UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to the NTSB, The tower controller on duty reported seeing the aircraft's landing lights prior to the crash.
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: On the Beach
Posts: 3,336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Capn Bloggs:
That apparently died before 1995, when AAL 965 did a "Full Monty" magenta line CFIT at Cali, Colombia.
I do know when I came off years on the 727 to the 767 in late 1983, everyone seemed to be paying attention. But, I wasn't on the 767 more than a year or so when F/Os would exclaim to me, "It's amazing you still have your en route charts out and folded. No one does that these days."
In the 767, at least the early one, you could turn off all that FMS and moving map stuff, thus reverting to an electronic HSI. I would fly one trip a month in that mode. I guess they figured I was nuts for doing that. Especially so, when it was the F/O's turn on that trip he had to do it the same way.
Besides, the pilots of those early magenta days were seasoned hand-flyers/brain-users. It takes years before the skills of the old hands atrophy, whereas the Children of the Magenta never had them.
I do know when I came off years on the 727 to the 767 in late 1983, everyone seemed to be paying attention. But, I wasn't on the 767 more than a year or so when F/Os would exclaim to me, "It's amazing you still have your en route charts out and folded. No one does that these days."
In the 767, at least the early one, you could turn off all that FMS and moving map stuff, thus reverting to an electronic HSI. I would fly one trip a month in that mode. I guess they figured I was nuts for doing that. Especially so, when it was the F/O's turn on that trip he had to do it the same way.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm not picking on you in the singular or plural, sir. I'm just trying to make sure the terminology is understood and that the right argument is used for the right situation.
"Children Of The Magenta" may be an effective rallying cry, but the fact is that I've seen the video appear on pretty much every accident/incident thread over the last few years, regardless of how relevant it may be. I don't think there is a broad agenda of the kind that Capt. Bloggs describes, but I do think there's a growing gap in understanding between airline management and line pilots when it comes to effective understanding and use of automation.
To the MBA generation making up modern management, technology of any kind is simply a magic box which can be used to improve efficiency and increase revenue. The ironic coincidence is that the skillset that it takes to be a good technologist and the skillset it takes to be a competent pilot overlap considerably. I suspect that in the past when computing was still in the academic phase, a great number of my colleagues would have become pilots or aero engineers instead, had we been of that era and not this.
I guess the point I'm trying to make is that in a general sense I am actually on your (as in the pilots') side. The reason I'm always so picky about getting the terminology right is that should it come down to a public confrontation in court or in the press between pilots and management and a pilot representative mixes up - for example - FBW and envelope protection with automation, then the management representatives will have hired an expensive "expert" who will not be on your side to discredit them and paint them as alarmist.
"Children Of The Magenta" may be an effective rallying cry, but the fact is that I've seen the video appear on pretty much every accident/incident thread over the last few years, regardless of how relevant it may be. I don't think there is a broad agenda of the kind that Capt. Bloggs describes, but I do think there's a growing gap in understanding between airline management and line pilots when it comes to effective understanding and use of automation.
To the MBA generation making up modern management, technology of any kind is simply a magic box which can be used to improve efficiency and increase revenue. The ironic coincidence is that the skillset that it takes to be a good technologist and the skillset it takes to be a competent pilot overlap considerably. I suspect that in the past when computing was still in the academic phase, a great number of my colleagues would have become pilots or aero engineers instead, had we been of that era and not this.
I guess the point I'm trying to make is that in a general sense I am actually on your (as in the pilots') side. The reason I'm always so picky about getting the terminology right is that should it come down to a public confrontation in court or in the press between pilots and management and a pilot representative mixes up - for example - FBW and envelope protection with automation, then the management representatives will have hired an expensive "expert" who will not be on your side to discredit them and paint them as alarmist.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by DW
FBW systems are not automation
Just as, from the earliest FMCS, the need for a pilot to think about what he/she was doing with the buttons became an 'optional extra' (viz Cali). No need to workout optimum levels, speeds, route etc - it tells you, and when you are 'wrong' - and so it goes on. Don't misunderstand me - I loved what I had on the 737, but still 'thought' about what I was doing, and I fear this 'thinking' is one of the facets that will steadily inevitably be eroded as time goes on.
Dozy, PA;
The one point I'm making comes under the heading of "awareness". It has nothing to do with fbw, automation, computers, etc. Those are just the present tools, and BOAC has hit the nail squarely on the head.
This is almost philosophical, in the sense that we are examining how machines change cognition and can dull senses which heretofor were keen because they were necessary for survival. Cadets can be taught the mechanism, but unlike the Cartesian world in which mechanical thought interpreted the world quite successfully, "automation", if anything, is most certainly not "the MCDU" or the "FMC".
We can call that which is necessary for our (and everyone else's!) survival, SA, we can call it "mindfulness", we can call it just "paying attention", but the activity is cognitive not technical - the "mind of the machine" is us.
Mindfulness is done with comprehension, not in the way one watches a circus or television etc but in the way one "tends to" one's perceptions and responsive, moment-to-moment actions; one is "engaged" vice merely being a witness. There is a 'cognitive intention' in this which is very easily lost through inaction or inactivity - a lack of exercising one's duties to the airplane and therefore to one's passengers.
There is no blame here, in the sense that one cannot be "blamed" for driving a car the way we do today either - it's "how things are". What we relinquish rapidly becomes invisible as another technology imposes its "reality" upon our cognitive processes, pushing out old options, old psychological behaviours, old ways, removing the sense of value we attribute to such "old ways" in doing so.
We have ended up as automatons-by-default. We accepted definitions of ourselves and our work as given by others...by outsiders to our profession until we became what others wanted so as to legitimize reductions in crew complements, flying long-haul overseas with two crew members, (done it until we fought back) and believe the mythology that "automation saved fuel". Nobody has yet successfully explained to me how automation "saves fuel" over a good crew that know what they're doing and can fly and know energy. I think part of what's at stake here is just getting more airplanes into the same airspace as before, which is part of the reason hand-flying isn't done any more - it's illegal in RVSM airspace.
It has been said many times in the past 25 years, and by those generations previous to ours: The fatal accident rate must first become unacceptable before real altering of the present course of dumbing down the profession will occur. The rest are details.
The one point I'm making comes under the heading of "awareness". It has nothing to do with fbw, automation, computers, etc. Those are just the present tools, and BOAC has hit the nail squarely on the head.
This is almost philosophical, in the sense that we are examining how machines change cognition and can dull senses which heretofor were keen because they were necessary for survival. Cadets can be taught the mechanism, but unlike the Cartesian world in which mechanical thought interpreted the world quite successfully, "automation", if anything, is most certainly not "the MCDU" or the "FMC".
We can call that which is necessary for our (and everyone else's!) survival, SA, we can call it "mindfulness", we can call it just "paying attention", but the activity is cognitive not technical - the "mind of the machine" is us.
Mindfulness is done with comprehension, not in the way one watches a circus or television etc but in the way one "tends to" one's perceptions and responsive, moment-to-moment actions; one is "engaged" vice merely being a witness. There is a 'cognitive intention' in this which is very easily lost through inaction or inactivity - a lack of exercising one's duties to the airplane and therefore to one's passengers.
There is no blame here, in the sense that one cannot be "blamed" for driving a car the way we do today either - it's "how things are". What we relinquish rapidly becomes invisible as another technology imposes its "reality" upon our cognitive processes, pushing out old options, old psychological behaviours, old ways, removing the sense of value we attribute to such "old ways" in doing so.
We have ended up as automatons-by-default. We accepted definitions of ourselves and our work as given by others...by outsiders to our profession until we became what others wanted so as to legitimize reductions in crew complements, flying long-haul overseas with two crew members, (done it until we fought back) and believe the mythology that "automation saved fuel". Nobody has yet successfully explained to me how automation "saves fuel" over a good crew that know what they're doing and can fly and know energy. I think part of what's at stake here is just getting more airplanes into the same airspace as before, which is part of the reason hand-flying isn't done any more - it's illegal in RVSM airspace.
It has been said many times in the past 25 years, and by those generations previous to ours: The fatal accident rate must first become unacceptable before real altering of the present course of dumbing down the profession will occur. The rest are details.
Last edited by PJ2; 15th Sep 2013 at 15:32.
At the risk of opening up another debate, may I bring up the subject of simple DME/Altitude tables. This may have been mentioned before in this thread, in which case many apologies, equally, I realise the use of a DME/Altitude table may not be strictly relevant to the UPS accident.
However, I am amazed that some airlines still use the old 'Dive and Drive' technique on NPA approaches. The rather lengthy presentation below is well worth studying and, while it may not have prevented the UPS accident, the constant angle NPA approach technique deserves to become the standard:-
http://www.dibley.eu.com/documents/W...HM-14sep13.pdf
However, I am amazed that some airlines still use the old 'Dive and Drive' technique on NPA approaches. The rather lengthy presentation below is well worth studying and, while it may not have prevented the UPS accident, the constant angle NPA approach technique deserves to become the standard:-
http://www.dibley.eu.com/documents/W...HM-14sep13.pdf
Last edited by Bergerie1; 15th Sep 2013 at 08:10.
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Duality
Originally Posted by Bergerie1
simple DME/Altitude tables
Some points' altitudes are mandatory : IAF,IF,FAF,Radionav, MAP,...
Tables are mostly not mandatory.
Saying that a "simple DME/Altitudes table" is the solution, is a dangerous message to the pilot's or approach designer's mind.
AIR FRANCE had to add position of the FAF on all their approach charts after Jan 20.1990 crash LFST VOR-DME 05 (SAINTE ODILE) . They thought it was unuseful after they built the CDA approach with two derogations. They just denied the FAF! That derogative chart has been accepted by many organisations listed in the report.
The BEA was not able(/allowed?) to write a recommandation about necessity to place the FAF on the approach chart. But AIR FRANCE was too happy to don't be pointed by the BEA and modified their AF/ATLAS charts very quickly....
In most operational computing you have two different varieties of variables. These who put absolute limits are called "constraints", and their description "equations" are inequations. The simple Distance/altitude points are from the other variety.
Altitude/DME tables
I support the use of Altitude/DME tables; note the order, altitude before distance.
This simple reordering drives the safer mind-set; not ‘we are at dist xxx the alt should be yyy’ … woops, but that of “we must not be below alt yyy until dist xxx”. This is the proactive use of a checking tool.
A simple check of parameters based on alt is after the fact (opportunity for error), whereas applying the tool as a (self-imposed) limit ‘not below until’ - altitude first, provides time (opportunity) for the necessary action to avoid a hazardous situation.
Thus not “Some points' altitudes are mandatory”, but ‘all altitudes are mandatory’.
Altitude involves the hard bits – the ground, whereas distance is generally softer.
I agree that Alt/Dist tables do not provide a solution, they are a tool. The human provides the solution in the use of the tool with a suitable mind-set; an Altitude/Distance table helps to steer the mind.
This simple reordering drives the safer mind-set; not ‘we are at dist xxx the alt should be yyy’ … woops, but that of “we must not be below alt yyy until dist xxx”. This is the proactive use of a checking tool.
A simple check of parameters based on alt is after the fact (opportunity for error), whereas applying the tool as a (self-imposed) limit ‘not below until’ - altitude first, provides time (opportunity) for the necessary action to avoid a hazardous situation.
Thus not “Some points' altitudes are mandatory”, but ‘all altitudes are mandatory’.
Altitude involves the hard bits – the ground, whereas distance is generally softer.
I agree that Alt/Dist tables do not provide a solution, they are a tool. The human provides the solution in the use of the tool with a suitable mind-set; an Altitude/Distance table helps to steer the mind.
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Altitude-DME-Altitude Tables
You can always read DME-Altitude tables from Altitude first if you want, whatever the presentation - Jeppesen has the Distance above the Altitude.
The primary action is to have the information published in whatever form and crews trained to use it.
(US pilot friends were unaware of the tables at the bottom of many Jeppesen approach charts.)
The primary action is to have the information published in whatever form and crews trained to use it.
(US pilot friends were unaware of the tables at the bottom of many Jeppesen approach charts.)
Altitude above the Distance.
“You can always read DME-Altitude tables from Altitude first if you want, whatever the presentation…”
You can; … but my human factors guidance suggest that you won’t, particularly when there the workload might be high, you have been distracted, tired, we forget, we are lazy, etc, etc, …
Many years ago you could read altitude from an altimeter with a three needle presentation, but the industry learnt;
‘Jeppesen has the Distance above the Altitude’, is Jeppesen prepared to learn?
You can; … but my human factors guidance suggest that you won’t, particularly when there the workload might be high, you have been distracted, tired, we forget, we are lazy, etc, etc, …
Many years ago you could read altitude from an altimeter with a three needle presentation, but the industry learnt;
‘Jeppesen has the Distance above the Altitude’, is Jeppesen prepared to learn?
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: chicago
Posts: 359
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I've read this thread from page one.
So much information, so little wisdom.
Change things is the cry...old ways don't work.
Pilots screw up? Or are they lead down the garden path to disaster by charting and procedures and gadgets galore.
Well, why not do what we did with circling approaches for part 121 airliners...all have to be done in basic VFR/VMC.
Why not make all NON PRECISION approaches to(circling or straight in or modified straight in) 1000 feet and 3 miles visibility. (or more in special situations).
There, now we don't have to monkey with the gadgets and other things.
And the bean counters will have to say: hmmm...planes not getting in, we better invest in a precision approach at that airport.
So much information, so little wisdom.
Change things is the cry...old ways don't work.
Pilots screw up? Or are they lead down the garden path to disaster by charting and procedures and gadgets galore.
Well, why not do what we did with circling approaches for part 121 airliners...all have to be done in basic VFR/VMC.
Why not make all NON PRECISION approaches to(circling or straight in or modified straight in) 1000 feet and 3 miles visibility. (or more in special situations).
There, now we don't have to monkey with the gadgets and other things.
And the bean counters will have to say: hmmm...planes not getting in, we better invest in a precision approach at that airport.
flarepilot;
Re, "So much information, so little wisdom."
I disagree - there is a great deal of wisdom mixed with excellent information and discussion on MDA approaches here from people who clearly know what they're talking about,, (and on the MDA thread).
I disagree too, with making NPA visual approaches, (and I assume you include all RNAV / RNP approaches too?). There are better solutions, especially as discussed in the contributions referenced above.
There aren't "gadgets galore", there are aircraft-specific navigation installations which require training, SOPs and practise as well as good CRM work. What happened at Birmingham is not known here yet. The 30-day interim Report should be out any day now.
Re, "So much information, so little wisdom."
I disagree - there is a great deal of wisdom mixed with excellent information and discussion on MDA approaches here from people who clearly know what they're talking about,, (and on the MDA thread).
I disagree too, with making NPA visual approaches, (and I assume you include all RNAV / RNP approaches too?). There are better solutions, especially as discussed in the contributions referenced above.
There aren't "gadgets galore", there are aircraft-specific navigation installations which require training, SOPs and practise as well as good CRM work. What happened at Birmingham is not known here yet. The 30-day interim Report should be out any day now.
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: On the Beach
Posts: 3,336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A Squared:
Indeed, Mr. Sumwalt stated that.
Nonetheless, that is not a factual statement. Mr. Samwalt relayed to the media in his press conference what the controller claims he saw.
Fair enough for press relationships.
The switch positions are factual. I presume they were all documented faithfully since the cockpit did not burn.
According to the NTSB, The tower controller on duty reported seeing the aircraft's landing lights prior to the crash.
Nonetheless, that is not a factual statement. Mr. Samwalt relayed to the media in his press conference what the controller claims he saw.
Fair enough for press relationships.
The switch positions are factual. I presume they were all documented faithfully since the cockpit did not burn.
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: PA
Age: 59
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
for Tom, et al VEB,
Tom, interesting explanation. While the VEB is certainly a beginning, many of the variables are a bit less detailed, and really havent progressed, such as the FTE/ATIS assumptions. The attempts with the precipitous terrain algorithm were a disaster.
For most people. looking at the VEB calcs provides an understanding of the complexity of the obstacle surfaces used for the flight path.
I am just not sure how one can get to the RNP 0.003 you speak of, when there are assumptions in the variables, the different combinations of FMC equipment, and the variations associated with the surveyed location of the threshold.
EDIT: BTW, for those of you wondering about the PT algorithm (isnt everyone), this calculation assumes that as the aircraft radar is scanning forward at intervals, if the terrain suddenly rises, the aircraft believes there is an object above it, and tends to dive down instead of up. (this is actually left over from Vietnam, when the VC would fire as much ak-ak above the jet as they had, causing it to dive into terrain...my how the FMS has changed..???
)
Tom, interesting explanation. While the VEB is certainly a beginning, many of the variables are a bit less detailed, and really havent progressed, such as the FTE/ATIS assumptions. The attempts with the precipitous terrain algorithm were a disaster.
For most people. looking at the VEB calcs provides an understanding of the complexity of the obstacle surfaces used for the flight path.
I am just not sure how one can get to the RNP 0.003 you speak of, when there are assumptions in the variables, the different combinations of FMC equipment, and the variations associated with the surveyed location of the threshold.
EDIT: BTW, for those of you wondering about the PT algorithm (isnt everyone), this calculation assumes that as the aircraft radar is scanning forward at intervals, if the terrain suddenly rises, the aircraft believes there is an object above it, and tends to dive down instead of up. (this is actually left over from Vietnam, when the VC would fire as much ak-ak above the jet as they had, causing it to dive into terrain...my how the FMS has changed..???
)
Last edited by underfire; 16th Sep 2013 at 19:19.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Ormond Beach
Age: 49
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by flarepilot
I've read this thread from page one.
So much information, so little wisdom.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: Western USA
Posts: 555
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flarepilot
Taken in its entirety, there is some traditional, industry-logical wisdom in this post, but not everyone will realize it. Automation, algorithms, graphs and charts aren't the entire solution.
I've read this thread from page one.
So much information, so little wisdom.
Change things is the cry...old ways don't work.
Pilots screw up? Or are they lead down the garden path to disaster by charting and procedures and gadgets galore.
Well, why not do what we did with circling approaches for part 121 airliners...all have to be done in basic VFR/VMC.
Why not make all NON PRECISION approaches to(circling or straight in or modified straight in) 1000 feet and 3 miles visibility. (or more in special situations).
There, now we don't have to monkey with the gadgets and other things.
And the bean counters will have to say: hmmm...planes not getting in, we better invest in a precision approach at that airport.
So much information, so little wisdom.
Change things is the cry...old ways don't work.
Pilots screw up? Or are they lead down the garden path to disaster by charting and procedures and gadgets galore.
Well, why not do what we did with circling approaches for part 121 airliners...all have to be done in basic VFR/VMC.
Why not make all NON PRECISION approaches to(circling or straight in or modified straight in) 1000 feet and 3 miles visibility. (or more in special situations).
There, now we don't have to monkey with the gadgets and other things.
And the bean counters will have to say: hmmm...planes not getting in, we better invest in a precision approach at that airport.
Why not make all NON PRECISION approaches to(circling or straight in or modified straight in) 1000 feet and 3 miles visibility. (or more in special
situations).
situations).
1000/3 is VMC.
What are you getting at with this suggestion?
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, you are correct, technically 1000 and 3 is VFR conditions. Now, suppose that 1000 ft overcast is solid right up to 12,000 ft. How do you propose to descend to 1000 ft? Visually? or on instruments?