UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
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Was it safe at night?
Do you really think they would have crashed if they were doing the ILS approach to runway 23 ?
Sink rate ... Sink rate ... I see the runway.
All you "Real" pilots have your head in the sand if you don't think the approach design criteria had anything to do with this accident.
A non-precision black hole approach over rising terrain, yeah it's prefectly safe. Have we not learned anything over the last 50 years of commerical aviation ?
Bunch of dinosours. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precison approaches, it's going to hurt your "real" pilots ego's, but at least it will save lives. Get with the times Grampa's.
And spare me this wait for the NTSB report BS, hello this isn't the NTSB, it's a pilots rumour forum on the internet FFS, what do you expect ?
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I hope not.
, I meant 1200 ft AND/OR 1 mile ....Actually in my SR22 I should be able to land fine even being 250 ft above the profile. I am not bound by where I should touch down...
Actually, that's probably exactly what the FAA does, or similar, when designing it.
Bunch of dinosours. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precison approaches,
We will see how far you get...
Last edited by olasek; 17th Aug 2013 at 04:28.
Originally Posted by olasek
I know you like to play those word games , I meant 1200 ft AND/OR 1 mile ....
Originally Posted by JC
Bunch of dinosaurs. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precision approaches, it's going to hurt your "real" pilots ego's, but at least it will save lives. Get with the times Grampa's.
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Then start your crusade, and start in Canada, plenty of such approaches remain... We will see how far you get...
To criticise crews for trying to do the job with the tools they have is simplistic and won't achieve anything.
Last edited by -JC-; 17th Aug 2013 at 04:53.
JimField;
Thank you for your response.
I believe in civil exchanges above all, but courtesy does not excuse; - however the exchange may take place, the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, please.
On your other points regarding training, automation etc, these have been under intense discussion for many years here in particular on the ten or eleven AF447 threads. The points made are thoroughly understood and frankly something new to add to the dialogue would likely be welcome.
Regarding "treatment of a newbie", well, no one's special when the conversation is about flight safety - if an idea or a view isn't cutting it, like CRM, there should be no beating about the bush - for me it's about "what, not who", and if you have something to add which respects fellow aviators' experience while advancing an interesting notion you're likely to get a hearing.
My own view regarding Flightaware "data" is abundantly clear because I do flight data and nothing on the web cuts it. To use such sources for detailed analyses in advance of anything substantive from the usual sources indicates a particular naivete regarding flight data work and the notions it can accidently impose on those who may have deep interests in what happened but who cannot distinguish investigative techniques when not done well.
Nothing personal of course - but this is about safety work and about finding out things in ways that have worked successfully. It is not about being first off the blocks with notions of what happened and possibly embarrassing oneself with clearly indefensible statements about speeds for example, with sample rates and resolutions like Flightaware's. Nor is it about making allies for one's point of view. As you've noticed, it is not always a friendly place, but neither is aviation, particularly at times like these. Thick skin and restraint kinda works.
Respectfully,
PJ2
Thank you for your response.
I believe in civil exchanges above all, but courtesy does not excuse; - however the exchange may take place, the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, please.
On your other points regarding training, automation etc, these have been under intense discussion for many years here in particular on the ten or eleven AF447 threads. The points made are thoroughly understood and frankly something new to add to the dialogue would likely be welcome.
Regarding "treatment of a newbie", well, no one's special when the conversation is about flight safety - if an idea or a view isn't cutting it, like CRM, there should be no beating about the bush - for me it's about "what, not who", and if you have something to add which respects fellow aviators' experience while advancing an interesting notion you're likely to get a hearing.
My own view regarding Flightaware "data" is abundantly clear because I do flight data and nothing on the web cuts it. To use such sources for detailed analyses in advance of anything substantive from the usual sources indicates a particular naivete regarding flight data work and the notions it can accidently impose on those who may have deep interests in what happened but who cannot distinguish investigative techniques when not done well.
Nothing personal of course - but this is about safety work and about finding out things in ways that have worked successfully. It is not about being first off the blocks with notions of what happened and possibly embarrassing oneself with clearly indefensible statements about speeds for example, with sample rates and resolutions like Flightaware's. Nor is it about making allies for one's point of view. As you've noticed, it is not always a friendly place, but neither is aviation, particularly at times like these. Thick skin and restraint kinda works.
Respectfully,
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 17th Aug 2013 at 06:41.
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I was thinking the crew would probably shoot the RNAV (GPS) RWY 18 approach but they certainly were legal to do the LOC Rwy 18 (don't know why it's RWY on one plate and Rwy on the other).
There are rumours, I stress rumors, of significant prior crew training issues, if so, I'm sure this will come out in the NTSB report.
So far, looks like there was no mechanical problem with the aircraft, as also apparently was the case with Asiana 214.
I wonder if the NTSB will harvest the chitchat about the company, the union, howya feelin', I'm tired, ready to go to the hotel, etc. from the CVR? They got a lot of what would previously be considered 'non-pertinent conversation' from the BUF Colgan 3407 crash.
I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.
Last edited by RetiredF4; 17th Aug 2013 at 06:46.
You need to google "sock puppet" and learn what it means in the context of an online forum.
The first was when I was Googling the "Streisand Effect", another term with which I wasn't familiar but came across when I saw it used in the context of recent events involving a large Irish airline. And then here on this thread, where its use appears to be entirely appropriate in this instance.
the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, please
Sooeet did a new analysis for UPS 1354, including nice plots of position and airspeed
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Excerpts from the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual:
i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.
1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.
2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.
3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.
4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.
5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.
j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.
1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.
2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.
3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).
i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.
1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.
2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.
3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.
4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.
5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.
j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.
1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.
2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.
3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).
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JC:
The VGSI criteria are not part of the FAA's instrument procedures design criteria. They are contained in an FAA Airport Division's 1500 series advisory circular. I recalled from memory a 15 degree splay for the VGSI. That was an incorrect recollection. It is 10 degrees. I don't have the criteria at hand but the 10 degrees is from a 2004 article on the subject I wrote for Business and Commercial Aviation. I had the VGSI criteria in hand at that time.
If, and I emphasize if, the PAPI at hand were designed correctly, the Birmingham airport authority would have had a competent survey team survey all obstacles out to 4 miles to assure the 3.2 degree PAPI surface had not less than 1 degree of obstacle clearance.
Apparently the NTSB is now very interested in verifying such a survey.
In any cases my work involves assessing the IMC phase of instrument procedures, not VGSIs. The FAA has a big computer in OKC where the design work (prior to flight inspection) is done at a desk. As good as the obstacle data are, they are insufficient to design the final approach segment of approaches with vertical guidance "APVs (ILS, LPV, LNAV/VNAV, and RNP AR). On site surveys are usually required for APVs.
I have no doubt all the special RNP AR IAPs that exist in Canada today were most, if not all, subject to a rigorous survey for the final segment.
Sometime in the 1990s I wrote an article for IFR Refresher article, "What's Below DH or MDA." The FAA stance was worse then with respect to NPAs with straight-in MDAs than it is today. You can ferret out that article at www.terps.com if you care to.
That terrain I see on Google Earth rising to 844 feet asl is offset 5 degrees from the final approach course (measured from the center of the theshold).
If, and I emphasize if, the PAPI at hand were designed correctly, the Birmingham airport authority would have had a competent survey team survey all obstacles out to 4 miles to assure the 3.2 degree PAPI surface had not less than 1 degree of obstacle clearance.
Apparently the NTSB is now very interested in verifying such a survey.
In any cases my work involves assessing the IMC phase of instrument procedures, not VGSIs. The FAA has a big computer in OKC where the design work (prior to flight inspection) is done at a desk. As good as the obstacle data are, they are insufficient to design the final approach segment of approaches with vertical guidance "APVs (ILS, LPV, LNAV/VNAV, and RNP AR). On site surveys are usually required for APVs.
I have no doubt all the special RNP AR IAPs that exist in Canada today were most, if not all, subject to a rigorous survey for the final segment.
Sometime in the 1990s I wrote an article for IFR Refresher article, "What's Below DH or MDA." The FAA stance was worse then with respect to NPAs with straight-in MDAs than it is today. You can ferret out that article at www.terps.com if you care to.
Last edited by aterpster; 17th Aug 2013 at 07:54.
Excerpts from the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual:
i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.
1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.
2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.
3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.
4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.
5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.
j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.
1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.
2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.
3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).
i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.
1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.
2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.
3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.
4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.
5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.
j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.
1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.
2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.
3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 17th Aug 2013 at 07:59.
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the CVR reveals "low altitude" warning, not specific about what callout was heard
See 3:09 here: Member Robert Sumwalt holds third press briefing on UPS flight 1354 crash in Birmingham, Alabama - YouTube
Last edited by Airbubba; 17th Aug 2013 at 14:22.
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The approach was over a heavily wooded area, possibility of bird strikes in the engines causing the engine spluttering heard. Speculation but add it to the chain of probables please.
PJ2
I was so very pleased to see your recent posts. I know nothing about Flightaware data and analysis but I do know quite a lot about FDR analysis in a major airline. We used to study the traces each month to provide useful operational feedback to our pilots, to modify SOPs and improve training programmes as required, etc.
You are so right to draw people's attention to the need to study genuine FDR data rather than the speculative attempts being made by too many amateurs from imprecise information.
The NTSB will, in due time, publish their findings based on the most reliable FACTS - not idle speculation. There are several professionals on this website who, based on their expertise, do their best to provide sound opinions. To a certain extent these are valuable but until facts are available they are only opinions.
In another post someone said too many people want instant results. In my experience, it is only after extensive analysis by the right experts that useful information emerges.
May I urge all those who want to know what really happened to await the published information from the NTSB.
I was so very pleased to see your recent posts. I know nothing about Flightaware data and analysis but I do know quite a lot about FDR analysis in a major airline. We used to study the traces each month to provide useful operational feedback to our pilots, to modify SOPs and improve training programmes as required, etc.
You are so right to draw people's attention to the need to study genuine FDR data rather than the speculative attempts being made by too many amateurs from imprecise information.
The NTSB will, in due time, publish their findings based on the most reliable FACTS - not idle speculation. There are several professionals on this website who, based on their expertise, do their best to provide sound opinions. To a certain extent these are valuable but until facts are available they are only opinions.
In another post someone said too many people want instant results. In my experience, it is only after extensive analysis by the right experts that useful information emerges.
May I urge all those who want to know what really happened to await the published information from the NTSB.
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From FAA Flight Inspection Manual:
SECTION 1. VISUAL GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR (VGSI)
7.10 INTRODUCTION. The Visual Glide Slope Indicators (VGSI) are ground devices that use lights to define a vertical approach path during the final approach to a runway. The visual signal must consist of not less than two and not more than four colors. Allowable colors are red, amber, green, or white. Color sectors must be distinct and identifiable throughout the horizontal beam width at all intensity settings. Only red is used to indicate the lowest below-path sector of the system.
The final approach area for VGSI(s) is 10° either side of the runway centerline extended, measured from the forward most bar or light extending from the threshold outward to a point a normal glidepath can commence from the en route or procedural altitude. VGSI(s) are aligned to provide a glidepath not less than 1.0° above obstacles 10° either side of the runway centerline to a distance specified for the system, usually 4 miles. Lateral guidance is obtained by reference to either visual cues or electronic aids.
Threshold crossing height (TCH) is the height of the lowest on-path signal at the threshold. The minimum TCH is determined by the most critical aircraft that normally operates on the runway. The TCH of VGSI(s) will normally be 25 to 75 ft. Specific TCH criteria for each type system is located in FAA Order 6850.2, Visual Guidance Lighting Systems.
Box Identification. The U.S. practice, as found in FAA Order 6850.5, Maintenance of Lighted Navigational Aids, is that individual VASI or PAPI light boxes are numbered starting at (1), with the box nearest the runway on each side and working outboard. ICAO Annex 14 and Aerodrome Design Manual reverse this, and number or letter the boxes starting with (1) or (A) at the outermost box and working toward the runway.
There are several different types of VGSI(s). The primary systems covered in this chapter are visual approach slope indicators (VASI), precision approach path indicators (PAPI), pulsating visual approach slope indicators (PVASI), T-VASI, three-color VASI, and helicopter approach path indicator (HAPI). Each of these systems presents a different type of visual indication to the pilot and requires different in-flight interpretation.
Last edited by aterpster; 17th Aug 2013 at 08:28.
aterpster
Further to my comments above, may I thank you for your good background information. This type of factual information educates and informs, and is a very valuable contribution to the debate.
Further to my comments above, may I thank you for your good background information. This type of factual information educates and informs, and is a very valuable contribution to the debate.
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So, I am a low time/high wing pilot myself...But spend a pretty fair amount of time in heavy iron cockpit jumpseats for Day Job. Actually have a, "I learned about CFIT from that" story when I was once in the jumpseat of a tired DC-9 with an even more tired crew dealing with a last minute change to BHM RWY 1 (that was how long ago this was...its since been redesignated to 36/18) night arrival, due to a pranged check runner Aerostar on the long runway that I can share....
Also flew light GA aircraft into BHM back then too and routinely landed on the north south runway. The terrain was actually alot more scary back then on that north end.
Anyway...Just for historical perspective, in the late '80s the high terrain on the north end of the north south runway, and the east end of what was then 7/25 was considered unsafe and an impediment to growth at the airport. Indeed 1/19 didnt even have an instrument approach from the north as I remember. So the city bought the property where the crash site is and also on the east side of the field and scraped off a massive amount of both hills. Took a number of years to complete the project. This allowed extensions to be added to both runways and an approach from the north to be implemented (and I also think enough obstacle clearance for a CATII to the east as well if memory serves correctly).
The area where the crash site is was actually some of the earliest settled part of the city and was dotted with houses. There was one house that was dismantled which turned out to be an extension of one of the earliest built dwellings in the community, and which had been added onto and absorbed in a larger structure. So, the speculation that the houses were built on the north side after the airport was is incorrect.
As for my CFIT experience, it was the ridgeline of Red Mountain on the south side of town that nearly got us in that DC-9 into some twisted knickers (this was not too long after the AAL crash in Cali BTW).
And I'll tell yah...Don't ever think it can't happen to you.
Also flew light GA aircraft into BHM back then too and routinely landed on the north south runway. The terrain was actually alot more scary back then on that north end.
Anyway...Just for historical perspective, in the late '80s the high terrain on the north end of the north south runway, and the east end of what was then 7/25 was considered unsafe and an impediment to growth at the airport. Indeed 1/19 didnt even have an instrument approach from the north as I remember. So the city bought the property where the crash site is and also on the east side of the field and scraped off a massive amount of both hills. Took a number of years to complete the project. This allowed extensions to be added to both runways and an approach from the north to be implemented (and I also think enough obstacle clearance for a CATII to the east as well if memory serves correctly).
The area where the crash site is was actually some of the earliest settled part of the city and was dotted with houses. There was one house that was dismantled which turned out to be an extension of one of the earliest built dwellings in the community, and which had been added onto and absorbed in a larger structure. So, the speculation that the houses were built on the north side after the airport was is incorrect.
As for my CFIT experience, it was the ridgeline of Red Mountain on the south side of town that nearly got us in that DC-9 into some twisted knickers (this was not too long after the AAL crash in Cali BTW).
And I'll tell yah...Don't ever think it can't happen to you.
Last edited by sidishus; 17th Aug 2013 at 09:35.
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Retired F4
I don't think that is what was meant.
NPA approaches are 'safe' but an RNAV RNP AR approach to RNP 0.1 is safer that is why when flying them you have lower limits.
This is going to be a repeated argument. There were comments that the crash at SFO would not have happened if there had been a serviceable ILS or the crew had carried out an RNAV RNP APV and that perhaps visual approaches were less safe. These comments were immediately followed by the: "whaddya mean unsafe?!! - we do visual approaches from slam dunks all the time to that runway" comments.
So the question is a simple one. Why, with aircraft that are capable of flying RNP LPV approaches to RNP 0.1, are pilots and operators still using NPA that are less safe? Not only less safe by calculation but also, unfortunately, demonstrably less safe by accidents.
The argument that "I can do it so those {think of an epithet} other pilots should be able to as well or they should not be flying" does not impress the relatives of the dead SLF or people on the ground. Especially, when safer approach procedures are available.
NPAs, fully visual approaches, asymmetric and flapless landings etc etc., should all be practiced but perhaps they should be seen as what they are - less safe alternates to the approaches that the aircraft systems are capable of and only used in exception.
This highlights a change in operations from ground aid supported to GNSS and internal aid supported. It is no longer necessary to have an expensive FAA (or *AA) certified landing system for each runway, just approved RNAV RNP AR procedures. So small regional airports could have the same Cat III capability as hubs. This raises all the questions on deskilling pilots and therefore is seen as a threat and a safety risk in its own right.
Non-Precision Approaches are accepted as safe enough for normal operations, Nevertheless, it is unarguable that Non Precision Approaches are less safe than Precision Approaches with vertical guidance. The aircraft are capable of RNAV RNP LPV all that is needed is approved procedures.
This is not a technical question any more. Stand in front of an audience of family members of dead flight crew and SLF, and tell them why a less safe procedure was 'good enough'.
This is not an easy debate, but it should not be avoided.
Quote:
I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.
Retired F4
"Now wait a second, are you now saying, that NPA approaches are unsafe?"
I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.
Retired F4
"Now wait a second, are you now saying, that NPA approaches are unsafe?"
NPA approaches are 'safe' but an RNAV RNP AR approach to RNP 0.1 is safer that is why when flying them you have lower limits.
This is going to be a repeated argument. There were comments that the crash at SFO would not have happened if there had been a serviceable ILS or the crew had carried out an RNAV RNP APV and that perhaps visual approaches were less safe. These comments were immediately followed by the: "whaddya mean unsafe?!! - we do visual approaches from slam dunks all the time to that runway" comments.
So the question is a simple one. Why, with aircraft that are capable of flying RNP LPV approaches to RNP 0.1, are pilots and operators still using NPA that are less safe? Not only less safe by calculation but also, unfortunately, demonstrably less safe by accidents.
The argument that "I can do it so those {think of an epithet} other pilots should be able to as well or they should not be flying" does not impress the relatives of the dead SLF or people on the ground. Especially, when safer approach procedures are available.
NPAs, fully visual approaches, asymmetric and flapless landings etc etc., should all be practiced but perhaps they should be seen as what they are - less safe alternates to the approaches that the aircraft systems are capable of and only used in exception.
This highlights a change in operations from ground aid supported to GNSS and internal aid supported. It is no longer necessary to have an expensive FAA (or *AA) certified landing system for each runway, just approved RNAV RNP AR procedures. So small regional airports could have the same Cat III capability as hubs. This raises all the questions on deskilling pilots and therefore is seen as a threat and a safety risk in its own right.
Non-Precision Approaches are accepted as safe enough for normal operations, Nevertheless, it is unarguable that Non Precision Approaches are less safe than Precision Approaches with vertical guidance. The aircraft are capable of RNAV RNP LPV all that is needed is approved procedures.
This is not a technical question any more. Stand in front of an audience of family members of dead flight crew and SLF, and tell them why a less safe procedure was 'good enough'.
This is not an easy debate, but it should not be avoided.
Last edited by Ian W; 17th Aug 2013 at 10:04.
Ian W,
Some good points there but:
- Does the A300-600 have the gear to be RNP-AR (or indeed LPV or LNAV/VNAV) capable;
- Why doesn't KBHM 18 have a glideslope? I suspect cost or terrain (which was collided-with) prohibits (could also preclude an RNP-AR approach).
- RNP LNAV works well when the aircraft can use the FMS database-coded approach slope/VNAV (even if just following it with VS/FPA or handflying), but aircraft must be capable.
Some good points there but:
- Does the A300-600 have the gear to be RNP-AR (or indeed LPV or LNAV/VNAV) capable;
- Why doesn't KBHM 18 have a glideslope? I suspect cost or terrain (which was collided-with) prohibits (could also preclude an RNP-AR approach).
- RNP LNAV works well when the aircraft can use the FMS database-coded approach slope/VNAV (even if just following it with VS/FPA or handflying), but aircraft must be capable.