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737 Max cockpit upgrades

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Old 19th Jul 2014, 08:44
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african skies loved your shopping list

I guess Boeing are between a rock & hard place in terms of what they'd like to do and what the authorities will allow for a common type rating and its the latter that drives what the airlines want/will pay for. The NG is a significant improvement on the CL but the MAX will have a transatlantic range and it would be a lot less fatiguing if the cockpit was quieter and the central pedestal lost some girth.

I believe that the overhead panel simply mimics the CL switch gear and it could just as easily be push button black panel technology, but for the need of a common rating?

Whilst the 'RECAL' system is from the ark it does work provided you understand the logic of dual systems and resist the temptation to dismiss any light as a nuisance warning !!!

But lower fuel burn, more payload/range will be the driver, not the comfort of the driver....
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 14:13
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I'm surprised nobody has mentioned the pressurisation panel. You could not come up with a system more likely to lead to accidents than they did with that - ergonomic disaster doesn't even come close.
In my view they need to move on from the entire flight deck, it's a mess.
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 14:41
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Push buttons have a short life span, those pesky switches last forever.
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 18:56
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Originally Posted by Al Murdoch
I'm surprised nobody has mentioned the pressurisation panel. You could not come up with a system more likely to lead to accidents than they did with that - ergonomic disaster doesn't even come close.
What's wrong with it? As long as you remember the C-flow and use a hair of common sense and systems understanding, you shouldn't have any problems. Although I do hear that some companies require the bleeds off takeoff procedure to be done from supplementary procedures.
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 20:34
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Al Murdoch says
I'm surprised nobody has mentioned the pressurisation panel. You could not come up with a system more likely to lead to accidents than they did with that - ergonomic disaster doesn't even come close.

In my view they need to move on from the entire flight deck, it's a mess.
The cockpit has been working fine since its inception. May not be the best... but its not the worst either.

The problem lie with pilots that have not or may not follow company SOPs and visually verify switch positions as appropriate.
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 20:54
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WINSCREEN WIPERS?!!?

FORWARDS VISIBILITY?!?

Does this mean some B73 crews have the spare capacity to actually LOOKOUT, instead of scanning their screens and proclaiming to the CVR:

"What's it doing now?"-indicating a new 'Bus pilot

"Oh, it's doing that again!" - indicating an experienced 'Bus pilot

Careful folks, if this keeps up, we'll see the word "airmanship" creeping back into the manuals and that will never do!

Anyway, it was fun searching the cramped flight deck for those grubby little rubber switch caps. Better than the F/O retiring into his/her hand-held info pad and gawping at motorcycles/gliders/high-heeled shoes etc..........
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Old 19th Jul 2014, 21:25
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one thing they could change that would be a big improvement for me is the possibility to tune a VOR and ILS at the same time and still both get the loc and gp indication on the pfd

(if this is possible i'm sorry than it's just my company that doesn't want to pay for it)
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 07:33
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The gauges alone are appallingly designed for a start - if your aircraft is not pressurising at 10,000ft the needles are in exactly the opposite sense to where they should be - a quick glance in a busy environment and it looks like everything is fine.
The cabin altitude horn is the SAME SOUND as the configuration alarm. Seriously?? Boeing have had to add warning lights to distinguish between the two because of the original poor design that contributed to the Helios accident.
Lots of people do and should notice that immediately, but guess what - people make mistakes and the easier you make it to do so, the more they'll do it.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 10:22
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LED

What about replacing the antiquated Edison light bulbs with LED ones, at least we don't have to change one every day.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 12:17
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Things I'd like to see changed on the 737
Boeing IMHO made a fatal mistake some years back in changing the items on the original B737 after take off checklist. The original checklist first item was "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation......Set." Amplification was contained in the FCOM. It included checking the two pressurisation instruments of cabin altitude and cabin rate of climb.

Instead, Boeing changed that to: "Engine Bleeds....On and Packs.....Auto.

From personal observation of many after take off checklists I believe very few crews bother to verify the correct operation of the two vital pressurisation instruments of cabin altitude and cabin rate of climb and that is simply because it is not written in a checklist.

Random scanning in flight by either pilot of various overhead switches and instruments is not a checklist item and that is fair enough. Yet sound airmanship would dictate it is prudent to do so; especially the two instruments of the pressurisation system.

And another gripe. Having the PM challenge and reply to his own actions during the after take off checklist and with no input from the PF, is a real human factors trap, since more often than not, it results in the PF failing to cross check the PM's check list verbal enunciation/ actions. The PF can doubtless hear the self challenge and response by the PM, but does he look across and confirm for himself that all is done correctly? Maybe - maybe not. I am all for bringing back the tried and trusted challenge by one pilot and respond by the other pilot. And that is for all normal checklists. At least it is a proper double check.

The fatal accident to the Helios Airline B737 that took off in the manual pressurisation mode and outflow valve open, may not have happened if the crew had used the original Boeing 737 after take off checklist of "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation...Set" where part of that check was to observe the cabin altitude and cabin rate of climb as directed in the amplified section of the FCOM. Clearly neither pilot did this otherwise they would have seen an abnormal cabin rate of climb and be alerted to a pressurisation problem.

On that occasion it is presumed the PM did indeed challenge and respond to himself that he had "Set or verified" that the engine bleeds and air conditioning packs were operating as the first items on the published after take off checklist. But yet the aircraft took off unpressurised.

Right now, the Boeing 737 after take off checklist, which is started after flap retraction is complete (typically by 3000 feet), includes nothing about checking the cabin altitude or cabin rate of climb. As a result, these two vital pressurisation instruments are often missed by both pilots in the after take off scan.

Last edited by Tee Emm; 20th Jul 2014 at 12:35.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 13:09
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Originally Posted by 737 CL
Hi,
Anybody knows If the overhead panel is going to be the same that 737 Ng?
The picture posted of the MAX cockpit very intentionally omits the overhead panel. There will be minimum changes to its appearance, even if the systems change somewhat. Awful antiquated design that is way past its sell-by date.

And the lovely grinder wheel is still there, "clunk, clunk".

That's so 1960s...
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 13:10
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Write to Boeing or tweet about it, there is a bit of work to be done.

Move all the CBs to the E&E bay and make it more like the 787.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 13:18
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Sorry chaps, great points but you will have to get all proposed changes approved by Southwest Airlines first... They have Boeing by the sack.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 15:19
  #34 (permalink)  
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Ha I laughed reading some of these!

Tee Em I completely agree with you regarding the checklists challenge.

What's with the finishing of the before takeoff checklist after cabin secure nowadays? There's still items to be done now after its completion ie. Strobes, transponder, lights.. and if you fly 300 400 and 800 these items are all in different places..
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 15:29
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Dualbleed

The manufacturers of the B737 warning lights do produce an LED direct replacement............... All your boss has to do is buy them!

http://www.esterline.com/controlsyst...Indicator.aspx
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 18:46
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And the lovely grinder wheel is still there, "clunk, clunk".
That is one of the best features, that and the throttles that actually move. Both provide ample warning of impending doom.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 20:49
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Al Murdoch, if you are a current 73 driver, a little thinking outside the TRIs box and the cabin alt/diff guage is soooh easy to interpret!

It reads like a clock, 12 o'clock on the ground at sea level airports.

By the time the after T/O checklist is actioned, the "clock" reads 1210 to 1215 with the "minute hand" ALWAYS leading the "hour hand", just like any normal analogue watch/clock.

By 10,000 ft, it reads 1225, by 20,000 ft it reads 1235 and at 30,000 ft it reads 1340ish.

If it doesn't, it is blindingly obvious, especially when the little hand moves faster/further than the big hand.

The same obvious trend, with slightly different "times", will be obvious after takeoff from non-sealevel fields.

In various companies I tried to get the TRIs to try this as a method for teaching new to type trainees, but alas the not-invented-here syndrome ensured this easy unambiguous way of interpreting the 2 pointer instrument was never adopted.

S'not rocket science.

Tee Emm, this is a similar reason for your observations on the lack of pressn checks in the climb. The responsibility rests with the hallowed profession of TRE/TRI/LTC. Why are they not teaching the check and appropriately debriefing their candidates?

Last edited by BARKINGMAD; 20th Jul 2014 at 21:07. Reason: Added text.
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Old 20th Jul 2014, 22:41
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5,000' 2PSI, 10,000' 4PSI, FL180 6PSI...

This is not rocket science, and should be part of your scan after clean up and passing through altitude benchmarks.

Just the noise level change with the exhaust valve closing is part of the routine.
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Old 23rd Jul 2014, 12:44
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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Boeing IMHO made a fatal mistake some years back in changing the items on the original B737 after take off checklist. The original checklist first item was "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation......Set." Amplification was contained in the FCOM. It included checking the two pressurisation instruments of cabin altitude and cabin rate of climb.

Instead, Boeing changed that to: "Engine Bleeds....On and Packs.....Auto.
Flight International 15-21 July 2014 has just published extracts from a an Irish investigation into a Ryan Air 737-800 pressurisation problem where the aircraft was incorrectly configured for take off and which was missed by the crew conducting the after take off checklist. According to the FI article, the crew also missed subsequent checks of the pressurisation at 3000 ft and 10,000 ft and the oversight was not discovered until 18,000 ft. Inquiries by the Ireland Air Accidents Investigation Unit found that during the after start checklist, the captain responded "packs off" when the first officer called the after start checklist.

While the before start checklist requires the air conditioning packs to be off, the after start checklist demands a "Packs Auto." The first officer did not query the error. In response, Ryan Air has introduced a procedural change following the incident, requiring the PM to verbalise cabin pressure gauge readings rather than simply call "check" during the climb. The inquiry is recommending that this change be introduced by all carriers.

In the actual AAIU report there is a interesting comment concerning an obvious flat cockpit gradient. That presumably referred to the habit of the first officer addressing the captain as "Mate" on several occasions during the pressurisation problem and taking precipitate actions without apparently first coordinating with the captain

Talk about re-inventing the wheel. The check of the cabin pressurisation instruments was always part of the after take off checklist scan from the introduction of the first Boeing 737-100 in 1968 until Boeing saw fit to change it a few years ago. See Tee Emm's earlier comments at Post 30.

Last edited by Centaurus; 23rd Jul 2014 at 13:49.
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Old 23rd Jul 2014, 19:52
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At the rate of climb of the NG over that altitude increase, I'm surprised the trapped wind pressure and possible escape plus the popping of the eustacion tubes didn't alert these 2?

I'm not advocating flying by the seat of the pants but occasionally this can indicate a systems malfunction or mis-setting..........

I refer the readers to my previous posting, a practice which I attribute to the dead science of "airmanship/common sense", written out of the plot in recent amendments of the "How to fly it" series of manuals!!!
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