.g. landing at wrong airport in VMC) it's usually career-limiting.
In a current review of over 100 reports from the last 25 years where crew "failure" was the primary cause, 39% of the crews had not considered poor weather likely and found themselves unprepared for what they encountered. In many of these, vertical guidance was available, but just wasn't used by either pilot, apparently in part because the PM had been looking out, seen "something", and not returned to monitoring instruments when the PF also went "outside" (e.g. UPS 1354?).
Hence the NTSB recommendations (in the study of ILS accidents in the USA exactly 40 years ago!) that "flightcrew coordination procedures [should] limit sighting callouts to those visual cues which are associated with the runway environment. Unrequired callouts which can result in the premature abandonment of instrument procedures should be prohibited".
The same study also recommended that "flightcrew coordination procedures [should] insure continuous monitoring of the aircraft's instruments from the OM to landing....... procedures which require a transfer or exchange of visual scanning responsibilities should require that the appropriate crew member announce that he is relinquishing previously assigned duties or responsibilities". Does ANY operator have such callouts?
It's also clear that while much lip service is paid to it, CRM training doesn't solve the problem of cross-cockpit monitoring breakdowns. Conventionally the PM's job is both "assist the PF" AND "obstruct the PF if what he/she is trying to do is wrong". Making the switch is a difficult call, especially for junior F/Os - the PM is betting his/her judgement of the situation against the boss. Odds are the boss is right, but not always and the report falgs up a "monitoring/challenging" failure.
Hence yet another NTSB statement and associated recommendation (in 2000): "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."
Final approach for autoland cases are actually a bit of a red herring - the biggest safety problem with these seems to be failure of the PF to initiate a go-around correctly when needed, and confusing "landing" actions with "go-around" actions. (Maybe an issue in recent B777 at DXB?) Again this risk can be reduced if one pilot is set up with go-around as no 1 task.
Cat3b autolands are actually a vanishingly small percentage of the total airline ops, and are not where "crew failures" wreck aircraft - it's always in "better" weather but with fewer facilities in the air or on the ground. Anyway if anyone knows of an accident during a low vis. autoland please send me the reference.
So as far as routine use is concerned, IMHO it's smarter to be prepared for the worst by assuming you'll need an MA, reverting to "conventional" when you've found it's really not needed, than the other way round. Just like you prepare for engine failure on every takeoff......
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An interesting thread and as one that cut his aviation teeth flying viscounts into the channel islands using the monitored approach,I became a big fan.I flew the needles,came out with the calls and waited for the response "I have control" or "go around".The company I joined after also had a similar system, which on an aircraft with full autoland capability worked very well,however,where the system excelled in my opinion,was the NPA with large offset in marginal weather.
I was a little saddened when we as a company adopted pure boeing procedures and scrapped the idea.I have no doubt in the fullness of time it will re appear as a new broom comes in and claims it as the way forward.
I would hope that crews may wish to consider the option if circumstances dictate and use good airmanship,but maybe that is another debate.
Regards,
M
I was a little saddened when we as a company adopted pure boeing procedures and scrapped the idea.I have no doubt in the fullness of time it will re appear as a new broom comes in and claims it as the way forward.
I would hope that crews may wish to consider the option if circumstances dictate and use good airmanship,but maybe that is another debate.
Regards,
M
The subject of "the monitored approach" always raises interesting differing viewpoints.
With regard to the instrument/visual transition can I ask members to honestly "put their hand on their hearts" and tell me just when was the last time that they actually completed an approach, either precision or NPA to anywhere near to minimas without the use of an autopilot? I,for one, cannot even remember such an occasion because most company manuals prohibit such folly these days! This somewhat undermines one of the principle pillars.
Steve, I commend your longtime work in the air safety field but am I not correct in thinking that your entire career was conducted using only the one system?
With regard to the instrument/visual transition can I ask members to honestly "put their hand on their hearts" and tell me just when was the last time that they actually completed an approach, either precision or NPA to anywhere near to minimas without the use of an autopilot? I,for one, cannot even remember such an occasion because most company manuals prohibit such folly these days! This somewhat undermines one of the principle pillars.
Steve, I commend your longtime work in the air safety field but am I not correct in thinking that your entire career was conducted using only the one system?
Thread Starter
Hi Meikleour,
Thank you for the kind words about my past activities - it seems likely that we are acquainted, so just for my own information can I ask you to identify yourself to me - by PM will be fine.
You raise the point of my own experience which is OK by me, and yes, the vast bulk of my line operating experience has been with PMA as the approach SOP - plus some visual circling etc of course. So probably about 8000+ total, of which 5000 are LHS. You are correctly just pointing out that I don't have much experience of traditional SOP operations, but what I think you are implying is that this must reduce the validity of any arguments I make in favour of MA as having safety benefits over traditional. Apologies if no such implication intended, but of course it would also apply to any counter-arguments from those with only conventional experience.
Can I just make one thing clear - I do not see these arguments as being like politics, where proponents of one party want to achieve dominance over another to achieve some benefit for themselves and those they represent. My concern is simply that ordinary line pilots today are still being held individually responsible for the tragic outcome of events which could easily have been avoided if they had been given better procedural "tools" to do their job. The only benefit for me personally now is I want to minimise my risk as a passenger!
As far as relevant experience in "limits" transitions is concerned, I was lucky in that my experience includes not only those in normal line operations, and routine line pilot training exercises, but also being a subject pilot in simulator and some flight trials at for example BLEU Bedford, NASA AMES, the FAA test centre at Oklahoma City, the Dutch NLR facility, and with HUDS in France and with Flight Dynamics at Boeing.
Such trials were mostly aimed at finding out what a human pilot can reliably actually achieve, and especially what visual cues are necessary to make the decision actually needed at DH. Of necessity such trials were "single pilot" approach and landing (or go-around) transitions, just as in "conventional" ops, and often included deliberate offsets to see if the pilot actually could detect them, which would not be usual I think for normal pilot training.
The basic point that comes out of all the research is that even if the aircraft is in the right place at DH - on G/S and on centreline - it is extremely hard to detect vertical path errors in limited visibility. 200ft DH and 200ft cloud-base - no problem. 200ft DH and 550M RVR you just cannot see enough, as illustrated above.
I agree with you that most ops which are IMC to minima today are planned to be done using the autopilot, which usually reduces the PF workload and increases approach accuracy significantly. Unfortunately, that hasn't stopped them being a problem. Of the accidents in the study, 67% started out using the autopilot for the approach. In the Turkish Kathmandu accident it appears that both pilots were head-up as the autopilot took them through DH, accurately on the RNAV path but going to the wrong point on the ground, with nothing visible outside. My analysis of this is at 2015 A333 landed off runway Kathmandu Nepal | PicMA .
Steve
Thank you for the kind words about my past activities - it seems likely that we are acquainted, so just for my own information can I ask you to identify yourself to me - by PM will be fine.
You raise the point of my own experience which is OK by me, and yes, the vast bulk of my line operating experience has been with PMA as the approach SOP - plus some visual circling etc of course. So probably about 8000+ total, of which 5000 are LHS. You are correctly just pointing out that I don't have much experience of traditional SOP operations, but what I think you are implying is that this must reduce the validity of any arguments I make in favour of MA as having safety benefits over traditional. Apologies if no such implication intended, but of course it would also apply to any counter-arguments from those with only conventional experience.
Can I just make one thing clear - I do not see these arguments as being like politics, where proponents of one party want to achieve dominance over another to achieve some benefit for themselves and those they represent. My concern is simply that ordinary line pilots today are still being held individually responsible for the tragic outcome of events which could easily have been avoided if they had been given better procedural "tools" to do their job. The only benefit for me personally now is I want to minimise my risk as a passenger!
As far as relevant experience in "limits" transitions is concerned, I was lucky in that my experience includes not only those in normal line operations, and routine line pilot training exercises, but also being a subject pilot in simulator and some flight trials at for example BLEU Bedford, NASA AMES, the FAA test centre at Oklahoma City, the Dutch NLR facility, and with HUDS in France and with Flight Dynamics at Boeing.
Such trials were mostly aimed at finding out what a human pilot can reliably actually achieve, and especially what visual cues are necessary to make the decision actually needed at DH. Of necessity such trials were "single pilot" approach and landing (or go-around) transitions, just as in "conventional" ops, and often included deliberate offsets to see if the pilot actually could detect them, which would not be usual I think for normal pilot training.
The basic point that comes out of all the research is that even if the aircraft is in the right place at DH - on G/S and on centreline - it is extremely hard to detect vertical path errors in limited visibility. 200ft DH and 200ft cloud-base - no problem. 200ft DH and 550M RVR you just cannot see enough, as illustrated above.
I agree with you that most ops which are IMC to minima today are planned to be done using the autopilot, which usually reduces the PF workload and increases approach accuracy significantly. Unfortunately, that hasn't stopped them being a problem. Of the accidents in the study, 67% started out using the autopilot for the approach. In the Turkish Kathmandu accident it appears that both pilots were head-up as the autopilot took them through DH, accurately on the RNAV path but going to the wrong point on the ground, with nothing visible outside. My analysis of this is at 2015 A333 landed off runway Kathmandu Nepal | PicMA .
Steve
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Indeed. The idea that PF can transit from head-in to head-out at or near minimums, safely, AND then make a safe decision to land or not; and if not visual to then transit back inside to make a GA as the A/P disconnects (B737) safely, does not seem to be the best solution. Indeed, I would consider it nigh impossible for PF to have AP in CMD, go head out at DA +100, search for visual reference, decide NO at DA, go head in and make a GA and achieve the required max sink height during the transition. If the cloud base is DA +500' there is not a big problem, if vis is OK. In dodgy weather, PNF has been searching for visual clues approaching minimums: the a/c will be in trim and so the hand over for the landing is non-problematic. If the call is GA there is no hand over; i.e. the approach PF is the 'go-round man'. It's very relaxed and stress-free, in reality. IMHO it is only a bad weather (vis & cloudbase) occasion. There is no macho issue here, just a safety one, that is expected by the pax.
Remember, in todays day & age where min fuel is the norm, it is safer to land 1st time rather than GA and lose quite a bit of fuel for the 2nd attempt.
Remember, in todays day & age where min fuel is the norm, it is safer to land 1st time rather than GA and lose quite a bit of fuel for the 2nd attempt.
