Originally Posted by BizJetJock
This is not an AF447 thread; it is about whether the FD can cause people to lose sight of what they should be scanning.
I certainly concur with your observations in re "it's about both, not either." Despite this entirely rational and reasonable approach to aviation, at some point after all the licenses are obtained and one is working in commercial aviation, airline managements, airline pilot associations and, despite recent actions even the regulators are not ensuring that pilots know how to fly an airplane and are testing knowledge of auto flight systems. The one or two manual handling exercises appear more to be concessions to history than actual meaningful exercises in maintaining physical and cognitive skills required to fly an aircraft well and with deep-down comprehension / anticipation of what one is actually doing.
In fact, in recently speaking with those doing the training and checking work at a major air carrier I am informed that "just flying the airplane" is receding even further back into history as a new generation of pilots who were raised on keyboards and touchscreens and who know little or nothing else about aeronautics rely entirely upon auto flight systems for the basics.
In one sense the BEA made
flight directors about AF 447 by positing the notion that the PF slavishly followed their pitch commands, (
in my view: the PF did this rather than maintaining cockpit discipline and training by following SOPs, and keeping the PNF in the loop).
The point regarding FDs extends to other accidents as is illustrated below, and I think is relevant to the thread:
From a TSBC Report, (
Loss of Control on Go-around):
2.3.4.2 Flight Director Guidance
The aircraft operating philosophy stressing that the flight director commands must be followed for proper flight control is valid for most anticipated flight conditions. Notwithstanding, not all commanded pitch attitudes are achievable or safe. In particular, following the command bars in go-around mode does not ensure that a safe flying speed will be maintained because, unlike in the windshear guidance mode, the positioning of the command bars does not take into consideration the airspeed, flap configuration, and the rate of change of the AOA—all factors to consider in achieving an adequate stall margin. The high level of concentration required during a go-around and the limited time available may limit a pilot’s ability to recognize and react to indications from other instruments. In this case, rotating the aircraft toward the command bars was a priority task for the first officer, and the level of concentration required to get the aircraft pitch to match the command bars probably affected his ability to adequately monitor the airspeed. The command bars, by directing the pilot to pitch the aircraft to 10 degrees nose-up without taking into account stall margin factors, probably contributed to the onset of the stall.