Flight Directors - a sometimes fatal attraction

[BizJetJock]

Absolutely - but pilots who are not completely on top of the automatics and comfortable using them where appropriate are also not real pilots.

It is not either/or - it is both.

[main_dog]

Absolutely - but pilots who are not completely on top of the automatics and comfortable using them where appropriate are also not real pilots.

This is undoubtedly true, and is the reason why modern training emphasises such aspects as careful FMA monitoring and both crewmembers checking FMS programming.

However, recently as an industry we seem to be losing airplanes not because of automation mismanagement, but rather because when the automation "gives up the ghost" (and sooner or later it always does), guys seem to have forgotten how to actually fly the airplane.

The point of the thread -I think- is that there are very few (if any) pilots uncomfortable using automation nowadays, but try switching off A/P F/D A/T and watch the sweat start to roll... we have definitely gone too far in one direction.

[bubbers44]

MD I agree. All of us should have no problem taking over if automation fails. If you can't you aren't capable of being PIC. Automation can fail at any time and we need a real pilot to take care of things.

[Escape Path]

What an interesting scenario: Me reading carefully through all of this nurturing thread and appreciating the comments and lessons for where the time comes for me to fly a glass cockpit aircraft and in the mean time, flying a Twin Otter without any kind of automation whatsoever!

Funny stuff...

[BizJetJock]

My point was that I see all the time, both training and on line, people who only need to revert to "old fashioned" flying because they have screwed up the selections - there is nothing wrong with the automatics. They are increasing their own and the rest of the crew's workload unnecessarily. And then they often blame the system saying "it failed" when it is working as advertised.

I agree entirely with needing to be completely proficient on hand flying as well for the rare occasions where it does fail, or in the corporate environment the commoner situation where you need to fly a profile that the AP/FD system cannot cope with.

As I said, it is both, not either/or.

[bubbers44]

AF447 pilots didn't screw up the automation, the automation failed. Can't you see that? They were left with an aircraft with no automation and neither one could fly it manually. Everybody died because nobody could hand fly in the cockpit. It was an easy fix for anybody that could hand fly, they couldn't. Make our pilots really know how to fly the airplane before letting them fly if automation doesn't work. It is quite simple.

[bubbers44]

EP, I know you could have flown AF447 with no problem, it doesn't fly much different than a Twin Otter, just higher, never let them lose your flying skills, I didn't. Old twin beach 18 and Boeing 737 guy talking from experience.

[bubbers44]

Ended up in the B757 and 767 however with the same way of flying. Always flew a while when things were not busy flying wet compass and emergency standby instruments to make sure I hadn't lost the skill to fly without the magic s*it. We all should if we want to be considered real pilots. You don't have to stare at the magenta line if you don't want to.

[RAT 5]

Years ago, nice severe clear days, only a/c in the sky, lovely quiet Canary islands airport, visual circuit to an ILS, long runway, perfect for the practice: once I'd convinced the apprentice that a programmed LNAV circuit was not necessary, but rather use Mk.1 eyeball, there was the question of "how will I know when to turn in?" "suck it and see, same as a cherokee." Nicely on profile on base leg and on speed I informed the apprentice that the ILS had failed and it would be a pilot guided/controlled final approach. As the FD's were not locked onto anything they should be switched off. Shock horror. Some enjoyed it, others made complaints to CP. I was told not to do training on line flights without a full briefing.
Those who shouted 'shock horror' were the same ones who always chose the bumpy weather arrivals because it would be 'sportive'. They were also the ones who flew their sportive approach to 300' on autopilot and then disconnected to 'save the day' at the last minute. The culture of the pilot corps will be created from the top. Sadly there are some questionable influences at the top.

[A37575]

there is nothing wrong with the automatics. They are increasing their own and the rest of the crew's workload unnecessarily. And then they often blame the system saying "it failed" when it is working as advertised.

Not being proficient in manual flying because you don't need to with all the you beaut automatic goodies, reminds me of the bloke that says you will drown if you can't swim. So, rather than teach you how to swim I will teach you how not to go near the water...

[BizJetJock]

No, read the post properly.

This is not an AF447 thread; it is about whether the FD can cause people to lose sight of what they should be scanning.

I am saying that you need to be able to fly the aircraft manually, but also be able to use the automatics properly when it's appropriate. You don't get any prizes for showing what a superhero you are by flying manually when the only reason the automatics tripped off is because of your own incompetence.

[PJ2]

Originally Posted by BizJetJock

This is not an AF447 thread; it is about whether the FD can cause people to lose sight of what they should be scanning.

I certainly concur with your observations in re "it's about both, not either." Despite this entirely rational and reasonable approach to aviation, at some point after all the licenses are obtained and one is working in commercial aviation, airline managements, airline pilot associations and, despite recent actions even the regulators are not ensuring that pilots know how to fly an airplane and are testing knowledge of auto flight systems. The one or two manual handling exercises appear more to be concessions to history than actual meaningful exercises in maintaining physical and cognitive skills required to fly an aircraft well and with deep-down comprehension / anticipation of what one is actually doing.

In fact, in recently speaking with those doing the training and checking work at a major air carrier I am informed that "just flying the airplane" is receding even further back into history as a new generation of pilots who were raised on keyboards and touchscreens and who know little or nothing else about aeronautics rely entirely upon auto flight systems for the basics.

In one sense the BEA made flight directors about AF 447 by positing the notion that the PF slavishly followed their pitch commands, (in my view: the PF did this rather than maintaining cockpit discipline and training by following SOPs, and keeping the PNF in the loop).

The point regarding FDs extends to other accidents as is illustrated below, and I think is relevant to the thread:

From a TSBC Report, (Loss of Control on Go-around):

2.3.4.2 Flight Director Guidance
The aircraft operating philosophy stressing that the flight director commands must be followed for proper flight control is valid for most anticipated flight conditions. Notwithstanding, not all commanded pitch attitudes are achievable or safe. In particular, following the command bars in go-around mode does not ensure that a safe flying speed will be maintained because, unlike in the windshear guidance mode, the positioning of the command bars does not take into consideration the airspeed, flap configuration, and the rate of change of the AOA—all factors to consider in achieving an adequate stall margin. The high level of concentration required during a go-around and the limited time available may limit a pilot’s ability to recognize and react to indications from other instruments. In this case, rotating the aircraft toward the command bars was a priority task for the first officer, and the level of concentration required to get the aircraft pitch to match the command bars probably affected his ability to adequately monitor the airspeed. The command bars, by directing the pilot to pitch the aircraft to 10 degrees nose-up without taking into account stall margin factors, probably contributed to the onset of the stall.