Here is Part B
Emirates Airlines is also adapting its approach to training in the light of recent events and is aiming at the highest standards, a point well made by Captain Martin Mahoney, SVP Flight Training at Emirates. To that end, the carrier has introduced a 'basic aerodynamics' course to refresh new entrants about the fundamentals of flight. Intriguingly, it has also reversed the trend for distance learning in favour of a return to 'chalk and blackboard' classroom learning.
Why? Captain Mahoney contends that not only do pilots learn better by being in the presence of other pilots (as well as reinforcing the pilot culture - an important factor in multicultural airline like Emirates) - but also in that the instructor can watch the students' eyes to see if the lessons have really understood. . In addition, Emirates is also boosting its pilots' skills with two manual handling simulator sessions every year for new commanders.
The airline has also introduced personality profiles for command upgrade candidates which are pilot's eyes only (management does not see them) and which provides potential captains with individual, practical feedback on their leadership style as well as strengths and weaknesses. However, Captain Mahoney had harsh words for ICAO's Level 4 English standards - arguing that they are "not worth the paper they are written on". In fact, he revealed that recent simulator tests of pilots from an unnamed defunct European charter carrier saw a 50% failure rate due to their English not being up to the standard needed by Emirates
Though the flightdeck is regarded as the gold standard for CRM (crew resource management), there maybe lessons from the medical sector, especially from surgeons, who have a similar high-skilled job with large responsibilities and operate in teams.
Indeed, Professor Rhona Flin, an industrial psychology expert at the University of Aberdeen observed that that in order to access and fully exploit the 'working memory' (analytical, which experts now believe can hold up to four 'chunks' at the same time), it may be a case of the 'slower the better'. She noted that one surgeon had once been given advice "Don't just do something, stand there", indicating that slowing down rather than rushing into action may contribute to better decision making in medical operations.
Though this may not be possible in some circumstances (Captain Sullenberger's Hudson ditching and the BA 777 Heathrow landing short of the runway needing fast reactions), taking a step back from the flashing displays and warnings may actually improve critical thinking. Was it perhaps due to the extra critical thinking time brought to the QF32 incident by five experienced captains that resolved the problem successfully?
Conversely, when thinking time is limited decision-making relies on long-term memory containing models of the world that we use, together with procedures and experience. These might be characterised by 'the gut feeling' or 'we've always done it this way'. This may work in some instances but, in more novel or unexpected situations, may make pilots (or surgeons) make the wrong choices or continue down an incorrect path - even when it is obvious in hindsight that the decision was the wrong one.
That aircraft (and crews) are now safer than ever is not in doubt and the statistics bear this out. However, the aviation industry is always striving for perfection. Furthermore, there is a growing unease that the previous ways of learning (and command) need adapting to new and future generations of automated aircraft. Ex-military pilots with 'nerves of steel', experience of flying at the edges of the envelope yet unwilling to talk to juniors have given way to systems managers and team players. However, these new pilots, fluent in the latest crew management skills, may also be lacking some basic 'stick and rudder' skills and be too willing to trust the computer.
The highly automated aircraft also provides fresh challenges. The issue is not the technology itself but the gulf between normal and non-normal (i.e. emergency) operations. In normal operations a highly automated airliner is easier to fly than previous generations of aircraft but, in a non-normal situation, it is comparatively harder.
It is this gulf between normal and non- normal which is the issue and is so difficult to train for because of the extreme rarity of non-normal emergencies. As one speaker pointed out, in the old days he had flown as a third pilot observing the crew routine and watching them deal with multiple engine failures as part of his apprenticeship to command. Today, a trainee captain riding a jump seat as an observer would be extremely unlikely to witness an in-flight emergency to 'learn' from the more experienced crews.
In short, some forward-thinking airlines are already adapting their approach to training and command issues in making sure that the aircraft commander of the future has the correct mix of technical and non-technical skills and, more importantly, knows when to ignore, question or override the computers. As Captain David Evans observes, the commander must: "work out
the solutions with the help of technology, not depend on technology for the solution".