Industry best practice during abnormals
Thread Starter
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Kyalami
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Industry best practice during abnormals
'Best practice' as a term in the airline industry is asking everyone how wonderful they think their company / aircraft SOPs are.
Of course each airline does 'it' the best possible way, for a myriad of reasons ranging from when the Fleet Training Captain screwed something up and decided to change a procedure to when the Manufacturer In Question decides that an aspect requires revision for technical / engineering / safety / legal reasons.
My question concerns Effective Monitoring.
After mega hours on the line and a multitude of hours in the A346 sim doing the instructional thing, I have observed many variations of mashing up procedures while attempting to handle both simple and highly complex procedures.
The airline I work for prescribes the following (and of course it is the best method....
): btw PM = pilot monitoring - we don't use the term PNF.
Ping!
PF - I have control (verifies the blue side is still up and whats engaged)
Both pilots read ECAM
PF- Identify
PM- Hydraulics: Yellow system low pressure
PF- Verify
PM- (looking at SD page) Yellow system low pressure (looking at overhead panel) Yellow system engine-driven pump inop
Now - this is the point of my post:
Captain now becomes PF (if not already so), to allow the FO to action the ECAM and / or QRH as required. This allows the higher authority unit to challenge the lower one if the wrong switch is about to be used.
Capt: (now PF): I have control and the radio, ECAM actions.
Once "ECAM actions complete" signal the end of this phase, the Captain then becomes PM, with the normal handover of control. Now the fearless leader can assess, with all available resources what's what, while the FO flies and handles the radio.
Obviously, this ritual doesn't happen for a Level One warning, and appropriate behavior is exercised throughout.
I know of a few airlines that expect the Captain to handle AND action the QRH (Boeing) or ECAM ('bus) while the FO flies. Is that effective monitoring? Will the FO challenge the incorrect switch / checklist / etc if he notices such a mistake? How does this assist Risk Management?
A well publicised study in the US from 1985 to 1995 revealed that 84% of approach accidents happened while the the Capt was PF. That, to me says it all about effective monitoring by the little 'ol FO.
What says your (perfect!) airline?
Of course each airline does 'it' the best possible way, for a myriad of reasons ranging from when the Fleet Training Captain screwed something up and decided to change a procedure to when the Manufacturer In Question decides that an aspect requires revision for technical / engineering / safety / legal reasons.
My question concerns Effective Monitoring.
After mega hours on the line and a multitude of hours in the A346 sim doing the instructional thing, I have observed many variations of mashing up procedures while attempting to handle both simple and highly complex procedures.
The airline I work for prescribes the following (and of course it is the best method....
): btw PM = pilot monitoring - we don't use the term PNF.Ping!
PF - I have control (verifies the blue side is still up and whats engaged)
Both pilots read ECAM
PF- Identify
PM- Hydraulics: Yellow system low pressure
PF- Verify
PM- (looking at SD page) Yellow system low pressure (looking at overhead panel) Yellow system engine-driven pump inop
Now - this is the point of my post:
Captain now becomes PF (if not already so), to allow the FO to action the ECAM and / or QRH as required. This allows the higher authority unit to challenge the lower one if the wrong switch is about to be used.
Capt: (now PF): I have control and the radio, ECAM actions.
Once "ECAM actions complete" signal the end of this phase, the Captain then becomes PM, with the normal handover of control. Now the fearless leader can assess, with all available resources what's what, while the FO flies and handles the radio.
Obviously, this ritual doesn't happen for a Level One warning, and appropriate behavior is exercised throughout.
I know of a few airlines that expect the Captain to handle AND action the QRH (Boeing) or ECAM ('bus) while the FO flies. Is that effective monitoring? Will the FO challenge the incorrect switch / checklist / etc if he notices such a mistake? How does this assist Risk Management?
A well publicised study in the US from 1985 to 1995 revealed that 84% of approach accidents happened while the the Capt was PF. That, to me says it all about effective monitoring by the little 'ol FO.
What says your (perfect!) airline?
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 329
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All that role flip-flopping sounds like a recipe for confusion but I suppose you get used to your airline's way of doing it. What does Airbus say?
My airline follows the manufacturer's guidelines (Boeing in my case) i.e. either pilot announces the problem, PF handles, takes radio and initiates QRH actions etc. PM carries out QRH actions/troubleshooting/monitoring etc. This happens regardless of who is PF (Captain or FO) when it goes south. Seems to work fine. Obviously the situation may dictate that there should be (or the captain may prefer) a role reversal at some point.
I think suggesting that an FO wouldn't challenge/warn the captain if he was about to run the incorrect checklist or activate the wrong switch/button is being unfair to FOs (at least in the company and area of the world I work) - in any decent airline with a good training department, cockpit gradient and CRM are pretty optimised I would humbly suggest.
We're always learning though - our last recurrent CRM course was all about effective monitoring as it's an area that, as you suggest, is sometimes identified by audits as having scope for improvement.
My airline follows the manufacturer's guidelines (Boeing in my case) i.e. either pilot announces the problem, PF handles, takes radio and initiates QRH actions etc. PM carries out QRH actions/troubleshooting/monitoring etc. This happens regardless of who is PF (Captain or FO) when it goes south. Seems to work fine. Obviously the situation may dictate that there should be (or the captain may prefer) a role reversal at some point.
I think suggesting that an FO wouldn't challenge/warn the captain if he was about to run the incorrect checklist or activate the wrong switch/button is being unfair to FOs (at least in the company and area of the world I work) - in any decent airline with a good training department, cockpit gradient and CRM are pretty optimised I would humbly suggest.
We're always learning though - our last recurrent CRM course was all about effective monitoring as it's an area that, as you suggest, is sometimes identified by audits as having scope for improvement.
There are five-odd roles on the flight deck:
It is the Captain's job to assign those roles according to the requirements of the time. The jobs are not of equal workload, and increase and decrease in workload as time and situation demands.
You can always tell a Captain failing the task assignment portion of "CRM" in the sim when you see one person working their ring off, while the other sits staring out of the window. (This normally happens as the abnormal checklist is completed (that task suddenly becomes smaller) and the Captain fails to re-assign the task load, so the other person is flying AND programming the box AND working the radio AND trying to brief ...)
Now I have no problem with pre defining some role assignments, it helps to have an idea - but prescribing roles is a bad idea - all situations are different. Sometimes you are flying with a well experienced good flyer but new to type (so not so solid on the mechanicals), sometimes you are flying with a cadet just off rating, so not so hot on handling, but brand new solid mechanical knowledge etc etc.
- Pilot handling controls
- Pilot preparing/briefing approach charts/nav radios etc
- Person manipulating the navigation systems (the old Navigator's job)
- Person running the mechanical system switches (the old flight engineer's job)
- Person working the radios (the old radio officer's job)
It is the Captain's job to assign those roles according to the requirements of the time. The jobs are not of equal workload, and increase and decrease in workload as time and situation demands.
You can always tell a Captain failing the task assignment portion of "CRM" in the sim when you see one person working their ring off, while the other sits staring out of the window. (This normally happens as the abnormal checklist is completed (that task suddenly becomes smaller) and the Captain fails to re-assign the task load, so the other person is flying AND programming the box AND working the radio AND trying to brief ...)
Now I have no problem with pre defining some role assignments, it helps to have an idea - but prescribing roles is a bad idea - all situations are different. Sometimes you are flying with a well experienced good flyer but new to type (so not so solid on the mechanicals), sometimes you are flying with a cadet just off rating, so not so hot on handling, but brand new solid mechanical knowledge etc etc.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Kyalami
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As stated in my first post - appropriate behavior. The process is a guideline to ensure risk management is part of the process.
To re-state my question: How many airlines require the Captain to monitor the processes during abnormals as opposed to actioning them?
Our principle is the same as the monitored approach, which has some merit without doubt..
To re-state my question: How many airlines require the Captain to monitor the processes during abnormals as opposed to actioning them?
Our principle is the same as the monitored approach, which has some merit without doubt..
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: United States of Europe
Age: 40
Posts: 502
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You must be working for an English airline?
It all sounds a bit complicated to me. Why don´t you just follow manufacturer procedures? I understand that effective monitoring is a good idea, but there are other ways.
Every situation is different and workload management and (re)assigning tasks is one of those things the capt gets paid for.
Just my 2 cents.
It all sounds a bit complicated to me. Why don´t you just follow manufacturer procedures? I understand that effective monitoring is a good idea, but there are other ways.
Every situation is different and workload management and (re)assigning tasks is one of those things the capt gets paid for.
Just my 2 cents.
Join Date: Jun 1999
Location: Australasia
Posts: 362
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OEMs - False Gods?
OPEN DES,
Manufacturers build aircraft. They test them and develop generic procedures, predominantly based on the personal whims and pecadillos of those folks employed at that time in the Operations Department, and on the presumption that "one size fits all".
Operators live with the reality of their operating environment and their crew demographics. They have to manage the day to day risks.
The reason everyone treats the OEM as the operational God is that they are the most obvious target to sue - most regulators and operators choose not to stick their heads up into the line of fire. But I guess Airbus' "it cannot be stalled" and "you do not have to learn about that in our aircraft" are little sermons that they wish they hadn't shoved down everyone's throat. And I wonder what the operators who blindly followed them will offer as a defence to the apparent failure to conduct due diligence, etc...
Stay Alive,
PS Alternate Law: I think it is well structured and offers a good risk management platform
- provided it does not become a rigidity in its own right! 
Manufacturers build aircraft. They test them and develop generic procedures, predominantly based on the personal whims and pecadillos of those folks employed at that time in the Operations Department, and on the presumption that "one size fits all".
Operators live with the reality of their operating environment and their crew demographics. They have to manage the day to day risks.
The reason everyone treats the OEM as the operational God is that they are the most obvious target to sue - most regulators and operators choose not to stick their heads up into the line of fire. But I guess Airbus' "it cannot be stalled" and "you do not have to learn about that in our aircraft" are little sermons that they wish they hadn't shoved down everyone's throat. And I wonder what the operators who blindly followed them will offer as a defence to the apparent failure to conduct due diligence, etc...
Stay Alive,
PS Alternate Law: I think it is well structured and offers a good risk management platform
- provided it does not become a rigidity in its own right!
Thread Starter
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Kyalami
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks all for responses.
B&S - yes the role changing can be an issue. I have spent entire Vsim sessions with 'new' crew (ex-744) just rehearsing the pantomime. Then in the heat of the moment, both guys try to reply to a radio call as we forget who has what.
I did my original 340 transition in Toulouse - much simpler but as 4dogs said, they have a fairly shallow and pre-conceived idea about line operations and the reality of FBW aircraft.
Being a 'legacy' airline, we have P1s of 20 to 40 years service, and P2s of five to 15 years service - so cockpit gradient is hugely variable and this type of SOP guideline is to stop the 'old bullets' doing their any-old thing, and getting the young co-jo's to pay attention.
Monitoring throughout all phases of flight is an issue that can improve throughout the operation - and I'm sure not just ours. Analysing the complete lack of effective input from the PM (and then the P1) during the AF447 debacle gives one the chills.
So far, I take it, most airlines follow what the airframers suggest.
When things are not standard, SOPs no longer by definition apply, then Non-Normal Ops do - which is what is outlined in post 1. One size does not fit all, but guidance for when it completely falls apart needs an anchor point.
B&S - yes the role changing can be an issue. I have spent entire Vsim sessions with 'new' crew (ex-744) just rehearsing the pantomime. Then in the heat of the moment, both guys try to reply to a radio call as we forget who has what.
I did my original 340 transition in Toulouse - much simpler but as 4dogs said, they have a fairly shallow and pre-conceived idea about line operations and the reality of FBW aircraft.
Being a 'legacy' airline, we have P1s of 20 to 40 years service, and P2s of five to 15 years service - so cockpit gradient is hugely variable and this type of SOP guideline is to stop the 'old bullets' doing their any-old thing, and getting the young co-jo's to pay attention.
Monitoring throughout all phases of flight is an issue that can improve throughout the operation - and I'm sure not just ours. Analysing the complete lack of effective input from the PM (and then the P1) during the AF447 debacle gives one the chills.
So far, I take it, most airlines follow what the airframers suggest.
When things are not standard, SOPs no longer by definition apply, then Non-Normal Ops do - which is what is outlined in post 1. One size does not fit all, but guidance for when it completely falls apart needs an anchor point.
